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This project asks why changing norms of statehood in the early twentieth century 
produced extraordinary violence, and locates the answer in the way a variety of actors 
across the British Empire—colonial and Dominion governments, nationalist movements, 
and clients or partners of colonial regimes—leveraged the problem of imperial defense to 
serve their own political goals. It explores how this process increasingly bound ideas 
about sovereignty to the question of security and provoked militarizing tendencies across 
the British world in the early twentieth century, especially among liberal governments in 
Britain and the colonies, which were nominally opposed to militarism and costly military 
spending. Security provided a framework in which the matters of imperial defense and 
strategy could be translated into an expedient language of danger and safety, risk and 
reward, order and disorder. It legitimized colonial state-building projects and helped 
control populations; it propelled the renegotiation of relationships between those colonial 
states. Security suffused the British world’s racial identities and hierarchies with yet more 
hopes and fears, and yoked these to the centralization and growth of states and 
institutions. The project employs sources and methodologies that link history to debates 
about sovereignty and state-building in political theory and international relations, about 
identity and anxiety in the production of literature, and about federalism and subsidiarity 
in constitutional law. Beginning with the outbreak of the South African War, the first 
chapters cover the haphazard coordination of imperial forces in that conflict, and how it 
shaped movements for constitutional federation in Australia and New Zealand. Next, the 
project explores how the Government of India under George Curzon attempted to manage 
its military clients in the Indian Princely States, and how Indian princes understood and 
performed their sovereignty by providing troops to serve in the Indian Army. It then 
compares these arguments about sovereignty in India to highly similar ones about 
military subsidies from British Dominions to the Royal Navy, and the irony of self-
governing Dominions converging with Indian modes of rule. The third chapter discusses 
colonial reactions to the Anglo-German naval crisis in 1909 and how colonial 
governments leveraged the Empire’s security crisis to argue that, through their 
contributions to imperial defense, they had transcended colonial status and become 
“Dominions.” Next, the project discusses the breakdown of systematic schemes for 
defense and political cooperation in the British Empire in the years leading up to World 
War I, and how they reflected the tensions inherent in the empire’s emerging norms of 
sovereignty. Central to this chapter is the struggles of Wilfrid Laurier’s government in 
Canada and between nationalist and unionist factions in Ireland to manage the 
militarization unleashed by the securitizing logic that had taken hold in the British  
Empire and, increasingly, the British metropole. The final chapter explores the issue of 
conscription during World War I, and how it personalized the problems of security and 
  
sovereignty for millions of British subjects by forcing them to apprehend the reality that 
states could take possession of their physical selves for service in war. This chapter draws 
extensively on personal recollections of the war years by Irish men and women who gave 
“witness statements” to the Republic of Ireland’s Bureau of Military History during the 
1940s and 50s about their experience of the years 1912-1922, including World War I, 
conscription, the Anglo-Irish War, and the creation of the Irish Free State. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
    The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
    Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
    Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
    The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
    The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
    The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
    Are full of passionate intensity. 
 
    Surely some revelation is at hand; 
    Surely the Second Coming is at hand. 
    The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out 
    When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi 
    Troubles my sight: a waste of desert sand; 
    A shape with lion body and the head of a man, 
    A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun, 
    Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it 
    Wind shadows of the indignant desert birds. 
 
    The darkness drops again but now I know 
    That twenty centuries of stony sleep 
    Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle, 
    And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, 
    Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born? 
 
-William Butler Yeats – The Second Coming (1919) 
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0.1 INTRODUCTION 
Albert Venn Dicey published the first edition of his seminal Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution in 1885.1 It ran for eight editions during his lifetime, 
each prefaced by Dicey with a brief update of constitutional happenings since the last. In 
the preface to the 1915 final edition, Dicey reflected on all that had passed since he 
delivered his first lecture as Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford in 1882. “This 
introduction…is in the main a work of historical retrospection,” he wrote, “It is 
impossible, however…to prevent a writer's survey of the past from exhibiting or 
betraying his anticipations of the future.” Dicey could not have known the true magnitude 
of global death and ruin that awaited in 1914. Instead, he focused his professional 
analysis on two more specific portents of doom. First, he predicted, the recent revocation 
of the House of Lords’ historic right to veto legislation would fundamentally alter the 
nature of parliamentary sovereignty. Secondly, in his words, “the Imperial Parliament 
may, if not in theory yet in fact, have ceased as a rule to exercise supreme legislative 
power in certain countries subject to the authority of the King.”2 Even worse, Dicey 
argued, Britain and its colonies could no longer afford to hold one another in benign 
neglect that might have assuaged the problem. “Imperialism,” he explained, had become 
received wisdom, because it offered a priceless gift to imperial subjects: it foreclosed on 
                                                        
1 Dicey’s work has been so influential, including among other things popularizing the phrase “rule of law” 
and articulating the function of Parliamentary sovereignty, that his writings are considered part of the UK’s 
unwritten constitution. See a recent exploration of Dicey’s impact by Lord Bingham: Tom Bingham, The 
Rule of Law, Reprint edition (London: Penguin Global, 2011). 
2 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (orig. 1915) 8 ed. (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Classics, 1982), 21. Dicey refers in the first instance to the Parliament Act 1911, which replaced the 
Lords’ legislative veto powers with a limited delaying mechanism.  
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the possibility of war between them, in their millions, and (through their combined 
strength), ruled out war against foreign powers too.3 This boon obliged Britain and its 
colonies to consider one another’s mutual interests going forward, and made crisis-
management an Empire-wide imperative. “The war in South Africa,” Dicey remembered 
more than a decade on from the conflict, “was in reality a war waged not only by 
England, but also by the Dominions to prevent secession.”4 No longer peripheral 
inconveniences, wars like the one in South Africa had become existential struggles to 
preserve the unity of the Empire and the crucial security cordon it provided. Dicey thus 
described a grim dilemma: imperialism had simultaneously turned the British constitution 
into a bulwark holding back all assailants, and yet was weakening that bulwark from 
within. The British constitution had become like iron: strong but brittle. 
 Arthur Berriedale Keith was Dicey’s Scottish contemporary and counterpart, a 
lecturer in Sanskrit and constitutional law at the University of Edinburgh. Keith, a 
prolific writer with broad expertise, wrote extensively on the constitutional confusions 
created by the expansion of British imperialism. Whereas the wizened Oxonian Dicey 
mostly confined himself to study of the white-settled Dominions, Keith took a keen 
interest also in India, and later in 1919 would be appointed to a special committee formed 
to consider the implementation of responsible government there.5 He also shared Dicey’s 
sense of foreboding. Keith wrote in his 1909 Responsible Government in the Dominions 
that those who expected a linear progression across the Empire from dependency to 
                                                        
3 Ibid., 29. 
4 Ibid., 30. 
5 See: Papers Presented to Parliament at the Command of His Majesty (hereafter Cd.) 207, 1919, “Great 
Britain. India Office. Committee on Home Administration of Indian Affairs. East India (Home 
Administration),” UK Parliamentary Papers, Chadwyck Online. 
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democracy were simply mistaken.6 Where there were “large and increasing white 
population[s]” this might be the case, but in “small islands or tropical colonies where 
there is a relatively large native population,” it was unlikely.7 Keith’s offered two reasons 
for this discrepancy: some colonies, such as Bermuda, served as imperial fortresses, and 
their strategic value could not be risked to the whims of democracy, while in the others 
the Imperial Government had to act in trusteeship for the native population, in other 
words, to prevent migrant whites from running roughshod over indigenous peoples.8 
India, for Keith and for most others, did not easily fit any of these categories. It was all of 
them and none – a fortress containing the world’s largest professional army, a repository 
of its own legal tradition of considerable antiquity,9 a composite of native aristocratic and 
foreign colonial regimes,10 and an uneasy if surprisingly durable balancing act between a 
small, white ruling bureaucracy and a large non-white population. While India did not 
experience the British Empire’s crisis of security and sovereignty in the same way as the 
self-governing colonies, its strategic importance gave it a central role in the same drama. 
                                                        
6 More specifically, from Crown Colony (rule by a local Governor responsible only to Crown and Colonial 
Office, e.g. in Fiji) to full responsible government (rule by a local, democratically-accountable legislature, 
e.g. in Canada). 
7 Arthur Berriedale Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions (London: Stephen and Sons, 1909), 
3. 
8 The prevalence of the “trustee” mentality within the Colonial Office points also to the critical fact that 
metropolitan colonial policy often had much to do with constraining British clients or settlers. This topic 
has been studied extensively in the literature; two of the most important works are Stephen Constantine, 
The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940, 1st ed. (Routledge, 1984); Ronald Hyam, 
Understanding the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 7, “Bureaucracy 
and Trusteeship in the Colonial Empire.” 
9 Keith fell in with an established tradition of British orientalists like William Jones who sought to unlock 
the essence, as it were, of Indian legal and political heritage through the rigorous study of Indian, especially 
Sanskrit, texts. Their legacy has been critiqued by Edward Said and others. 
10 For a recent investigation of the composite nature of British colonialism in India in the Company period, 
see Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the 
British Empire in India (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2011). 
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 The crises Dicey and Keith portended were the crises of the global twentieth 
century: imperial decline, self-determination, and the politics of identity; violence and 
global war. World order changed drastically in the first half of the twentieth century. This 
project tries to explain why it happened so rapidly, and why it appeared so strongly 
within the British Empire, for shifts in world order emerged strongly in colonial 
environments. In 1905, the colony of New Zealand had a local militia of a few thousand, 
no blue-water navy, no office of foreign affairs, and no distinct identity among 
international observers; its ships and soldiers existed abroad, officially, as British. Its 
government could not prevent its interests from being bargained away by British 
diplomats in deals with Germany, the United States, and Japan. Its courts could have their 
decisions overturned via appeals to the British Privy Council. A little over a decade later, 
the same New Zealand funded the construction of one of the world’s most advanced 
warships, deployed troops under its own flag in four continents simultaneously, passed 
laws conscripting its young men for service in a foreign war, independently signed the 
most momentous international treaty in world history to date, and received authorization 
from the League of Nations to rule German Samoa as its own Protectorate. This story and 
others explored here shows how the rapid changes of the twentieth century were driven 
by unlikely actors. They were not Great Powers but insurgent ones. Their epicenter was 
not in Europe, but Asia and the greater Pacific. These reworkings and redistributions of 
sovereignty were not simply conceded by European powers as they collapsed, for the 
British Empire emerged from the war nominally stronger and larger than ever. Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa actively pursued these concessions, and similar 
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processes unfolded in Ireland and India. They did this by leveraging the problem of 
imperial defense to legitimize their goals.   
 A second puzzle about the militarization of the British Empire is that it mostly 
occurred under the auspices of liberalism and at the hands of liberal governments. 
Militarism demanded high public spending, to which British liberals were usually averse, 
threatened the civil liberties cherished by liberals for much of the preceding century, and 
distracted from the plans of contemporary liberals to build social welfare provisions into 
the repertoires of their states. This puzzle can be explained in two ways. First, unleashing 
the logic of security meant that some militarizing measures would have to be taken in 
spite of liberal impulses – H.H. Asquith’s British government would certainly have 
preferred to build fewer dreadnoughts, for example. Secondly, however, militarization 
and the conflation of security and sovereignty occurred under liberal oversight because it 
helped satisfy liberal impulses to create communities of equality and social contracts that 
could produce political order. Building military machinery and agreeing to use it to serve 
imperial goals served as a test for whether colonies were ready to become responsible 
members of the imperial community, and colonies’ joint trust in maintaining imperial 
security allowed them to construct themselves as partners, allies, and increasingly as 
equals to Britain. This satisfied liberal cravings to flatten social hierarchy, and yet 
constructed new hierarchies in its place – namely, ones that privileged conformity to the 
examples and norms shaped by European colonial powers which built powerful states and 
used them to create security and order at home, and then to project power abroad. 
The picture of crisis Keith and Dicey painted had already taken shape before 
1914, and would not reach its logical conclusion until 1931, when the Statute of 
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Westminster revoked Britain’s right to legislate for colonial governments, and placed all 
of the Empire’s responsible governments on legally equal footing under the Crown. 
While often read also as a consequence of the First World War, the Statute merely 
confirmed in law what had already become true in practice – the imperial center no 
longer held in matters of security. The colonies (and their military capabilities) evolved 
haltingly, as did their abilities to influence and react to imperial norms and policies. The 
first significant international conflict in which most British colonies were forced to 
confront their obligations (and functional abilities) to participate was not World War I, 
but the South African War fifteen years earlier. The strains on the British constitution 
itself also crescendoed well before the war; Dicey’s beloved House of Lords had been 
handcuffed in 1910 mainly because of its recalcitrance in the matter of Irish sovereignty. 
The pre-World War I era’s most interesting civil-military debate occurred not in Britain 
but India, between its Viceroy George Curzon and his proposed Commander-in-Chief, 
General Herbert Kitchener, and engulfed Indian nationalists and colonial bureaucrats 
alike.11 The rapid evolution of colonial military capabilities and diplomatic autonomy is a 
puzzle unto itself: from 1898-1900, Britain fought wars in China and southern Africa that 
substantively used colonial resources and soldiers, in many cases informally because 
colonial governments lacked established systems for authorizing military force. By the 
1922 Chanak Crisis, Canada, Australia, and other colonies, because of their strategic 
indispensability to imperial security goals, effectively vetoed British military intervention 
in the newly-created Republic of Turkey. This story will begin at the turn of the twentieth 
                                                        
11 See Chapter 2. Curzon thought Kitchener’s bid to collapse the functions of India’s top military post and 
its top civilian defense office into a single post was a barbarous and militarist affront to the civil-military 
norms of the British constitutional tradition.  
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century, when events like the South African War, the federation of Australia, and the 
debate over Indian and Irish reform stimulated fresh interest in questions of security and 
sovereignty. It will end with the Statute and its immediate impact. 
A.V. Dicey noted towards the end of his introduction, as Keith had, how the 
previous century’s debates on the future of the Empire tended to assume two possible 
futures: a series of American-style separations or a wholesale imperial centralization into 
a single, federal state. In their place emerged a new synthesis; each colony would remain 
connected to the imperial community, but to the greatest extent possible be “Master of its 
own house.” Dicey attributed the happy emergence of this new synthesis to “the political 
instinct of our race.”12 Indeed, Anglo-Saxon settlers were a key ingredient in his recipe 
for institutional success; even Ireland was not safe for concessions in his view. Any 
attempt to explain the development of colonial institutions and states in this period must 
contend with the fact that most of the Empire’s inhabitants viewed the world through 
racialized phenomenologies.13 Some recent scholarship has explored the way this 
affected the making of modern states, as institutionalized racism.14 The political rhetoric 
of security – in which colonial states used the language of dangers, risks, safety, and 
opportunity to persuade their subjects to back militarizing schemes – readily co-opted 
racial imagery and helped these incipient states map out population groups as threats to, 
                                                        
12 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 29. 
13 See D.A. Washbrook, “Orients and Occidents: Colonial Discourse Theory and the Historiography of the 
British Empire,” in Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume V: Historiography, ed. Robin W Winks, 
vol. 5, 5 vols., The Oxford History of the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 596–
611. 
14 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); David Theo 
Goldberg, The Racial State (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2002). 
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or defenders of, order. Securitizing logic used race to help define the borders of states – 
inside, it confronted the threat of uprisings and the need to build harmonious social order; 
outside, it faced the menace of foreign invasion or infiltration, and the imperative to 
project power and build order regionally, even globally. In this way, the security logic 
deployed by political elites to speak to their subjects encouraged the latter to embrace 
militarization, and to think racially about the way they mapped the boundaries of the state 
and the world. Exploring how race influenced ideas about security and sovereignty in this 
project will help place the extensive research on the role of race in colonialism in 
conversation with new work on race and the state.15 
Scholars, especially those interested in military and strategic questions, have been 
tempted to explain the rapid changes in world order during this period as consequences of 
the First World War. This interpretation, while tidy and befitting of the war’s impact, is 
too convenient. As Dicey and Keith observed before the war broke out, the Westminster 
Parliament had already lost its priest-like role as mediator and conduit of the sovereign 
power of the Crown to its subjects in all parts of the Empire. In place of that magisterium 
prevailed an eclectic and perhaps appropriately Anglican settlement – Westminster 
remained predominant, but colonial actors increasingly asserted their autonomy – the 
gyre, as Yeats would write in 1919, widened.16 In fact, one of the war’s causes can be 
                                                        
15 Australia has proved a fruitful case for exploring this theme; see also Goldberg, The Racial State; Eric 
Richards, “Migrations: The Career of British White Australia,” in Australia’s Empire, ed. Stuart Ward and 
D.M. Schreuder, The Oxford History of the British Empire Companion Series (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008); Luke Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, 
Conflict, and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century, Studies in Australian History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), chap. 13, “Federating in a White World.” 
16 Yeats’ “gyre” – a spiral, growing ever wider, struggling to maintain its shape as the motion that made it 
larger slowly tore it apart – was sufficiently abstract (and occult) to be useful in this context. The Second 
Coming reflected on the ruin of both physical and metaphysical order in the aftermath of World War I. For 
Yeats it seemed to herald the dawn of a new age, and begged the question of what messianic figure would 
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read as the failure by other world empires to effectively manage similar crises of 
sovereignty to the one Britain faced. British colonies played an important role in 
reshaping international order in the early twentieth century, and offer a glimpse at the 
metamorphosis from subordinate colony to sovereign state. But this story of transition 
might also be told about the successor states of World War I’s myriad crumbled empires, 
from Turkey to Czechoslovakia. The British world’s peculiar influence lay in the fact 
that, as the world’s fading hegemon, Britain’s efforts to work through the dilemmas of 
sovereignty acted as an incubator for ideas about international- and even world-
government. This was in no small part due to the fact that Britain had managed to survive 
the war relatively intact, and had done so by successfully leveraging its empire as a 
military asset. 
 
 
 
0.2 BACKGROUND – CRISES OF SOVEREIGNTY 
“Sovereignty” is an abstract concept. It refers to authority, and its exercise within 
the context of states. Describing its usage in the British world is rendered more difficult 
by the fact that Britain lacks a formal, written constitution that carefully describes the 
parameters of state power. Instead, it consists of an informal system of precedent and 
                                                        
arise, as Christ had in the previous, to dominate it. Unfortunately, the latter question falls outside the scope 
of this project. 
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practice, and relies on occasional figures like Dicey to make observations about it. In rare 
instances, like Dicey’s and especially William Blackstone’s, those observations attract 
sufficient consensus to become part of Britain’s constitutional ecosystem itself. In short, 
sovereignty’s precise meaning and usage in the British Empire has changed over time. Its 
most common usage has been reference to the person of the monarch. The King or Queen 
was, qua Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan – “The Sovereign” - the physical embodiment of 
rightful authority, and of the state. Though some have argued (notably, Hobbes in 1651) 
that sovereignty ought to be absolute; a binary condition of authority that either existed or 
did not, in practice sovereignty has always functioned as a mediation between coercion 
and consent. England's 1688 Glorious Revolution made this mediation a matter of 
formality: the Crown was no longer the absolute Sovereign; instead, the Crown-in-
Parliament represented the source of sovereignty for the English state (which would 
further augment itself through the 1707 and 1800 Acts of Union with Scotland and 
Ireland, respectively). “Crown-in-Parliament” reflected the reality that the absolute 
sovereignty of the monarch was mediated by the consent of his subjects, the latter 
expressed via representation in Parliament. 
The explosive expansion of Britain's empire created a host of new puzzles. Each 
new colonial venture produced a new context in which the sovereignty of the British 
monarchy - imperial power - would be mediated, negotiated, and contested. The 
integration of other legislative assemblies into the imperial system, such as Ireland's and 
those of the American colonies, introduced a new concept, “Parliamentary Sovereignty,” 
which described the superiority of the Westminster Parliament to the others in the 
Empire, and gave it the legislative prerogative to supersede their acts. This authority, too, 
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was mediated, for as Edmund Burke argued in defense of rebellious Americans, authority 
was a matter not of theory but of things, and Parliament could not expect to govern in 
Massachusetts as absolutely as it did in Middlesex.17 The Empire also mediated 
sovereignty through non-democratic institutions. In India, after the end of Company rule, 
the Viceroy stood as the representative of the British Sovereign just as Governors did in 
self-governing colonies, but the Raj constructed itself as an aristocratic regime that ruled 
Indians with direct authority.18 It also recognized subsidiary rulers, the native aristocrats 
of the Princely States who enjoyed sovereignty within their own territories, which led to 
the restyling of Victoria as “Empress” rather than simply “Queen” in 1877. The main 
official distinction here involved the constitutional concept of responsibility – 
“responsible governments” in the British Empire were responsible to local assemblies 
(with the consent of their Governors as Crown representatives); other colonial 
governments were responsible to the Crown (or its Governors) alone, hence their 
designation as “Crown Colonies.” 
Sovereignty, then, was a capacious concept that referred both to formal 
constitutional relationships between different parts of the British Empire, and more 
abstractly to the growth of the authority and powers of colonial states. British subjects 
talked about sovereignty fairly often, even when they did not mention it by name. They 
also invoked it directly in extraordinary moments, which will be highlighted in this 
project. Some colonial liberals invoked sovereignty in arguments against military 
                                                        
17 Burke, Conciliation with America, vol. III (ed. 1808), 56-57. in Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution, 24–25. 
18 A useful exploration of the way the Raj constructed its sovereignty in India as a kind of translatio imperii 
from the East India Company and the Mughal Empire is Sudipta Sen, Distant Soveriegnty: National 
Imperialism and the Origins of British India (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
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spending, asserting (speciously) that only sovereign states needed navies and armies, not 
their humble colonies – Henry Bournes Higgins of Australia and Wilfrid Laurier of 
Canada both deployed this argument.19 Maori invoked sovereignty (and its contested 
Maori translation, mana) in their debates over the Treaty of Waitangi, which regulated 
their relations with Pākehā New Zealanders, and also in the way they under stood their 
loyalty and military service to the British Crown.20 Politicians and the press in multiple 
British colonies invoked sovereignty in their rejection of naval and military subsidies to 
Britain, which they felt eroded the sovereignty of their incipient states.21 Finally, 
nationalists used sovereignty extensively to describe their opposition to British rule, 
especially in Ireland, and often linked these arguments to their opposition to military 
conscription during the First World War.22 The idea of sovereignty is useful here, even 
when it is not invoked directly, because it captures the exercise of state power in both 
democratic and undemocratic cases, unlike terms such as “self-government,” and can also 
describe de facto as well as de jure exercises of power. Focusing on how sovereignty 
changed over time thus allows this project to measure two things: the way colonial states 
changed relative to each other (such as in the creation of Dominion status, a new 
constitutional category for some colonies), and the way they changed absolutely (such as 
in the growth of their own powers to tax and coerce populations). Colonial subjects and 
colonial governments fixated on security in the early twentieth century because it allowed 
                                                        
19 Higgins’ remarks are discussed in Chapter 1, and Laurier’s in Chapter 3, below. 
20 Mana, sovereignty, and the Maori are discussed in Chapter 2 below. 
21 The subsidy problem is discussed in Chapter 2 below. 
22 Conscription and Irish nationalism are discussed in Chapter 5 below. 
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them to alter the balance between coercion and consent through which authority was 
produced. 
If A.V. Dicey and A.B. Keith were firsthand observers of the British Empire’s 
crisis of sovereignty at the turn of the twentieth century, the seeds of that crisis had been 
germinating for at least a century. Recent work on sovereignty has tended to revolve 
around the issue of territoriality, or the imposition of authority within given borders.23 
From its inception, the Empire faced related dilemmas over how to defend the nominal 
extent of its territory. Failure to settle this question of security begat crises of sovereignty. 
The first bitter fruits of this problem had been the American Revolution, itself a result of 
the unsettled Seven Years’ War and the fiscal-military mess that conflict made of North 
America. George III and his government in Great Britain thought his governments in the 
American colonies should be funding the imperial security apparatus that protected them 
more robustly. The American colonists, discomfited by imperial troops in their 
communities and chagrined by the tax rates needed to sustain them, saw tyranny in the 
Crown’s mismanagement of its security responsibilities.24 In the aftermath of the 
revolution, the Empire was forced to consolidate in North America and rebalance around 
                                                        
23 Some have argued that territoriality obscures more than it reveals. An excellent overview on competing 
theories of sovereignty and recent scholarship is available in Lauren A. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: 
Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400--1900 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 279–283; Cf. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 
(Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell, 1990); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
24 A book that usefully explores how British politics made sense of the American Revolution as a crisis of 
sovereignty is Eliga H Gould, The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the 
American Revolution, Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Gould has more recently returned to this topic to explore how 
the American state repackaged some of the same themes and sought to enhance its sovereignty via 
diplomatic recognition in Eliga H. Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and 
the Making of a New World Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
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its presently more profitable colonies in Asia.25 The problem remained: where coercion 
and consent were out of balance, crises of sovereignty ensued, and self-government only 
exacerbated them. Carl Schmitt, the German jurist whose works on sovereignty 
influenced the rise of Nazism, argued that sovereignty proceeded from the “state of 
exception,” or the ability to impose emergency conditions regardless of their nominal 
legality.26 In short, this refers to raw coercive power without mediation. Colonial 
governments used the language of security to legitimize these coercive demonstrations.27 
Financial extraction, another key measure of state power, has been intimately linked to 
security imperatives; it has been argued that the nexus between them propelled the 
emergence of centralized, modern states.28 The quest for sovereignty, moreover, always 
involved internal and external negotiation – colonial claimants of sovereignty needed to 
convince both themselves and their interlocutors of their credentials. 
Another crisis of sovereignty emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and 
fundamentally altered the constitutional and ideological realities of British rule in the 
world.29 The 1857 Rebellion in India prompted a reconstruction of British rule in Asia, 
                                                        
25 Some helpful recent works on this pivotal moment are Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: The Loss of 
America and the Remaking of the British Empire (London: Harper Press, 2011); P. J. Marshall, The Making 
and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America, c.1750-1783 (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
26 Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship (Wiley, 2015). 
27 The legal scholar James Whitman has argued for the capacity to wage war as a key determinant of state 
sovereignty. See James Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern 
War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
28 The growth of the “fiscal-military state” is usefully explored in an important book by John Brewer. John 
Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (New York: Knopf, 1989). 
29 A recent book by Antony Anghie has argued for the “de-centering” of ideas of sovereignty that are 
essentially Western and imperialistic, arguing that these have mainly been tools of colonial rule. This 
project advances a parallel if not equivalent objective to uncover the ways actors outside imperial centers 
both appropriated and challenged the forms of sovereignty produced therein. A. Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative 
Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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namely, the demise of the Company-state form of government and its replacement by the 
formal institutional structure of the British Raj. 1857 began with a sepoy mutiny in the 
Indian Army and ended with the final collapse of the Mughal dynasty that had continued 
to rule, at least in name, alongside the East India Company. In its aftermath, both the 
Army and the manifestation of royal power in India had to be reconstituted – a new 
balance between coercion and consent had to be struck. This was accomplished in 
ensuing decades by reform and selective-recruiting of “loyal” regions of India for the 
Army, and by creating a new royal honor system that incorporated India’s native 
aristocracies under the aegis of the British Crown, with Victoria as Empress.30 This new 
settlement was highly symbolic and hinged on military power – the Army dominated the 
business of the Government of India in fiscal, infrastructural, and strategic terms, and 
sovereignty on the subcontinent was constituted through participation in its defense 
against foreign assailants.31 India serves as one example of how colonial governments 
tried to use militarism to mediate their sovereignty, and how security logic could 
                                                        
30 A useful dialog about this system is Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of 
Tradition, Past and Present Publications (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chap. 5 Bernard 
Cohn, “Representing Authority in Victorian India”; David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British 
Saw Their Empire (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
31 Literature on the Indian Army is extensive and especially concerns the way the Army harnessed India’s 
military labor market and depended on racial concepts of soldiering. See Stephen Cohen, The Indian Army: 
Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); T.A. 
Heathcote, The Indian Army: The Garrison of British Imperial India, 1822-1922 (London: David & 
Charles, 1974); Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men 
(Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1974); Madan Paul Singh, Indian Army Under the East India Company (New Delhi: 
Sterling Publishers, 1976); Kenneth Ballhatchet, Race, Sex, and Class Under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes 
and Policies and Their Critics, 1793-1905 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980); S. L. Menezes, Fidelity & 
Honour: The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-First Century (New Delhi, India: Viking, 
Penguin Books India, 1993); David E. Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994); Victor Kiernan, Colonial Empires and Armies 1815-1960 (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998); Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race and 
Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914 (Manchester University Press, 2004). 
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legitimize state-building projects.32 This refashioning of sovereignty in India through 
security will be further explored in Chapter 2. 
The other major constitutional development of the late-nineteenth century, with 
its attendant dilemmas of sovereignty, was the confederation of Canada in 1867. 
Canadian confederation appears to hold little in common with India’s 1857 rebellion 
settlement beyond chronological proximity, yet they did bear some key similarities – both 
shared the burden of mastering vast continental spaces and yoking hitherto separate 
systems of rule into a unitary whole. Keith wrote that Canada deserved credit for setting 
the form and precedent for responsible government in the Empire, dating back to Lord 
Dunham’s 1838 report on the joining of Upper and Lower Canada.33 A comparable 
security subtext also featured – confederation followed the planned withdrawal of British 
troops from forward positions across the Empire in the 1860s, a fraught and divisive 
process that raised tensions between colonies and London.34 The Canadian government 
was forced to reconstitute its land defenses in order to secure its newly-unified territory, 
which was not presumed safe while the United States remained in a state of vast 
armament from its Civil War. The “Fenian raids” of the late 1860s, in which US-based 
Irish had attacked British interests across the Canadian border stoked these fears. The 
situation underscored the need for British troops among many Canadians, and the need to 
                                                        
32 A recent book that explores how this process unfolded in the late-nineteenth century is Jill Bender, The 
1857 Uprising and the British Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
33 Keith said of Dunham’s report that “no single point of his exposition of the fundamental character of 
responsible government requires alteration to-day after sixty-six years of actual experience of its working.” 
Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, 6–7. 
34 These accompanied the Cardwell Reforms in Britain; see Donald C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership 
in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), chap. 2. “The Withdrawal of the 
Legions” 
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minimize strategic liabilities in North America to many British decision-makers. Still, the 
newly-created Dominion of Canada was to serve as a model for self-governing colonies, 
in years to come, of the payoffs that accrued to colonies that amalgamated themselves 
into large, capacious states with greater resource pools and greater weight in the minds of 
imperial leaders. It also reflected the centralizing (and at the imperial level, centrifugal) 
impulses typical of modern statehood, impulses that were frequently connected to the 
issue of defensibility. From Australia to Canada to South Africa and India, arguments for 
the federal centralization of colonial states often drew attention to their vulnerability as 
smaller, fractured units, as will be explored below.35 
These dilemmas of sovereignty and security resurfaced in the twentieth century. 
In imperial borderlands such as the Middle East, British, French, and Ottomans jointly 
ruled territory; the United States, recovering from its Civil War, strained the limits of its 
republican constitution with its own imperial adventures and its more aggressive pursuit 
of the Monroe Doctrine under Teddy Roosevelt; a host of foreign powers occupied and 
exploited a declining imperial China; new global actors such as Japan and a unified 
Germany entered the field. The coercive processes by which these sovereignty claims 
were mediated exposed unprecedented numbers of people to the fundamental questions 
of legitimate state power. The meteoric rise of popular sovereignty as the organizing 
principle for world politics must be understood also as a mass reaction to the lengthening 
reach of war (and imperial state power) into all facets of society.36 The First World War’s 
                                                        
35 I have explored this theme in greater depth in the article “The ‘Durbar Settlement’ and the Union of 
South Africa: Railways and Infrastructural Power in the British Empire, 1905-1914,” Selected Proceedings 
of the 2012 Northeastern Graduate Student Conference, The Middle Ground Journal No. 8, Spring, 2014. 
36 Recent books investigating this apogee of popular soveriegnty and some of its consequences, intended 
and otherwise, are Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins 
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position as the fulcrum of the modern, destructive age can be read as the result of these 
new, insurgent, and often extra-European states wielding their coercive power in a 
collective bid to have their sovereignties recognized by the international community.37 
The runaway militarization of European powers that presaged the war distracts from this 
emerging trend – a more global story of the norms of state power converging around the 
ability to wage war.38 “Imperial defence” – as a concept, a policy issue, and an 
ideological movement – acted as a system of legitimacy that enabled British colonies to 
access sovereignty, statehood, and various political concessions.39 Interrogating the early 
twentieth century’s most important geopolitical narratives from the perspective of the 
British Empire reveals militarization and expansionism as global, rather than narrowly 
European, phenomena. Moreover, colonial actors drove those processes as much as they 
were instrumentalized by them. British colonies voluntarily funded the construction of 
Dreadnought battleships, the Empire’s largest and most costly pre-war defense platform. 
The Indian Army and its activities in South Asia, the early Union of South Africa and its 
dreams of manifest destiny on that continent, and the aspirations of Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada in the greater Pacific are all examples that speak to this expanded 
                                                        
of Anti-Colonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Marilyn Lake and Henry 
Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line. 
37 A new book investigating this dynamic is Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking 
of Global Order 1916-1931 (Allen Lane, 2014). 
38 Another book on the modern state’s violent capacity in the British case is David Edgerton, Warfare 
State: Britain, 1920-1970 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
39 Perspectives on the decline of the British Empire in the early twentieth century change when one takes a 
broader view of security as a collective good that could sustain political order. Some classic works on the 
issue of decline are Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 
1895-1905, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); John Gallagher, The Decline, Revival 
and Fall of the British Empire: The Ford Lectures and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982). 
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scope and some of the common tendencies that ensue when sovereignty converged 
around security, militarism, and violence. 
The view from turn-of-the-century Britain suggested that containing a rising 
Germany and other world powers required both a mobilization of imperial security assets 
and serious economizing measures, as the costs of defense rose and successive British 
governments hoped to advance social entitlement programs at home. These concerns 
made leveraging the Empire as a reservoir of security resources especially important, and 
opened up space for negotiating with colonial states on shared security priorities. The 
same concerns also helped legitimize militarism among liberal governments across the 
Empire, as collective security gave them a kind of general will around which to build 
imperial unity, in contrast to the formal imperial federation schemes favored by 
conservatives in Britain and the colonies. Whereas other sectors of policy (trade, 
migration, and formal constitutional movements like the imperial federation idea, to 
name the most important) failed to make significant progress during this period, security 
proved more fruitful. Colonial security concerns operated on two levels: internally, where 
they often hinged on managing relationships between white settlers and indigenous 
peoples, and externally, where colonial governments and ruling elites volunteered for 
imperial collective security schemes, which acted as an opportunity for them to build 
diplomatic capital.40 It was at this moment that a critical mass of metropolitan officials in 
                                                        
40 Work on intra-imperial relations enjoyed a period of popularity in the late 1960s but has been scarce in 
recent decades. See Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914; John E. Kendle, 
The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911: A Study in Imperial Organization (London: Longmans, 
1967); Franklyn Arthur Johnson, Defence By Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 
1885-1959 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960); J.J. Eddy, D.M. Schreuder, and Oliver MacDonagh, 
eds., The Rise of Colonial Nationalism: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa First Assert 
Their Nationalities, 1880-1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988). 
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London first entertained the proposition of consuming, rather than producing, security 
within the Empire. 
That proposition produced paradoxical outcomes. Britain’s success in securing 
colonial cooperation and resources for its own defense required slacking the colonies’ 
rein to pursue their own regional objectives. Over the period 1898 to 1931, colonies’ 
autonomy to act in the world reached unprecedented heights, and yet, never before had 
the Empire’s resources and collective strategy been so closely intertwined, both during 
and before the First World War. Thus the First World War should be read as part of an 
ongoing trend in the role of security in politics rather than a rupture that fundamentally 
altered the political or strategic relationships between Britain and its colonies.41 
Investigating this trend helps us understand the violent project of imperialism (and the 
persistence of its forms after decolonization) from the institutional level, and the way 
colonial actors were sometimes active participants in it rather than passive recipients of it. 
That Britain required their cooperation as independent actors in the defense of the Empire 
created diplomatic upward mobility not previously available to colonial actors. This 
dynamic also goes some way towards explaining how Britain was able to wage a 
successful global war from 1914 to 1918 with the help of imperial resources, and how the 
nexus between a state’s sovereignty and its security capabilities came to be written into 
the formal machinery of international politics in the interwar period with the Treaty of 
Versailles, the League of Nations Covenant, and the Locarno Treaties, among others.42 
                                                        
41 For an overview of the literature on Dominion status, and a representative argument about the war’s 
importance, see John Darwin, “A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics,” in The 
Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century, vol. IV, V vols., The Oxford History of the 
British Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 64–87. 
42 The Dominions and India (Ireland was at war with Britain) were independent signatories to the Treaty of 
Versailles; the League Covenant began to design formal mechanisms for collective defense that required 
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0.3 LITERATURE, METHODS, AND THEORY  
This project will address two historiographical problems. First, the historical 
literature on the British Empire tends to address important questions of state and imperial 
rise and decline, the nature of imperial power, and the empire’s influence in shaping the 
modern world, but under-utilizes colonial sources, instead relying on metropolitan data to 
support its claims. Conversely, the scholarship produced in former British colonies 
naturally avoids this pitfall but tends toward preoccupation with the narrative arcs of 
colonial nationhood that prefigure the emergence of states or identities. Some also 
intentionally eschew metropolitan sources, forfeiting the opportunity to understand 
political mediation between imperial governments and institutions. This project addresses 
some of the major questions asked by imperial histories above, but does so substantively 
by using sources produced by colonial states, and thus is able to show how historical 
changes have occurred in multiple, simultaneous cases and locales. The second 
historiographical problem this project addresses is that histories of the British Empire 
written between 1945 and 1980 tended to focus strongly on institutional, diplomatic, and 
political questions, but were insufficiently attentive to the way these institutional 
questions masked other ways that power was produced. More recent waves of scholarship 
have revealed the many ways that race, gender, class and other structures have produced 
                                                        
signatories to underwrite each other’s sovereignty, and the Locarno pacts also dealt with the issue of how 
status quo in Europe would be upheld by military guarantors. 
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power and hierarchy, especially in colonial contexts, but have tended to focus on non-
institutional questions. This project returns to questions about how institutional change 
takes place, and about the way states and international order have evolved, but does so by 
showing how institutional power is produced by discursive power. The language of 
security, as stated above, mobilized both fears and hopes in colonial populations, and 
drew heavily on racial ideas to legitimize colonial state-building projects. In these ways, 
the project applies newer methodological approaches to older questions. 
Efforts to gain sovereignty through militarization proved the most effective in the 
white settlement colonies (“Dominions” after 1907): Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
and Newfoundland. However, similar trends played out notably in the Union of South 
Africa with its still greater racial and social complexities, in India with its vast and 
undemocratic sub-imperium, and in Ireland with its uneasy membership of the United 
Kingdom itself. These were no less influential to the Empire’s debates about race, 
security, and sovereignty than were the Dominions, if their efforts saw less (or harder-
won) payoffs.43 The Indian Army was the world’s largest professional military force and 
the Empire’s primary manpower reserve; the strategic landscape of the early twentieth 
century cannot be understood without it. Irish issues struck at the heart of the United 
Kingdom and dominated its constitutional debates; questions of internal security formerly 
relegated to the colonial sphere were brought home in 1916 by Irish insurgents, who 
made strange bedfellows in subsequent years with their countrymen who fought with 
Britain in World War I. South Africa, meanwhile, demonstrated the bankruptcy of 
                                                        
43 A recent work that has investigated the political theories linking the self-governing colonies in an earlier 
period is Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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imperial military coordination at the turn of the century; its 1910 Union reignited debates 
about federation, and its white representatives incessantly disrupted imperial conferences 
with their concerns about race and security.  
To confine analysis to the pre-war Dominions would subordinate interpretations 
of sovereignty to cases in which the coercion of imperial power was mediated through 
democratic institutions and ignore the myriad other ways in which authority was 
produced. Such an approach would foreclose on explaining how sovereignty was 
constructed through racial identity-formation, aristocracy, and authoritarianism. Both 
enfranchised and disenfranchised colonial subjects asserted their utility to imperial 
security goals, though this produced mixed results that often correlated with the racial 
identities of these subjects. One notable explanation of how sovereignty has been 
constructed through race and violence is through postcolonial theory, advanced 
conspicuously by Frantz Fanon and followed by a thriving body of scholarship. It posits 
imperialism as an inherently violent project, and the colonizer-colonized relationship as 
managed through and defined by violence.44 This is a helpful framework for thinking 
about imperial power in the context of this project, but needs refashioning to capture 
instances in which violence served as a site of cooperation (or perhaps competition) 
between colonizer and colonized, whereby the latter’s replication of colonial forms of 
power was used to remake hierarchies, instead of functioning in a purely adversarial 
sense.45 If imperialism’s definitive feature was the creation of hierarchy through violence, 
this feature has long outlived decolonization in the international system. Recent 
                                                        
44 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, ed. Richard Philcox (Grove Press, 2007). 
45 See for example Fanon, “On Violence,” 3.  
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scholarship has explained the institutional ramifications of that persistence.46 The goals of 
colonial political actors transcended the issue of democratic self-government, and even 
nationalists of varying degrees of radicalism still had to react against the institutional 
norms used and created by colonial regimes.47  
Meanwhile, treating a wide array of colonial cases together captures one of 
imperial history’s methodological advantages: thinking through problems with broad 
geographic and chronological scope, with resulting opportunities for comparison and 
contrast.48 It also brings colonial cases to bear on theoretical questions of the way modern 
states have behaved, especially on whether these behaviors are perennial or historically 
contingent. The reality was somewhere in between; colonial states could indeed be 
classified as discrete, self-interested, and power-maximizing entities of the type Max 
Weber began to posit in the aftermath of World War I.49 However, the forms and logics 
of state-building were also normative – designed to bring aspiring entrants to the 
international community into closer alignment with prevailing international concepts of 
                                                        
46 Some excellent recent work on this topic is Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire 
and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); This has 
also been argued in Bernard Cohn, “Representing Authority in Victorian India,” in The Invention of 
Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Past and Present Publications (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). 
47 One excellent example of this methodological debate is to be found within the literature on Ireland; that 
between the revisionist R. F. Foster, “History and the Irish Question,” Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, Fifth Series, 33 (1983): 169–92; and the advocacy of nationalist historiography and the legacy of 
Butterfield’s “whig” history found in Brendan Bradshaw, “Nationalism and Historical Scholarship in 
Modern Ireland,” Irish Historical Studies 26, no. 104 (November 1989): 329–51 I will return to this 
problem in Chapter 5, which deals most closely with Ireland and the issue of conscription. 
48 This advantage was elucidated in a chapter by Linda Colley, “What Is Imperial History Now?,” in What 
Is History Now?, ed. David Cannadine (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002). 
49 This framework suggests that states have perennial or immutable interests, and that these interests should 
be the primary concern of those who study their behavior. The classic argument for realism, as such, is 
Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979).  
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state sovereignty that privileged robust security capabilities.50 These norms were fully 
contingent on ideas and discourses that worked in a mutually constitutive fashion on 
states within the international system. Thinking outside and across the boundaries of 
colonial states draws also attention to their regional strategic objectives, and the 
continuities between their cases and across time.51 Here I echo among others D.K. 
Fieldhouse, who argued in 1961 that strategy and not economics was the first-order issue 
of British imperialism, and thus that intra-imperial relations tended to hinge on strategic 
concerns.52 Subsequent chapters will explore this theme further. 
The final literature implicated in this project is that on the way states evolve and 
grow, or the way they augment their power and capabilities in absolute terms. Theories 
abound on the key variable driving state expansion. Notorious examples include Karl 
Marx’s, which posited the state as the “committee for managing the common affairs of 
the whole bourgeoisie,” growing as its parasitic power grows.53 A stable of liberal 
thinkers from John Stuart Mill to William Gladstone suggested the state could be made to 
serve as guarantor of the property and rights of greater swathes of the population were 
                                                        
50 For a discussion of the formation of international norms and the way states respond to them, see 
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391–425. 
51 For some useful recent work on the way late British imperialism made room for colonial strategic 
ambitions see Priya Satia, “Developing Iraq: Britain, India and the Redemption of Empire and Technology 
in the First World War,” Past & Present 197, no. 1 (2007): 211–55; John Darwin, The Empire Project: The 
Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970, 1st ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
52 D. K. Fieldhouse, “‘Imperialism’: An Historiographical Revision,” The Economic History Review, New 
Series, 14, no. 2 (January 1, 1961): 187–209, doi:10.2307/2593218. 
53 “…the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of modern industry and of the world market, 
conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, exclusive political sway. The executive of the 
modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” K. Marx and 
F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Friedrich Engels, 2015), chap. 1, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=TO_qCQAAQBAJ. 
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they given a stake in its business via the franchise. Still others have argued that the state 
arises primarily as an engine of war, and will grow as the exigencies of war grow.54 This 
interpretation enjoys diverse endorsements, from the Athenian historian and general 
Thucydides, to Immanuel Kant, who theorized that the internal conditions of a civitas 
prevail at the whim of their external environs and that defense is thus their prerequisite, to 
Friedrich Nietzsche and the twentieth century fascists who admired him, seeing the state 
as the vehicle for the violent struggle that would bring spiritual transcendence to the 
nation.55 The sociologist and political theorist Michael Mann has also argued that state-
formation tends to occur as a dialectic between militaristic centralization and federal 
diffusion; the British Empire of the early twentieth century witnessed both.56 
The case of state development in Britain’s large colonies supports this eclectic 
consensus on the centrality of war, violence, and militarism. Not in the manner suggested 
by nationalist-separatists like the figurehead of the Irish 1916 Easter Rising, Patrick 
Pearse, or the nationalist historians who followed them, like Australia’s official historian-
observer of World War I, C.E.W. Bean, who saw national liberation in a quasi-mystical, 
Christoid sacrifice of colonial blood that bought or earned parity with the imperial 
                                                        
54 This argument has been notably articulated by Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-
1990; International Relations scholars have also built this argument into their theories; see R. Harrison 
Wagner, “How Do You Build a State?,” Stanford University Workshop on State-Building, 2003, 
http://hw.webhost.utexas.edu/papers/sb.pdf; and R. Harrison Wagner, War and the State: The Theory of 
International Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007); historians of Britain and other 
states have illustrated the links between war and state provision of social services in the twentieth century 
as well. See James E. Cronin, The Politics of State Expansion: War, State, and Society in Twentieth-
Century Britain (New York: Routledge, 1991). 
55 Benito Mussolini wrote in his Doctrine of Fascism that “The state leads men from primitive tribal life to 
that ultimate expression of human power which is Empire…”B. Mussolini, The Doctrine of Fascism (H. 
Fertig, 2006), 21. 
56 Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results,” Archives 
Europeenes de Sociologie 25 (1984): 129. 
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power.57 Rather, colonial governments were engaged in an institutional project aimed at 
parity with British institutional capacities that was accelerated by, but substantively 
preceded, actual military combat. The British political philosopher Michael Oakeshott 
separated the function of states into two modes: nomocracy (that which prescribes the 
manner of politics), and telocracy (that which prescribes the end or purpose of politics). 
Modern states, in his esteem, have tended toward the latter, and the primary reason has 
been war. “War,” he wrote, “is the paradigm case of a situation in which the variety of 
‘admitted goods’ in a society is reduced, or almost reduced, to one; a state at war is a 
paradigm case of telocracy. And it is not insignificant that the rhetoric of telocratic belief 
is always liberally sprinkled with military analogy.”58 The early twentieth century, then, 
was a moment in which both Britain and its large colonies became more alike through the 
telocratic preparation for, and occasional experience of, war. And they emerged from that 
experience with yet greater parity in the international system. Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, South Africa, and India independently signed both the Treaty of Versailles and 
the League of Nations Covenant. Ireland was still at war with Britain in 1919 but its 26-
county rump joined the League as the Irish Free State at the end of hostilities in 1923. 
These acts of membership in the international community were taken as diplomatic 
recognition of a sovereignty derived partly and perhaps mostly from these states’ military 
capabilities. 
                                                        
57 The Proclamation of the Republic, issued by those who initiated the Easter Rising in 1916, read: “In this 
supreme hour, the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the readiness of its children to 
sacrifice themselves…prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.” Bean wrote in The 
Story of Anzac that “Australian national consciousness was born on 25 April 1915” (the date of the landing 
at Gallipoli). The apparent disagreement over the proper date for Australia’s “founding” will be explored 
further in Chapter 1. 
58 M. Oakeshott, T. Nardin, and L. O’Sullivan, Lectures in the History of Political Thought, Michael 
Oakeshott Selected Writings (Imprint Academic, 2011), 496. 
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0.4 SOURCES  
A.V. Dicey laid out four “rules” that generally governed the relations between 
Britain and the Dominions in 1914, and the fourth of these was the imperial conference 
system.59 These conferences, “quite unthought-of thirty years ago,” met every few years 
from 1887 and occupied a constitutionally fluid space whereby political leaders and 
bureaucrats from various colonies gathered and deliberated on topics of concern for the 
Empire broadly.60 The constitutional authority vested in these conferences was nebulous, 
their composition shifting, and their ability to reach workable settlements, never mind 
consensus, rare. But they reward close reading for the way elites across the Empire 
imagined themselves and their relation to one another at a critical moment when colonial 
military, diplomatic, and political institutions were undergoing rapid evolution. They 
were the Empire’s first official multilateral political forum, and defense issues frequently 
dominated their proceedings. The conferences also produced both public and confidential 
records that will be used extensively in this project, and provide a set of narrative 
moments at which to measure the state of discourse about sovereignty and security 
among colonial elites and military leaders. 
                                                        
59 The other three were, respectively, that the Imperial Parliament remains nominally superior to legislate 
on matters of imperial interest, that colonial governments are prohibited from individual treatymaking with 
foreign powers or from holding themselves neutral in an imperial war, and that Dominions have the right to 
a free hand in legislating for matters that strictly concern their internal affairs. 
60 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 26. 
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Furthermore, the diplomatic correspondence between imperial Governments, the 
personal papers of officials across the Empire, and the documents generated by both 
colonial parliamentary assemblies and their nascent military bureaucracies will be 
critical. This source base invites analysis of the way the Empire’s aspiring sovereign 
states advanced their interests both with and against imperial authority rather than 
adopting a center-focused perspective as in much scholarship on imperialism. While the 
Empire’s hierarchical structure exerted itself on the thoughts, words, and deeds of 
colonial subjects, they often acted laterally, managing relationships, communicating, and 
in some cases jostling, with counterparts in other colonies or Dominions. These lateral 
relations are just as important as the vertical axis of imperial power relations, because 
they demonstrate colonial states working through their status in the diplomatic sphere 
with peer actors, and the gradual subversion of colonial hierarchy at the diplomatic level. 
Most of the evidence used in this project is that produced by the apparatus of 
colonial states. This is appropriate for measuring the changing forms of sovereignty in the 
British Empire, and for understanding the way colonial states created discourses of 
security that could be used to control populations and legitimize the growth of their own 
power. However, the chapters also use print media and popular literature at points to 
illustrate how issues of imperial defense resonated among British subjects, especially 
how it produced fears and anxieties among publics. Finally, while few non-elites 
produced historical sources on the matter of sovereignty or the constitutional future of the 
British Empire, a handful of collections do access these very matters, most notably the 
Irish Bureau of Military History’s witness statement program, which asked around 1,800 
people to recall their experiences of Ireland’s revolutionary period from 1912-1922. The 
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fifth chapter analyzes these sources to access the way ordinary people responded to vexed 
questions like conscription that struck at the heart of state sovereignty. 
Colonial ideas about sovereignty were also shaped by their relationships with peer 
actors in other colonies and Dominions, not simply through their hierarchical 
relationships with Britain. For, as is often noted by scholars of international relations, a 
state’s ability to accrue legitimacy and possess sovereignty depends as much on its 
acceptance by external actors as it does on that state’s internal qualities.61 Historians can 
benefit from this insight in their understanding of modernity’s implications for the state, 
and for decolonization broadly. Colonial states and peoples hoping to shirk imperial 
control had not just to overcome or subvert hierarchies, but also to appeal to other, 
parallel sets of meaning and power from which they could draw legitimacy and 
recognition.62 That imperative (and their general self-interest in pursuing autonomy) is 
another point of continuity across the varied cases considered here. Historians working 
on early America have explored this phenomenon, as have others on non-European 
nation-states.63  
 
                                                        
61 A helpful overview of the literature on this topic may be found at David A. Lake, “The New Sovereignty 
in International Relations,” International Studies Review 5, no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 303–23. 
62 See Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984); and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
63 See David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2007) who argues that the Declaration began a genre in which states formally attempted 
to engage the international community; and the previously-mentioned Gould, Among the Powers of the 
Earth. 
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0.5 PROJECT OUTLINE 
The first chapter begins during the Boer War at the turn of the twentieth century, 
and examines the ad hoc coordination of imperial resources to fight that ill-fated 
counterinsurgency in South Africa from 1898-1901. It sets the stage for the project 
narrative by highlighting the moment of anxiety that followed this conflict as imperial 
elites realized that they had no effective means of coordinating and directing their 
aggregate resources in times of crisis, and the way concurrent state-building projects – 
the federation movements in the South Pacific, were structured by this environment of 
fear and anxiety. In Chapter 2, which spans the years 1902-1906, I trace the political and 
military reforms that grew around the British Empire in the aftermath of the South 
African War, and how these calls for reform sparked debates over militarization. Here the 
Government of India’s attempts to reinforce its military client relationships on the 
subcontinent, and the civil-military debate between Curzon and Kitchener, will also 
feature. In the third chapter, I examine how these changes occurred at the institutional 
level at the Colonial Conference of 1907, which formally acknowledged “Dominion 
status” in a way that privileged security capabilities, and how this new arrangement was 
given its first test with the Anglo-German naval crisis in 1909. This chapter shows how 
security logic was used to create an exclusive community of constitutional status. 
In Chapter 4 I show how this political settlement became increasingly strained in 
the years leading up to the outbreak of World War I, as colonial democracy and colonial 
interests ran counter to the Empire’s ostensible collective priorities on defense and 
political order. This chapter will explore how the exigencies of security created political 
divergence as well. Through the First World War, my fifth chapter examines how the 
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relationship between security and sovereignty was demonstrated by the debates over 
military conscription that raged across the Empire as British forces faced serious drains 
on manpower and resources. Here sources on the conscription crisis in Ireland and the 
conscription referenda in Australia and Canada are especially critical. The responses of 
hundreds of Irish recollections of conscription and war show how the state’s sovereignty 
over individual bodies brought the hitherto abstract questions home to ordinary people. 
The conclusion discusses how imperial security cooperation produced unintended 
consequences in Ireland’s War of Independence and the repressive crackdowns across 
India as World War I drew to a close, and how colonial states achieved legitimacy and 
projected new norms of sovereignty into the international system as independent 
signatories to the agreements at Versailles, the League of Nations Covenant, and others. 
In short, this project continues the work of explaining how political modernity 
was shaped by imperialism and war. The British Empire must be central to this 
explanation. It entered the twentieth century as a global hegemon, and even through 
imperial decline, played a large role in shaping the new forms of political order that 
followed decolonization. Many of the twentieth century’s emergent states began as 
British colonies. The extraordinary, coordinated violence of the twentieth century and the 
forms of international order that sprung up in response or opposition to it remain a great 
historical puzzle which cannot be solved without looking to Britain, the power that 
predominated in its beginning – as the dread and envy of them all. Narratives of the turn 
of the twentieth century are often drawn into the orbit of World War I, but the war was 
predated by, and itself just one episode in, an longer story of how states came to organize 
and plan for each other’s destruction. That story is taken up here at the outbreak of the 
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Boer War at the close of the nineteenth century and the sunset of the Victorian age. 
George Curzon, then the Viceroy of India and one of the era’s most influential characters, 
said this to his Legislative Council as he reflected on the conflict from Calcutta in 1900: 
“A storm has taken place in the great ocean, the commotion caused by which will be felt 
thousands of miles away on every beach and shore. Here, as elsewhere, we shall require 
to set our own house in order, to overhaul our military machine, and to profit by the 
lessons learned.”64 
                                                        
64 Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Viceroy and Governor General of India, vol. II, 1900–1902 
(Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1902), 322. 
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1 CHAPTER 1 – ‘A TIDE IN THE AFFAIRS OF MEN’: FEAR, FEDERATION, 
AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR IN AUSTRALASIA 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A cartoon published in the Sydney-based Australian news magazine The Bulletin 
and carried in the periodical The Australian Federalist on 7 May 1898 shows a small boy 
standing defiantly athwart a railroad track, his fists raised. His opponent, a locomotive, 
has just hurtled from the mouth of a tunnel, and seems sure to run him down. The young 
boxer’s hatband displays the word “ANTIFED”; the locomotive is emblazoned 
“FEDERATION.” In case readers harbored any confusion at what was to happen next, 
the lower right inset displays an exasperated engineer scraping the boy’s mangled corpse 
off the wheels of the locomotive with a masonry knife. The caption reads “A 
FEDERATION POEM: The boy stood on the railroad track – he heard the whistle squeal 
– The engineer got slowly down, and scraped him off the wheel.”65 
                                                        
65 “Australia’s Glorious Fourth,” The Bulletin (Sydney), May 7, 1898; Accessed via MS 1540, Papers of 
Alfred Deakin, National Library of Australia (NLA), Subseries 11.2 Item 11/348. 
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 This grisly collision indeed came to pass, albeit a year behind the cartoonist’s 
expectations – two rounds of referenda in each Australian colony were needed after the 
first returned overall majorities in favor of federation but failed to reach the agreed 
majority threshold in New South Wales.66 The “Glorious Fourth” proved just a prelude to 
the eventual federation moment in June 1899. The Bulletin, whose masthead read 
“Australia for the White Man,” was not a subtle publication. Its locomotive-on-juvenile-
pugilist cartoon violence, though, may have been unintentionally perceptive. Federation – 
                                                        
66 This eventuality confused contemporaries; one exasperated voter wrote to the Melbourne Argus on 31 
May positing a variety of polling outcomes and asking which would result in federation, signing the letter 
“IGNORAMUS”. “The Federal Vote: to the Editor of the Argus,” Argus (Melbourne), May 31, 1898. 
Accessed via MS 1540, Papers of Alfred Deakin, NLA, Subseries 11.12, Item 11/359.  
Figure 1 – “Australia’s Glorious Fourth” 
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the joining of multiple, discrete state structures into larger constitutional unions that 
formally distribute sovereign functions – emerged at the turn of the twentieth century as a 
minor political craze in the British world, and its advocates possessed a frenetic, 
locomotive attitude. Violence, if not always as obvious as a railway collision, lurked 
beneath federation debates across the Empire and surfaced dramatically if sporadically. 
Federation activists cultivated an air of inevitability around their movements much like 
that of the hurtling train. But not all of them reached their destinations. In some cases, the 
forces of divergence proved too strong and federalist dreams were dashed by 
unexpectedly strong upstarts in their tracks.  
 This chapter investigates why federation proved a popular idea in the British 
Empire during the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries. Though some of these 
movements failed, others succeeded, including those of Australia, the Union of South 
Africa, and the Federated Malay States, to name some notables that followed in Canada’s 
1867 footsteps. This was a remarkable constitutional efflorescence that occurred over a 
short period (1901-1910) across three continents. It also coincided with a particularly 
busy slate of diplomatic treaty-making by the Imperial Government in London, and a few 
internationally notorious wars – namely, Britain’s second major war in South Africa (the 
Boer War), the Boxer Rebellion in China, and the Russo-Japanese War. These events, 
wound together, propelled the realignment of British power in the world and within the 
Empire. In the space of a decade, Britain went from relative diplomatic isolation under 
Lord Salisbury, in fact and in spirit the last Victorian Prime Minister (and erstwhile 
Foreign Minister), into a crowded and complex new environment. Here, it was forced to 
manage formal strategic agreements with Japan, France, and Russia, an informal 
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relationship with a frenetically-rising United States, and a rearguard attempt to contain 
the ascent of the German Empire while managing the collapse of the Ottoman.67 These 
very well-studied diplomatic shifts took place laterally, among peers – an inflection point 
in the long tale of the “rise and fall of great powers.”68 But Britain’s global footprint 
consisted firstly of its Empire, and the hierarchical world order of this period must also be 
understood vertically, beyond its thin upper crust. Colonial governments began 
increasingly to contest Britain’s control over diplomatic and strategic affairs, which were 
hitherto formally reserved to London. Federation movements advanced that competition 
by enhancing the notoriety, scope, and resources of colonial states and opening questions 
about sovereignty and how to divide the functions of state. As such, international order in 
the early twentieth century was also reshaped from below, as colonial actors mounted 
institutional and constitutional challenges to their subordinate status. International 
hierarchy did not, of course, disappear, but the imperialism upon which it was based 
began to evolve. The pinnacle of international hierarchy also began to tilt away from 
Europe, towards the United States and Asia beyond. 
 Scholars often treat the late nineteenth century as a moment of federations and 
unifications, and the early twentieth century as a moment of international atomization and 
                                                        
67 Down to 1904, when the Entente Cordiale was concluded, it was scarcely clear that Britain would choose 
to focus on containing Germany and not, as it had so often since Napoleon, on France. A classic study of 
the transition from isolation under Salisbury is Christopher H. D. Howard, Splendid Isolation: A Study of 
Ideas Concerning Britain’s International Position and Foreign Policy during the Later Years of the Third 
Marquess of Salisbury (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967); see also John Charmley, Splendid Isolation?: 
Britain, the Balance of Power, and the Origins of the First World War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1999); An extended meditation on Britain’s behavior during this period of relative decline can be found in 
Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, 2nd ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
68 Articulated by Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987) and others. 
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fracture along Wilsonian lines, with perhaps a slight reversion to consolidation in the 
postwar era.69 This ebb and flow misses a frenetic moment of federal state-building just 
before World War I, a moment that arose out of the growing pains (and death throes) of 
empires in the world’s contested zones – the Middle East, southeastern Europe, and the 
Pacific.70 The peculiarities of interwar internationalist schemes for rebuilding global 
order, or the economic-currency blocs of the Depression era, or even the strategic blocs 
of the later Cold War, trace their origins to the British Empire’s schemes for federation at 
the turn of the twentieth century and the way they tried to solve crises of sovereignty and 
institutional fracture. Richard Jebb, a journalist and activist for the cause of constitutional 
change in the British Empire, wrote and lobbied for federalism his whole career. Initially, 
he even advocated the yoking of the whole Empire into a single federal union, though he 
abandoned that position around 1902 and moved toward a looser model in which colonies 
(settled by Britons) would wax into large federations and then join voluntarily with 
Britain in a grand, “Britannic alliance.” This small but close-knit family of imperial states 
                                                        
69 Cases for unification and federalism include Canada, the postbellum United States, and the Italian and 
German unifications. The rise of self-determination and the nation-state followed World War I, and this 
norm extended into the mid-century with some notable exceptions. Susan Pedersen has recently explored 
the implications of League of Nations schemes for creating viable states and inter-state relationships in 
Susan Pedersen, “Getting Out of Iraq—in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative 
Statehood,” The American Historical Review 115, no. 4 (October 1, 2010): 975–1000, 
doi:10.1086/ahr.115.4.975; For a theorization of the way drastic changes in political order can follow major 
wars, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order 
After Major Wars, Princeton Studies in International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
70 The turn of the century efflorescence of imperialism posed major problems for the sovereignty and 
constitutional structures of imperial states. Some of these problems have been recently explored in Lauren 
A. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400--1900 (Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Chap. 6, “Bare Sovereignty and Empire”; Two recent 
works that have explored the interwar Wilsonian heyday and complicated its salience for many states are 
Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti-Colonial 
Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League 
of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); For a discussion of the 
many attempts at reforging a viable international order through collective security in the interwar period, 
see Patrick O Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace After World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of 
Europe, 1919-1932 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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could, in Jebb’s mind, control the world. “The advance of the Britannic polity along that 
path [to alliance] has been wonderfully rapid in the past fifteen years,” he wrote in 1913, 
“and especially since the creation in South Africa of the fourth new nation-state, which 
practically completed the original units.”71 Jebb presciently imagined the ad hoc future of 
imperial ties, and to an extent the peculiar, centripetal direction of Britannic nationalism 
in the colonies. This was a holy paradox – through independence, Jebb predicted, they 
would grow closer together. These visions of the Empire’s future, casting forward from 
the precipice of World War I, conjure a different image than that of an atomizing 
nationalist whirlwind, or what George Curzon later called “the unmixing of peoples.”72 In 
fact, it suggested deliberate mixing of peoples: the building of federal states that could 
reshape an imperial order by balancing its hierarchies and creating political stability 
through strategic makeweights.73 The British Empire’s experiments with colonial 
federalism were thus the front line of a shift in world order, and the epicenter of a global 
conversation about the future of sovereignty. In Jebb’s words, these experiments would 
be either “the last monument of an old order or the great exemplar of a new.”74 
 The British Empire’s successful federal projects in this period are not usually 
understood as such; rather, they are situated within the long narratives of settler 
colonialism and democratic self-government. These narratives understand the formation 
                                                        
71 Richard Jebb, The Britannic Question: A Survey of Alternatives (London: Longmans, 1913), 252. 
72 Curzon made this remark in his observations of the Balkan Wars; it later resurfaced as a key slogan of the 
1924 Lausanne Conference, which sought to manage the collapse of the Ottoman Empire through, among 
other things, mass population transfers between newly-made nation-states. 
73 Imperial planners returned to this tactic as early as 1930; see Great Britain and Colonial Office, Papers 
Relating to the Question of the Closer Union of Kenya, Uganda, and the Tanganyika Territory. (London: 
H.M.S.O. [printed by Metchim & Son], 1931). 
74 Richard Jebb, The Britannic Question: A Survey of Alternatives (London: Longmans, 1913), 252. 
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of the self-governing Dominions as a process of replicating British models of society, 
commerce, and institutions.75 But the United Kingdom offered no clear model for 
federation projects – its monarchy ruled four distinct kingdoms, but its legislature was a 
unitary body populated from all. Would-be federations in the colonies had to look to 
other exemplars, usually Canada and the United States.76 Furthermore, creating optimal 
domestic conditions comprised only half the logic of large federal projects in the British 
world – the other half concerned the need to position new British states within, and 
secure them against, their foreign environments. Federal movements tapped into colonial 
imaginations of what lay outside the border, and off the shore. This was a space pregnant 
with fear, anxiety, and risk – but also ripe with opportunity. Southern Africa and the 
Southern Pacific were such places. Federal ideas there were not just the outgrowth of 
settler aspirations to replicate Britain and extend its power, they also hinged on perceived 
threats menacing nearby, frustration with imperial restrictions or negligence, and even 
fears that, in the end, Britain would forsake or betray its children to serve metropolitan 
goals. These anxieties meant that federal schemes unfolded with an eye to strategic 
defensibility. Colonial federalists dreamed also of what they could accomplish given 
greater diplomatic weight in London and a freer hand to act regionally. Thus the logic of 
                                                        
75 Two often-cited recent synthetic histories of the Empire that have emphasized the colonies of settlement 
explain their development as a process of socializing into the norms and practices of a global British system 
with primarily economic characteristics. John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British 
World-System, 1830-1970, 1st ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); James Belich, 
Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld, 1783-1939 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). See also Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, eds., Settler Colonialism in 
the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies (New York: Routledge, 2005); again Marilyn Lake 
and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International 
Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
76 Here I echo the move made by Linda Colley in her study of the formation of British identity - a thing 
structured as much by external as internal factors. Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 
3rd Revised Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
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federal projects reflected the reality that sovereignty had to be constituted both 
domestically and internationally. Security imperatives served both of these objectives by 
providing a justification for territorial conquest and a common strategic ground for intra-
imperial bargaining.77 
 Federal moments in the Pacific coincided with the Empire’s turn of the century 
crisis – the war in South Africa. The Boer War dominated the Empire’s headlines while it 
ran from 1899-1902, and raised a great many questions. The first of these was why it took 
so long to bring to a satisfactory conclusion – it was assumed that bands of poorly-
organized rustics like the Afrikaner farmers would not stand for long against the might of 
the British Empire. But when they did, bottling British forces into a handful of fortified 
towns and winning early victories with what Arthur Conan-Doyle called their “ancient 
theology and their inconveniently modern rifles,” uncomfortable realities emerged. The 
Empire, populous and well-resourced though it was, appeared quite inept at organizing 
for war – colonial participation proved highly conspicuous but poorly coordinated. This 
alarming realization underscored the necessity for diplomatic and domestic reforms that 
continued apace in the following years, down to the outbreak of the First World War. 
 This chapter will proceed with a short overview of the South African War to 
provide context. It will then consider how the fears and hopes raised by the war (and 
other strategic and security-oriented issues) featured in the South Pacific and the bids for 
political federation launched there at the turn of the twentieth century. The first and 
                                                        
77 Max Weber theorized in 1919 that states must monopolize the legitimate use of force within a given 
space to consolidate internal sovereignty. See “Politics as a Vocation” in Max Weber, The Vocation 
Lectures: Science As a Vocation, Politics As a Vocation, ed. David S. Owen, Tracy B. Strong, and Rodney 
Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co, 2004); A helpful overview of the two-level nature of 
sovereignty as theorized in international relations is David A. Lake, “The New Sovereignty in International 
Relations,” International Studies Review 5, no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 303–23. 
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greatest of these was the movement for Australian federation, the steaming locomotive 
mentioned above, a movement that had stewed for much of the 1880s and 90s and finally 
realized its Commonwealth dream on New Years’ Day 1901. Voting commenced in 
Australia during the Boer War’s dark early stages; federation’s success was confirmed by 
the Westminster Parliament as imperial troops were working to relieve the siege of the 
international legations at Peking and to crush the Boxer Rebellion in China. Meanwhile, a 
concurrent debate raged just across the Tasman Sea in New Zealand as to whether that 
self-governing colony should join with the Australian federation. New Zealand elected to 
go its own way, but the logic of its decision will prove useful in this chapter and, 
moreover, led directly to the final case that will be considered here: the failed attempt by 
New Zealand premier Richard Seddon to annex Fiji into a federation of his own with the 
help of a vocal lobby of British settlers there. The South Pacific was the Empire’s 
remotest corner, but for a time it was the very center of debate about the Empire’s future 
political order. 
 
1.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR AND ITS COLONIAL REVERBERATIONS 
 
As the Empire’s dominating political crisis of the turn of the century, the Boer 
War insinuated itself into far-flung affairs, and contemporaries seized on the war and its 
supposed lessons for their own political ends. Proponents of federal projects in Australia, 
New Zealand, and Fiji looked to events in South Africa as an example of what colonial 
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states could do given the will and organization, a warning of what might happen if 
colonial counterinsurgency efforts failed, and an opportunity to extract concessions from 
Britain for the help they supplied.78 Somewhat unexpectedly, then, a shambles of a war 
and the reckoning that followed it created opportunities for colonial subjects hoping to 
challenge the prevailing order.79 The Boer War had been a nasty business – its debacles 
created an international media storm, drove deeper wedges between mainstream British 
opinion and various “pro-Boer” factions across the Empire, especially in Ireland, and 
destabilized Britain’s electoral landscape itself, crippling the Liberal Party and sparking 
years of inquiries and reforms. But the story that emerges from the colonial diplomatic 
sphere was one of opportunity and possibility. Colonial actors responded to the war and 
the issues it raised, and used it as an opportunity to reshape the Empire’s political 
landscape. Reading the war from this perspective reveals how events on the edge of 
Empire, like the Boer War, not only rebounded upon and shaped policies in the imperial 
center, but also affected events in other colonies and shaped the course of their politics. 
Meanwhile, the war’s happy coincidence with the advent of the Conference system gave 
rise to a new era of diplomatic communication across the Empire. With a new forum in 
which to use them, colonies found their diplomatic voices in debates about South Africa, 
which proved critical to their pursuits of greater autonomy. The urgency of discussion 
surrounding the Empire’s strategic and security dilemmas enabled emerging colonial 
                                                        
78 For an example of how a colonial event, and the fears it generated, could affect other colonial contexts, 
see Jill Bender, “Fears of 1857: The British Empire in the Wake of the Indian Rebellion” (Boston College, 
2011); Jill Bender, The 1857 Uprising and the British Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016). 
79 The most commonly cited cases here are those of Mohandas Gandhi, who observed the mistreatment of 
Indian laborers in South Africa while working there as a barrister, and Ireland, where pro-Boer sympathy 
ran high among republicans. But other British subjects drew different lessons from the South African War, 
especially in the Pacific. 
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states and aspiring federations to seek previously unavailable concessions, and so to chip 
away at the Empire’s hierarchical edifice. 
Leo Amery, tireless operative of imperial (and later international) politics, and 
himself a major proponent of imperial federation (more steadfast than his colleague 
Jebb), spent several years writing and editing The Times History of the South African 
War, which arrived in 1909 and was based on his reportage for that newspaper during the 
war.80 Amery epigraphed the book with a couplet by Rudyard Kipling, which the 
Empire’s consummate bard had composed in 1900 to memorialize the Boer General Piet 
Joubert as Britain’s noble enemy. Joubert represented a moderating voice among the 
Boers in the lead-up to war, but lost his bid for leadership to the more hardline Paul 
Kruger, and on the outbreak of hostilities assumed command of Boer forces. This made 
him a tragic figure to some on the British side; a sort of Teutonic Robert E. Lee who 
fought with honor in a doomed resistance to Federal power. Joubert’s horse, possessed of 
a sense of poetic tragedy, abruptly threw the general to his death in late 1899. Kipling’s 
couplet, lines 5 and 6 of a 3-stanza poem, spoke of Joubert’s legacy:  
Later shall rise a people, sane and great,         5 
  Forged in strong fires, by equal war made one81  
  
                                                        
80 By “imperial federation” I refer not to efforts to create federal states out of multiple colonies, but the 
effort to federate the whole Empire via new institutions designed to include colonial input in metropolitan 
policymaking. L. S. (Leopold Stennett) Amery, The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 
(London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, Ltd., 1909), 
http://archive.org/details/timeshistoryofwa06ameriala. 
81 Rudyard Kipling, Rudyard Kipling’s Verse, Inclusive Edition, 1885–1918 (Garden City: Doubleday, 
Page & Co., 1922), http://www.bartleby.com/br/364.html. 
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Kipling, and by extension Amery, meditated on these lines because they evoked the 
equalizing nature of war. Kipling and others referred to the war as a crucible, forging “a 
people” of the war’s key belligerents – the Boers on the one side, the British and imperial 
forces on the other. This imagined smelting had precious little room for South Africa’s 
majority black inhabitants, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Amery, though, 
had still greater metaphors in mind. He noted in the preface to his Times History that 
writing it had been “a wonderful lesson not only in the supremely interesting business of 
war, but in the whole Imperial problem of which the struggle in South Africa is but a 
single phase.”82 The subtext for Amery was the way the crucible of war could create 
unity not just between romanticized opponents but also between allies – the colonial 
participants who served alongside British forces. 
 Hostilities between the Boers of southern Africa and their neighboring British 
settlers stretched across centuries.83 Largely Calvinist, Dutch-speaking colonists had been 
arriving in southern Africa since the Dutch East India Company set up there in the late 
seventeenth century. Many became farmers, or smallholders called “Boers,” who by the 
nineteenth century had begun to migrate inland in search of workable land and freedom 
from encroachment by competing colonial powers – a phenomenon known as The Great 
Trek. Southern Africa’s strategic position along the maritime route to India, and the vast 
gold and diamond reserves discovered in its interior in the mid-nineteenth century, 
                                                        
82 Amery, The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902, viii. 
83 A classic account of the war and its antecedents is Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (New York: 
Random House, 1979); The centenary of the conflict also sparked a number of new studies, such as Denis 
Judd and Keith Terrance Surridge, The Boer War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Donal Lowry, 
The South African War Reappraised (Manchester University Press, 2000); David E. Omissi and Andrew 
Thompson, eds., The Impact of the South African War (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 
2002). 
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primed the ensuing era for unstable competition between indigenous peoples, settler 
colonists, and imperial powers. Organized opposition to colonial expansion and 
settlement from the region’s indigenous people led to the Zulu War in 1879, after which 
Britain assumed control of Zulu lands, and the first Anglo-Boer war in 1880-1, which 
resulted in a Boer victory and British recognition of two Afrikaner republics, the Orange 
Free State and the Transvaal (or South African Republic).84 This left an uneasy regional 
balance between the two British colonies, the Cape Colony and Natal, and the two 
Afrikaner republics bestriding most of the region’s mineral reserves. By century’s end, 
then, a legacy of conflict between the region’s competing powers and their local interests 
had set up a major strategic tension: would the future lead to regional consolidation under 
British rule, or remain fractured? Federation of these colonies into a single, expansive 
state had been a goal of the Colonial Office since the days of the Zulu War and First Boer 
War – a goal that had been routinely frustrated by recalcitrant opposition to British 
hegemony by indigenous peoples and Boer settlers alike.85 
 Afrikaners in the mineral-rich Rand, the upland region drained by the Vaal and 
Orange rivers, faced a possible British takeover not just through a military putsch or 
invasion, but via ordinary democratic – and demographic – change.86 The Boer 
Republics’ abundant resources and chronic labor shortage meant they had to maintain 
                                                        
84 There were further conflicts as well, especially the Matabele Wars (1893-4 and 1896-7) in Rhodesia. For 
more see Richard Price, Making Empire: Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in 
Nineteenth-Century Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
85 Lord Carnavron made the first attempt at a British federation in South Africa in the late 1870s; this led to 
the first Anglo-Boer War. Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, 28; Amery described the war as a rerun of the 
American Civil War, between “the forces making for union and the forces making for disintegration.” See 
Lowry, The South African War Reappraised, 26–7. 
86 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, 32–33; 44–7. 
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significant inward migration to keep the mines productive and thus to service their 
abundant debt. Thousands of foreigners poured into the Rand, many of whom were 
laborers from other parts of Africa, India, and China that worked for a pittance and 
suffered high mortality rates in the mines. Over 100,000 British settlers, less happily for 
Boer governments, accompanied them, drawn by the promise of gold-strikes, land 
speculation, and chain-migration.87 These “Uitlanders” (the Afrikaans word for 
foreigner), when naturalized, could swamp the incumbent Boers in a stroke of legal, 
democratic regime change – or so they feared. The imagined British federation in 
Southern Africa could arrive without a fired shot. To avoid this sort of euthanasia, the 
Transvaal government placed strict franchise controls on Uitlanders to stop their 
acquiring voting rights and thus threatening the Afrikaners’ Herrenvolk model of 
government.88 With democratic paths apparently closed to them, those hoping for a 
British, federal South Africa resorted to coup and conspiracy. A cabal of Randlords – 
fabulously rich and politically ambitious British mining magnates like Cecil Rhodes and 
Leander Starr Jameson, who between them controlled De Beers, the British South Africa 
Company, and the government of the Cape Colony itself – colluded with officials in 
London and the Colonial Office to destabilize the regime of Paul Kruger, the intransigent 
Afrikaner Prime Minister of the Transvaal.89 The “Jameson Raid,” the fruit of their labor, 
                                                        
87 The populations of the Transvaal, Cape Colony, and Natal roughly doubled over the period 1890-1905. 
The city of Johannesburg grew to a population of over 100,000 in 1895 from virtual nonexistence in 1885. 
Belich, Replenishing the Earth, chap. 6, “Boers, Britons, and the ‘Black English’” pp. 378–9. 
88 For the concept of Herrenvolk Democracy, in which a state is nominally democratic but reserves the 
franchise to racial in-groups, see Kenneth P. Vickery, “‘Herrenvolk’ Democracy and Egalitarianism in 
South Africa and the U.S. South,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 16, no. 3 (June 1, 1974): 
309–28. 
89 One of the best overviews of the situation remains AJP Taylor’s 1952 essay in A. J. P. Taylor, English 
History, 1914-1945, The Oxford History of England 15 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), chap. 
6, “The Jameson Raid.” 
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was a monument to failed coups. By the end of 1895 the plot, which involved a small 
army raised b the British South Africa Company under Jameson’s direction but which 
depended on a mass Uitlander uprising that never came, had been routed by the Boers. 
Knowing British officialdom needed to distance itself from the affair and with no interest 
in prosecuting a high-profile international trial, Kruger simply packed the ringleaders 
back to London in shackles. Rhodes resigned his chairmanship of the British South 
Africa Company to avoid repeal of the Company’s Charter; Jameson served a predictably 
short prison sentence, given his sustained popularity in Britain. 
 And so the nineteenth century drew to a close with the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State still firmly within Boer hands. A paranoid Paul Kruger even succeeded in attracting 
diplomatic sympathy from Germany, and in procuring shipments of cutting-edge German 
rifles with which to arm his forces. The dream of a British South Africa had been 
stymied, but pressures continued to mount. British officials, especially the Colonial 
Secretary Joseph Chamberlain and the High Commissioner for Southern Africa, Alfred 
Milner, continued to advocate for voting rights to Uitlanders under Boer rule.90 Kruger, 
with few incentives to cooperate and the hints of German backing from the notorious 
Kruger Telegram, stood firm.91 After a mutual exchange of ultimatums in late 1899 – 
Chamberlain demanded full rights for Uitlanders; Kruger demanded withdrawal of all 
British forces from the Transvaal border within forty-eight hours – the situation 
deteriorated into open war. 
                                                        
90 High Commissioners acted as representatives of Crown sovereignty to British colonial governments. 
Constitutionally, they appointed Governments and assented legislation, etc., on the Crown’s behalf. 
91 In the aftermath of the Jameson Raid in 1896, Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II telegraphed Kruger to 
congratulate him on repelling British aggression. Once leaked, the telegram sparked an Anglo-German 
diplomatic crisis which the Kaiser was forced to diffuse with a conciliatory letter to his grandmother, 
Queen Victoria. 
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 The opening moves of the Boer War went horribly pear-shaped for British forces. 
With reinforcements thousands of miles away, well-armed and fast-moving Boer troops 
seized the initiative and cornered British positions. Soon they bottled up General George 
White in Ladysmith, Natal (the operation that took the life of Piet Joubert and bestirred 
Kipling); Cecil Rhodes in Kimberley, the Cape Colony; and Robert Baden-Powell in 
Mafeking, Bechuanaland. Thus Redvers Buller, the British general initially tasked with 
prosecuting the war, faced the impossible task of liberating three ongoing sieges with his 
single, already outnumbered force. Buller split his strength into thirds and tried to 
accomplish this in one three-pronged stroke. This failed miserably, and 1899 ended with 
“Black Week” – three successive defeats for British forces and nearly 3,000 casualties. 
Following intense public hand-wringing, the War Office sacked Buller and attempted to 
reconstitute British forces in southern Africa. 30,000 new volunteers from British South 
Africa and almost as many again from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand leant an air 
of imperial solidarity to the reconstituted force.92 The Indian Army arrived in time to 
prevent a total collapse of British positions in Natal, though it was a special detachment 
of British soldiers from the Indian Army; native Indians with guns risked upsetting the 
racist sensibilities of the white population in South Africa, whom Britain could not afford 
to alienate.93 
By this point, the calamity of the South African emergency had begun to affect 
politics in London, and in the seats of government across the Empire. Salisbury, then 
                                                        
92 See the figures provided in Keith Jeffery, “Kruger’s Farmers, Strathcona’s Horse, Sir George Clarke’s 
Camels and the Kaiser’s Battleships: The Impact of the South African War on Imperial Defence,” in The 
South African War Reappraised, ed. Donal Lowry (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), 189. 
93 See Balasubramanyam Chandramohan, “‘Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark Left out’?: The South 
African War, Empire and India,” in The South African War Reappraised, ed. Donal Lowry (New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2000), 158–9. 
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double-jobbing as both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, was judged (rightly, it 
must be said) to have overstretched himself, and surrendered the latter portfolio to 
Lansdowne in late 1900.94 Meanwhile, as the imperial war machine lumbered to life, the 
Pacific colonial contingents and 7,000 troops from India were supplemented by imperial 
detachments from across the Mediterranean and Middle East: Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, 
Egypt, Aden, and Mauritius. This vast regional muster proved haphazard and, in the 
war’s aftermath, an easy target for criticism. Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster, the Belfast 
firebrand and secretary of the Imperial Federation League, wrote a sensational polemic 
against the Government’s management of deployment to South Africa from his post at 
the Admiralty in 1900: The War Office, the Army, and the Empire: A Review of the 
Military Situation in 1900.95 Of the scrambling, fevered manner in which imperial 
outposts were denuded of troops for the war effort, he wrote: “it stands to reason that in 
any war except the particular one in which we happen to have been engaged such 
transfers could only be described as criminal folly.”96 In one exemplary case, the 
Government of New Zealand under Richard Seddon, having sent an initial detachment of 
troops to South Africa, faced calls for additional deployments and felt compelled to poll 
                                                        
94 Wilson, International Impact of the Boer War, ch. 10 “The Boer War in the Context of Britain’s Imperial 
Problems” This move involved pressure from Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, to do a deal with 
Germany over South Africa and related strategic questions. Germany played here for a Triple Alliance 
(with Britain and Austria), but Salisbury feared the multiplicity of global land borders shared by British 
territory and that of France and Russia, who would be created his formal enemies by such a deal, and 
demurred this offer. 
95 H.O. Arnold-Forster, The War Office, the Army, and the Empire: A Review of the Military Situation in 
1900 (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1900). 
96 Ibid., 30. The text will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter. 
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the assent of Representatives on their willingness to dispatch more men from their 
constituencies.97 By war’s end in 1902 they had performed ten such consultations.98 
 The imperial troop surge eventually worked, albeit at great cost. The cost in 
casualties on both sides joined the diplomatic and moral costs of a grisly, counter-
insurgent war. Probing, on-site journalism cataloged the increasingly repressive tactics of 
British troops against unconventional Boer forces. An Irishman and committed 
imperialist named Roger Casement reported on the atrocities of the Boer War and the 
Congo colony from a consular post. The experience so reframed his perspective on 
British power in the world that it drove him into the welcoming arms of Irish 
republicanism.99 Emily Hobhouse’s exposé on the British practice of rounding up the 
families of Boer soldiers into “concentration camps,” where they were malnourished and 
prone to disease and death, made her, and the Manchester Guardian for which she wrote, 
household names of liberal reformism.100 The course of the war featured enough 
fortunate turns for British forces to keep the campaign from derailing, however. The 
relief of Mafeking in May 1900 provoked an Empire-wide night of bacchanalian revelry 
and catapulted future Scoutmaster Robert Baden-Powell to fame as the garrison’s 
indomitable commander. 
                                                        
97 See: “South African War Telegrams,” 1902 ACHW 8634 SEDDON2/4/15 R19467553, NANZ. 
98 See Ian McGibbon and John Crawford, eds., One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New Zealand, The 
British Empire, and the South African War (Auckland (New Zealand): Auckland University Press, 2003), 
chap. 5, Thomas Pakenham, “The Contribution of the Colonial Forces.” 
99 Casement’s Road to Damascus moment culminated in his own death at the hands of British forces in 
1916, after the German U-boat on which he had been conspiring farcically dumped him on the shores of his 
native land, delivering him, hypothermic and bewildered, into the hands of his erstwhile employers.  
100 See G. R. Searle, A New England?: Peace and War 1886-1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 281; Searle has written elsewhere of how the debacle of the war provoked a national craze for 
“efficiency”; G. R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political 
Thought, 1899-1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971). 
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The war’s fortunate turn for British forces affected many other careers besides. 
The early disasters at Colenso and Spion Kop were followed by successes at Paardeburg, 
and the relief of Rhodes at Kimberley. These victories redeemed the reputation of 
Redvers Buller, and burnished that of Gen. Lord Roberts, aging hero of many Victorian 
engagements, qualifying him to assume initial command of British forces in World War 
I, the conflict that claimed his life in late 1914. The man who would succeed him in 
Flanders, Herbert Kitchener, also cemented his reputation as a military fixer in South 
Africa. Having won fame for saving the British campaign in the Sudan some years 
before, Kitchener spearheaded the scorched-earth tactics he believed would win the war, 
in accordance with his Shermanesque reputation. The war’s turn also gave Salisbury’s 
Tory Government of 1895 a new lease on life, ushering him into a final term, despite his 
failing health, on the heels of the “Khaki Election” of October 1900, so named for the hue 
of imperial kit in South Africa. 1900 marked a resounding victory for the Tories, who 
rode a wave of imperial fervor (jingoism, according to their critics) to an increased 
majority and a renewed confidence to win the war.101 
 But the elation of final victory over Afrikaner forces, after much mopping-up, in 
May 1902 scarcely masked the revulsion at what it had cost, and the anxiety over the 
sheer inadequacy of imperial planning, institutions, and politics to address military crises 
of this type. Formal measures to reform these inadequacies in the war’s aftermath will be 
                                                        
101 A helpful discussion of the implications of class in the 1900 election is Richard Price, An Imperial War 
and the British Working Class: Working-Class Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War, 1899-1902, 1st ed. 
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discussed below. The remainder of this chapter will discuss how the war – as crisis, 
logistical challenge, romantic cause, shameful debacle – affected political debates in 
Britain’s Pacific colonies. British forces’ nominal casus belli in South Africa concerned 
electoral democracy – Kruger’s refusal of voting rights to Uitlander-British settlers. The 
ramifications of this global intervention to vindicate democracy provoked Empire-wide 
conversations about democracy and self-government as the racial birthrights and 
constitutional baselines necessary for British political society to function. Critically, the 
war also established a precedent that the British Government would militarily intervene 
to protect the political rights of its subjects; an ironic inversion of the blundered 
American Revolution. Finally, it also stimulated thinking about the viable paths to 
sovereignty available to British colonies. The Afrikaner republics served as warnings: 
they had democratic institutions and copious mineral wealth, but lacked the resources to 
defend the former and the labor and infrastructure to exploit the latter. Now, they were to 
be subsumed within a loosely-agreed roadmap to the trusty federation model, agreed at 
the Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902. Colonial participants in the war from farther afield 
took heart also – operating jointly with Britain implicitly posed them as its partners; the 
pretense of democratic assent to these interventions, however perfunctory, created 
procedural precedents for autonomous security policies among colonial governments. 
Likewise, those hoping to distance themselves from British influence found themselves 
galvanized by the cruelty and sloppiness of the imperial war effort. Especially in Ireland 
and India, the prospect of delegitimizing British power, or resisting it by force of arms, 
looked more feasible to hardline nationalists after 1902. Australians, properly understood 
as proto-Australians at the war’s outbreak, had to complete their own federation project 
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concurrently with the conflict in South Africa. As the Empire’s headline story, they could 
not ignore it, yet by virtue of the Indian Ocean they could keep it at arm’s length. And so 
opportunists on both sides of Pacific federation projects seized on South Africa for their 
own ends. 
 
1.3 AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION, IMPERIAL STRATEGY, AND THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN WAR 
While the war to which Australian colonies would ship over 16,000 troops raged 
in South Africa, the heads of those colonies deliberated over the terms of their federation. 
Australians’ reaction to the plight of Uitlanders carried more emotion than that of 
metropolitan Britons; they empathized with the experience of migration and the 
hardscrabble life that followed it in faraway lands.102 The juxtaposition of some British 
migrants poised to complete a grand federation in the South Pacific and others being 
cheated of their destiny in southern Africa only enhanced the poignancy of Australia’s 
involvement in the war. It also heightened the sense of urgency surrounding the new 
federal state’s ability to defend itself. The alarum raised by Arnold-Forster over the 
reallocation of imperial troop garrisons resounded too in Australia – even farther from 
major concentrations of British forces in the event of a local military contingency. 
Kipling, never one to let an auspicious event in the Empire pass him by, penned an ode to 
                                                        
102 Pakenham, The Boer War, 260. 
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Australia’s emergence as a nation from the crucible of the war; entitled “The Young 
Queen,” it first ran in The Times in late 1900 and was published again as part of Kipling’s 
anthology The Five Nations in 1903.103 In it, the “Young Queen” symbolizing the new 
Australia comes before the Old, symbolizing Britain, in the aftermath of conquest: “Her 
hand was still on her sword-hilt / The spur was still on her heel”. Asking to be crowned 
for her valor, the Old Queen refrains “How shall I crown thee further?” (than the war 
already has), and after several stanzas, sends her new sister forth with a warning about 
peace and security:  
Shall I give thee delight in dominion – mere pride in thy 
setting forth? 
Nay, we be women together – we know what that lust is 
worth. 
Peace in thy utmost borders, and strength on a road 
untrod? 
These are dealt and diminished at the secret will of 
God.104 
 
This stanza, fittingly, contains both the promise of federation (peace within the borders), 
and the solemn reminder that peace and prosperity are fragile, contingent on divine 
ordination. Australia’s nationhood, its security, was inscribed in the heavens, and made 
                                                        
103 A full account of the poem’s publication history is available at 
http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/rg_youngqueen1.htm 
104 Kipling, The Five Nations, 1903, 102-3 
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manifest in a heavenly sign – the Southern Cross – “the Five-Starred Cross above them, 
for sign of the Nations Five.”105 
 At the opposite pole from Kipling’s celestial ramblings lay the grim episode of 
Harry “Breaker” Morant – an Australian who served in South Africa in the Bushveldt 
Carabineers. Morant and another officer were alleged to have shot Boer prisoners during 
the war, and found themselves court-martialed and executed in 1902. Morant’s case 
proved highly controversial – supporters professed his innocence – as an effort by Britain 
to find a convenient colonial scapegoat for the myriad abuses of the South African 
campaign.106 Among other things, the Breaker case highlighted the diplomatic 
disadvantages facing the “Young Queen” – namely, that she was not capable of 
protecting the rights of her citizens against judicial proceedings initiated from the 
imperial center – the very constitutional puzzle that aroused the cogitations of A.V. Dicey 
and A.B. Keith. Here were the paradoxes of constitutional reality in the Edwardian 
autumn of the British Empire. Some colonies were carving new forms of sovereignty out 
of the stultifying hierarchy of a colonized international system, and metropolitan 
officialdom even recognized the utility of this for strategic ends. But changing 
circumstances begat precarious, liminal conditions for colonies like Australia positioning 
themselves as new, rising states. Supporters of Australian federation meant to pry open 
these constitutional lockboxes and take possession of their contents. Strategic expediency 
                                                        
105 The constellation Crux, or “Southern Cross,” rather confusingly features five bright stars, though the 
four that form its cruciform shape are the most well-known. Thus Kipling’s metaphor for the five self-
governing nations of the Empire: Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Cape Colony, is 
technically coherent – the Cape Colony’s status here being roughly as tenuous as Epsilon Crucis’ in Crux.  
106 Donal Lowry discusses the importance of the Morant case to Australian national consciousness, 
especially later during the Vietnam War with the release of the film Breaker Morant, in Lowry, The South 
African War Reappraised, 226–7. 
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to imperial goals was to be their key. Australia’s federation was not just about the way 
the Australian colonies chose to associate with one another, it was about the way they 
chose collectively to associate with the outside world. It was an international project, not 
merely a national one. 
 The prelude to Australian federation reflected this two-level sovereignty.107 A 
series of Australian inter-colonial conferences through the 1880s and 90s provided a 
forum for the individual colonies to discuss common concerns, yet these meetings were 
driven substantively by the colonies’ outward expansionism. The governments of 
individual colonies, especially northerly Queensland, grew anxious at foreign colonial 
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incursion by France and Germany, and to a lesser extent, Japan and the United States. 
They lobbied the British Government to annex the island chains ringing Australia’s 
coasts before another power could. London, particularly the Foreign Office, loathed 
nothing so much as the prospect of colonials complicating their careful diplomatic 
machinations with other European powers. So the Australians resorted to subterfuge – 
Queenslanders seized New Guinea in 1883 and had to be walked back by a hand-
wringing Colonial Office. Britain eventually assumed official control of part of 
southeastern New Guinea five years later and placed it under joint administration with the 
government of Queensland, partly vindicating the colonists’ tactics.108 The issue of New 
Guinea, and of the French threat to annex the New Hebrides, provided the impetus for the 
first Inter-Colonial Convention between Queensland, Victoria, and New South Wales at 
Sydney later in 1883. After this meeting, advocates of federation attempted to seize the 
initiative for future cooperation, and lobby organizations like the Australian Natives 
Association (as one important white political group so preciously dubbed itself) 
spearheaded the effort. The British Government took the first step toward encouraging 
the colonies’ federation when it passed the Australasian Federal Council Act 1885. In its 
original conception, this consultative body included the Australian colonies plus New 
Zealand and representatives from the Crown Colony of Fiji, annexed in 1874.  
Even after the creation of the Federal Council, serious obstacles to unification 
remained. The Australian colonies at the end of the nineteenth century were a diverse lot, 
and their interests often clashed. New South Wales, with its bustling port of Sydney, 
                                                        
108 The National Archives of Australia’s own finding guide on the Federation period narrates this series of 
annexations as part of its official chronology. It says of the climbdown over New Guinea, 
“…demonstrating how powerless Australian colonies were to act on their own.” See: 
<http://www.naa.gov.au/naaresources/publications/research_guides/fedguide/chronology/chron4.htm> 
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greatly valued commercial maritime trade. Its Premier Richard Parkes, a late-warmer to 
federation keen to preserve New South Wales’ interests, feared the Council was a 
platitudinous half-measure and ensured his government never joined it. Queensland, the 
northern colony governed from Brisbane, looked to the tropical zone off its shores and its 
attendant commodities – migration and labor proved critical issues there. Victoria in the 
southeast had been the recent beneficiary of a gold boom that made Melbourne one of the 
wealthiest cities in the British Empire.109 Van Diemen’s Land, or Tasmania, possessed a 
temperate climate and conditions presumed ideal for European settlement, as well as a 
thriving capital at Hobart. Southern and Western Australia remained preoccupied with 
settlerism – enticing new (British) migrants to sign up for the life of hardscrabble farming 
offered by its vast terra nullis where dispossessed Aboriginal peoples once dominated.110 
These differences made it difficult for the colonies to reach consensus on many of the 
day’s important policy issues, most conspicuously trade policy, for which commercial 
Sydney had much to gain from the London-endorsed orthodoxy of free trade, and the 
agricultural and commodity-producing colonies elsewhere on the island-continent, much 
to lose. But the Federal Council served an immediate need for regulating matters of 
business between the colonies, who had no constitutional powers to legislate beyond their 
own borders on matters such as extradition and shipping. 
 While the fears stoked by Queenslanders and other Australians against French or 
German incursion took on a competitive tone – annexation of Pacific islands proved a 
race of sorts, in which the Continentals sprinted ahead with the German claim of western 
                                                        
109 See Belich, Replenishing the Earth, chap. 11, “Melbourne’s Empire.” 
110 The Northern Territory, with all its imagined defensive liabilities, was at the time administered remotely 
from Adelaide in South Australia. 
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New Guinea in 1885 and the French claim of the New Hebrides in 1886 – the fears 
stoked against Japan proved more ominous and adversarial. Japan’s increasingly 
muscular Meiji regime grabbed the world’s attention in 1894 by launching an amphibious 
assault on the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria that efficiently deployed over 200,000 
land forces, held control over the Yellow Sea, and wrested Korea from Qing China in a 
short, eight-month war. Colonel (later Commander-in-Chief of Australian forces) Edward 
T.H. Hutton, the commandant of New South Wales’ military forces, wrote to the NSW 
Colonial Secretary in Sydney in Spring 1895,  
The sudden rise of Japan to the position of a naval and military power of 
the first magnitude has placed the importance of the defence of the 
Australian continent by mutual agreement between the several colonies in 
the light of necessity…The final result of their successive and momentous 
victories by land and sea cannot be foreseen…The necessity for 
preparation for such a possibility becomes a question of the utmost 
importance to Australia, not only in relation to British trade but national 
future.111 
 
Japan’s military show in the Sino-Japanese War only confirmed the worst fears of 
Australasian staff officers – that an organized invader could surely rout the inadequate 
and hopelessly fractured defenses of the individual colonies. Legally, there was not even 
a clear basis for volunteers from New South Wales to come to the aid of a hypothetically-
                                                        
111 Minute by Maj. Gen. Edward Hutton to the NSW Colonial secretary, 12 March 1895, CAB 11/23; 
quoted in Meaney, The Search for Security, 29. 
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besieged Queensland, since the colonies’ militias could only operate within their own 
borders, or up to three miles offshore.112 Lt. Gen. J. Bevan Edwards, the officer 
commanding the Royal Navy’s China Station at Hong Kong, had embarked on a military 
inspection of Australasian colonies’ forces in 1889 and wrote to his counterpart in the 
Horse Guards, London, “The assurances which I have received from the Premiers and 
Ministers of the different Colonies lead me to believe that steps will now be taken to 
bring about federation of the local forces of the different Colonies, so that they may 
combine for defence.”113 
 Edwards was correct. His report helped convince Henry Parkes that New South 
Wales should cooperate with the movement for federation – in his famous Tenterfield 
Speech, often seen as the turning point in the story of Australian unification, Parkes noted 
that nothing short of a unified, federal Australia could ensure the colonies’ security.114 
With all governments finally on board, negotiations over the path forward accelerated. A 
preliminary constitutional convention met in Spring 1891 and approved a draft 
constitution and a name, “The Commonwealth of Australia.” Colonial legislatures failed 
to pass this document, however, as they were in the grip of a severe economic depression 
and their governments were rent by resignations and gridlock. In subsequent years, the 
colonies finally agreed a framework for electing delegates to a Constitutional 
                                                        
112 This was the doctrine of “Colonial Extra-territorial Incompetence.” See S.B. Kaye, “The Offshore 
Jurisdiction of the Australian States,” Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 1, no. 2 (2009): 
37. 
113 Cd. 6188 1890, Australasia – Correspondence Relating to the Inspection of the Military Forces of the 
Australasian Colonies by Major-General J. Bevan Edwards, C.B. Parliamentary Papers, 6. 
114 “SIR HENRY PARKES AT TENTERFIELD. BANQUET TO THE PREMIER. A BRILLIANT 
RECEPTION. [BY TELEGRAPH.] (FROM OUR SPECIAL REPORTER.) TENTERFIELD, 
THURSDAY.,” The Sydney Morning Herald, October 25, 1889, 8. 
 63 
 
Convention, the output of which would then be ratified by referenda in each colony. 
Delegates were elected in early 1897 and met first later that year. The aging Parkes 
suffered the Mosaic misfortune of dying in 1896, but his ambitious young Attorney 
General, Edmund Barton, took center stage at the Convention. The task facing the 
delegates, of authoring Australia’s founding document and making it acceptable to the 
colonial governments, was in its technical sense a task of drafting a bill for the Imperial 
Parliament in London – if they succeeded in having the constitution ratified, it would 
need Westminster’s approval and Royal Assent to become law. The delegates completed 
their work in 1898 and threw themselves to the winds of colonial referenda. In June of 
that year, all the voting colonies approved the draft constitution. But New South Wales 
was not finished complicating matters – its majority in favor came up 8,000 votes short of 
the agreed 80,000-vote threshold, and a new vote had to be scheduled for the following 
year, along with that of Western Australia, which drug its feet for concessions on 
railways throughout the federation negotiations. Having finally cleared the hurdles of 
Australian ratification, the draft constitution would meet its final reckoning in London. 
 Nascent Australians faced an eighteen-month gestation, while their founding 
documents circulated through their colonial plebiscites and then through the corridors of 
London, before their legal birth on the first day of 1901. But international events did not 
wait for constitutional formalities to be settled – the summer of 1898 proved hot and 
dizzying for Britain in seemingly every colonial theater, and especially nervy for 
Australians. Gen. Edwards had warned of this eventuality in his report, stating hopefully 
that federation “would also prevent the unseemly scares which take place whenever the 
relations of the mother country with a foreign power are somewhat strained. The mere 
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fracture of the cable between Darwin and Batavia which recently took place was 
sufficient to cause uneasiness throughout all the Colonies, and in Victoria preparations 
were actually made to resist an attack.”115 In July 1898, the British Government 
negotiated a settlement to lease the Chinese port of Weihaiwei after foreign powers began 
snapping up naval stations in the Yellow Sea following the Sino-Japanese War. American 
forces, having landed in the Philippines in May, captured Manila on 13 August, ejecting 
the Spanish colonial government and establishing a major foothold in the western Pacific. 
Britain and France nearly went to war over the Sudan; British forces under Kitchener 
swept through the defunct Ottoman province after their victory at Khartoum until they 
encountered a French force stationed at the Nile port of Fashoda. A tense stalemate 
ensued, and a British flotilla arrived in early September 1898 to tilt the balance in favor 
of the British, but the standoff was not resolved until Théophile Delcassé ordered his out-
gunned French forces to stand down in November. The ongoing standoff with Paul 
Kruger’s government in the Transvaal did not resolve so fortunately, of course, and by 
late 1899, the war in South Africa was underway. 
 Though South Africa was thousands of miles away from the Commonwealth-in-
waiting, the war with the Afrikaner republics marked the most significant imperial 
conflict since the 1857 rebellion in India, and the first serious inter-state conflict Britain 
had fought since the Crimean War in 1853-6. The commandants of the Australian 
colonies faced an operational headache: Australian subjects kept volunteering for military 
forces that were not fully realized, to fight in conflicts to which they were not formally 
                                                        
115 Cd. 6188 1890, Australasia – Correspondence Relating to the Inspection of the Military Forces of the 
Australasian Colonies by Major-General J. Bevan Edwards, C.B. Parliamentary Papers, 22. 
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deployed.116 The Colonial Office had rebuffed repeated offers of troops to serve in the 
Sudan campaigns, though one contingent of New South Welshmen managed to reach that 
conflict in time to play a role.117 As Edwards and Parkes had warned, federation was the 
only path to defensibility for the Australian colonies, but their disunity also posed a 
challenge for offensives and military adventurism – the colonies found themselves 
coordinating the robust voluntary response to the South African War on an ad hoc basis. 
Queensland sent a formal offer of troops to the British Government first, in fact well 
before the expiry of the diplomatic ultimatum to Kruger, on 11 July 1899. It offered 
Joseph Chamberlain 250 mounted troops and machine guns, and roughly that number 
arrived with the first wave of British offensives under Gen. Lord Methuen in December. 
Loath to be out-shone by the Queenslanders, the other Australian governments quickly 
followed suit.118 The Australian commandants, gathered in Melbourne, hoped to win 
approval for a unified Australian force of a few thousand to deploy in South Africa under 
its own officers. The British War Office quashed the idea. Chamberlain informed the 
Governors of Victoria, NSW, and South Australia on 3 October 1899 that their offered 
troops were to be “an integral portion of Imperial forces” and that they should be 
                                                        
116 In fact, offers of troops by colonial governments were carefully planned for public consumption, as 
work by C.N. Connolly has shown. John Leonard Mordike, An Army for a Nation: A History of Australian 
Military Developments, 1880-1914, Directorate of Army Studies, Dept. of Defence (North Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1992), chap. “Manufacturing Spontaneity”; See also Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian 
Nationalism, 150; Stephen Clarke has challenged this thesis in a recent book chapter, arguing that activist 
officers in Australasian posts expedited the deployment of colonial contingents, see McGibbon and 
Crawford, One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New Zealand, The British Empire, and the South African 
War, chap. 2, “Desperately Seeking Service: The Australasian Commandants and the War.” 
117 A good overview is Barbara R. Penny, “Australia’s Reactions to the Boer War—a Study in Colonial 
Imperialism,” Journal of British Studies 7, no. 01 (November 1967): 97–130, doi:10.1086/385546. 
118 For an overview see the official account published following the war, John Stirling, The Colonials in 
South Africa, 1899-1902: Being the Services of the Various Irregular Corps Raised in South Africa and the 
Contingents from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, and Ceylon Together with the Details of Those 
Mentioned in Despatches with Related Honours and Awards, 2nd ed. (Polstead, Suffolk: J.B. Hayward & 
Son, 1990), 435. 
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commanded at unit-level by officers not higher-ranked than Captain or Major.119 An 
additional spot of bother arose over costs – the Imperial Government expected the 
Australians to cover the costs of equipping and transporting their troops, as well as 
paying their wages (and pensions) at standard imperial rates.  Their only reciprocal offer 
was for arms.120 These issues – of costs and of unified force structure – represented a 
greater tension between the public enthusiasm for the war effort, and private irritations 
over Australia’s security and military capabilities. 
 The Australian colonies nonetheless cooperated with Britain in organizing the 
deployment of the “contingents,” as they came to be known in shorthand. Contemporary 
accounts of these deployments made clear that they marked the first act of a new state. A 
27 January 1900 issue of the South Australian Register featured a number of conspicuous 
articles marking the departure of that colony’s troops.121 Following a correspondent’s 
report from the Veldt about the hazards of life on deployment with the contingents in 
South Africa, a letter signed “LOYAL GERMAN” exhorted the German residents of 
Australia to remain faithful to their domiciled country in the face of the insidious German 
press, which had turned steadily anti-British since the start of the Boer War (and anti-
American since the war with Spain). Next came an account of an Australian Natives 
Association meeting on the occasion of Foundation Day, which marked the arrival of the 
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First Fleet of British ships in Australia, on 26 January 1788. The irony of the Australian 
Natives Association again blazes brightly. Vaiben Solomon, former Mayor of Adelaide 
and serving MP for South Australia, remarked at the meeting that “The spirit of 
patriotism [evident in the deployment of Australian troops to South Africa] had drawn the 
colonies themselves closer together than twenty-five years of commercial peace had 
done, and it had been a striking lesson to the world.”122 Solomon’s words invoke both the 
extent to which federationists regarded security matters as more salient to their 
nationalism and state-building projects than all-too-divisive economic matters, and also 
the way that Australia’s participation in the South African War served as an important 
signaling mechanism to both Britain and the wider international community. As 
diplomatic cables and daily newspapers indicated, Australia seemed to swim in a sea of 
crisis, and its rebirth as a continental federation was as much an outward-facing measure 
as it was an internal consolidation. 
 Mafeking’s liberation on 17 May 1900 spawned the barbarous neologism to 
maffick – to celebrate exuberantly, uncritically, wildly.123 Within two months, Queen 
Victoria’s subjects had more occasions for mafficking. They mafficked on 17 July, when 
Indian troops bore the imperial flag into Peking and freed the besieged international 
legations trapped in its diplomatic quarter, turning the tide of the Boxer Rebellion in 
favor of the international coalition. They mafficked also in Australia the previous week, 
when the Federation Bill passed through the Mother of Parliaments in Westminster and 
                                                        
122 “FOUNDATION DAY – A.N.A. BANQUET,” The South Australian Register, January 27, 1900, 5.  
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received Royal Assent on 9 July. The anti-federationist boy had at last been run down in 
the tracks, brave but misguided. The Commonwealth of Australia realized what one St. 
Kildan had described as “the consolidat[ion] of the power of the British Empire in the 
southern seas.”124 It remained to implement the provisions of the new constitution. The 
Australian colonies legally became “states” of the Australian Commonwealth. The 
constitution entrusted to the new, bicameral Australian Parliament “[the] naval and 
military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States,” but importantly 
clarified in the following chapter that “The command in chief of the naval and military 
forces of the Commonwealth is vested in the Governor-General as the Queen’s 
representative.”125 The ability to make war, then, remained a centralized privilege of the 
British monarchy, itself indivisible from the British Parliament. This detail proved critical 
in subsequent years. So too did Section 87 of the constitution, which stipulated that for a 
period of ten years following the establishment of the Commonwealth, the federal 
government would return 75% of its customs and excise revenue to the governments of 
the States for their use as needed. Thus for the first ten years of its life, the 
Commonwealth of Australia would operate, fiscally, at quarter capacity. Australian 
military and naval ambitions would have to plan accordingly. The usual headquarters for 
Australian commandants and naval officers, Melbourne, stood in as the Commonwealth’s 
capital until such time as land could be set aside for the creation of a new one in interior 
                                                        
124 “MEETING AT ST. KILDA,” (probably) The Critic, June 4, 1898, 5. Accessed MS 1540, The Papers of 
Alfred Deakin, Series 11, Item 11/356. 
125 63 & 64 VICT. THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT, Ch. II Sect. 68, 
“Command of naval and military forces.” 
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New South Wales, “not less than one hundred miles from Sydney.”126 Finally, the new 
constitution contained a few sections that directly addressed the way the Commonwealth 
would count its population, a critical procedure for determining the apportionment of 
seats in the new population-based lower house, the House of Representatives. In a move 
that directly echoed the American sectional crisis fifty years earlier, the constitution 
stated explicitly that “aboriginal natives shall not be counted,” (Section 127) and that 
“persons of any race [who] are disqualified from voting at elections for the more 
numerous House of the Parliament of the States” would not be counted in either a State’s 
or the Commonwealth’s population figures (Section 25). The census method reflected 
and reinforced thinking about citizenship in the new Commonwealth. With security as the 
Commonwealth’s first principle and Anglo-Saxonism its racial self-image, Aborigines 
fell outside the imagined national borders.127 
 The news of the Commonwealth Bill’s performance in London came off 
Australian presses sandwiched between columns on the South African War and columns 
on the plight of the besieged legations in Peking; Australians fought in both those 
conflicts, under the aegis of an imagined nation not yet possessed of a state. The 
Tasmanian Daily Telegraph noted as it reported the Bill’s passage, “The work of making 
the constitution was done when the public mind was free from the distractions of great 
wars,” but that “the dangerous state of affairs in Eastern Asia is a matter of deep concern 
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for Australia,” and that henceforth it would be Australia’s “destiny” to play a role there. 
For, it concluded, “Australia will speak and act more weightily when she speaks and acts 
as a nation.”128 Here again the imagined moment of Australia’s nativity is confused – 
contemporaries seemed unable to decide whether the de jure provisions of the 
Commonwealth Bill, or the de facto acts of Australian forces in the international sphere, 
constituted the true measure of nationhood. These conflations and interminglings 
underscore the two-dimensional nature of sovereignty in the case of Australia and in the 
British Empire more broadly – building a new state from colonial materials required an 
internal consolidation; a constitutional process, a legal procedure designed to confer the 
sovereignty of the Crown upon a new unified Governorship and convened legislature. 
But it also required a message to the world. Australians situated themselves, and their 
nascent identity, within an international context of conflict, uncertainty, and fear, for 
which they constructed themselves as interested actors ready to contribute. The nature of 
this contribution was interventionist, and even colonialist in its own right. In that sense, 
Australians took on the mode of their imperial forebears, but Britain and the great 
European imperial powers were not the only forces shaping these norms of sovereignty; 
Australians contributed their own ingredients, many of which Britain and specifically the 
Colonial Office actively worked to restrain or suppress. Manifest destiny had driven 
Australians across the island-continent to establish the sovereignty of colonial states, in 
which the Aboriginal inhabitants would now lack voting rights; it drove them also into 
                                                        
128 No title. Daily Telegraph (Launceston, Tasmania), Monday July 9, 1900, 2. 
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the Greater Pacific – to China, and to their near-abroad, in their quest to become “master 
of the Southern Seas,” as it was put at St. Kilda.129 But there were rivals for that title. 
 On the same day Australian newspapers reported on the success of the 
Commonwealth Bill, they also reported on the landing of between 25,000 and 100,000 
Japanese troops on mainland China (reports varied), deployed to stop the massacre of 
foreigners in Peking.130 The Allied invasion of China took another month to liberate the 
surviving foreigners in the capital, ultimately with far fewer troops than the papers 
speculated. By the following summer Australia was attempting to pass its first Defence 
Bill through the Commonwealth parliament. Richard Armstrong Crouch, the Member for 
Corio near Melbourne, soliloquized during the Bill’s second reading: “It is not from the 
European nations that I think we Australians have to expect any great national 
difficulties, but from those great nations of the East, China and Japan, which we have 
unfortunately stirred up, and which we are unfortunately teaching European methods of 
utilizing their military resources. We have already seen,” he continued, “with the recent 
Chinese campaign how very complete—far too complete—the Japanese arrangements 
already are in connexion with their military organization.”131 Crouch’s warnings 
supported two recommendations – to fortify Darwin, that northernmost extremity of 
                                                        
129 At the time of federation there was still not a formal State or Colony government controlling the over 
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Australia and the first point of arrival for a supposed “Oriental” invader, and the 
restriction of migrants to that region for the same reason.  
Forceful arguments for Australian interests arose also in the wind-up of the South 
African War. Joseph Chamberlain, hoping to leverage colonial enthusiasm for the war to 
advance his own federal scheme for the whole Empire, cabled a secret offer to the heads 
of colonial governments who had sent contingents to South Africa, offering to loop them 
into the peace negotiations.132 The Australians rebuffed the offer. This move seems 
strange for a newly-made federal state hoping to leverage its diplomatic position in the 
Empire and the world, but for two factors: Chamberlain’s was a pro-forma offer and the 
colonies sensed this, and even if the offer had carried serious weight, it would have 
pulled Australian interests too far out of the new federal government’s preferred area of 
emphasis – the southern Pacific. This strategic tension typified relations between the 
early Commonwealth and metropolitan officials. Australians’ enthusiasm for serving in 
South Africa and their relative lack of interest in influencing the future of political order 
in South Africa seems at first a paradox, but it need not be.133 Colonial statesmen 
imagined the political capital their troops earned in South Africa as fungible and not 
limited to South African affairs. As discussed above, they saw the Boer War as an 
opportunity to demonstrate their competence in joint military operations and to redirect 
the Empire’s strategic orientation to their own ends. As an exercise in building good faith 
and political capital, it was presumed useful for its own end. Both Barton in the early 
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Commonwealth and his neighbors in New Zealand deployed this basic strategy, seeking 
little beyond trade opportunities with postwar South Africa. 
Some voices in the early Commonwealth held opposing views about the 
appropriate military modus operandi for the fledgling state. At the Defence Bill’s reading 
in late 1901, the Commonwealth’s combined military assets were paltry and not centrally 
organized – about 5,000 remained in South Africa; there were roughly 28,000 on 
combined State registers and about 2,000 seamen, but of all these a mere 1,750 were 
active duty.134 A significant faction in the Australian Parliament preferred things remain 
that way. Henry Bournes Higgins, the MP for North Melbourne and a prominent liberal, 
railed against “militarism” and the Defence Bill, preferring that Australia remain isolated, 
trusting in the protection of the Royal Navy, and eschew any robust system of national 
defense, to say nothing of foreign deployments like the one in South Africa. Higgins 
protested, “it is inadvisable and impracticable for us to have any military system like that 
of a sovereign European State. So long as we are not a sovereign State, in the sense of 
being able to dictate peace or war, we shall not be consulted as to peace or war” 
(emphasis mine).135 Higgins was both misguided (apparently he was not aware of 
Chamberlain’s offer, nominal though it was, of a seat at the table in South Africa) and 
prophetic: he perceived that the first principles of sovereignty’s norms, as shaped by 
European empires, concerned security. Moreover, he shared the view of many British 
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subjects in the Pacific that “the storm centre of the world has shifted to the east of Asia” 
and thus his arguments, anti-military though they were, complimented the visions of 
Australasians hoping to shift the Empire’s strategic center of gravity eastwards.136 
Unlike the military issue and the idea of foreign deployment, few in Australia 
seriously questioned the importance of naval protection for the island-continent and its 
fledgling Commonwealth government. Here too, the issue of Australian interests and the 
Commonwealth’s incipient sovereignty loomed large in the early years of the twentieth 
century. Its first Governor, Lord Hopetoun, having simply graduated from his post as 
Governor of Victoria, wrote to William Creswell, naval officer and staunch advocate for 
an Australian naval force fresh off a deployment to China, that “In profound peace the 
risk to Australia appears remote, but it must be remembered that when War breaks out 
there is no time to acquire what is then admitted it would have been prudent to possess.” 
Creswell replied that a “Force [of ships serving in Australian waters] has been kept 
together in the firm belief that with Federation, a Federation mainly for defence, there 
would be established an Australian Naval Defence in which they would be accorded their 
due place.” He noted that the slow progress on this matter was having a “detrimental 
effect.”137 In the coming years, the young Australian state’s naval aspirations proved to 
be one of the British Empire’s most pressing strategic issues; one that drove a broad 
conversation about the meaning of sovereignty within the Empire and the way its 
changing constitutional landscape would reflect that meaning. 
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1.4 NEW ZEALAND AND THE FEDERATION OF AUSTRALIA: 
MISTRESS(ES) OF THE SOUTHERN SEAS? 
 New Zealand watched the process of Australian federation closely. In fact, it 
acted as a formal participant in the preliminary conferencing and federal discussions, and 
enjoyed an invitation to join the Commonwealth. While New Zealand did not undergo a 
major institutional evolution at the turn of the century like Australia, then, its supporting 
role in Australian federation and its parallel role in the South African War stimulated 
similar conversations about sovereignty, its meaning, and its future.138 But the colony, 
like its Australian neighbor, looked increasingly outward, and in this period its level of 
engagement with imperial counterparts and the international community evolved – by 
1907 its Prime Minister Joseph Ward would tell his colleagues in London that the term 
“colony” no longer described his country.139 Successive New Zealand governments 
pursued outward-looking and self-consciously expansionistic strategies. London officials’ 
                                                        
138 New Zealand’s historiography does not usually emphasize this moment; where it does, the focus tends 
to be inward, on the social changes taking place in the early twentieth century, or on nationalist self-
conception. Contrast the latest iterations of the Oxford History of New Zealand, which cover the topic of 
war lightly and the latter of which suggests that “War has generally touched lightly on New Zealand,” 
(245) with the works of Ian McGibbon and James Belich. Geoffrey W. Rice, ed., The Oxford History of 
New Zealand, 2nd ed. (Auckland, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Giselle Byrnes, ed., The New 
Oxford History of New Zealand (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); I. C. 1947-(Ian C. ) 
McGibbon, Blue-Water Rationale: The Naval Defence of New Zealand 1914-1942 (Wellington, N.Z.: Govt. 
Printer, 1981); McGibbon and Crawford, One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New Zealand, The British 
Empire, and the South African War; James Belich, The New Zealand Wars (Auckland, N.Z. ; New York: 
Penguin, 1998); James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880’s to the 
Year 2000 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004). 
139 See Chapter 3 below. 
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dyspepsia over the diplomatic and military crises playing out across the Empire was, for 
New Zealanders, opportunity. This sort of opportunism was not straightforwardly 
nationalistic or anti-colonial, however; New Zealanders, like their Australian neighbors, 
offered to mutualize the strategic burdens of the Empire in the South Pacific, which 
enhanced their autonomy and prestige but allowed them to connect their local interests to 
the common interests of the metropole and the Empire.140 As above, New Zealand’s own 
debate about whether to join the nascent Australian Commonwealth, and subsequently 
whether to carve out a Pacific federation of its own, featured much discussion of the 
South African War. New Zealanders drew similar conclusions to their neighbors about 
the diplomatic payoffs of their participation in the war – that Britain would be forced to 
pay closer attention to their interests – but the strategic lessons they took home from the 
Veldt diverged in interesting ways. Australians feared invasion. Theirs was a large 
country, sparsely populated, with thousands of miles of coastline and close proximity to 
competing colonial powers. Their fears aligned with those of South Africa’s British 
inhabitants that began the war bottled up in besieged towns. New Zealand, curiously, 
seemed to strategically identify instead with the Boers. The Afrikaners’ dogged defense 
of their rugged territory and success in making the war costly to invaders heartened New 
Zealanders and gave them the confidence to defer inclusion in an Australian federation – 
federations coalesced for security purposes and, after all, the New Zealanders felt secure 
enough.  
                                                        
140 See Eddy and Schreuder - “The phenomenon of colonial natioanlism can be seen acting as the 
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 Richard Seddon’s Government made early offers to supply troops from New 
Zealand for the British war effort in South Africa. By the war’s end, New Zealand’s 
legislature authorized ten contingents totaling over 6,000 men.141 This robust contribution 
produced a number of domestic effects – many felt national pride, a smaller number, 
often those with Irish backgrounds, decried imperial tyranny against the Boers, and as in 
Australia, many took the war as occasion for anti-German rhetoric.142 Anti-Germanism 
played a dual role here – as a function of British patriotism it intuitively demonized the 
Boer enemy and its German patron, yet as a function of New Zealander patriotism it also 
linked the distant war in South Africa to matters closer to New Zealand’s interests, 
namely, competition with German colonialism in the southern Pacific. There was also a 
sense of competition with the other British colonies to assist the imperial war effort – one 
New Zealand legislator cabled his assent for an eighth contingent of troops in 1902 with 
the note “We must not be behind Canada in assisting to terminate the war.”143 An early 
1902 government memo contains records of resolutions passed by city councils across 
New Zealand condemning the German press, for all the good it did, for printing 
“vilifying” invective against the British war effort and New Zealand’s participation 
therein.144 One article in the New Zealand Herald alleged that Germany’s denunciation of 
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British war crimes in South Africa stemmed effectively from jealousy – from Germany’s 
second-rate empire, especially in the realization that it would make no gains in South 
Africa, with “North America and Australasia now closed to her.”145 
 The specters of Germany and South Africa loomed over New Zealand’s decision 
over whether to join the Australian Commonwealth as well. Ahead of this decision, the 
Government of New Zealand called a special commission in early 1901 to hear testimony 
on the desirability of union with Australia, drawn from a variety of notable personalities 
from the realms of trade, finance, politics, and the military.146 These extensive 
testimonies contain a wealth of information on the logics of state-building as conceived 
by New Zealanders at the time – the committee questioned their guests thoroughly and 
pressed them to elaborate on key points. A vast majority advised against joining 
Australia. Less predictably, South Africa entered these testimonies with remarkable 
frequency. Most of the respondents mentioned trade in some way, for potential 
competition with Australian products and the issue of trade policy were key concerns for 
any possible federation, but even here South Africa proved a point of reference. Many 
opined that with the coming South African federation as a trade partner, New Zealand 
would not be as dependent on her large Australian neighbor as a market, or conduit for, 
food commodities. In this argument, New Zealand’s contingents in South Africa served 
as the vanguard of an enduring bilateral influence that would last through peacetime.  
Many of those giving testimony also mentioned the issue of defense. On this issue 
there were two key parameters – the respondents seemed to have internalized that the 
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federation of Australia had occurred for military and geostrategic ends, and felt obliged to 
speculate on whether the inclusion of New Zealand served those ends; secondly, they 
usually followed with an appraisal of New Zealand’s defensibility on its own terms. A 
Rev. William Curzon-Siggers, vicar of a Dunedin Anglican church, testified that New 
Zealand needed to preserve its aloofness as an “island race,” akin to Britain, from that of 
“continental” Australia. He also told the committee that New Zealand would neither 
need, nor could it expect, military aid from Australia in the event of an invasion, since the 
latter would have astronomically greater territorial liabilities.147 Three respondents – a 
grain merchant, the Mayor of Christchurch, and a timber and sawmill magnate, directly 
stated that the experience of the South African War had proved that highly motivated and 
dogged defenders of rugged territory could hold out for extended periods of time against 
superior forces operating with long, seaborne supply lines.148 In this fanciful invasion 
scenario, New Zealanders imagined themselves as Boers. The strategic lessons of the 
South African War contained multitudes, from clergy to politicians to commercial 
traders. Their collective focus on the danger and ramifications of invasion show how 
some in other colonial theaters were applying the military lessons of South Africa to the 
task of securing and building states, and shaping the eventual consensus that New 
Zealand could go it alone as a sovereign state in the South Pacific. 
Within a year, the evolving colony would re-open another federation debate, but 
instead of identifying with the Boer opponent, advocates would invoke the Uitlander 
British faction instead. One common strand that ran through New Zealand’s debates 
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about federation, with Australia or in some other configuration, was the geostrategic 
dimension of prevailing opinions. The government commission testimonies abound with 
speculation on the balance of power in the Pacific and how New Zealand could best serve 
British, and its own, interests in the matter going forward.149 As the country moved into 
its next debate on the possibility of carving out a new federation from South Pacific 
islands, these geostrategic arguments resonated ever louder. The New Zealand Times and 
other newspapers reported large public meetings held in the country’s major cities in 
January 1902 to express outrage at German press commentary on the South African War. 
Sir George White, the commander of the besieged British occupants of Ladysmith at the 
outbreak of the war, was on hand at the Wellington rally. He boasted to the crowd, “Let 
our enemies take a forecast of the last two years. They must be conscious that in Canada, 
in South Africa, and in Australasia there was in each case an infant Hercules, and that the 
voice of these young giants must soon be heard in the councils of the nations.” The Otago 
Daily Times reported the remarks of Dunedin’s mayor, James Alexander Park, 
channeling Tennyson’s surreal and clairvoyant 1835 masterwork “Locksley Hall”:  
When the war is over we shall go on our way like the river that has been 
choked by an avalanche. Our Empire is building a group of federations. It 
has succeeded in Canada and Australia, and now that Boer obstinacy will 
be removed, it will succeed in Africa. On these great pillars will be laid a 
roof to shelter the world. As time passes we hope to make one mighty 
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peace-loving English-speaking Power, preliminary to the parliament of 
man, the federation of the world.150 
 
 
 
 
1.5 THE NEW ZEALAND-FIJI FEDERATION MOVEMENT  
As quickly as the debate on whether to join Australia had died out, a new one 
took its place – whether and how New Zealand should create its own federation by 
joining with Fiji, the Cook Islands, and a number of other small archipelagos. This 
question had surfaced a number of times before, but gained unprecedented momentum 
after 1900. What made the situation different here was its diplomatic and strategic 
context. The federation of Australia, the progress of the Boer War, and the British 
Government’s foreign treaty-making in the Pacific each leant the Fijian question urgency 
and attention. The logic of the proposed federation included many factors, and trade and 
labor were among the most important of these, but diplomatic and security concerns 
alone pushed the issue to its resolution, albeit unsuccessful, in three colonies and in 
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London itself.151 This small South Pacific colony, through both diplomatic and social 
scandals and a burst of political agitation, briefly served as the front line of an ongoing 
battle over how to define sovereignty and how best to organize states in the British 
Empire. Fiji’s federation saga reveals some of this period’s most burning issues: murky 
constitutional puzzles, fraught racial politics, and a fixation on federation as a political 
path that could deliver colonial dreams of sovereignty and defensibility. 
 New Zealand Premier Julius Vogel had twice attempted to annex Fiji, in 1874 and 
1885, and had been rebuffed by the Colonial Office, which still reserved the right to 
regulate the external affairs of colonies, self-governing or otherwise.152 Thus by the turn 
of the century Fiji had been a frequent if not entirely positive feature of New Zealand’s 
near-abroad. Settlers in Fiji had also attempted to have the islands annexed by both 
Victoria and New South Wales before Australia’s federation, but these efforts failed too, 
primarily due to the problem of trade competition between like commodities. 
Constitutionally, Fiji remained a Crown Colony, which meant that the Crown (and in real 
terms, the Colonial Secretary) bore exclusive responsibility for its affairs, which were 
managed by an appointed local Governor who ruled through small Executive and 
Legislative Councils comprised of appointed officials. The islands themselves held just 
over 110,000 inhabitants; of these about 4,000 were white settlers who owned the large 
agricultural companies and worked in towns, about 15,000 were migrant laborers from 
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India, and the remaining 90,000 native Fijians.153 The movement for federation with New 
Zealand emerged almost exclusively among the islands’ white settlers. Its leaders 
included Humphry Berkeley, a lawyer with aspirations in the Fijian court system, and 
F.E. Riemenschneider, the son of an Australian timber magnate and Warden (a mayoral 
post) of Suva, Fiji’s second city. Berkeley and Riemenschneider were articulate 
advocates of federation for a variety of reasons, but among the most important was their 
personal dislike of Fiji’s Colonial Governor, George O’Brien, and their desire to rid the 
islands of O’Brien, and his very office, altogether.154 O’Brien reciprocated their 
sentiment and considered it his duty to protect the colony in his trust from rapacious 
cowboys like the federationists, and he told the Colonial Office as much in repeated 
memos. 
 What brought Fiji and New Zealand close to federation in 1900 was the Tripartite 
Convention concluded between Britain, Germany, and the United States in November 
1899. The Convention’s object was a carve-up of the Samoan Islands, which lay a few 
hundred miles east of Fiji. In the resulting settlement, Britain renounced all claims in 
Samoa in exchange for concessions in Africa and elsewhere, while the Germans and 
Americans divided the Samoan islands between them. British Australasians regarded this 
agreement as nothing short of an abject betrayal of themselves and their interests. The 
Americans may have been a meddlesome presence in the region but the hated Germans, 
now with a working colony and attendant naval and telegraph stations, were a rival 
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imperial power and a menace to British hegemony in the South Pacific. The British 
Empire’s undersea telegraph cable, the sole means of rapid communication between 
Australia, New Zealand, and London, ran through Suva. Australians and New Zealanders 
took the Convention as evidence that Britain was willing to mortgage their regional 
aspirations, and their very security, for metropolitan payoffs and what they viewed as 
petty claims in Africa and elsewhere. 
Enter Richard Seddon, who noted after the Tripartite Convention,  
This surrender of Samoa will, in future, be a source of anxiety, and entail expense 
on Great Britain and the Colonies in preparing for and providing against 
eventualities. However, now that it has been done, it is necessary that 
immediately it is opportune, steps be taken to put the islands admitted to be 
British on a satisfactory footing. I therefore venture to suggest for consideration 
that the boundaries of New Zealand should be extended so as to include the Cook 
Group, the Fiji, the Friendly, and the Society Islands, or such of them as might be 
included within the extended boundaries with advantage and without causing 
complications.155 
 
Seddon’s idea of “satisfactory footing,” apparently, meant a manifest destiny for New 
Zealand in the South Pacific, and a recognition that New Zealand, not Britain, would act 
as guarantor of British interests in the region. “Eventualities,” likewise, was typical 
understatement. Germany’s meteoric naval ascent now had an anchor point in the Fijian 
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and New Zealander back-yards, and with Britain’s attention elsewhere it would now fall 
to local actors to “prepare,” such as they could, for the consequences of the German 
presence.  
 Accordingly, Seddon drafted a memo to the Colonial Office in which he 
advocated federation with the South Pacific islands and argued that this measure was 
necessary for their mutual security and the safeguard of British interests. He also hoped 
that these measures would offset New Zealand’s presumed relative decline in prestige, 
after opting out of the Australian Commonwealth, in the eyes of Britain and the Colonial 
Office.156 But the Colonial Office politely rebuffed his petitions, and here the story 
changed directions. Rather than dropping the matter, Seddon doubled down on his 
interest in Fiji and embarked on a tour of the South Pacific islands in May 1900, 
ostensibly as a rest from his political labor at home. From this point the emphasis of his 
machinations for Fiji would focus on the issue of representative government there and not 
on New Zealand’s ambitions, which clearly did not play as well in London as he had 
hoped. Self-government in Fiji would create an opportunity for settlers there to self-
authorize its union with New Zealand, short-circuiting the Governor and by extension the 
meddlesome Colonial Office. This tactical shift fit well with the hopes of Fiji’s British 
settlers, who received Seddon warmly on his visit. 
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 By the time of Seddon’s arrival in Fiji, the federationists there had created an 
organization called the Fiji Federation League to organize meetings and distribute 
propaganda for their cause. The latter pursuit was greatly helped by the fact that 
federation activist Humphry Berkeley controlled the islands’ only circulating newspaper, 
the Fiji Times.157 The League organized a number of town-hall meetings in the wake of 
Seddon’s visit in effort to sustain local enthusiasm for federation. The arguments made 
by attendees to these meetings, which were recorded and reprinted in the Fiji Times, are 
of interest not just for understanding the singular animosity that existed between agents 
of the Crown and Fiji’s federationists, as Fieldhouse is primarily concerned to explain. 
They are also remarkable for the number of times they invoke the Boer War. Southern 
Africa lay some thousands of miles removed from Fiji; the war had not much affected, 
much less threatened, the islands. But the records of Fiji’s attempted federation with New 
Zealand, as in the cases seen above, do not reflect that detachment.  
Seddon arrived in Fiji just weeks after Mafeking Night. Fijians hoping to join 
New Zealand in federation referenced the Boer War both in terms of the reciprocity they 
felt Britain owed its colonies for their aid there, but chiefly in their arguments about their 
right to self-government itself. South Africa gave the federationists an opportunity to 
argue that service in war showed colonial commitment to British values such as the 
franchise, which Britain had fought to vindicate against the hated Kruger government, 
and that their martial efficacy was itself proof of their fitness to govern their own affairs. 
Fijian settlers also argued that the diplomatic capital accrued by the colonial contingents 
in South Africa should be fungible for Australian issues. Like the Boer War itself, these 
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arguments also had strong racial connotations, both in the extent to which racial outsiders 
were seen as security risks and in the British settlers’ presumed fitness to be their own 
masters, and perhaps the masters of the greater South Pacific. These arguments emerged 
forcefully at a Fiji Federation League meeting in Levuka on 14 June 1900. The themes of 
democracy, diplomatic capital, and race will now be considered in turn.  
After the Chairman called the Levuka meeting to order, a short opening oration by 
one W.I. Thomas concluded with a formal motion in favor of Fijian federation with New 
Zealand. Thomas’ motion was seconded by John M. Hedstrom, the son of a local retail 
department store magnate. Hedstrom gave a lengthy speech connecting the aspirations of 
those gathered with the struggles of the Uitlanders in South Africa, those British miners 
and settlers to whom Paul Kruger had denied the franchise and for whom the war there 
had begun. “Gentlemen, Napoleon has called us a nation of shopkeepers. But we feel 
sometimes like the defenders of Mafeking – we are widening the outposts of the Queen,” 
he began. “Why are our armies fighting in South Africa? …it is for the franchise. We, the 
supporters of freedom, are pouring out blood and money to vindicate our proud boast in 
South Africa, and yet, gentlemen, we of the Colony of Fiji are, after all, only 
Uitlanders.”158 Hedstrom here laid meaning atop meaning. He and his fellow settlers were 
quite literally “outlanders” in Fiji, to translate the Afrikaans, but they also, in Hedstrom’s 
esteem, shared the Uitlander dilemma of being deprived of their ostensible rights by a 
ruling regime of questionable legitimacy. In this case, though, the tyrannical power 
denying British citizens their rights was not the bearded Boer, “Uncle Paul,” but the 
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British Government, the Colonial Office, and the Governor, who stood in the way of their 
self-determination and their federal dream. 
The South African War also gave the Fijian settlers a critical opportunity to 
capitalize on metropolitan attention and gratitude, specifically by joining themselves in 
federation with a larger colony that had participated vigorously in the imperial war effort. 
Hedstrom emphasized this point as well: “Another important factor is that the Premier of 
New Zealand, as head of the [proposed federal] Government, is at this moment persona 
grata with the colonial authorities at Home, in consequence of assistance of colonial 
troops sent to the front.” He continued, “This is a most propitious time for bringing this 
matter forward…We may go twenty or fifty years before such a chance occurs again.”159 
Hedstrom’s statement here underscores the mixed legacy and “lessons” of the Boer War 
in the British Empire – what was for Britain a calamitous expenditure of blood and 
treasure was for some colonial subjects an unmissable fifty-year opportunity to extract 
concessions. 
The previously-mentioned Warden and logging heir, Mr. Riemenschneider, rose 
in agreement with Hedstrom. “There is no time like the present,” he averred, “when all 
the colonies have done so well in the Transvaal crisis. Their claims cannot be shelved. 
The Imperial Government must recognise their strength and power. Any request made at 
the present time by federated Australia or New Zealand must be received with great 
consideration by the Imperial Government.”160 These arguments made clear the 
importance of intra-imperial diplomacy for achieving local aims. They also suggested 
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that, in addition to the need to capture the Mafeking moment, imperial geopolitics had 
entered a new era – one in which the highest levels of negotiation (represented most 
clearly by the recently-convened Colonial Conferences) was only available to colonial 
states sufficiently large and organized to command seats at the table – credentials they 
demonstrated by participating in imperial military interventions.  
Finally, the federationists’ invocations of South Africa revealed the extent to 
which racial ideas infused their concepts of security and political order, and informed 
their perceived need for a federation with New Zealand. To begin, Fiji’s status as a 
Crown Colony meant that the Colonial Office considered itself the trustee of the native 
population and was required to safeguard its interests vis-à-vis the white settlers. It also 
meant that the Colonial Office could decide whether to allow intra-imperial labor 
migration to Fiji, namely that of Indian “coolie” laborers for local sugar plantations and 
other natural resource industries, which it did in agreement with the Government of 
India.161 The federationists had yet to convince Fiji’s wealthy plantation owners that a 
New Zealand government would not jeopardize their access to Indian labor by closing 
down this link in the interests of more local labor sources. Neither was it clear what 
would become of the existing system of bribing Fijian tribal chiefs to supply native 
laborers for miscellaneous jobs under rule from Wellington, which had its own policies 
on labor and the Maori to consider. Hedstrom argued that New Zealand was uniquely 
proficient at managing native populations and would improve conditions in Fiji, having 
“conclusively demonstrated that in their dealings with the native races they have used 
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justice and temperance.”162 This was a tenuous claim, but the federationists cited the 
precipitous decline of the native Fijian population (from about 115,000 in 1885 down to 
90,000 in 1900) as strong evidence that Crown Colony status was harming the native 
population.163 For this reason, several Fijian chiefs from the Serua and Namosi regions 
supported the federation idea, and formally endorsed it in a memo signed by Chief Ratu 
Radomodomo in 1901.164 The plantation owners and the Colonial Office, unsurprisingly, 
were not amused by this suggestion. Still, arguments for Fijian federation with New 
Zealand depended partly on optimizing white colonists’ paternalistic care for native 
populations, and on localizing control of the islands’ non-white migration and labor 
policies. 
Moreover, the federationists’ quest for self-determination, and their broader goals 
in the South Pacific, were tinged with racialized concepts of their identities as Britons, 
which entailed dominion over and pacification of broad spaces. This is evident in 
Seddon’s original cables to the Colonial Office arguing that New Zealand should hold the 
South Pacific in trust, to be the mistress of the Southern Hemisphere as Britain was of the 
Northern.165 A Mr. Garner-Jones addressed the Levuka meeting, saying “Federation to us 
of Fiji means – in a nutshell – progression. We, like our forefathers, are naturally 
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conservative in our feelings; but when we are convinced that changes are necessary we 
can also exhibit that dogged obstinacy and determination that is the heritage of our race, 
and which in the defence of Mafeking we have had the latest instance.”166 Here the 
federationists made a connection with South Africa that invoked firstly competition – 
British resistance to the (German client-) Boer siege at Mafeking symbolized British 
resistance to German encroachment in the South Pacific. Anti-Germanism again helped 
Australasian colonists connect South Africa to their own local aspirations in an imperial 
grand strategy of containing Germany. They attempted this with Japan as well, to less 
success. Secondly, connection to South Africa invoked colonialism’s racial hierarchy, 
inherent in the ability to look after native populations, whether these were African, 
Maori, or Fijian; perhaps even Indian. Also inherent in their racial arguments was a claim 
about rights – the right to the franchise as a British inheritance. This argument allowed 
federationists to appeal to democratizing liberals across the Empire in much the same 
way some of them had come to support the Boer War at its outset – as a struggle to 
democratize a repressive regime. The enfranchisement of nonwhite subjects remained a 
tenuous prospect. 
Despite Seddon’s persistence and the enthusiasm of the Fiji Federation League, 
their dreams went unfulfilled. Governor O’Brien successfully persuaded Colonial 
Secretary Joseph Chamberlain in Whitehall that the ringleaders of the federation 
movement in Fiji were dangerous rapscallions, even if he was subsequently sacked for 
taking this smear campaign too far, having proclaimed to the tribal chiefs that they should 
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renounce federation, and attempted to imprison anyone who publicly called for 
constitutional change in Fiji.167 That O’Brien won Chamberlain’s support at all is 
remarkable, given Chamberlain’s warm embrace of federalism in other colonial contexts, 
namely Australia and South Africa, as well as on Empire-wide matters. A likely reason 
was the influence of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, which vociferously opposed the 
end of Fiji’s Crown Colony status in London.168 Chamberlain’s energetic ministerial 
activism at the Colonial Office mobilized the federal principle at both operative levels – 
as a way of building stable, populous states out of multiple smaller colonies, and as an 
organizing principle for the whole Empire that could solve thorny constitutional 
problems. Still Seddon, never knowing when he was beaten, went so far as to raise the 
federation issue again, out of turn, from the floor of the 1902 Colonial Conference, 
whereupon Chamberlain was forced into the exceedingly uncomfortable position of 
rebuking the Premier for impropriety.169 Still, the episode demonstrates the peculiar way 
in which the South African War had emboldened colonial actors on the other side of the 
world, and how they related their experiences to those of both the soldiers and the settlers 
in South Africa.  
It also showcases some of the reasons why federation was such a popular idea at 
this time – namely, because it allowed ambitious colonists to cast themselves as strategic 
makeweights for Britain on the global gameboard, and in so doing secure to themselves 
greater autonomy in their own strategic goals and in specific policy sectors like the 
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Fijians’ labor and migration concerns. The Boer War served here as the opportunity to 
lobby the imperial center on strategic matters, which had never seemed so salient. The 
Fijian federationists realized that diplomatic relationships across the Empire had 
intensified because of the war, and believed this gave them greater space to negotiate 
directly with the Imperial government rather than with the irritatingly conservative 
Governor normally assigned this task. Finally, South Africa served as a convenient case 
onto which colonists could project their fears and hopes about racial and political order in 
the Empire and the world at large. As the garrulous Mr. Hedstrom observed that night in 
Levuka, channeling Brutus from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, “Remember, ‘There is a 
tide in the affairs of men which leads on to fortune.’ We are working for a country we 
believe in – we live in – the cannibal islands. We are here to-night the makers of an 
Empire. (Cheers)”170 
 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
 The twentieth century broke like a tidal wave over the Pacific Rim, bringing 
strategic upheaval and new challengers to old order. In the north, Japan carved out space 
at China’s expense and began to challenge Russia for maritime supremacy. In the 
equatorial band, the United States began operating more vigorously out of Hawaii and 
seized the Philippines from its former Spanish masters. In the south, the new Australia 
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and its neighbor New Zealand looked to a future when they would call themselves 
Mistresses of the Southern Seas. France and Germany did their best to slither into the 
cracks between. To prescient observers, there was no region more volatile. Henry 
Bournes Higgins said in summer 1901 that “the storm centre of the world has shifted to 
the east of Asia,” making Australia dependent for survival on naval protection.171 When a 
group of naval officers gathered in Melbourne in 1899 to discuss strategic priorities for a 
future federal Australia, their official memo stated: “Within the last half-dozen years the 
keen attention of .the political world has been concentrated on the Pacific. There is every 
indication that it will play the part of the Mediterranean in the past century as the arena of 
national contending forces. France, Russia, Japan have established naval bases and 
possess powerful fleets in the north of the Pacific. Nearly every other European power 
has effected a lodgment in the seas to our north.”172 These observers had no way of 
knowing they were a decade away from the catalog of horrors that was World War I, but 
they did know they had just witnessed wars erupt in Manchuria, China, the Philippines, 
and South Africa, and that numerous other localities had required cartographic re-
shading, war or no war. These events drove a strategic wedge between Australasian (and 
later, western Canadian) subjects of the Empire and their metropolitan cousins. 
 British grand strategy in the early twentieth century was not a monolith then, but 
Melbourne and Wellington and Levuka faced tough odds in contesting London’s views, 
which is why they took such a keen interest in the South African War. By helping to 
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crush the Boers (and constantly referring back to the fact that they helped crush the 
Boers), they further insinuated themselves into the Empire’s strategic logic. Richard 
Seddon’s visit to Fiji was also a stopover on his voyage to South Africa, where he toured 
battlefields and met with officers and politicians. Through local anti-German sentiment, 
Australasians also painted a larger strategic canvas in which their efforts to stave off a 
spectral German menace in the Pacific linked directly to the thwarting of Germany’s 
grand ambitions in South Africa. The New Zealand Herald fulminated that in Germany’s 
failure in South Africa, “which she unquestionably planned to seize someday, with the 
rest of the Dutch inheritance…she sees another scheme brought to nought. Her hatred is 
the hatred of feebleness and impotence, that vociferous and venomous hatred which 
exhausts the passions of nations that shrink from staking their claims upon the cast of the 
iron dice of war.”173 Such arguments go some way towards explaining the intensification 
of the Anglo-German rivalry in coming years, a rivalry that scholars intuitively locate in 
the North Sea but whose tensions were shaped and driven by peripheral issues and actors 
as well. 
 It also explains the strategic bent and paranoia that suffused and motivated the 
state-building projects in the British Pacific. The ideological and constitutional (never 
mind metaphysical, as Kipling would have it) transition from colony to federation to a 
misty, future sovereign statehood, advanced with a security-driven logic. This logic 
served two purposes – it sniffed out common interests with Britain that failed to 
materialize elsewhere, as in trade policy, and it chased norms established by Britain and 
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other colonizing powers, that sovereign statehood required the capable marshaling of 
military force, if not outright imperialism itself. A center/periphery model does not 
suffice here; the involved parties did not agree on what was the center. Instead they 
pushed and pulled one another in a strategic and political argument about the future of 
political order in the British Empire. The Colonial Office played an influential role in the 
successes and failures of these federation projects. It conspired to block the New 
Zealand-Fiji experiment, but vociferously supported the Australian. The common 
denominator for the Colonial Office’s position involved non-white races – it supported 
federations between white, self-governing colonies, but did not trust these to manage 
relations with large native populations of the kind present in Fiji. 
 In the coming years, the resounding clatter of the South African War provoked 
change in governing corridors across the British world. This was to be an era of reform, 
of economizing, of national “efficiency,” in which the failures of the fractious turn of the 
century would hopefully be rationalized away and followed by an era of stability or, 
barring that, tidier victories. This too meant institutional change, especially where 
military matters were concerned. British officialdom scrambled to recalibrate its 
methods; colonial governments scrambled frantically to build up their capabilities and to 
contest changing imperial orthodoxies. The constitutional ramifications of these new 
strategic realities continued to vex, as the likes of Dicey and Keith would attest, but they 
resounded loudest far from the cobbled streets of Whitehall. In the Government of India, 
lumbering semi-annually between its winter quarters in Calcutta and its summer throne 
high in the mountains of Simla, the era’s greatest civil-military debate took place. The 
impossibly vast Indian Army exercised a commensurately vast hold on imperial strategic 
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thought, and its constitutional future was also up for grabs. George Curzon, the rosy-
cheeked Tory romantic serving as Viceroy of India, insatiably ambitious and obsessed 
with creating a durable basis for British world power, went toe to toe with the era’s most 
formidable military man – Herbert Kitchener, the hero of Khartoum and butcher of the 
Veldt, who was to assume as his next post the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. 
Their vicious battle over the constitutional and strategic foundations of British world 
power pointed the way to the bloody, tempestuous future that lay ahead. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 – THE CENTRE HOLDS: REFORM AND REACTION IN THE 
NEW CENTURY, 1902-1906 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The South African War ended on 31 May 1902 with the ringing of bells in 
Pretoria and the wringing of hands in London. While the ink dried on the Treaty of 
Vereeniging, Whitehall prepared itself for a painful reckoning. As early as 1900, at the 
height of the war and by which time it was painfully clear that things would not go 
smoothly for the imperial war effort, Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster published his 
incendiary The War Office, the Army, and the Empire.174 Under ordinary circumstances, a 
pamphlet brimming with such barely-concealed contempt for imperial security policy and 
so many professional bridge-burnings would have sounded the death knell on the author’s 
political career. But these were not ordinary circumstances, and instead of his suicide 
note, the tract was Arnold-Forster’s ticket to the office of Secretary of State for War in 
1903. 
 Arnold-Forster thundered against the military deployment plan to South Africa 
and the War Office’s acute negligence in managing its imperial resource pool. He praised 
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the “courage and patriotism of our Colonial fellow-subjects,” which alone enabled them 
to help the imperial war effort, but crowed that “the war has taught us that as far as any 
preparation or organisation on the part of the War Office was concerned, the Colonies 
might have been non-existent.”175 He reserved special opprobrium for Lord Lansdowne, 
the incumbent War Secretary. “If, and when, an inquiry is held into the condition of our 
stores at the outbreak of the war,” he wrote, “the public will be startled. Hundreds of 
people knew that this would be so; scores of competent people pointed it out over and 
over again. At the twelfth hour it struck Lord Lansdowne…The manager of any private 
business who had so acted would be instantly, and rightly, discharged. So would Lord 
Lansdowne if we regarded his responsibility as anything more than a joke.”176 Member 
for West Belfast and acting financial secretary at the Admiralty, Arnold-Forster already 
had a reputation as a security Cassandra. A relative of both Matthew Arnold and the 
Huxleys, his record of prophesying military Armageddon with poetic acuity stretched 
back to the Cardwell Reforms of 1870. Considered rash and insufferable by many of his 
contemporaries, he had finally found his moment. He returned, towards the end of the 
pamphlet, to the matter of imperial security cooperation, its merits, and its future. “It is 
difficult to exaggerate the value of the help that has been given,” he reiterated, “a value 
perhaps even greater from a moral than a material point of view.”177 He closed thus:  
And now it only remains to sum up, as briefly as possible, the lessons 
which these articles have been intended to enforce. It has been the object 
of the writer to show that the Empire was never more in need of a well-
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organised defensive system than at present; to point out that, though that 
need exists and is admitted, little or nothing has yet been done to organise 
the great resources of the Empire upon any reasonable basis for the 
purposes of defence; that those who might fairly be regarded as chargeable 
with this duty show no signs of an intention to perform it, and that our 
institutions are of such a character that, unless an impetus be given from 
without, no change is likely to take place in the methods or in the results 
of our present military system.178 
 
Arnold-Forster, like so many of his contemporaries, had come to the realization that the 
norms and institutions of the British Empire no longer met the needs for which they had 
been built. 
 This chapter will begin with an overview of the attempts at reform in Britain in 
the aftermath of the South African War. During these years, a number of the crucial 
offices of state were occupied by fierce modernizers with an agenda for change: Joseph 
Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, Arnold-Forster at the War Office, who oversaw the 
reporting of the Elgin Commission and the Esher Committee charged with discerning the 
lessons of South Africa, Admiral John “Jacky” Fisher at the Admiralty and his civilian 
superior Lord Selborne, and the previously-maligned Lord Lansdowne, who had fallen 
from the War Office to a soft landing at the Foreign Office, and presided over two of 
Britain’s most critical diplomatic agreements: the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 and 
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the Entente Cordiale with the French in 1904.179 Arthur Balfour’s Conservative 
government watched uneasily over them all, with moments of active intervention as with 
the creation of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1902. The chapter will continue 
with some of the social dimensions of this moment, such as the movement for “national 
efficiency” and related Darwinist paranoias.180 It will then move to India, to examine the 
tumultuous Viceroyalty of George Curzon, and the way the central conflicts of his 
administration both drove and recapitulated similar debates in Britain. Curzon attempted 
to reform the funding and force structure of the Indian Army, partitioned the critical 
province of Bengal, and staked his career on an acrimonious struggle to stop General 
Herbert Kitchener from merging India’s highest civilian and military offices: Military 
Member of the Government of India, and Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. 
Curzon’s battles, and his opposition, reveal how many of the most crucial questions of 
political order in this period centered on Asia and its growing indigenous and settler 
populations. Finally, the chapter will pick up the stories of the major Pacific colonies – 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, to show how they continued to forge institutional 
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military capability, and especially how they contested metropolitan perspectives on 
imperial strategy in the matter of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.  
The fallout from the Boer War touched off debates over military reform not just in 
Britain but across the British Empire. This chapter explores the colonial states, which 
were often in financially precarious situations due to their rapid expansion and 
centralization, proved averse to relatively cheap subsidies to Britain in order to obtain 
security. Instead, they preferred to undertake militarizing schemes to develop 
independent military, naval, and diplomatic assets. Liberals, the natural enemies of such 
schemes, either failed to stop them or made their peace with them. This unexpected 
outcome occurred because subsidies infringed on emerging norms of sovereignty, and 
independent military assets gave colonial states greater freedom to act. The chapter 
shows how liberal, democratic governments in British colonies made the same arguments 
against subsidies as those made by Indian princes to the British Raj about the Indian 
Army. This unexpected congruence shows the globalizing trends of early twentieth 
century militarization: self-governing colonies echoed the quasi-feudal arguments of 
Indian princes about providing military service to the Empire, while the Indian princes in 
turn openly praised German militarism and German unification as a template for state 
aggrandizement that might be replicated within British India and, by extension, elsewhere 
in the Empire. 
The conclusion of a troubling war – and the expectation of a future one – imbued 
heady political debates in the Empire with strategic weight and heightened the urgency of 
security questions in rapidly-changing colonies. The military reforms that followed the 
South African War in Britain have been well-studied by historians, since they are an 
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obvious point at which to measure Britain’s institutional ethos, and its military 
competence, on the eve of World War I.181 The role of the Empire in these processes has 
been less well-studied. Despite its heavily-scrutinized domestic debate on military 
reform, Britain’s capacity for real change was narrower than that in South Asia or the 
Pacific Rim, where colonial state institutions were newer, the geostrategic situation more 
fluid, and the range of possible futures broader.182 One task of this chapter will thus be to 
re-situate this struggle – to shoehorn new military realities into old structures of British 
rule and constitutionalism – in Asia, rather than Europe. Faced with an onslaught of 
uncertainty, Britain’s colonies across Asia began making themselves into fortress-states. 
The disparity with the liberal tenets of the British constitution were already evident in 
India, which lacked democratic institutions and kept a large standing army, the bête noir 
of classical liberal order. But Britain’s own militarizing reforms narrowed this distinction 
after South Africa. In this way, the forms of constitutional order prevailing across the 
British Empire, including the metropole itself, began to converge around the purpose of 
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war-fighting.183 The outcomes of the process varied, but the process nonetheless drove a 
parallel convergence in the way British imperial subjects imagined and projected 
sovereignty at home and abroad. The highly-charged racial and strategic tensions of 
southern-, eastern-, and Australasia also began, in this period, to reshape the international 
hierarchy through which Britain had managed its colonies for the better part of a century. 
Diplomatic voices from New Zealand to India to Japan called the world’s attention 
eastward, adding counterweight to the Empire’s strategic balance and inaugurating a new 
era of geopolitical dilemmas for the “Weary Titan,” as Colonial Secretary Joseph 
Chamberlain called the British Empire in a famous 1897 speech.184 
 Adjusting perspectives in this way rearranges some of this period’s most vexing 
historical puzzles. It complicates the Eurocentric narrative of militarization and imperial 
rivalry before the First World War – imperial competition is rightly considered a key 
causal force motivating that conflict, but the colonial sphere is usually couched as a set of 
broader liabilities and advantages that the European belligerents quibbled over, rather 
than as players who actively contributed to a global process of militarization from which 
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their conspicuous participation in the war logically followed.185 After South Africa, 
successive British Governments lost the ability to maintain either Victorian Liberalism’s 
instinctive aversion to foreign adventures or Victorian Toryism’s distinct lack of interest 
in formal diplomatic entanglement outside the Vienna system.186 Instead, Britain’s 
rivalries with other empires became more beholden to the concerns of Calcutta, 
Melbourne, Auckland, and Vancouver; London found itself devoting ever greater energy 
to restraining its clients, who as such qualified as clients more poorly by the day.187 As 
Dicey remarked in 1914, they had lost the luxury of holding one another in benign 
neglect. At points from 1902-1906, Indian military questions risked destabilizing the 
British Government. Britain’s ability to conduct bilateral diplomacy came under 
increasing pressure from colonial governments and interests, especially where Japan was 
concerned. Observers in 1905 did not know they were less than a decade away from a 
war that would destroy much of Europe. What they did know was that Japan had just 
destroyed Russian naval power at Tsushima, and upended the strategic – and racial – 
order in East Asia. They knew that western imperial powers had just launched a 
swashbuckling joint military operation, replete with romantic and press-worthy turns, by 
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invading and subduing China. Asia, not Europe, was the bubbling cauldron of the 
century’s first decade. 
 The issue of security subsidies across the British Empire serves as an excellent 
barometer for the changing nature of sovereignty in this period, and the ways that change 
resonated in the processes of internal state-building and external relations between 
colonial and imperial governments. By the end of the nineteenth century, the colonies 
considered here paid Britain some form of fiscal subsidy in exchange for protection, 
increasingly not for land forces but emphatically still for the Royal Navy. These 
subsidies, originating as taxes on colonial populations, were in reality a fantastically 
cheap means by which nascent states could obtain security; relative to the cost of building 
indigenous military forces (and especially navies), and to the rates of defense expenditure 
paid by European powers, they were miniscule.188 But subsidies proved intolerable to 
colonial governments and polities. India and the large Pacific colonies preferred to obtain 
their security through means that were more tangible, more local, and often more costly. 
Subsidies came to be understood as a tributary act that placed limits on the sovereignty of 
colonial states under emerging norms; proprietary military assets, by comparison, could 
support colonial claims to legitimacy and peer national status, even when used for 
collective imperial ends (such as liberating Peking or subduing Afrikaner republics). The 
multiple valences of the subsidy question point to crystallizing norms of sovereignty in 
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the early twentieth century and its twofold, internal and external nature.189 They also 
foreshadow the strategic quid-pro-quos Britain would make with colonial representatives 
at a series of colonial and imperial conferences, ceding the right to colonial navies in 
exchange for coordination and cooperation in imperial defense.190 
 Race both simplified and complicated efforts to find new political equilibria in 
Asia and the Pacific in the early twentieth century. Recent scholarship on the British 
Empire, and on colonial state-building projects, has highlighted the growing role of 
racism in shaping political and institutional developments in this period.191 British and 
American colonizers may have hoped to form an Anglo-Saxon bulwark in Asia and the 
Pacific that could keep co-ethnic migrant flows in, rival Europeans out, and indigenous 
populations down, but instead they found themselves diplomatically split by Britain’s 
formal alliance with Japan. Race acted as a strategic heuristic that allowed colonial state-
builders to sort friends from foes, and those who could help secure the state from those 
who would endanger it. Race had multiple valences too, however – it sometimes worked 
across “color lines” to construct Japanese or Indians as worthy, martially fit allies. 
Colonial state-building in the early twentieth century has been described as an exercise in 
building “white men’s countries,” and this insight has been rightly influential, but it 
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subordinates the exigencies of security problems to population-focused issues like 
immigration, and its “color line” is too impermeable; it does not capture the fluidity of 
racial paradigms that sometimes served collaboration as well as division.192 Whatever its 
valence, though, race readily served discussions of military security, and by extension of 
sovereignty, as these too were discourses of power. 
 
2.2 BRITAIN AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR 
 While ensconced at the Colonial Office from 1895-1903, Joseph Chamberlain 
was one of the most compelling political characters in the British Empire. A product of 
Birmingham’s manufacturing sector and formerly that city’s mayor, Chamberlain brought 
a workmanlike approach and an improving mentality to a ministerial portfolio usually 
assigned to career water-treaders. Much of his energy was devoted to economic matters; 
he spearheaded the Colonial Stock Act in 1900, a law that encouraged City investment 
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stimulus to Crown Colonies in order to jumpstart development by guaranteeing low rates, 
and famously led the (doomed) movement to end Britain’s decades-old orthodoxy of free 
trade and replace it with a tariff barrier privileging colonial markets.193 This and the 
problem of Irish Home Rule saw him fall out with the Liberal Party and eventually to his 
service in Tory governments. Chamberlain’s mission entailed a wholesale re-imagination 
of the Empire, and he fought for that goal on many fronts. One of these was his attempt to 
create new institutional machinery for governing the Empire that would spread 
responsibility for its core functions among the colonies. He chose the recently-developed 
practice of colonial conferencing as his vessel for fashioning a new imperial body, but 
when he proposed a “council” of representatives from the self-governing colonies at the 
1897 Diamond Jubilee conference in honor of Queen Victoria, he encountered 
unexpected resistance.194 Colonial representatives (especially Canada’s Wilfrid Laurier) 
feared that any formal decision-making body would formalize their subordination to 
Britain on key matters, and preferred that deliberation between governments remain ad 
hoc.195 Chagrined, Chamberlain resolved to play his hand more conservatively in the 
future. When Israel Tarte, Canada’s Minister for Public Works and a supporter of 
                                                        
193 For more on these efforts, see Richard M. Kesner, Economic Control and Colonial Development: Crown 
Colony Financial Management in the Age of Joseph Chamberlain (Greenwood Press, 1981); Frank 
Trentmann, Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption, and Civil Society in Modern Britain (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2009). 
194 Conferences began as ad hoc meetings of visiting colonial dignitaries on the occasion of royal holidays 
in Britain. The first occurred parallel to Victoria’s Golden Jubilee in 1887. John Kendle locates the impetus 
for this meeting in the initial wave of colonial opposition to the Cardwell Reforms. The event’s title, 
“Colonial Conference,” meant the attendees featured Crown Colonies and self-governing colonies, but not 
India, which strictly-speaking was not a colony but a sub-imperium. There was a decade lapse before 
another conference convened, this time with the self-governing colonies only, for Victoria’s Diamond 
Jubilee in 1897. See John E. Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911: A Study in 
Imperial Organization (London: Longmans, 1967), chap. 1 – “Early Years, 1869–94.” 
195 See ibid., chap. 11 – “Joseph Chamberlain and an Imperial Council.” 
 110 
 
imperial federation, publically called for conciliar Canadian representation in the peace 
settlement of the South African War, Chamberlain responded with rank sarcasm.196 He 
wrote to Lord Minto, the Governor General of Canada, that if Canada received such 
representation it would be proportional to her contributing war expenditure – and at 
£20,000 to Britain’s £20,000,000, that thousandth amounted to about 2/3 of a Member of 
the House of Commons.197 
 Chamberlain cautiously polled the self-governing colonies in advance of the 1902 
Conference, asking for their desired topics of discussion. The response he received from 
Richard Seddon’s government in New Zealand, a 7-point proposal that included the 
creation of an Imperial Reserve Force and a new advisory body, comported well enough 
with Chamberlain’s wishes that he simply circulated it to the other governments as a draft 
agenda.198 Less fortunately, the exchange of post between Britain and New Zealand and 
subsequent forwarding to still other geographic extremities proved cumbersome, and the 
other heads of government arrived in London lacking up-to-date memoranda. 
Chamberlain laid out his priorities for the Conference and the future of the Empire in his 
opening speech, in a clear order: “Through our political relations in the first place; 
secondly, by some kind of commercial union. In the third place, by considering the 
questions which arise out of Imperial defence.”199 Though Chamberlain’s approach 
apparently favored other vectors, he still saved time to admonish the visiting premiers 
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about the disproportionately large sums Britain spent on defense relative to its colonies – 
about fifteen times more. He continued:  
While the Colonies were young and poor, in the first place they did not 
offer anything like the same temptation to the ambitions of others, and, in 
the second place, they were clearly incapable of providing large sums for 
their own defence, and there-fore it was perfectly right and natural that the 
mother country should undertake the protection of her children. But now 
that the Colonies are rich and powerful, that every day they are growing 
by leaps and bounds, their material prosperity promises to rival that of the 
United Kingdom itself, and I think it is inconsistent with their position – 
inconsistent with their dignity as nations – that they should leave the 
mother country to bear the whole, or almost the whole, of the expense.200 
 
“Inconsistent with their dignity as nations” invoked a matrix of abstract concepts that 
typified the spirit of the moment: honor, a moral duty to act within ethical parameters; 
kinship, the tie that bound the realms of the Crown together for mutual support; and an 
enticing picture of normative sovereignty, which beckoned the colonies to begin 
comporting themselves as sovereign states – by spending more on defense.201 
The political possibilities swirling around the 1902 Colonial Conference largely 
foundered on the rocky protuberance of Canada’s Wilfrid Laurier. Laurier, a Liberal, 
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found himself caught in a vise – the Quebecois wing of his party under Henri Bourassa 
seized on any mention of military affairs to argue that Canada risked being made into 
Britain’s vassal state. Meanwhile, the Conservative opposition led by Robert Borden 
hammered him for refusing to take a more active role in addressing Canada’s (and the 
Empire’s) security concerns. Fearing he would be dragged down by either Scylla or 
Charybdis, Laurier simply refused to proceed, resolving instead to stonewall talk of 
imperial councils, secretariats, or reserve forces.202 Thus, the opportunity for change 
presented by the aftermath of South Africa, and the eager proposals of Seddon, collapsed 
under the opposition of the Empire’s most senior self-governing colony. Laurier even 
attempted to skip the conference altogether. His opposition making that a political 
impossibility, Laurier decided instead to push hard on the issue of trade, on which 
Canada’s political spectrum looked more fondly to Britain given the draconian McKinley 
tariffs handed down by the United States from 1890 on, and their stultifying effects on 
regional commerce.203 Chamberlain, as above, was happy to engage. But Chamberlain 
did not speak for the Westminster establishment as a whole, least of all the Treasury, and 
the resolutions produced by the Conference in favor of trade preference fell on deaf ears 
elsewhere in Whitehall. 
The 1902 Colonial Conference produced some interesting samples of its 
participants’ priorities, then, but failed to produce meaningful institutional change that 
measured up to the challenges of reform – political, economic, or military – facing the 
                                                        
202 Laurier’s legacy at the conferences will be discussed below in Chapter 3. See also Kendle, The Colonial 
and Imperial Conferences 1887 - 1911, 43. 
203 William McKinley introduced his first high tariff barrier as a Senator in 1890; Grover Cleveland’s 
Democrats lowered them in 1894, but McKinley saw to their reinstatement after his election as President in 
1897. 
 113 
 
Empire. When formal improvements to the imperial war machine did arrive, in the 
waning days of 1902, their cause was largely inadvertent. The Committee of Imperial 
Defence was conceived as a way to facilitate more efficient communication between the 
United Kingdom’s service branches – the Admiralty and the (newly recalibrated) War 
Office. Yet, the CID evolved, in an informal and largely unforeseen manner, into the 
Empire’s only inter-state military planning body. It emerged from the British 
Government’s internal inquiries into the mismanagement of the Boer War, namely, from 
the Elgin Commission charged with investigating the War Office’s failures, and from 
Lord Selborne’s efforts to reform the Admiralty. Lord Elgin, the recently returned 
Viceroy of India, took over the inquiry into the war in 1902. Originally conceived as a 
fact-finding body only, the Elgin Commission eventually found itself overshadowed by 
one of its members, Lord Esher, who went beyond the remit of the commission and 
issued recommendations to the Government in a document that came to be known as the 
Esher Report. Esher argued forcefully in his report that the War Office in its present form 
could no longer manage the challenges of modern warfare, and that it should be 
reconstituted along the lines of the Admiralty, with a council of generals responsible for 
constant planning, instead of a single Commander-in-Chief. He also called for the 
reorganization of the council of civilian and military officials that advised the Cabinet on 
military matters, and suggested that this body be vested with strategic planning 
responsibilities.204 Esher’s report stoked the sense of urgency surrounding the military in 
London’s crowded news cycle, and rightly predicted the need to create plans for rapidly 
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up-scaling the size and operations of the British Army for the contingency of a larger 
war.205 Esher’s report also motivated Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty 
(Britain’s highest-ranking civilian naval post), to co-author a memo to the Government 
with St. John Brodrick, the new Minister for War, calling for a new inter-service body 
that could coordinate military planning and policy, and advise the Government. That 
body would become the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
In its first iteration, the CID was supposed to ease contact between land and sea 
forces, not between the states and colonies of the Empire, but it gradually assumed the 
latter function as well. In 1903 Sir Frederick Borden, the Canadian Minister for Militia 
and Defence, sat in on CID meetings, inaugurating a trend by which its ranks filled up 
with a revolving door of visiting colonial attendees. The War Office reorganization 
started by Brodrick made it more like the Admiralty and, less comfortably, like the 
Prussian-German general staff system.206 The Admiralty also saw its share of innovation 
and change – under Selborne and his radical First Sea Lord, Admiral Jacky Fisher, the 
Royal Navy underwent drastic changes in both force structure and posture, responding in 
turn to influential new treatises on naval power by Julian Corbett and Alfred Thayer 
Mahan.207 Overall, Balfour’s Tory Government inherited the crises of Salisbury, the last 
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Victorian, and changed much of Britain’s military governance. Balfour realized that the 
CID, insofar as it included colonial representatives, would have to remain an advisory 
body rather than an executive council, and in this he retained his predecessor Salisbury’s 
views of the Empire as an organic whole rather than as a formal structure tending toward 
institutional unification. Meanwhile, he restrained Chamberlain’s schemes for imperial 
union, trade preference, and a common reserve force, thinking them an improper 
imposition on colonial liberties.208 
Post-war Britain’s military reforms rippled beyond the corridors of Whitehall. 
They substantively realigned British politics, and overflowed into deeper social 
conversations about the country’s imagined liberal soul. British strategic and social 
mentalities intertwined across centuries – the values encoded in Magna Carta, of 
safeguarded liberties and due process, were understood to be contingent on Britain’s 
record of upholding sea-power offshore, and thus eschewing the kind of large standing 
armies and command-control political economies required by states with major strategic 
liabilities on land – France, Germany, and Russia most prominently. Since the 
Napoleonic Wars (and farther still, to the Hanoverian Settlement), Britain’s grand 
strategy involved projecting naval force across the globe, and working to balance the 
powers on the European Continent to ensure stability (and manageable peace) there.209 
This nexus of strategy, social memory, and ideology placed British reformers after the 
Boer War in a double-bind: the quality and efficiency of the German military command 
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structure enjoyed near-universal admiration in this period, but emulating it involved a 
betrayal of the long-held British practice of forming national identity in opposition to 
“militaristic Prussia” or “absolutist/statist France.” The complications were summarized 
in a 1905 anecdote by GK Chesterton –  
Mr. Rudyard Kipling has said complacently of the English, ‘We do not fall 
on the neck and kiss when we come together.’ It is true that this ancient 
and universal custom has vanished with the modern weakening of 
England…I willingly concede that Mr. Brodrick would not be likely to 
kiss Mr. Arnold-Forster, if that be any proof of the increased manliness 
and military greatness of England. But the Englishman who does not show 
his feelings has not altogether given up the power of seeing something 
English in the great sea-hero of the Napoleonic war. You cannot break the 
legend of Nelson. And across the sunset of that glory is written in flaming 
letters for ever the great English sentiment, ‘Kiss me, Hardy.’210 
 
Britain’s military crisis appears here as a crisis of masculinity – British men had 
stopped kissing one another in an effort to be more like the war-winning 
Germans, forgetting, according to Chesterton, the habits of their own past war 
heroes. 
Though Germany would not become Britain’s central strategic preoccupation for 
some years hence (the title remained for the moment with the Old Enemy, France), only 
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Germany seriously provoked this level of both envy and dread.211 The Liberal Party had 
the most to lose from this paradox, since its ostensible values were those at stake in a 
debate about militarism. The Khaki Election of 1900 had been an early warning of a 
challenging new era for the Liberals. Those challenges were legion, and included other 
quagmires such as Ireland, women’s suffrage, and pensions and social insurance. But the 
literature on the erosion of British Liberalism tends to underplay the role of militarism in 
reshaping British politics around the question of security and “efficiency” and causing 
party defections amid top-level indecision.212 Popular liberal takes on war and security 
that attempted to downplay the danger and appeal to the mollifying effects of 
international trade, exemplified by Norman Angell’s The Great Illusion, competed to 
capture the public imagination with a raft of alarmist, lurid invasion literature about the 
imminent destruction of Britain, exemplified by Erskine Childers’ The Riddle of the 
Sands.213 Meaningful distinctions on the issue of militarism between Britain and its 
colonies, much like those between Britain and its Continental rivals, should not be swept 
aside. But it should be noted also that Britain was not the liberal bastion against 
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militarism in the North Atlantic that some wished it to be; at any rate it found itself 
increasingly in militarism’s grip after 1902. As such it was converging with, rather than 
diverging from, more militaristic regimes in both its competitors and its colonies. 
 
2.3 GEORGE CURZON, INDIA, AND THE DILEMMAS OF CONTINENTAL 
SECURITY IN ASIA 
 India stood apart from the rest of the British Empire in the early twentieth 
century. Its continental geography, massive population, territorial abutment of rival 
powers, eclectic and undemocratic institutions, and broad social diversity made it 
incongruous with the United Kingdom or the self-governing settlement colonies. Yet 
India experienced very similar pressures of militarization, nationalism, and state 
centralization in this period, and featured prominently in Empire-wide discussions of 
these topics. The period covered in this chapter overlaps with George Curzon’s 
tempestuous tenure as Viceroy of India. Curzon, like his Prime Minister Salisbury, was in 
some senses already an anachronism upon his accession in 1899 – a Tory, an aristocrat, 
and a strong believer in British power and global primacy. He followed a well-trod path 
through Eton and Balliol and developed a reputation as an Orientalist that he augmented 
with tours of the Eastern Mediterranean, Persia, Central Asia, Russia, and the Hindu 
Kush as a young man in the 1880s. Curzon got himself elected as the Conservative 
Member for Southport, formerly a Liberal seat, in 1886, and many considered him a 
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rising star despite his fussy and conspicuously elitist manner. A verse composed about 
him by some of his Balliol classmates read:  
My name is George Nathaniel Curzon, 
I am a most superior person. 
My cheek is pink, my hair is sleek, 
I dine at Blenheim once a week.214 
Curzon’s was and is easy to misread. His strongly conservative veneer obscured an 
aggressively activist operational mentality; Curzon attempted vigorously to reform most 
of the political posts he occupied throughout his career, and railed against any rigid, 
inefficient systems that impeded his progress. His aggressive reformism did not extend to 
democratization; in that he retained a fierce Salisburian suspicion, a sort of pre-Disraelian 
Toryism that informed his harsh resistance to democratic reform in India as in Britain.215  
These attributes existed in some tension – Curzon would show himself to be an 
incautious reformer on some fronts, like his ill-starred partition of Bengal, and a cautious 
stonewaller when dealing with the Indian National Congress. What he retained in all 
cases was a strong respect for prudent administration as he imagined it, beneficial to his 
subjects and consistent with their values (as he imagined those), like many fellow Tories 
of his time. His governing strategy as Viceroy was to make allies with the aristocratic 
rulers of India’s princely states and to resist middle-class calls for democracy, which 
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emanated chiefly from the province of Bengal and the Indian National Congress. 
Curzon’s complicated legacy and meteoric career are necessary backdrops to the 
controversies embroiling India through this period. His geostrategic agenda, his attempts 
to reform the organization and finance of the Indian Army, and his battle with Gen. 
Herbert Kitchener over civilian control of the military, made India the epicenter of 
political controversy on the burning questions of security, sovereignty, and British 
institutions at the turn of the century. The Indian Army proved an integral part of each of 
these controversies, and ensured that they reached well beyond the rapidly-expanding 
strategic borders of the Indian Empire. The Indian Army’s size and significance meant 
that Curzon’s gales battered governments from Australasia to North America to London 
itself. At its height, the faceoff with Kitchener threatened to destabilize the British 
Government itself. It drove an Empire-wide conversation about the future of sovereignty 
that included the self-governing dominions as well. India’s civil-military debate also 
raised interesting questions and contradictions for liberalism in the British world. Curzon 
and other observers made essentially liberal critiques of military power while resisting 
democratization. Meanwhile, the conservative (and militarist) deals the Raj made with 
India’s Princely States were echoed by liberal governments in Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand in their bargaining with Britain. This strange confluence shows how 
security imperatives exerted a tightening grip on conceptions of sovereignty in this 
period. 
The British Raj headed by Curzon faced rising competition from an insurgent 
Indian National Congress for political legitimacy on the subcontinent. The Congress had 
emerged some years before in the late-nineteenth century as a forum for the advancement 
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of the interests of Indians relative to the British Raj – among other things, to extend to 
them some form of the franchise.216 Relations between the Raj and the Congress 
remained uneasy over the years as their political objectives took on a zero-sum quality, 
and by Curzon’s Viceroyalty tensions were running high. The Congress itself contained 
two key factions – moderate, constitutional nationalists led by Gopal Krishna Gokhale, an 
Elphinstone-educated Maharashtran, and the radical nationalist faction led by another 
Maharashtran, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who had studied law in Bombay and taught 
mathematics at Fergusson College in Pune. Gokhale’s moderates remained at the reins 
for these years but steadily gave ground to the radical faction during Curzon’s tenure.217 
The Congress itself was but the institutional face for brewing Indian nationalisms across 
the subcontinent, which increasingly opposed British rule and sought new ways to 
understand and assert sovereignty in the new century.  
 Thus, the field of Indian politics triangulated around the British Raj, the princes 
that ruled the subcontinent’s Princely States as quasi-vassals of the Raj, and a 
constellation of nationalists loosely represented under the rubric of the Congress. When 
Curzon arrived in India to assume office in 1899, he went immediately to work on reform 
campaigns he had devised, grappling first with a grinding famine that had been sweeping 
the subcontinent and had claimed millions of lives. He oversaw the extension of famine 
relief to some five million Indians and went ahead with irrigation projects and land 
reforms designed to mitigate the severity of famine in the future. His other early 
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landmark policies involved Indian Army discipline – he discovered that regiments had 
hushed up their soldiers’ murders of Indian civilians, and sentenced those regiments to 
collective punishment, enraging British observers who felt it was a loss of face.218 He 
also insisted on reforming the Indian Civil Service, increasing funds for university 
education, and passing a law to protect ancient monuments, including a notable 
restoration of the Taj Mahal. Crucially, he resisted calls emanating from Congress to 
“Indianize” the Civil Service. Curzon also endeavored to stay afloat in the changing seas 
of British institutional reform, especially on the Government of India’s relationship to the 
Committee of Imperial Defence. He set a precedent for the Departments of State in India 
to submit formal questions to the CID, and duly began a dialog about improving the 
coastal defenses of India’s major ports – Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi, and Rangoon.219 He 
also saw to the appointment of an Indian Army member to the permanent secretariat of 
the CID, once it became clear that such positions could and would exist.220 
 Curzon also made several moves early in his Viceroyalty (and even ahead of his 
appointment) that altered the British Empire’s strategic balance to suit Indian priorities. 
Whereas other strategic thinkers in the Empire channeled Mahan or Corbett, Curzon 
aligned more with Halford Mackinder, a geographer and diplomat, who gave a famous 
1904 paper at the Royal Geographical Society propounding a “Heartland Theory” of 
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world power that pivoted upon the centers of large landmasses.221 Since his early trips to 
Afghanistan, Curzon had been a Russian alarmist in London, constantly warning his often 
apathetic colleagues that the Tsar meant to extend his empire to the farthest possible 
extent, which meant deliberately destabilizing the vast regions of Central Asia in which 
Russian territory menaced British India. He convinced the British Government to 
maintain robust relations with the Emir in Kabul to counter creeping Russian influence, 
and to continue stationing troops in Chitral, to guard the Khyber Pass in India’s 
Northwest Frontier.222 Curzon also sealed two important deals designed to secure the far 
strategic flanks of the Indian Empire. First, he argued for well-resourced military 
presences in Kuwait and Aden from which the Royal Navy could police the Persian Gulf 
and Suez route through the Red Sea, which led to the Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899, 
and later in 1903, the Lansdowne Declaration, which established a “British Monroe 
Doctrine” for the Gulf. Curzon held a lavish durbar in November of that year to 
underscore British-Indian power on its western interface with the Ottoman Empire. 
Second, he successfully persuaded Balfour’s Government to pay up for a lease of the 
Chinese port of Weihaiwei in 1898, so the Royal Navy would have a workable position in 
the Yellow Sea from which to contest the presence of other European powers who had 
leased ports there. These commitments would be a source of tension between the British 
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and Indian Exchequers in subsequent years. In Curzon’s Viceroyalty, Indian 
constitutional affairs provoked scrambled reactions from the British metropole, and 
Indian strategic interests likewise. The colonies were not a mere peripheral concern in 
Curzon’s view; they sat at the “Heartland” of the British world and thus its geostrategic 
problems. His was an Indocentric British Empire. 
Curzon also attempted to use the Indian Army to leverage other colonial 
governments and to press Indian interests across the Empire, albeit with less success. The 
most important issues here were security and Indian migration. To these ends he 
frequently referenced the efforts of the Indian Army to rescue the Empire in its hour of 
need during his tenure, at the Boxer Rebellion in China and in the relief of British 
colonies in South Africa during the Boer War. He thundered to his own Legislative 
Council in 1902, “…it was an Indian General commanding Native troops from India that 
relieved the Legations at Peking; and further that, in the absence of our European troops 
elsewhere, it has been by Native regiments that our garrisons in China have since been 
supplied.”223 He went on to point out that “it is, I think, generally known that it was by 
the loan and prompt despatch of British troops from India that Natal was saved from 
being overrun by the Boers at the beginning of the South African Campaign. It was the 
holding of Ladysmith that prevented them from sweeping down to the sea.”224 That the 
Imperial and other colonial governments were not more appreciative of India and its 
army enraged Curzon, who found the task of convincing them to admit Indians as labor 
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migrants quite difficult.225 The racially selective policies of the new Australian 
Commonwealth, as well as those of other self-governing colonies, barred Indians from 
free entry.226 The reason for Curzon’s consternation over migration was twofold: first, it 
put the lie to the concept of equal subjecthood under the Crown by racially disparaging 
Indians, and secondly, migration restrictions were an ironic expression of territorial 
sovereignty by colonial governments when, as he argued, the Indian Army underwrote 
their sovereignty through its timely interventions in colonial security crises. 
Though he did not yet know it, George Curzon encountered his nemesis when 
General Herbert Horatio Kitchener, Lord of Khartoum, the British Empire’s most famous 
living soldier, arrived in India at the start of 1903 to assume the post of Commander-in-
Chief of the Indian Army. Kitchener’s fame made him an ideal choice for the Empire’s 
most prestigious military post, and Curzon thought him a perfect candidate for carrying 
out the kinds of robust reform that he felt the Indian Army needed. Kitchener arrived in 
time to participate in Curzon’s lavish and epochal 1903 Durbar in Delhi, the historic 
Mughal capital of India. The Durbar, a grand royal pageant that fused British royal 
courtliness with Mughal custom and ritual, was held to mark the succession of Edward 
VII to the British throne (and as Emperor of India) after the death of his mother, Queen 
Victoria, in 1901. Curzon hoped Edward himself would attend, but ultimately had to 
settle for his brother, the Duke of Connaught. Nevertheless, several hectares of Delhi 
were given over to parade grounds and tent complexes as the Raj staged its elaborate 
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show of power. It all fit Curzon’s plan for strengthening his alliances with India’s native 
aristocracy. He rode to the dais on a massive elephant festooned in rugs. Kitchener stood 
at attention as rank upon rank of Indian soldiers from across the Indian Empire, and 
princes from every state, marched past. An early film reel captured some of the 
pageantry, and audiences across the greater Empire would later marvel at the show.227 
Yet, as the great external show of force played out in 1903, Curzon knew the time was 
running out on his Viceroyalty, and that he had much more (far less glamorous) work left 
to do. For this reason, he petitioned Balfour’s Government to grant him an additional 
term as Viceroy as the year waned. Reluctantly, Balfour agreed, and Curzon remained in 
India. The moment marked a watershed in his career – he was slated to lead the Tory bid 
for re-election in Britain after Balfour’s term in Downing St. ended, and was widely 
believed to be on a shortlist of future Prime Ministers. As it happened, he would never 
occupy Number 10.228 His new counterpart as Secretary of State for India, the British 
Cabinet member responsible for liaising with the Government of India, was St. John 
Brodrick, who had been reshuffled from the War Office in favor of Arnold-Forster. 
Curzon’s next big project involved the Indian Army. He wanted to make it a more 
efficient fighting force capable of facing down the Russian threat at home and deploying 
as the Empire’s Asian police force abroad, and to repair its complicated financial 
machinery. He imagined Kitchener would be his ally in these tasks. He was wrong. 
Much as Chamberlain admonished colonial premiers at the 1902 Colonial 
Conference, Curzon sent letters in early 1904 to the rulers of the Indian Princely States 
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with the goal of cajoling them into increasing their subsidies to the Indian Army. His 
exchanges with some of the prominent princes reveal the interplay between the military 
capabilities of the state and the way India’s political actors imagined and constituted their 
sovereignty. The negotiation of this sovereignty had a complex recent past. The 1857 
Rebellion in India forced a re-making of British institutions and power in Asia, namely 
the demise of the once-potent East India Company and its replacement by the formal 
government of the British Raj. Even the Company had articulated its rule as a joint matter 
of British Royal Charter and Mughal sovereign writ to govern Indian territory. Central to 
the project of re-legitimizing British rule in India after 1857 was the creation of a new 
honors system that attempted to merge local forms of fealty with that of Britain’s feudal 
past in the person of the newly-dubbed Empress, Victoria.229 This honors system 
privileged acts of loyalty to British rule, which were formally tabulated and which often 
consisted of Indian princes supplying soldiers from their domains to serve in the newly 
reconstituted Indian Army, and ruling on the basis of  agreements with the Viceroy not to 
wage war on the subcontinent. Thus the ritualized constitutional system that governed 
India after 1857 was one in which the Raj-as-incipient colonial state monopolized 
military force within India via compact with its princely clients, and in which a figure’s 
right to rule, from the Empress down to the local Nizam or Maharaja, was a function of 
his or her contribution to the incipient state’s security. In this way the colonial Indian 
state, which continued to consolidate and centralize after 1900, was itself constituted by 
needs of the Indian Army - fiscal, infrastructural, and strategic.  
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Standing arrangements between the Raj and the princes in 1904 involved both 
subsidies and the provision of Imperial Service Troops – auxiliary corps usually 
delegated by the Indian Army to supply and transport tasks. Some of these arrangements 
predated 1857 and actually followed the Company’s victories against Tipu Sultan, and in 
the Anglo-Maratha Wars of the late eighteenth century. Curzon noted in his letters and 
memos that only 23% of the princes voluntarily contributed fiscal subsidies to the Army, 
and hoped to secure a 10% margin from as many of their revenues as possible in the 
future. He wrote, “It has been under the security guaranteed to them by the Indian Army 
against either external invasion or internal revolt that the revenues of the majority of 
Native States in India have doubled, and trebled, and in some cases been multiplied 
tenfold, during the past century. Moreover, if a Foreign Power [Russia] is continually 
drawing closer to the frontiers of India…that advance is as direct a menace to every 
Native State in India as it is to any portion of Indian territory.”230 Having sent his postal 
salvo, Curzon made his way back to Britain to settle accounts before the start of his 
second term. The tone of the princes’ replies caught him off guard. Instead of a dialog on 
the rate of subsidy, never mind an agreed increase, he found himself reading principled 
rejections of the concept of subsidy itself. The princes’ responses reveal the complex 
interplay between their local sovereignties and the defense of greater India. Some of the 
wealthiest made conspicuous offers to contribute more troops, while others insisted they 
could not spare more from their local duties, but they uniformly expressed displeasure at 
the subsidies they paid to the Raj, however small. Curzon and his government soon 
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realized they would need to reposition their requests to target troop contributions, since 
these seemed to comport with the princes’ self-image as sovereign actors and co-
defenders of the realm.  
Krishna Raja Wadiyar IV, the Maharaja of Mysore, wrote to Curzon, in 1904, 
“Your Excellency has indeed correctly divined the true feeling in the hearts of the Indian 
Princes, viz., that to ensure their willing co-operation, it is essential that the Military 
service rendered [to the Raj] should not assume the character of periodically discharging 
a mere fiscal obligation.”231 Mysore had paid a military subsidy to the Government of 
India since its defeat, under Tipu Sultan in 1799, at the hands of the East India Company, 
and in 1904 the Maharaja’s subsidy stood at 41 lakhs annually.232 He hoped to seize on 
the occasion of Curzon’s audit of military clientage to return Mysore to its former glory 
as a partner, rather than a client, of the Raj. He closed his letter by drawing explicit 
parallels to the period’s most conspicuous (and violent) example of state consolidation – 
Germany:  
I am hopeful that before Your Excellency leaves India after your next term 
of office, the movement will have assumed a practical shape, and, like the 
German Confederation, the threads composing the bonds of common 
interest between the Imperial Government and the Indian Princes will have 
been woven closer than at present. We may then hope, as Your Excellency 
has observed, to see emerge from the present lack of a system, a 
confederation of the armed forces of India with each Prince holding ready 
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and efficient at all times, his contingent for participation in Imperial 
Defence.233 
 
The Maharaja’s message here abounds with allusion to contemporary events and speaks 
directly to the issue of sovereignty. By invoking German unification, the Maharaja 
posited a model of state-formation predicated on cooperative militarism and security. By 
invoking “contingents for Imperial Defence,” he also invoked the diplomatic boons that 
had accrued to colonial participants in the South Africa and China interventions. Prussian 
militarism, the bête-noir of British liberalism, had arrived in India. 
The Maharaja of Travancore, meanwhile, noted in his letter to the Government 
that Travancore had sent sepoys to fight alongside the Company against Tipu Sultan, but 
since that time had usually paid an 8 lakh annual subsidy. He offered to add to this sum 
funding for troops from Travancore from his personal guard to train with the Indian 
Army.234 The Raja of Cochin likewise noted that “…an invasion of India by a foreign 
Power, God forbid a thing like that for ever, will be a danger no less disastrous to the 
Native States than to the British Government,” but protested that his regime could not 
afford to pay subsidies.235 The princes’ animosity to paying subsidies became abundantly 
clear as they responded to the Raj’s entreaties. The Chief Secretary receiving these 
reports for the Government of India noted, “…any impression of a defence-tax, as such, 
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should be avoided, and even were a pecuniary standard accepted in principle, it would 
probably be thought advisable to convert it into some form of military service in 
practice.”236 This diplomatic conversation was about more than the fiscal costs involved. 
It was a conversation about the way the Indian princes and the British Raj imagined and 
manifested their sovereignty, and how they managed their relationships accordingly. 
Paying subsidies to the Raj (and the garrison its Army provided) for security and stability 
in their autocratic realms was an efficient solution for the Princely States, but it also 
resembled tribute and magnified their subservience to British power. Providing troops 
directly though, even in token quantities, allowed them to position themselves as fellows 
of the Raj and joint guarantors of Indian sovereignty. Curzon had to settle for more troops 
than money. In many cases this too caused tension, as the princes still had their own 
internal sovereignty to uphold.237 
 Curzon’s negotiations with the princes involved a group of elites ensconced 
within or invested in the colonial Indian state, but similar arguments also emerged from 
those working in more obvious ways to reform and subvert British power. The Congress 
still held a measure of respect for the Indian Army as a symbol of the nation, and 
advocated for the advancement of Indians through its ranks, whose upper echelons were 
dominated by the British just as was the case in the Raj itself. A 1908 Congress 
resolution underscored the importance of the army as a symbol of Indian sovereignty: 
“this Congress prays that the high recognition of the valour and fidelity of the Indian 
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troops by His Majesty the King Emperor in his message to the Princes and Peoples of 
India should include the throwing open to Indians of higher career in the Army from 
which, as this Congress has repeatedly pointed out, they have been hitherto excluded.”238 
For the Congress too, then, the Army represented India itself, and as such its purpose 
transcended its role as a guarantor of security. It also symbolized sovereignty on the 
subcontinent, and the racial divide that kept Indians in a subordinate position under 
British rule. Thus, while they had divergent objectives for the future of Indian politics, 
both the Raj and the princes on the one hand, and the Congress on the other, appreciated 
that the Indian Army played the pivotal role in upholding the sovereignty of the Indian 
state. This was true both for questions of territorial defense and for how India was 
represented abroad, where the Army’s regional role supplied diplomatic leverage that was 
the best hope for helping the Indian diaspora in other colonies. The Army also guarded 
against external menace, whether this was Russian or Muslim or even British. Military 
logic framed also the territoriality of the Indian colonial state, and framed the way this 
diverse array of political actors imagined and asserted their sovereignty and legitimacy. 
 At this very moment, a conflict erupted over precisely who commanded the 
Indian Army. General Kitchener, imperious and mustachioed, began telling his 
interlocutors in 1904 that his position in India was “intolerable” – the problem, he fumed, 
was the meddlesome Government of India itself and its role in the command of the Army. 
The constitutional arrangement at the time involved Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief, 
presiding over a general staff that ran the Army. His was the most prestigious and well-
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resourced military post in the British Empire, eclipsed only in prestige by the First Sea 
Lord who commanded the Royal Navy – and even the First Sea Lord had less operational 
freedom than Indian Commanders-in-Chief enjoyed. But the latter had a counterpart, the 
“Military Member” of the Government of India, another military officer who traditionally 
oversaw matters of supply and logistics, who sat on the Viceroy’s Council, which was 
effectively the Cabinet that comprised the Government of India.239 Kitchener could not 
abide sharing his command with another officer who could second-guess his decisions in 
council, or worse, de-fund or reallocate resources for his initiatives. He said as much, 
loudly, to his politically-connected friends in India and Britain. He proposed, 
furthermore, that the Military Member position be abolished as part of the ongoing 
reforms of the Indian Army. The issue transcended its technical nature – civilian control 
of the military was a cornerstone of British constitutional culture, a principle imagined to 
have been inviolable for untold misty centuries (with perhaps a brief intermission of 
Cromwellian tyranny).  
Neither was the Indian conundrum wholly new – previous Viceroys had grappled 
with it also. Lord Dufferin, Viceroy from 1884-1888, left extensive notes on the matter. 
“It is out of the question,” he wrote in 1888, “to suppose such perfection in human nature 
                                                        
239 A more precise overview, provided in an 1888 memo by then-Viceroy Lord Dufferin: “Thus we have in 
India a great executive officer styled the "commander in chief" who is ex officio a member of the 
Government, but who is at the same time subordinate in certain respects to the Government of India. The 
"military department" is not a War Office in the European sense of the term, still less in the English sense, 
but the ministerial agency through which the authority of the Governor General in Council [Viceroy] was 
exercised. This Department is in charge of a Member of Government who is titled the Military Member of 
Council. That high official has no military Command nor any executive military functions, but, through the 
Military Department, under its constitutional head the Secretary to Government, he controls the great 
spending departments of the Army, namely the Ordinance, the Supply and Transport, the Military Works, 
the Army Remount, the Army Clothing and the Royal Indian Marine, as well as the Military Accounts 
Department.” Dufferin, Simla, 1 Oct. 1888, MSS Eur E420/3, Barrow Papers, “Organization and 
administration of the Army in India,” BL, 11-12. 
 134 
 
as would enable one man accurately to weigh military efficiency and financial 
considerations, to hold the balance between the traditions of the past and economy, and 
the innovations or expenditure desired; the whole weight of his enormous and 
uncontrolled authority would be thrown into that side of the scale which represented 
military power, and to use words which have been employed before against this 
proposition, the revenue of the country would be at his mercy.”240 Ten years prior, an 
Army Reorganization Committee had considered the perils of embedding the 
Commander-in-Chief within the Government, and concluded: “The position of the 
Executive Commander in Chief as a Member of Council is, in the opinion of the 
Majority, one without precedent in the organization of any European Government or 
Army. It is contrary to one of the most essential and salutary principles of sound 
administration, and the common instinct and experience of all administrations, whether 
representative or despotic, has everywhere rejected it.”241 Not even the Germans, so 
beloved of the Maharaja, were this beholden to their military. Curzon, predictably, was 
not about to cede his power or influence as Viceroy, or personally to capitulate to 
Kitchener. He rebuffed the proposal.  
 In this, Curzon joined a lengthening list of people who underestimated Herbert 
Kitchener’s recalcitrance. During Curzon’s brief return to Britain, Kitchener was writing 
privately to many of the very people the Viceroy was dining with, doubling down on his 
demands. One memo captures his attitude and characteristic tone:  
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Since writing my Minute, I have studied all that has been urged against my 
proposals in the Minutes of His Excellency the Viceroy… Some attempt 
has been made to dispute my facts, but, in my opinion, without success. 
My assertions have been contradicted, but not, I think, disproved. My 
arguments remain uncontroverted, and are, I believe, incontrovertible. I 
adhere, therefore, to everything that is contained in my memorandum, and 
it follows that I entirely dissent from the accompanying Despatch.242 
 
Curzon attempted routinely to appoint General Edmund Barrow, who had led British 
forces in the Boxer intervention in China, to the Military Member’s position in the 
Government. He began to understand his predicament when St. John Brodrick, Secretary 
of State for India, stalled on approving the appointment. Curzon wrote reflectively to 
Barrow in autumn 1905 that leaks of Kitchener’s memos revealed “what a farce Lord K’s 
repudiation was,” and that their publication had “discredited him to a phenomenal 
degree.”243 But Curzon had misjudged his position. Kitchener threatened to resign his 
post if his demands were not met, and that was an eventuality the British Government 
could not afford. Balfour’s premiership looked shaky ahead of the 1905 election cycle, 
and General Kitchener was one of the few people who inspired British public confidence 
in the upheaval following the Boer War moment, which war Kitchener was also widely 
credited with salvaging. The Empire’s most famous soldier acrimoniously resigning the 
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Empire’s most prestigious military post would have sounded deafening klaxons on 
Balfour’s ability to manage his associates. Privately, Balfour even favored Curzon’s 
position, but reluctantly informed him through Brodrick that he was being overruled and 
would need to go ahead with Kitchener’s plan.244 After a last-ditch attempt to forge a 
compromise position with Kitchener, Curzon resigned in August 1905.245 He was forty-
six. His career did not recover for a decade. Kitchener proceeded to remake the Military 
Department in his image, and to centralize command of the Indian Army in himself. 
 The Times of India, an establishment-favoring newspaper, wrote on 2 September 
that “The publication of the minute by Lord Kitchener and the reply by H.E. the Viceroy 
has created a new, as well as a decidedly painful, sensation here. Many men here are now 
desperately weary of the military controversy and wish they could have been spared this 
further washing of uncommonly dirty linen in public.”246 James Mackenzie Maclean, a 
former Tory MP and journalist in Bombay, wrote that “next to the Prime Minster himself 
Mr. Brodrick is the most martial member of the Cabinet. The supremacy of the military 
element in English society, which unhappily has become one of the most characteristic 
features of the age has in him one of its most doughty supporters…Lord Curzon has 
become the champion of Constitutional government against militarism.” Maclean added 
that “very soon” the people of India would get control of representative government, and 
“[what] must be their amazement to find that the Governor-General [Viceroy], to whom 
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they have always looked up, has been replaced by a soldier who knows nothing of civil 
life?”247 Curzon himself remarked, on his return to Britain, that ceding constitutional 
authority to soldiers in this way was “what lost Charles II his head.”248 This unquiet spirit 
stalked the annals of British history – Thomas Jefferson had written of General Gage’s 
1774 appointment as Governor of Massachusetts as one of George III’s many abuses in 
the Declaration of Independence: “He has affected to render the Military independent of 
and superior to the Civil power.”249 
 Indian reactions to Curzon’s departure were not uniformly characterized by 
goodwill and sadness, however. Though he had enjoyed cordial relations with Congress 
and moderate nationalists in his early Viceroyalty, his last successful signature policy 
destroyed those relationships. Convinced that the Province of Bengal, which contained 
the Government’s winter capital in Calcutta, was both too populous and too complex to 
be efficiently governed, he resolved to partition it into eastern and western halves, 
corresponding to areas of Hindu and Muslim predominance respectively. Partition also 
served his divide et impera strategy of keeping Bengal, and by extension the Congress, 
weak. Despite considerable controversy and public denunciation by nationalists, Curzon 
finalized the partition shortly before his final departure of India. Speaking from Benares 
in Uttar Pradesh, Gokhale, in a Presidential address to the Congress in December 1905, 
compared Curzon to the seventeenth century Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb 
                                                        
247 THE VICEROY'S POSITION: OPINION AT HOME: MR. J. M. MACLEAN'S VIEWS, The Times of 
India (Delhi), 26 September 1905, 7. 
248 Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Viceroy and Governor General of India, Vol. IV. 1904-1905. 
(Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1906) India Office Library, BL, T 
31037 (1900), p 
249 See Armitage, The Declaration of Independence, 168. 
 138 
 
was responsible for formalizing Islamic law in the Empire, a decision that paralleled 
Curzon’s establishment of a de facto Muslim province in East Bengal, and, though 
Aurangzeb presided over the Mughal Empire’s nominal height, sent it into terminal 
decline through profligate spending and overambitious military campaigning.250 Congress 
had already attempted to circumvent Curzon altogether on the matter, and to send 
representatives to petition the British Government directly.251 Already, Gohkale was 
losing ground to Bal Ganghadar Tilak and the more radical factions. Shyamji 
Krishnavarna, a Sanskrit scholar and radical nationalist who had matriculated from 
Balliol at the same time as Curzon, wrote in his London-based nationalist newspaper The 
Indian Sociologist that Gokhale was useless, as were any Indians who were “members of 
Indian Legislative Councils, holders of titles, and persons who pride themselves on being 
called ‘Honorable,’” referring to Gokhale’s government pension, “while a self-
sacrificing, unbending patriot” (like Tilak) “suffers at the hands of an alien 
Government.”252 The ensuing years in Bengal marked the most volatile and violent in 
India since the 1857 Rebellion, as radical nationalists like Tilak and Surendranath 
Banerjee launched the Swadeshi movement to boycott British goods. A generation of 
Bengali nationalists marked the 1905 partition as a moment of national awakening, 
including future Nobel Prize for Literature winner Rabindranath Tagore, who composed 
Banglar Mati, Banglar Jol as an ode to the Bengali nation in the months after partition. 
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 The pivotal years of Curzon’s Viceroyalty, 1899-1905, marked a new contest to 
define and assert sovereignty in greater India. Increasingly, new players joined that 
contest and challenged the Raj’s ability to monopolize the conversation. Though relations 
between nationalists and India’s British rulers became markedly more oppositional, 
especially after 1905, their conceptions of sovereignty converged around the issues of 
territoriality and security. Curzon’s and his princely and nationalist interlocturors’ mental 
maps of the incipient Indian state looked remarkably similar; their strategic 
preoccupations, nearly identical. The rulers of India’s princely states tried to reduce their 
financial liabilities to the Raj, and fiercely protected their local sovereignties, but where 
possible they made an effort to contribute more troops to the service of the Indian Army. 
They did so because they recognized, as did the Congress, that the Army was the most 
constitutive agent of sovereignty on the subcontinent, and as such could act as a vehicle 
for legitimating their own regimes. These congruencies, alongside Curzon’s 
constitutional tug-of-war with Kitchener over the levers of command, mark the years 
1899 to 1905 as moment of consolidating and ascending military power in India. The 
Army’s commander shirked the nominal oversight heretofore constraining him; military 
relations between the Raj and the Princes tightened, and as James Maclean put it above, 
militarism had triumphed on the subcontinent. Curzon’s partition of Bengal was likewise 
calibrated to deliver closer administrative oversight on the two resulting provinces. 
Balfour even told a meeting of the CID in 1905 that he wanted to bring the command of 
the Indian Army and the British Army under the same general staff, though he noted the 
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many obstacles facing that wish.253 The British constitutional ecosystem was being 
contorted into ever stranger (and more Teutonic) shapes, and the forces driving it 
emanated substantially from outside the Mother Country. 
 
 
2.4 FISHERIES MINISTRIES AND MANA FROM HEAVEN: SOVEREIGNTY IN 
THE PACIFIC, REDUX 
 In May 1903, Mahuta Tāwhiao became a member of New Zealand’s Legislative 
Council, the colony’s upper chamber, analogous to the British House of Lords. Tāwhiao 
was the Maori King – the third of his line; the Kīngitanga or “king movement” had only 
existed since 1858, when accelerating land purchases by British settlers in New Zealand 
drove the Maori to innovative political tactics. Realizing that their political disunity vis-à-
vis the Pākehā (the Maori word for white Europeans) was a serious disadvantage, the 
Maori appointed a single King they hoped would ease their diplomatic and legal relations 
with the British Crown. The Kīngitanga eventually developed its own judicial system and 
small bureaucracy, but never attracted unanimous legitimacy among Maori iwi (tribes), 
much less from the Government of New Zealand – Pākehā militia fought a series of small 
wars with “Kingites” in the 1860s over the issue of recognition. Mahuta Tāwhiao’s entry 
to the Legislative Council was controversial though, and epochal. After a few uncertain 
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decades regarding the future of the Kīngitanga, its relationship with the British monarchy, 
and its role in mediating the Treaty of Waitangi that governed relations between Maori 
and Pākehā, Tāwhiao’s move marked a capitulation of sorts to the institutional structure 
of British power in New Zealand. James Mackay, a government agent charged with 
negotiating land agreements, summed up Tāwhiao’s appointment thus: “Sir George Grey 
[Governor of New Zealand from 1845-1854 and from 1861-1868] once said to me ‘How 
do you account for the present difficulties with the Natives now; they did not formerly 
arise so acutely?’ My reply was ‘Your Excellency, when we came into the colony we 
were their Pakehas, we are now trying to make them our Maoris.’ Messrs Seddon and 
Carroll have now succeeded in making them our Maoris.”254 King Mahuta, in the eyes of 
his critics, was making the same mistake as Gokhale in India – allowing himself to be 
subsumed within Britain’s imperial machine. 
 Kīngitanga invoked familiar problems in the changing world of the colonial 
Pacific at the turn of the century. It marked a need to create consolidated, centralized 
institutions through which political actors could stay afloat in the rising tide of migration, 
colonization, and war. Inchoate though it was, Kīngitanga also invoked the essence of the 
political struggle between the Maori and Pākehā in New Zealand – mana, the loose Maori 
translation of the English word “sovereignty.” The Treaty of Waitangi (as read aloud to 
the chiefs by the missionary Henry Williams in 1840) translated the English passage 
“…all the rights and powers of Sovereignty…” that were being ceded to Queen Victoria 
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as “Ko te kingitanga ko te mana i te wenua…”255 The suitability of the term and concept 
Mana to stand for “sovereignty” has been the main subject of over 150 years of 
subsequent judicial dispute between Maori and the Government of New Zealand.256 The 
wars fought sporadically in the decades following Waitangi in 1840 were, in a more 
widely-acknowledged sense, wars for mana. Mana meant both the metaphysical right to 
rule and the manifest evidence of legitimate rulership.257 The concept lay at the heart of 
land rights and other thorny issues, but also of the military domination of territory; Maori 
chiefs were said to have mana when they defeated other tribes, and the Pākehā victories 
in the late nineteenth century cemented Pākehā (and the Pākehā Queen’s) mana over New 
Zealand. King Mahuta’s entry to the Legislative Council symbolized that reality in acute 
fashion. 
 The remainder of this chapter will examine the coalescence and 
institutionalization of sovereignty in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada in the years 
1902-1906. Following the federation of Australia, the new Commonwealth faced a 
complicated task building federal military institutions for the first time. New Zealand, 
having opted out of the Australian federation, needed to forge its own path, one that 
effectively triangulated regional interests with its metropolitan links which, above all the 
other large colonies, it could not afford to jeopardize. Canada, under Laurier’s careful 
stewardship, aimed at more robust state institutions and built a Department of External 
Affairs and a comically distended Ministry for Marine and Fisheries to oversee naval 
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defense, all the while balancing its British, American, and French identity and interest 
groups. These were complex games that played out in a period of institutional fluidity in 
the British Empire, allowing these colonies to negotiate new positions in the matrix of 
relationships that constituted the Empire. As in India, the issue of subsidy became a 
controversy for the Pacific colonies, and they contested the practice of simply paying 
Britain for naval security. As in India, developments in the Pacific colonies resolved in a 
centralizing, militarizing fashion that enhanced their institutional and ideational 
congruence with the British state in debates about the suitability of a Commander-in-
Chief. Once again, Japan acted as a flashpoint that propelled these negotiations and 
provoked colonial contestation of imperial diplomacy and strategy. The reactions of the 
Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, Indian, and later, South African governments to the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance treaties in 1902 and 1905 serve as revealing evidence of the 
way colonial actors imagined sovereignty and security, and the way they were prepared 
to contest metropolitan perspectives on security strategy. 
 The issue of security subsidies across the British Empire had been festering for at 
least a half-century and enjoyed an even longer history stretching back to before the 
American Revolution. During Gladstone’s 1868 government, Secretary of War Edward 
Cardwell reorganized the Empire’s policies on military garrisons, initiating a withdrawal 
of regular British troops from colonial posts and encouraging colonial governments to 
pick up the slack.258  The transition proved piecemeal and controversial, but by 1900 the 
self-governing colonies had mostly cobbled together militia forces that, at least in theory, 
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could act as forces for self-defense. While land defense remained the central 
preoccupation in India as a continental power, the conversation in the other colonies 
turned to the issue of naval subsidies. There had been no Cardwell-style reform of the 
Royal Navy; the British Admiralty jealously guarded its central command over a globe-
spanning network of ships and bases. Colonial recompense to the Admiralty, for maritime 
security and the protection of their vital shipping links to the Empire, came from fiscal 
subsidies, and the Admiralty preferred this no-strings arrangement.259 Though subsidies 
were far cheaper for the Dominions than the alternative – building and crewing their own 
ships – they provoked considerable opposition along the Pacific Rim.260 Aversion to 
subsidies, and the fiscal hit entailed in scrapping them, was an aversion to dependence 
and clientage. Such was the cost of sovereignty. 
 Following the federation of Australia, the individual Australian colonies had to 
turn over control of their modest naval forces to the federal government by March 1901. 
The ships in question made for a rather underwhelming armada – they were coastal 
vessels, mostly obsolete, some even grizzled ironclad monitors, like HMVS Cerberus, 
from the birth of the steam age. There was much to be done before the Commonwealth 
Naval Force could reach something approximating that of a sovereign naval power; it 
remained in the shadow of the Royal Navy’s Australia Squadron, itself a modest force of 
                                                        
259 See Reginald McKenna. “Imperial Conference on the Subject of the Defence of the Empire, 1909. 
Minutes of Proceedings,” 1909, CAB 18/12A, TNA, 65. 
260 The Dominions spent between 3 pence and 1 shilling per capita annually on naval expenditures 
including subsidies, compared with Britain’s 15 shillings. See Part II Table I, “Statement showing Naval 
and Military Expenditure of the United Kingdom, Self-governing Dominions, India, and Crown Colonies,” 
1909, CAB 18/12A, TNA. For a discussion of individual governments’ spending increases for building 
ships, see “Proceedings of a conference at the Admiralty, August 1909,” CAB 18/12A, pp. 12-18. The 
initial agreement involved, in Australia’s case, trading a £200,000 annual subsidy for a £750,000 annual 
upkeep on a fleet unit; even after a £250,000 rebate from British coffers until Australia could afford the 
whole bill, this more than doubled spending.       
 145 
 
mostly torpedo cruisers under the command of a British commodore, a position that was 
upgraded to Vice Admiral following federation. The development of Australia’s military 
and naval institutions in the years following federation owed much to two relentlessly 
activist officers, Colonel Edward T.H. Hutton and Captain William Creswell. Before 
arriving in Australia, Hutton had already been effectively banished from Canada by 
Laurier’s Government after he used his posting there to publicly whip up support for the 
deployment of Canadian forces to South Africa. To the Veldt he went instead, and 
commanded a force of colonial cavalry there, under General Roberts, which earned the 
latter’s respect and his recommendation to take over as the commander of Australia’s 
first combined military force in late 1901.  
Hutton’s goal was to expand his portfolio to its maximal extent, like a petty 
Kitchener, a goal made obvious by his interference in Australia’s preliminary attempts at 
passing a Defence Bill. His civilian counterpart, Sir John Forrest, Australia’s inaugural 
Secretary of Defence, had the pleasure of trying to usher these bills through the 
Commonwealth parliament, a job that would bring his career to a disappointing end.261 
The first iteration of the bill arrived in the first Australian parliamentary session. Forrest 
noted in the debate following the Bill’s second reading that “sole power” over the Army 
in Australia was being vested in the Governor (not the Government), and that while this 
contradicted the political direction of the Commonwealth’s other institutions, there was 
“no precedent whatever to guide us, in British countries,” of acting without a Governor’s 
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oversight.262 The bill also called for a multi-tiered defense force in which Regular troops 
on active duty could serve in any theater, Militia likewise on a part-time basis, and finally 
a force of Volunteers would be tied to their own districts and forbidden from deploying 
outside Australia. The combination of a powerful officer (Hutton) heading a combined 
force holding itself ready for imperial use, and of an imperially-appointed Governor 
charged with directing that force, provoked sufficient opposition to collapse the bill. Billy 
Hughes, the Member for West Sydney, called it an “olla podrida” of old colonial 
statutes.263 This legislative setback for Edmund Barton’s Government forced him to tread 
carefully on the issue of an “imperial reserve force” the following year when he attended 
the 1902 Colonial Conference in London. Though Hutton was chagrined by the failure of 
the first bill, he doubled down on his efforts and produced a heavily-annotated copy of 
the next Defence Bill for Forrest in 1903, recommending “improvements” in meticulous 
detail.264 The final Defence Act provided for a very small regular Army, numbering 
around 1,300, and with the rest comprised of citizen-soldiers that would not be available 
for use outside Australia, a special point of ongoing acrimony to Hutton. He publicly 
dissented the Government’s moves and, when they opted to replace the Commander-in-
Chief’s position with a Military Board of the kind Britain was moving to, Hutton went 
fully rogue and began leaking his concerns to the press.265 The distinguishing act of his 
tenure as commander was to send Australian officers to observe the Russo-Japanese War 
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in 1904 – Hutton (and his position) were dismissed later that year, and replaced by the 
Board system he feared and opposed. Hutton, like Kitchener in India, did his best to 
entrench power in the hands of the colonial state’s ranking soldier. He was not as 
successful (nor had he as much fame and political capital) as Kitchener, but he forced the 
early Australian government to react to his initiative. The 1904 Defence Act banned the 
Government of Australia from sending troops abroad, largely because of the fears raised 
by Hutton.266 This problem echoed a familiar critique of the Indian National Congress – 
that the Army would be used for purposes outside Indian interests, politically and 
geographically. 
 Barton and Forrest thus attended the Colonial Conference in 1902 with an as-yet-
undetermined constitutional framework for Australia’s defense. They were certain, 
however, that Australia’s continued payment of subsidies to the British Admiralty did not 
comport with their plans. Subsidies had become a controversial topic in the Australian 
press as well.267 While most still accepted the principle of central Admiralty control, as 
above the primary trouble was in providing a fiscal contribution to imperial defense 
rather than a material one. Lt. John Biddlecombe, a Victorian (of the Australian state) 
who had served in South Africa, gave an address to the Royal United Services Institute, a 
London-based research center for the military, in 1902, in which he explained that 
Australia could have its own navy but still remain under Royal Navy command; “like 
certain banks and many other commercial institutions in Australia, having their head 
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office in London is desirable.”268 Biddlecombe went on to launch a familiar critique of 
colonial defense subsidies: “From what one sees in the newspapers – it is now proposed 
to give to the Royal Navy a sum of £200,000 a year. Then, having given away another 2 
millions at the end of the next ten years, what amount of material and personnel will the 
Commonwealth have to show for it? – None. …It appears to foster the old fatal idea of 
levying a Colonial tribute – Taxation without representation.”269 A contemporary article 
in the Spectator agreed, arguing that “Canada, Australia, and New Zealand will never 
attain to that naval spirit which is the life-breath of maritime Empire if they hire their 
naval protection in Britain or merely pay in money.”270 Ahead of the Conference, the 
Sydney Daily Telegraph invidiously compared Australia’s naval spending to that of Latin 
American countries like Chile, and after it the Adelaide Advertiser stated grimly: “It is no 
use mincing words – under present conditions a direct contribution to the British navy by 
Australia would be naval tribute from a dependency to a sovereign power.”271 
 Metropolitan observers looked on these arguments with some disdain. Selborne 
attempted to underscore the logic of concentrating naval power in Britain to the colonial 
delegates at the 1902 Conference with a twee pastoral metaphor - “The first effort of the 
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enemy would be to destroy the sheep-dogs, and then they would prey on the flock” – 
imagery that understandably did nothing to mollify the colonial delegates.272 The Times 
dismissed the “taxation without representation” refrain with its own allusion to famous 
colonial oratory – Edmund Burke’s lament that (here), in the erosion of colonial 
cooperation on naval funds, “chivalry” had gone, to be replaced by “sophisters, 
economists, and calculators.”273 The subsidy question also had strong fiscal and strategic 
dimensions – this was both an argument about payment and procedure (as the colonial 
dog-whistling suggests), and, fundamentally, about strategy – both sides took pains to 
argue that the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the strategist-thinker du jour, vindicated 
their positions.274 
 William Creswell already had a long naval career behind him when he assumed 
command of Australian naval forces in 1904, having served in posts from the English 
Channel to Malaya, and most recently commanding an Australian gunboat in support of 
British forces in the Boxer Rebellion. Creswell endorsed the creation of an autonomous 
Australian naval force, unlike many of his contemporaries who still clove to the 
Admiralty’s orthodoxy of central command, including Hutton and Forrest who actually 
agreed on that matter if little else. But Creswell was not as meddlesome as Hutton, and 
bided his time. Alfred Deakin, who succeeded Barton as Prime Minister in 1904, sent 
Creswell and Bridges (Hutton’s de facto replacement as head of the Military Board) to 
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Britain to sit on the Committee of Imperial Defence, though he placed them on strict 
orders to simply observe, and forbade Bridges from traveling home to Australia by way 
of Canada, fearing he would generate inconvenient press along his way.275 Ultimately, 
the efforts of Creswell, Hutton, and others to set up command-and-control structures for 
the Australian state, and the consultations with imperial partners at the Colonial 
Conference and the Committee of Imperial Defence left Australia, in 1906, with an 
effectively localized (albeit tiny) military force. Its naval future was similarly uncertain – 
Creswell had at his disposal a handful of coastal ships, and the Commonwealth still paid 
a subsidy to the Admiralty to defray the cost of the Royal Navy ships at Australia Station. 
Per the advice of Rear Admiral Sir Lewis Beaumont, the officer commanding Australia 
Station, Forrest’s memo on Australian naval defense for the 1902 Conference conceded 
that for the immediate future, an autonomous and fully-realized Australian Navy was 
impracticable, and that subsidies funding Australia Station would have to continue.276 But 
public opinion and subsequent Australian governments chafed under these provisions.277 
 New Zealanders reacted to the issue of naval subsidies in similar ways, even if 
their positions on the future of imperial relations differed from those of their neighbors. 
Richard Seddon, the long-serving Prime Minister of the colony, who earned the name 
“King Dick” for his political longevity and imperious manner (as seen in matters like the 
Fiji Question) remained in office until removed from it, and life, by a heart attack in 
1906. Having successfully set the agenda for the 1902 Conference itself as noted above, 
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Seddon “repudiated” any notion of New Zealand building and funding its own naval 
force, and instead opted to push Chamberlain and the British on reinforcing Australia 
Station, offering to increase New Zealand’s contributions toward those specific ships.278 
He also wrote Selborne after the Conference to ask whether one of the obsolete ships 
attached to Australia Squadron (a subtle reminder of the need to upgrade) might be used 
to train New Zealand’s Naval Reserve seamen.279 Seddon referred here to the terms of the 
agreement made about Australia Station, which in addition to the colonial subsidy 
allowed that Australia and New Zealand would begin training capable naval crew – 
enough to fully staff a second-class cruiser on a permanent basis, and a further Reserve 
force that would train on drill ships.280  
The issue of crews and training mirrored the broader implications of New 
Zealand’s place in the greater Pacific – the link to Britain remained inextricable but was 
increasingly understood as something that also signified the voluntary will of the colony 
and a path to enhancing its national interests. Regional threats posed by the likes of 
Japan, but also France and Germany, were perceived in New Zealand as not just vexing 
problems, but as auspicious opportunities. An association of East Coast Maori cabled an 
assurance to Chamberlain in the aftermath of Germany’s 1902 diplomatic condemnation 
of the Boer War, “If they want war they should like chiefs say so…His Majesty's Maori 
sons of the Empire hasten to assure him that they will always devote themselves to the 
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maintenance at all hazards of His mana in the sovereignty, in the Empire, and the Nation, 
and that they are prepared to do battle with his enemies whenever called upon.”281 While 
subsidy of Australia Station was as much naval aggrandizement as New Zealand could 
realistically handle in 1902, in the coming years this solution became progressively less 
acceptable locally. During a 1908 House of Representatives debate on subsidies, one 
Member thundered, “I want members to consider for a moment if we are doing all that is 
necessary when we simply say to our mother, ‘Here is £100,000 per annum for ten years; 
you look after us.’ Are we everlastingly to go crying to our mother for everything we 
desire? Are we never going to grow up? Are we always to be children depending upon 
our mother for sustenance and support?”282 
Canada’s strategic future and approach to imperial diplomacy included the major 
complication that Canada was a two-coast, continental state, and contained two divergent 
national identity factions, Anglo and Quebecois. Laurier’s political difficulties wrangling 
Anglo imperialists and Quebecois liberals was compounded thus by regional splits – 
western, Pacific-facing Canada harbored different strategic preoccupations than that of 
the Atlantic side, namely Asian migration and the growth of rival naval powers. Teddy 
Roosevelt once warned that the US and Canadian Governments ignoring the Asian 
immigration question would provoke civil war and the creation of a new Canadian-
American white megastate west of the Rockies that could enforce its own immigration 
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preferences.283 Richard McBride, the Premier of British Columbia who assumed office in 
1903, encouraged local Navy Leagues to put pressure on Laurier and the Canadian 
Government to commit to higher spending on defense, and to build a Canadian navy.284 
Laurier did his best to deflect these political currents – one of his most famous utterances 
came at the 1902 Colonial Conference when he professed a desire to keep Canada from 
being sucked into the “vortex of militarism” that typified European politics. The falcon 
had shut its ears to the falconer. He also rejected, out of hand, Chamberlain’s and 
Selborne’s contention that colonial military spending lagged Britain’s, given colonial 
liabilities on infrastructure costs from which Britain was immune.285 For this purpose the 
development of Canadian naval forces – a Naval Reserve, a coastal force, an officer’s 
college – were tonally very different than in Australia. Canada’s civilian oversight of its 
navy under Laurier, as such, continued under the auspices of the Ministry for Marine and 
Fisheries, a suitable euphemism for a nascent military body. Laurier also kept its 
leadership reliably stocked with Quebecois, first Raymond Préfontaine and then Louis-
Philippe Brodeur who, if not radical French-Canadien nationalists themselves, were at 
least minimally provocative to them. 
The Canadian Government also felt an institutional shortfall in the matter of 
diplomacy and external affairs. The question of whether and how Canadian troops should 
join the Boer War, as well as the numerous complications arising from Canada’s 
proximity to the United States, complicated Britain’s ability adequately to represent 
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Canadian interests abroad. Following rumbling confrontations like the Venezuela Crisis 
of 1895, when the United States intervened in Britain’s boundary dispute with Venezuela 
(and which recurred over debt repayment in 1902-3), British diplomats concluded that 
war with the United States was an unthinkable proposition. Necessary arrangements 
followed, most immediately the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, in which Britain 
abandoned its objections to sole American construction of an isthmian canal. The canal 
concession also tacitly ceded naval hegemony in the Caribbean, once a British lake, to the 
United States. Britain’s further concession to the American position in the Alaska 
Boundary Dispute of 1903 brought the new thrust of British diplomacy home to 
Canadians, provoking especial rage in British Columbia. Finally, rapprochement with the 
United States (and the vague dictums of Alfred Thayer Mahan) led to the phased 
withdrawal of British forces from the Royal Navy’s two main bases in Canada from 1904 
to 1907: Halifax in the east and Esquimalt on Vancouver Island in the west. The 
combined effect of these moves was to harm British credibility with Canadian observers 
and to create worrying security vacuums, as far as Canada was concerned, in its littoral 
zones. It also pushed the Canadian government to raise around 3,000 troops to replace the 
vacated British garrisons, to nearly double its military spending over the intervening 
period, and to build up its institutional footprint in the realms of defense and foreign 
affairs.286 Joseph Pope, a Canadian bureaucrat working as a secretary and clerk to the 
Privy Council, began informally representing Canadian interests at international 
conferences and advocating for the creation of a Canadian department of external affairs 
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to coordinate communication between the British Government, the Colonial Office, the 
Canadian Government, and foreign interlocutors. Working against institutional inertia 
(the Colonial Office was loath to concede diplomatic power to any Canadian body), and 
with little public support beyond Brodeur at Marine and Fisheries, Pope finally got his 
wish for legislation creating a foreign ministry in 1908, though he still found himself 
effectively competing with the Governor and the Colonial Office in the matter of 
Canadian foreign affairs for some years hence.287  
These diplomatic and strategic imbroglios that complicated relations between 
Britain and its colonies enveloped roughly half the globe after the signing of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. Though they each had their own specific interests and objectives, the 
Pacific colonies and India shared a common, difficult goal: to reorient the Empire’s 
strategic focus away from the internecine squabbles of European arms races and to focus 
it instead on the more politically fluid and (potentially more rewarding) East. The 
strategic game-board in the greater Pacific changed drastically in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, beginning with the international intervention to neutralize the Boxer 
Rebellion in China. That conflict had seemed to underscore, for Europeans and 
Americans, the importance of colonial expeditionary warfare, and the danger of European 
enclaves in Asia being overwhelmed by recalcitrant local populations. Japan’s 1905 rout 
of the Russians at Tsushima just a few years later disrupted conditions further, proving 
that Japan would be an active and formidable force in the Pacific – a reality Britain had 
already acknowledged when it agreed a treaty pact with the Japanese in 1902.  
                                                        
287 An excellent overview of Pope and early Canadian diplomacy is James Eayrs, “The Origins of Canada’s 
Department of External Affairs,” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue 
Canadienne d’Economique et de Science Politique 25, no. 2 (May 1, 1959): 109–28. 
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This treaty sent shockwaves through international diplomatic channels, as it 
amounted to a formal acknowledgement of partnership between a European and an Asian 
power. Viewed from London, this alliance carried obvious benefits.288 An agreement 
from Japan to defend British interests in the Pacific allowed the latter to write off 
thousands of miles of space and to redeploy ships closer to home waters in order to 
balance against the rising German naval threat.289 This was, after all, the logic advocated 
by the omnipresent Mahan. Yet, while the Anglo-Japanese alliance may have seemed like 
a prudent and economical measure to metropolitan officials, the alliance was neither as 
intuitive nor as stable as it seemed.290 The first iteration of the treaty did not contain 
provisions for India, Britain’s chief military liability in Asia. This was rectified when the 
alliance was renewed in 1905 after Tsushima, but the Government of India remained 
skeptical of Japan’s commitment to their strategic interests.291 Likewise, if the Pacific 
colonies were uncomfortable with paying Britain subsidies to look after their security, 
they were that much less keen to entrust it to the Japanese in good faith, especially after 
Japan’s comprehensive thrashing of Russia and the alliance’s renewal in 1905. The 
“Anglo-Saxon instinct” to pacify the Pacific, as one Australian officer put it in racialized 
terms, would not yield that responsibility to an Asian nation, a matter underscored by 
                                                        
288 For a discussion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and a testing of the theory that economic cooperation 
enhances security partnerships, see Davis, “Linkage Diplomacy.” 
289 A recent article that has examined the way Britain and Japan managed their relationship is Antony Best, 
“Race, Monarchy, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922,” Social Science Japan Journal 9, no. 2 
(October 2006): 171–86; Two classic works on the Anglo-Japanese relationship are Ian Nish, The Anglo-
Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London: Athlone Press, 1966); Ian 
Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-1923 (London: Athlone Press, 
1972). 
290 For more on this theme see Antony Best, “The ‘Ghost’ of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: An Examination 
into Historical Mythmaking,” The Historical Journal 49, no. 3 (2006): 811–31. 
291 See “Notes on the Anglo-Japanese Agreement,” IOR/L/MIL/5/711, 1905, BL. 
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notorious and widely-studied immigration policies designed to keep these British settler 
states free of infiltration by Asians, such as the White Australia policy, which infuriated a 
young M.K. Gandhi in South Africa and George Curzon alike. Furthermore, insofar as 
the incipient colonial states of the Empire hoped to access international legitimacy 
through robust naval and military capabilities, it suited them to construct the Pacific itself 
as fraught with instability and peril, and teeming with adversaries and infiltrators. It 
would be their task and, they argued, their duty as mature nations, to meet these 
challenges, rather than to sit idly by. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 An instructional document published by the Colonial Office in August 1903 
detailed a set of magic lantern slides for teaching schoolchildren about the British 
Empire. The intended audience was the “Eastern Colonies…classes at the top of 
elementary schools…with some modifications for adult hearers.” The material was 
divided into seven lectures, which began with slides intending to display a voyage from 
Colombo, Ceylon west to London with all the usual stops between. The final lecture’s 
topic was “Imperial Defence.” It included slides on famous battles in British history – 
Trafalgar, Waterloo, South Africa. It also attempted to explain the joint nature of land 
and sea forces, and the combination of these necessary to defeat enemies of the Empire. It 
specifically stated that “Trafalgar…had no immediate effect on Napoleon’s military 
successes,” for which it was necessary to raise large combined land forces including 
 158 
 
militia. It continued in notational form, “The Army at Waterloo [was] largely recruited 
from, and composed of, Militia. So in South Africa home Militia and Volunteers and 
Colonial Contingents.”292 The end result, the Colonial Office hoped to impress on young 
colonials, was an image of imperial security that was contingent on the effective 
cooperation of all the Empire’s subjects working in concert. In other words, precisely the 
opposite of the grim image invoked by Arnold-Forster in his War Office, Army, and 
Empire screed. The recent South African War was still uppermost in all their minds. 
Worryingly for the Colonial Office, though, the lessons of South Africa were subject to a 
variety of interpretations in the colonies, and as if War Office disorganization were not 
enough, their colleagues in the Foreign Office were making diplomatic deals like the 
Japanese Alliance that complicated the operational harmony between Britain and its far-
flung clients. 
 Contemporary observers struggled to explain the new conditions and relationships 
crystallizing before them – at once, Britain’s large colonies were becoming more 
independent from the Mother Country; their interests, more distinguishable and dialogic. 
But they also grew closer together, both in form – the more colonial governments built 
military and diplomatic capacity, the more they resembled Britain, and in function – in 
the new era of joint military operations, committees, and conferences, Britain 
increasingly operated with its colonies in a parallel fashion. The Wellington, New 
Zealand Evening Post put it this way in a February 1902 article reflecting on the Colonial 
Conference:  
                                                        
292 “Imperial Lantern Slides,” 1902 CO 885/5/15, TNA.  
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The political trend in the British Empire has of late been towards what 
may paradoxically and somewhat imperfectly be termed centralised 
decentralisation. There has been an enormous increase of local 
independence; within certain wide and elastic limits the various parts of 
the Empire enjoy to the full the rights of self-government. At the same 
time there have been operating powerful centripetal forces; local 
autonomy, instead of proving a source of division, has allowed the 
different States of the Empire to gravitate more freely towards a common 
centre of attraction. Political decentralisation has, in fact, produced greater 
solidarity. The Empire is more closely united, more organic, to-day than it 
has ever been since the Kingdom of England grew into the world-wide 
British Empire.293 
 
This “centralized decentralization,” as the Post put it, typified the new era of British 
imperial politics. Whether as “united” in “solidarity” as the Post hoped, the incipient 
states mutating from colonial status into more fully-realized norms of sovereignty were 
suddenly making rapid progress via the “common centre” of security. Security gave their 
states a reason to be. Security gave them a point of common weal with the imperial center 
that they could leverage.  
Key differences remained – India’s centralizing, militarizing trends eclipsed even 
Britain’s in magnitude with the defeat of Curzon and the victory of Kitchener, and 
                                                        
293 Evening Post (Wellington), 21 February 1902, quoted in 1902 ACHW 8633 SEDDON 1.1 2.27a 
R11184693 Cuttings - Defence Taken to England, NANZ.  
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lacking democracy, the Indian state had less need than the settler colonies to obsess over 
racist population controls to placate its constituents. Likewise the colonies themselves 
disagreed on the preferable security roadmap, with the continental powers in India, 
Canada, and Australia advocating fuller autonomy and the more isolated states in South 
Africa and New Zealand advocating more closely-pooled resources.294 The great irony 
here was that instead of India becoming more like the self-governing colonies, as the 
Indian National Congress wanted, the self-governing colonies were becoming more like 
India: garrison states aiming to project regional power. What they shared here was a 
tendency to articulate their sovereignties, their legitimacies as states, and their very 
reasons for being as matters of security. Laurier and the other colonial premiers were 
careful to avoid direct assimilation into Britain’s command structure – security 
represented an opportunity to cooperate to mutual advantage, but only if this was 
voluntary and preferably informal. Informality gave them the best defense against radical 
critics, a lesson evident in the travails of Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Mahuta Tāwhiao. 
The following chapter will examine how the holiest symbol of central imperial authority 
– the Admiralty, and its Royal Navy – came into question in the following years, and how 
the constitutional framework holding the Empire together began to slouch ever closer 
toward the Bethlehem of “centralised decentralisation.”
                                                        
294 The South African colonial premiers, owing their recent victory to joint imperial military intervention, 
understandably favored the idea of an Imperial Reserve. 
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3 CHAPTER 3: DEFENSE AND THE BIRTH OF DOMINIONHOOD, 1907-1909 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION   
In 1907, Robert Baden-Powell sat down to write a serialized handbook, Scouting 
for Boys, which would become the constitutional document of the Boy Scouts. Baden-
Powell’s career had been a global “adventure;” since the relief of his forces at Mafeking 
he had thrown himself into reform of all stripes – the Army took his first attention, but he 
turned it increasingly to British society at large. After returning from South Africa he 
pursued the first objective as Inspector General of Cavalry from 1903, a largely 
ceremonial Army position. “The Chief,” as some called him, wrote now for the more 
ambitious goal of reversing the decline of the British Empire. Baden-Powell outlined how 
Scouting, his new adventure, would do so in the ninth chapter of Scouting for Boys, 
“Patriotism; or, Our Duties as Citizens,” whose first section was artfully titled “Camp 
Fire Yarn No. 26 – OUR EMPIRE: How it Grew – How it Must Be Held.”295 Baden-Powell 
                                                        
295 Robert Stephenson Smyth Baden-Powell of Gilwell and Elleke Boehmer, Scouting for Boys: A 
Handbook for Instruction in Good Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 273. 
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conceived Scouting as a remedy to the malaise he feared was undermining the Empire 
from within: embodied physical degeneration, unraveling social ties, declining martial 
aptitude, and absence of civic duty. 
 The pages of Scouting for Boys also evince the growth of colonial nationalism in 
the first decade of the twentieth century. Between the diagrams for estimating the height 
of a tree with a stave and the warnings that smoking is for “loafers,” repeated references 
to patriotism and duty to the nation show a concerted effort to give the reader a firm 
national framework within which to position himself. Baden-Powell’s imperial tutelage 
for young Scouts also featured a remarkable geopolitical preoccupation. Chapter IX 
opened by inviting the Scout to appreciate how long it took him to travel by train for an 
ordinary holiday, and then to imagine the longer and longer journeys necessary for him to 
reach various British colonies. Next it listed the landmasses of the colonies, expressed in 
proportion to Britain’s. From there, it turned to the real strategic peril the Empire faced – 
“If our island of Britain were attacked and taken, down comes our Empire like a house 
built of cards…We have had this danger always, even before our Empire was a paying 
one and worth taking. Nowadays it is much more tempting for other people to take.”296 
The Chief wished to drive this point home. Several pages later, next to a jaunty 
illustration, he did so with help from a tentacled aquatic creature:  
Great Britain has been compared to a cuttle-fish, the British Isles being the 
body and our distant Colonies the arms spread all over the world. When 
anyone wants to kill a cuttle-fish he does not go and lop off one of its 
arms; the other arms would probably tackle him and hold him for the 
                                                        
296 Ibid., 276. 
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cuttle-fish to suddenly eat. No, the way to kill a cuttle-fish is to suddenly 
stab him in the heart, and then his arms fall helpless and dead.297 
 
 The basic strategic axiom Baden-Powell strove to impart upon young British 
Tenderfeet – that defending Britain was tantamount to defending the colonies – had long 
vexed imperial officials in their negotiations with colonial politicians. Consider the Duke 
of Newcastle, Colonial Secretary, answering questions before a House of Commons 
Committee on colonial military expenditure in 1861: “I have frequently had to state to the 
Colonists that in truth our [English] Channel fleet constitutes a defence to Australia.”298 
The inability of youths or colonists to grasp these concepts points to an older tension that 
was reaching crisis in Baden-Powell’s time – how to reconcile the growth of local, 
colonial sovereignties, especially those enjoying a measure of democracy, to a security 
strategy that was global in scope. 
 This chapter will explore how Britain’s self-governing colonies reimagined 
themselves as “Dominions” after 1907, the way they deployed the logic of security to 
justify their new status, and how the implications of this shift, for security and 
sovereignty, were complicated by Britain’s naval crisis with Germany in 1909. 1907-
1909, bookended by a Colonial and Imperial Defence Conference respectively, marked 
the moment at which the British Empire perhaps came closest to finding a formal, 
institutional solution to its dual dilemma of security and sovereignty. Not since the 
                                                        
297 Ibid., 282–283. 
298 Report from the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure; together with the proceedings of 
the committee, minutes of evidence, appendix and index, 1861, XIII, UK Parliamentary Papers (UKPP), 
199. 
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American Revolution, with its Quartering Acts and tax controversies, had these issues 
reached a crescendo resulting in serious change across the Empire. Arguably, since 1776, 
no reliable settlement existed for reconciling colonists’ wishes for autonomy and self-
government with the need to harmonize imperial security schemes and, crucially, to tax 
colonists for the provision of their security.299 Such a solution failed to materialize again, 
presaging greater tensions and upheavals to come. 
 The making of the Dominion as a constitutional construct is crucial to 
understanding how these tensions played out in the twentieth century. The concept 
“Dominion,” originally describing the power the British Crown wielded over its domains 
generally, evolved in 1907 as a category that signified a medial position between colony 
and sovereign state. This evolution was as much about creating distance from “colonies” 
as it was about reaching proximity to Britain, and military calculation proved crucial to 
defining that position. Its most important criterion was self-government, but this criterion 
was necessary, not sufficient. Several other British colonies enjoyed self-government in 
some form but were not considered for Dominion status in this period.300 Moreover, the 
colonies that did achieve Dominion status in 1907 had enjoyed responsible government 
for nearly sixty years in the case of eastern Canada and nearly fifty for eastern Australia. 
The Dominion moment arrived in 1907 for other, more complex reasons. It was born of 
an exchange of concessions: Britain conceded greater autonomy in military and 
                                                        
299 For a discussion of the political dynamics of American colonial security and the fiscal realities of the 
eighteenth century Empire, see Eliga H Gould, The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the 
Age of the American Revolution, Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture (Chapel Hill, 
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
300 The Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal were all self-governing but did not 
achieve Dominion status until the Union of South Africa in 1910; Southern Rhodesia and several Caribbean 
colonies were ruled by partially-elected Legislative Councils with equivalent franchise qualifications to 
those extant in the Dominions.  
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sometimes diplomatic affairs; colonies in turn promised to look after their own domestic 
security but crucially also to underwrite the security of the Empire beyond their borders. 
This exchange followed the growing centralization and militarization of colonial states 
over preceding years, as discussed in previous chapters. It also marked the creation of a 
kind of social contract between the members of what Richard Jebb called the “Britannic 
Alliance” – autonomy entailed obligation to imperial security goals. 
Dominion status, as a medial category, meant asserting both proximity to Britain 
and distance from its other colonies. The most notable outlier here was India, which did 
not receive the Dominion label in 1907 (and struggled to gain admittance to the 
Conferences that produced it), further entrenching and institutionalizing its exceptional 
nature and its distinction from the self-governing white settlement colonies. Any 
discussion of Dominionhood must account for India’s exclusion from Dominion status, 
which it would not achieve until the 1947-50 period before its independent state 
constitution came into effect. Ireland is another outlying case; its Home Rule movement 
gained steam in this period, and neither did it reach Dominion status until after its rupture 
with Britain, as the Irish Free State, from 1922-37. Ireland will be discussed further in 
subsequent chapters. The story of the British Dominions, and of other British colonies 
who sought Dominion status, highlights the need for incipient colonial sovereignties to be 
cohere with the general will of imperial security goals. The variable of democracy made 
this prospect tenuous, and shaped the way political elites both signaled to their domestic 
audiences and electorates, and the way they negotiated with counterparts from other 
colonial states. Ireland and India found themselves on the wrong side of this calculus; 
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Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and South Africa (after 1910) were 
luckier. 
One interesting dimension of the Dominion moment was the new institutional 
machinery coming on-line simultaneously – the coalescence of such bodies as the 
Committee of Imperial Defence and the Imperial Conference system (and the failure of 
more holistic ideas for imperial institutions such as federation or an imperial senate) 
structured imperial politics around groups of experts and officials: chiefly colonial 
premiers and the military officers and bureaucrats they brought with them. This level of 
imperial policymaking bore more than a passing resemblance to the ruling apparatus of 
imperial Germany.301 The issue of official secrecy remained fluid in this period – much 
of the Conference happenings were matters of public record, and were discussed in 
newspapers, but the CID kept a tighter rein on its deliberations, and that ethos spread 
increasingly to the conferences as well. Metropolitan officials counted this among the 
costs of bringing colonists into their councils, and were duly irritated. Colonial officials 
faced excruciatingly long sea voyages at regular intervals to access the highest levels of 
imperial politics; their health, time, and ability to manage their legislative schedules at 
home had to cope with this reality. These messy compromises marked a new era of 
imperial politics in which some old distinctions began to collapse and others were 
reinforced. The issues of security and sovereignty remained central, however. 
Dominionhood set a new constitutional standard for incipient colonial states to pursue, 
and the exigencies of security shaped their efforts to do so. 
                                                        
301 For more on the powerful influence of military elites in contemporary Germany, see Isabel Hull, 
Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005). 
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The aftermath of the Boer War, explored in previous chapters, drove strategic 
realignment in the Empire; the process matched colonial aspirations for autonomy with 
imperial needs for closer policy coordination, especially on defense. This chapter will 
investigate the meaning of Dominionhood in the British Empire at two critical moments: 
first, the 1907 Colonial Conference, at which the concept of the Dominion was agreed 
and the mode of imperial institutions altered to reflect it. Second, the 1909 Defence 
Conference, an urgent response to the naval crisis between Britain and Germany at which 
the Dominions were called to assist with imperial defense in an agreement called the 
“fleet unit” scheme. These two events, which featured variety of colonial participants, are 
snapshots of evolving imperial policymaking. Together they show how Dominionhood 
was born as a political construct meant to reconcile simultaneous demands for democratic 
sovereignty and the production of security. 
Before narrating these two events it is useful to consider the environment of 
political, technological, and strategic upheaval in which they took place. Politically, the 
states that made up the British Empire faced increasingly complex internal and external 
challenges during this period. The breadth of the franchise had grown throughout the 
nineteenth century in the United Kingdom and its colonies alike; where local self-
government did not already exist it was increasingly sought, as in India and Ireland.302 
Sluggish reforms in India, such as those of Indian Secretary John Morley (Brodrick’s 
                                                        
302 Several scholars have debated the relationship between democracy and imperialism. John Mackenzie 
argues that the age of “high imperialism” was marked by a need for the British state to sell its electorate on 
the imperial project, John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public 
Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester University Press, 1988); Twenty years prior Eric Hobsbawm argued that 
Britain's newly enfranchised adopted bourgeois values in the late nineteenth century, underwriting the 
growth of imperialism, Eric Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: An Economic History of Britain Since 1750 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968). 
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successor) and Viceroy the Earl of Minto (Curzon’s successor) in 1909, concentrated 
more power and money in the central government with a new Legislative Council and 
grand new capital in Delhi to match. In nearly every part of the Empire, state structures 
expanded and demanded more participation from their citizen-subjects. At the same time, 
nationalism placed new strains on these states to satisfy the people over which they ruled, 
evidenced by the increasing salience of the Irish Question in the United Kingdom and 
other notable cases like that of Quebec and the Indian National Congress.303 The shifting 
international order and Britain’s rash of new diplomatic relationships, as in the case of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, added external pressures to the crisis of sovereignty 
Dominionhood was trying to solve. 
 In addition to these political upheavals, the launch of HMS Dreadnought in 1905 
radically changed naval technology. The ship, which ultimately leant its name to the 
ensuing era of shipbuilding, made use of technological breakthroughs that allowed it to 
significantly improve its armor and weapons without sacrificing speed.304 The drive to 
realize these improvements (which, to an extent, collapsed the battleship and battlecruiser 
design concepts together), came from Jacky Fisher, first in his capacity as Controller 
(Third Naval Lord, the Admiralty officer responsible for shipbuilding and procurement) 
                                                        
303 Recent works have emphasized racial and economic salience in these processes. Here again James 
Belich and John Darwin are advancing the discussion of self-governing colonies as part of an 
“Angloworld” and a “British world system” respectively in James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The 
Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld, 1783-1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); 
John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970, 1st ed. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
304 These breakthroughs involved steel plating, new ways of mounting and sighting guns, and turbine-style 
rather than reciprocating steam engines. For an extensive discussion of ship design advancements see Jon 
Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Financial Limitation, Technological Innovation and British 
Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989)., Ch. 2, “The Strategy of Qualitative Superiority: 
Sir John Fisher and Technological Radicalism, 1904-1906.” 
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and later as First Sea Lord. Especially fond of speed, Fisher’s salty utterances included 
the adage “In Mrs. Somebody’s Cookery Book, the receipt for Jugged Hare begins with 
‘First catch your hare.’”305 Fisher, a relentless technological innovator who believed that 
submarines and long-range torpedoes rendered large, slow ships obsolete, demanded that 
the Admiralty design faster ships for each successive year of construction. 
 
                                                        
305 John Fisher, Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of 
Kilverstone (London: J. Cape, 1952), 110–1; quoted in Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, 38. 
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Source: Tables 16-17; Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy306 
In fact, the new battleships and battle cruisers launched by the Royal Navy sped almost 
one knot faster every two fiscal years between 1892 and 1913, as the charts above 
indicate. As a result, discussions of technology and naval strategy were rife with the 
language of instantaneous obsolescence.307 The vast sums spent in consecutive years did 
not even have cumulative effects; last year’s ships could be fatally outpaced or outgunned 
by this year’s, and each new set of Naval Estimates brought a new crisis. Such a climate 
seemed to demand rapid adaptation; complacency could mean a loss of strategic 
supremacy or, at the last, destruction on the high seas. 
 Lastly and perhaps most importantly for understanding the links between naval 
policy and emerging Dominionhood, strategic paradigms changed significantly during 
this period as well. These new strategic norms involved sweeping changes to military 
doctrine, procurement, and a host of other directly related issues, but they also drove 
some of the Empire’s thorniest political problems. For almost a century since the battle of 
Trafalgar, the Royal Navy had enjoyed virtually unchallenged control of global sea-lanes. 
Over this period it developed an extensive global network of bases and stations for 
coaling and resupply. Moreover, the breadth of the Empire demanded a commensurately 
broad security scheme. But at the turn of the century the tides of naval thought began to 
turn against the concept of a diffuse global force in favor of fleet concentration. The 
                                                        
306 Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, Tables 16–17. 
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American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan argued in his 1890 work The Influence of 
Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 that history favored nations who maintained large, 
unified fleets of capital ships that could deal Trafalgar-like knockout blows to enemy 
forces.308 Mahan’s was a doctrine for an age of naval races. 
Mahan’s perspective proved highly influential amongst the world’s naval 
strategists, and indeed to any armchair theorists of national power, like Baden-Powell 
with his cuttlefish. While the British Admiralty had its disciples and skeptics of Mahan 
(Fisher, for instance, hardly followed his precepts), Mahanian logic still underpinned the 
general direction of British strategy in the period, especially the pact with Japan and the 
growing preoccupation with Germany. Without Mahan’s fleet concentration paradigm, 
Britain’s naval race with Germany would never have reached the raw calculative 
crescendo it achieved in the years before World War I. It introduced a hard assessment of 
fleet size and strength in home waters that heightened the sense of alarm and 
confrontation in both countries.309 Fleet concentration animated Britain’s withdrawal of 
major naval assets from whole sections of the globe, and the accompanying diplomatic 
deals that ended its “splendid isolation” from entangling alliances.310 It is perhaps 
                                                        
308 For a good overview of Mahan’s influence on the British and American navies, see Keith Neilson and 
Elizabeth Jane Erringon, eds., Navies and Global Defense: Theories and Strategy (Westport, Conn.: 
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unsurprising then that Britain’s colonies and Dominions were less comforted by the 
implications of fleet concentration than metropolitan officials were, as the preceding 
chapters show.  
The contingency, if not the peculiarity, of the newly-created Dominions’ interest 
in developing robust naval forces, and of acquiring top-line capital ships, should not be 
underestimated. Myriad forces militated against it. Liberalism, afire with the spirit of 
Gladstone’s aversion to militarism and high spending, was a deeply-held value by many 
in the Empire, from Henry Bournes Higgins’ warnings to nascent Australians in Chapter 
1, to the recently-elected British Governments led by Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who 
took office in late 1905, and Herbert Henry Asquith, who succeeded him in 1908. Other 
problems, like those expressed by Wilfrid Laurier at the 1902 Colonial Conference, 
pointed to the difficulty of colonial states simultaneously pursuing large domestic 
infrastructure investments and diverting significant sums to defense. Dominion 
governments certainly had strong incentives to continue benefiting from the protection of 
the Royal Navy at low cost, or to cleave to plans for modest littoral defense only. But a 
variety of factors overrode these incentives. Strategically, the instability of international 
order heightened the sense of fear and uncertainty gripping Dominions that might have 
felt at ease, as seen in New Zealand’s scramble for federation in the southern Pacific after 
the Tripartite Pact in 1900. Furthermore, colonial observers did, to some extent, 
internalize the argument inherent in Baden-Powell’s Cuttlefish – for the first time, the 
British Empire confronted a future in which the colonies might need to underwrite the 
security of Britain rather than the other way round. Finally, while Dominion naval 
buildup might have been expensive or politically difficult or strategically inchoate, it 
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gave Dominion governments an opportunity to accrue prestige, diplomatic capital, and 
strategic autonomy. Imperial collective security served as a framework in which the new 
Dominions could reconstitute and assert their sovereignties as legitimate states. This 
logic, of embracing imperial defense as a social good that created unity of purpose 
between a group of autonomous actors, was a logic liberals could and did embrace. 
 Scholarship on the evolution of the Dominions has mostly avoided defining them 
formally or dating their birth exactly. This is for good reason; it was indeed an informal 
and drawn-out process. The strictest explanation finds Dominion status declared in the 
Balfour Declaration of 1926 and legally enshrined in the Statute of Westminster in 1931, 
which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Historians have seen little reason to 
problematize this moment. But these conspicuous concessions by the British Government 
only acknowledged what had already been the case for some years, and the First World 
War, as ever, serves as a convenient watershed for dating the ruptures of the early 
twentieth century.311 The first wave of scholarship on the Dominions, typified by the 
Cambridge History of the British Empire series begun in the 1930s, described them in 
highly optimistic terms that served a story of progress to equality among the states of the 
British Commonwealth – the sort of progress Dicey and Keith warned, in the century’s 
first years, was too tidy to hope for. This work tended to acknowledge the role of security 
cooperation in binding together the British family of nations.312 The Cambridge History 
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even provided a picture of Dominionhood as the herald of a bright new future for the 
global community: “Self-government gave the political freedom; the federal 
principle…ensured the necessary economic and political strength, and the spirit of 
nationality gave character and personality to each…[Britain’s] political genius 
foreshadowed in this an international system, beginning in a family of nations.”313 But 
this radiant optimism obscured the fissures and rifts Dominionhood created as well. The 
perspectives offered by subsequent waves of scholarship from historians of the former 
Dominions themselves brought new assessments. These tended to emphasize the often 
divergent interests between the Dominions and Britain, and other logics that helped 
create the Dominion idea, especially race.314 Happily though, the renewed scholarly 
attention on race, and the arguments for reemphasizing the settler colonies found in a few 
large, synthetic works on the British Empire, has resulted in an emerging consensus on 
the centrality of the Dominions in understanding the history of the British Empire and of 
international politics generally in the twentieth century.315 
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3.2 DOMINIONHOOD AT THE 1907 COLONIAL CONFERENCE 
1907 proved an auspicious year for security and politics in the British Empire. 
After the Liberal victory in the British election of 1905, Richard Haldane succeeded 
Arnold-Forster at the War Office, where many of the central recommendations of the 
Esher Report had not yet been implemented. Over the next two years Haldane, an ardent 
Germanophile destined to play key roles in doomed crisis negotiations with the German 
government, saw to the realization of Esher’s prescriptions for an Army Council system, 
and a Territorial Force to balance the expeditionary segment of the British Army. The 
Foreign Office concluded yet another major treaty with a rival empire, signing the Anglo-
Russian Entente in the summer, which attempted to soothe the strategic fears of Central 
Asia stoked by the likes of Curzon and Halford Mackinder by agreeing formal Anglo-
Russian buffer zones in Persia and Tibet. Curzon, predictably, railed on against Russia’s 
danger to India from his new position as Chancellor of Oxford (which he was busy 
aggressively reforming), and continued to do so when he entered the House of Lords the 
following year. Furthermore, the Liberal Government got a big opportunity at the second 
Hague Convention in 1907 to secure an arms limitation deal with other major powers. 
Such a deal collapsed under German (and other) protests that arms limitation would only 
reify British naval hegemony. The 1907 Colonial Conference was set to be the first fully-
ordinary event of its kind, having been agreed based on a regular elapse of time rather 
than an auspicious royal occasion. Still, it began almost a year behind schedule due to the 
democratic obligations of colonial prime ministers – they needed a break from their own 
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legislative business in order to steam for London. The crowded diplomatic calendar of 
summer 1907 made it somewhat of a sideshow. The British camp had begun to assess 
their visiting colonial counterparts as equal parts boorish and boring. The Earl of Elgin, 
Colonial Secretary under the Campbell-Bannerman Government recalled after the 
Conference, “if you had been condemned to eat twenty meals day after day in their 
company, and to hear [Australian Prime Minister Alfred] Deakin yarn away hour after 
hour, I believe you would be as heartily glad to see their backs as I am.”316 The delegates 
endured a litany of social engagements and dinners.317 C-B’s Government, for its part, 
had its mind in The Hague. It was the likelier of the two Conferences to save them 
money.318  
Despite the distractions and the irritability, the 1907 Colonial Conference 
provides important clues as to how elites across the Empire interpreted the idea of 
national sovereignty at the time. The two most obvious qualifiers for the select states that 
won Dominion status at the Conference were self-government and a complex, preferably 
federal structure that in some sense confirmed the colony’s institutional maturity in the 
manner discussed in previous chapters. But the Conference also entrenched 
Dominionhood as a status befitting states within the Empire possessed of 
commensurately-sized military ambitions. Finally, the Conference established 
institutional structures to reinforce the new Dominion status, from participation on the 
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Committee of Imperial Defence to the reorganization of the Colonial Office and the tacit 
concession of Dominions’ rights to some level of autonomy in building naval forces. 
Discussions over official terminology at the Colonial Conference reveal the 
importance colonial delegations, and their constituents at home, attached to their own 
rhetorical signifiers. The term “Dominion” had no clear meaning in the British Empire 
prior to 1907, save that it was found in the King’s official title: By the Grace of God, of 
Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas… It was most 
commonly associated with Canada, the first of the colonies to federalize, where “the 
Dominion” was used as shorthand for the confederation’s official title, “the Dominion of 
Canada.” A British pre-dreadnought battleship, HMS Dominion, had been christened in 
1903 as a (rather confusing, given subsequent events) homage to Canada. Perhaps 
because Canada thought of itself as the Empire’s senior colony, its “Dominion” moniker 
was seized by colonial premiers in 1907 as they expressed displeasure with their 
“colonial” designation. Canada’s precedent proved influential in interesting ways. For 
their part, metropolitan officials felt far more comfortable with the adoption of Canada’s 
“Dominion” label, which evoked the authority of the Crown, than with the title Australia 
adopted when it became the Empire’s other large federal state in 1901 – 
“Commonwealth,” which evoked England’s republican seventeenth century and all its 
accompanying radicalism and bloodshed. Joseph Ward, Seddon’s successor as Prime 
Minister of New Zealand, summed up this sentiment at the Conference when he argued 
over the wording of a resolution, “I think the term ‘Colony,’ so far as our countries are 
concerned, ought to cease, and that that term ought to apply to the Crown Colonies 
purely, and that those of us who are not at present known as Dominions or 
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Commonwealths, should be known as States of the Empire or some other expressive 
word.”319 
A debate ensued over the suitability of the term “Dominion,” and its precise 
meaning. None present seemed able to define it in absolute terms, but relative ones 
abounded – Ward was comfortable with any definition suggested as long as it included 
New Zealand; Wilfrid Laurier, by now a venerable institution of the Conferences, insisted 
that whatever the definition, it should not be so broad as to include the likes of 
Trinidad.320 But a few salient qualities emerged. A Dominion ought to be self-governing, 
it seemed, but this alone was too broad. It should also (if possible) be federalized, which 
qualified Canada and Australia but placed New Zealand and the South African colonies 
on uncertain ground, never mind poor Newfoundland, which had achieved responsible 
government in 1855 but had not joined the Confederation of Canada. Dr. Thomas Smartt, 
the Commissioner of Public Works in the self-governing Cape Colony, opined that while 
his own colony lacked Dominion credentials, a unified South Africa (which looked 
increasingly likely in 1907) would qualify, and that New Zealand should meet the federal 
criterion as well, “being two islands under one Government.”321 These 1907 
preoccupations with federation went some way to validating the federal crazes that had 
gripped southern Africa and the southern Pacific in the preceding years. Federation, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, served as a proxy for stability and security, and these qualities 
proved critical to the Dominion conversation as well. 
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It is worth thinking further about what distinguished Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand from South Africa and Trinidad, Laurier’s preferred antithesis, in 1907. Neither 
of the latter was yet federally organized. Neither had white majorities either. The 
delegates at the Conference did not overtly mention race at this moment; that would have 
to wait until later when they debated imperial defense. Meanwhile, despite the apparent 
distinction between white- and black-majority colonies, every one of the “settlement 
colonies” contained a significant non-Anglo-Saxon population. Thus if Dominion 
credentials were a function of a colony’s whiteness or Britishness, each delegation at the 
Conference will have harbored its own anxieties about qualifying. Race and security 
intertwined here in two important ways, to be discussed further below. First, the need for 
ostensibly sovereign states to guarantee their own internal security had to contend with 
racialized fears about groups within the state that did not share its security goals. 
Secondly, sovereign states’ desires to project security beyond their borders, to create 
order in the international system, built upon racialized concepts of their populations as 
nations martially and spiritually fit for this role. Here again India’s omission stands out, 
and the absence of Indian representatives was not for lack of effort – since the first 
Colonial Conference in 1887, a group of prominent Indian businessmen had petitioned 
the Indian Secretary to join the conferences.322 Their only representation as such would 
be Indian Army officers attached to the CID, and Indians would not attend until after the 
First World War. 
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Haldane, fresh off his War Office successes in army reform, was slated to address 
the Colonial Conference two days after the debate on Dominionhood. He felt confident 
about Britain’s example in the matter of military organization, but knew as Balfour had 
reflected some years before that the colonies could not simply be ordered to comply with 
British aims. He hoped therefore that his system would speak for itself. Haldane’s 
presentation explained his splitting British forces in two, one part for home defense (the 
Territorial Army) and the other as an expeditionary force (joint with the Royal Navy) for 
deployment across the Empire.323 Haldane casually offered this system by way of 
suggestion to the visiting colonials, noting that they would of course choose their own 
national military schemes. The system bore more than a little resemblance to the idea of 
an Imperial Reserve Force that had caused controversy at the 1902 Conference. In the 
debate that followed, Dr. Smartt of the Cape Colony, for his part, heartily endorsed the 
same paradigm as his South African predecessors had. He expressed hope that when 
South Africa achieved Union, it would vote into being a naval reserve force that would 
serve anywhere the Admiralty liked. He went even further, calling for a collective 
resolution that “a certain portion of the forces of all the Colonies or Dominions beyond 
the Seas should be enrolled upon the basis that, with the consent of their Governments, 
their services would be available wherever required.”324 The other representatives present 
were less enthused about this, but Smartt’s words deserve close reading for elucidating 
some core components connected to the Dominion idea: sovereign democratic sanction 
(“consent of their governments…”) for local military outfits (reserve forces) deploying 
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abroad for collective, imperial purposes (“wherever required.”) These ideas contained 
payoffs for the colonial delegates hoping for greater autonomy from imperial control – 
namely, the right to give their own consent to military action and the tacit invitation to 
develop more capable militaries – yet also bound them and their increasing capabilities to 
collective imperial goals, which pleased the Colonial Office, the brain of the imperial 
cuttlefish. 
 The dilemma of local versus collective security had vexed officers in would-be 
Dominions for some years by this point, placing a high premium on military strategies 
that could manage the tensions between political autonomy and joint security operations. 
In 1906 a group of Australia’s senior naval officers had convened in Melbourne to sketch 
out their common goals ahead of the Colonial Conference. In a resulting memorandum 
they circulated to other imperial Governments, under the heading “Australia’s 
Birthright,” they stated, “It is surely permissible, however, for those at the furthest 
extreme of Empire’s dominions, without losing in any degree their full responsibility and 
participation in the Empire's wars, to propose measures for defence against dangers that 
come immediately home to them—measures that in no way detract from, but aid, the 
Imperial plans of naval strategy.”325 These words optimistically sweep aside the strategic 
debate between diffuse and concentrated fleet postures then swirling in London. This 
strategic debate was not strictly theoretical but contained serious legal ramifications as 
well, a fact the Admiralty realized, for even if the Dominions were to exercise their 
“birthrights” and build up local navies, these were still His Majesty’s ships under 
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international law, making London ultimately liable for any maritime imbroglio caused by 
Melbourne, or Ottawa.326 This legal haze pointed to another complication of sovereignty 
– just as the nascent Dominions worked to define their sovereignty on their own terms, 
and thence to assert and negotiate that sovereignty with their counterparts and superiors 
in Britain, they faced an additional challenge in making that sovereignty legible to the 
world outside the British Empire. Existing naval agreements meant that any supposed 
Dominion fleets would count as British in the eyes of French, Russian, or German fellow 
seafarers. Admiralty officials kept this fact in hand during subsequent discussions. 
The 1907 Conference adjourned with a resolution that formally altered the 
Empire’s constitutional structure, changing the name of the conference system from 
“Colonial” to “Imperial” to reflect its shifting political norms:  
That it will be to the advantage of the Empire if a Conference, to be called 
the Imperial Conference, is held every four years, at which questions of 
common interest may be discussed and considered as between His 
Majesty’s Government and his Governments of the self-governing 
Dominions beyond the seas. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 
will be ex-officio President, and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing 
Dominions ex-officio members of the Conference.327 
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The language of the resolution invoked a sort of Triennial Act for the Empire – the 1641 
statute designed to protect against Stuart tyranny by obligating Parliament to meet at 
regular intervals. With the elevation of select colonies to Dominions came new 
institutional machinery. The British Government agreed to restructure the Colonial 
Office, for like the Conference, the Dominions could hardly now take their cues from an 
office so named.328 Instead, a special Dominions Department was to be formed within the 
Colonial Office, which would handle inter-governmental communications. The Imperial 
Conference, given a new charter and permanent secretariat, effectively became the 
policymaking organ for the Empire. For the first time, the Conference would meet 
regularly rather than sporadically at imperial celebrations like jubilees. It also included a 
clause for extraordinary meetings, “That upon matters of importance requiring 
consultation between two or more Governments which cannot be conveniently postponed 
until the next Conference…subsidiary Conferences should be held between 
representatives of the Governments concerned specially chosen for the purpose.”329 This 
clause would prove important in just two years’ time. 
Dominion status also came with an invitation to permanently join the Committee 
of Imperial Defence.330 The Conference resolutions conceded both the right of colonials 
to influence imperial policy and the institutional mechanisms for them to do so.331 
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Franklyn Johnson, in his book on the Committee of Imperial Defence, underscored the 
extent to which military issues dominated intra-imperial relations: “The C.I.D. [by 1911] 
was now not only an organ, under the cabinet, for the co-ordinated planning of national 
policies, but it was also one of the key institutions of collaboration in foreign and military 
policy planning between the mother country and the respective Dominions.”332 The 
global nature of naval policy had placed it at the center of these discussions of 
sovereignty, and the new Dominions also won a tacit concession from the Admiralty 
when the First Lord, Tweedmouth, told them, “We do not wish to insist that the 
contributions from the Colonies should necessarily be in the form only of money…His 
Majesty’s Government recognize the natural desire of the self-governing colonies to have 
a more particular share in providing the naval defence force of the Empire,” and that so 
long as unity of command was maintained, “they are ready to consider a modification of 
the existing arrangements.”333 That the British Government apparently considered this 
desire “natural” spoke to the pace at which sovereignty was being redefined. 
Tweedmouth raised the issue of the hated subsidies again, and the Australian delegation 
duly introduced a motion to reconsider the prior agreement on naval subsidies agreed 
with the British Government. 1907 left the Empire in a state of paradox – for the first 
time it was bringing colonists into its councils and strengthening institutional bonds, but 
it was also granting some of them unprecedented autonomy. This mirrored the strategic 
paradox over whether to distribute the Royal Navy’s strength amongst new Dominions, 
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or to obey the axioms of Mahan and concentrate it, ships and command, in Home waters. 
It was not long before the ringing hammers of German shipyards forced the issue to the 
fore again. 
 
3.3 DOMINIONHOOD IN CRISIS: THE FLEET UNIT PLAN AT THE 1909 
CONFERENCE ON THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE 
 
The Dominions were scarcely over a year old when their new status, and the 
reciprocal security arrangement on which it was based, was tested. Britain found itself 
embroiled in a naval crisis with Germany in 1909, and invoked the 1907 Conference’s 
“extraordinary meetings” clause to bring colonial delegates back to London for a special 
conference on imperial defense. As ever, the 1909 meeting produced both tensions and 
opportunities. It produced another useful example of the convergence between imperial 
security imperatives and the ongoing quest for sovereignty among the new Dominions: 
the “fleet unit” scheme. In basic terms, the scheme allowed the Dominions to begin 
building their own autonomously-operated naval forces, but made provisions for these to 
be agglomerated into a single, imperial naval force under command of the Admiralty 
during times of crisis. Conceived as a solution to the Anglo-German naval crisis because 
it would diffuse the costs of shipbuilding across the Empire while preserving the ability 
concentrate the fleet(s), the fleet unit scheme also purported to reconcile the Dominions’ 
naval ambitions to the goals of imperial collective security. The scheme was never fully 
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realized. The Admiralty crafted it as a sort of crisis solution; it provoked serious 
opposition among some in the Dominions (and the Admiralty itself), and a young First 
Lord of the Admiralty named Winston Churchill eventually strangled it at birth. Yet, it 
briefly gave a tangible life as policy to the idea Baden-Powell articulated with the 
cuttlefish. It tested the Dominion idea and further probed the limits of the new forms of 
sovereignty taking shape in the British Empire. 
Making sense of the 1909 Anglo-German naval “crisis” as such requires 
acknowledgement of its non-military ingredients: the party politics of both states, and the 
fiscal ramifications of shipbuilding.334 The crisis provoked a surprisingly swift response 
across the Empire. Mountains of books have been written attempting to make sense of the 
strategic aims of the German state on the eve of World War I, but it should suffice to 
point out that after Britain’s noted accords with France and Russia in Europe, with Japan 
to free the Pacific, and its increasingly cozy relationship with the United States, Germany 
felt strategically encircled. There were foes on both its flanks, and the Royal Navy’s 
dominance of the high seas limited its available outlets. Fork-bearded Alfred von Tirpitz, 
commander of the German High Fleet and close, if occasionally strained, confidant of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, argued that an aggressive naval building program was the only way 
for Germany to effectively leverage its rivals. Tirpitz’s “risk theory” held that if the 
German fleet reached a critical mass, the Royal Navy would be sufficiently averse to 
confrontation that its absolute hold on the high seas would be neutralized. With the 
backing of the Kaiser, Tirpitz successfully shepherded unprecedentedly aggressive Naval 
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Laws through the Reichstag in 1898 and 1900, and with subsequent augmentations of the 
shipbuilding timetables in 1906 and 1908.  
The trouble of 1909 began when British naval intelligence discovered that 
German shipyards, which could already out-build Britain in gun fittings and other critical 
ship components, was stockpiling these in order to accelerate its general shipbuilding 
program surreptitiously. Worse, its allies Austria and Italy were laying down 
dreadnought-style ships in the Mediterranean, in coordination with the Kaiserliche 
Marine. The arithmetic of naval supremacy suddenly did not add up to the Admiralty’s 
liking. These revelations scuttled what little hope for arms limitation had come out of the 
lukewarm Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Reginald McKenna, who had succeeded 
Tweedmouth as First Lord of the Admiralty under Asquith’s Government, delivered the 
grim news to Parliament in a speech on the year’s naval estimates. McKenna had lobbied 
his Government, headed then by reform-minded HH Asquith and packed with other 
economizing Liberals irked by defense spending in principle, for six new dreadnoughts to 
match the German threat. When the new information came to light and the press frenzy 
began, McKenna had the whip-hand. Winston Churchill, then President of the Board of 
Trade, later recalled, “the Admiralty demanded six Dreadnoughts, the economists offered 
four, and we eventually compromised on eight.”335  
Specific policies and fiscal math, rather than some sense of rivalry or strategic 
danger, made the above into a legitimate crisis. Because of the “2-power standard,” 
which committed Britain to building enough ships to match the two next largest navies 
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(France and Russia, when the policy was instituted), revelations about German 
shipbuilding meant instant demands on Britain’s industrial capacity and public 
finances.336 Potentially worse, and often overlooked by scholarly treatments of the 1909 
crisis, the Asquith Government was in the process of remaking the British state into 
something more oriented to social services than providing security.337 Chancellor David 
Lloyd George’s “People’s Budget,” which introduced higher taxes and social insurance 
programs, came the same year. The urgency of 1909 was less about preparing for a 
German attack than it was about rapidly recalibrating the fiscal-extractive habits of the 
British state. Hence the crisis must be viewed through the lens of political economy and 
not simply strategy and security.338 The same holds for the fleet unit plan, the proposed 
answer to the naval crisis. The few scholarly treatments of the fleet unit scheme are 
mainly concerned with the manner of and reasons for its eventual failure.339 Yet, the fleet 
unit plan can be brought to bear on broader questions as well. It foreshadows not just 
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Churchill and Empire. Lambert, “Economy or Empire?,” 73–; Richard Toye, Churchill’s Empire: The 
World That Made Him and the World He Made (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2010). 
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decolonization but a re-imagination of sovereignty intimately linked to security. 
Likewise, the scheme was more than just a chapter in the story of institutional maturation 
in the British Empire. It was a moment in the lurching militarization of states in the early 
twentieth century that presaged yet greater upheavals. 
When word of the intelligence on Germany, and the Admiralty’s plight, spread 
through the Empire’s telegraph cables, the Dominion governments responded quickly. 
New Zealand cabled just days later on 22 March 1909 offering to subsidize the 
construction of at least one and, if necessary, two dreadnoughts.340 This was a bold offer, 
and put pressure on the other Dominions to measure up. While Laurier would have liked 
to offer a similar ship donation, since it would involve fewer strings attached, he could 
not afford the assumption by other parties that Canada was to go on subsidizing the Royal 
Navy. He had studiously avoided this issue during the 1908 elections, hoping to avoid 
controversy. Instead, he fell back on a statement from earlier in 1909 by George Foster, 
the MP for North Toronto: “in view of...that spirit of self-help and self-respect which 
alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her 
proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection 
of her exposed coastline and great seaports.”341  In another week’s time the Canadian 
Parliament passed a resolution promising to assume the duty of looking after its own 
coastlines and territorial waters, which would ostensibly save the British Admiralty 
                                                        
340 The cable left the precise class and specification of the ship vague; one complication for working with 
these sources is that contemporaries used the term “Dreadnought” liberally – it originally referred to a 
single ship that gave its name to a new class of battleships as noted above, but served as a synecdoche for a 
whole era of naval technology, and represented a liminal ship class between those designed for speed and 
for firepower. As such its usage is a source of confusion. Where possible I will specify the difference 
between the heavier battleship and the lighter battlecruiser as they arise.  
341  § House of Commons, Debates, 29 March 1909, 3484. Quoted in Sarty, “Canadian Maritime Defence, 
1892–1914,” 478 where a longer discussion is given. 
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money. By mid-April Australia telegraphed its support to London, hoping to build its 
own fleet of destroyers in line with its aspirations to eschew subsidy and replace it with 
real materiel. Asquith’s Government smiled on the potential savings these offers 
represented. The Admiralty and the Colonial Office, meanwhile, saw the unresolved 
strategic and political quarrels still swirling beneath the surface. Andrew Fisher’s Labor 
Government in Australia was fragile; Fisher was a pacifist ill-suited to playing popular 
militarism. Laurier’s Liberals, as usual, could not afford to alienate the Quebecois, who 
had no taste for British imperial defense coordination. All Dominion camps, even the 
enthusiastic Joseph Ward’s in New Zealand, held beneath the velvet glove of friendly 
offers the iron fist of strategic self-interest. 
 Realizing the need to coordinate these offers and confer with their Dominion 
counterparts, the British Government called them to London for an urgent meeting under 
Resolution 1 of the 1907 Conference.342 While the Government relished the opportunity 
to offload some of its fiscal burden, the Admiralty readied a different pitch to the 
Dominions: a modified version of the proposals for Dominion navies it had wrangled 
with Alfred Deakin’s Australian Government, impatient as ever with the naval subsidies 
it paid, in 1908. What had been a plan for Dominion governments to fund auxiliary ships 
for the Royal Navy in their home waters was revamped – instead they would fund “fleet 
units,” each based around a new battlecruiser of the Indomitable class.343 In a stroke, the 
scheme would relieve fiscal pressure on London, satisfy Dominion national aspirations 
                                                        
342 Confidential Papers Laid Before the Imperial Defence Conference, opening remarks, 1909, CO 886/2/9, 
TNA, 29. 
343 The rest of each unit would consist of 3 Bristol-class cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 3 submarines. While 
Dominion governments might not have imagined taking on the German High Fleet with these squadrons, 
they were formidable forces capable of dealing with most conceivable enemies in the Pacific, especially 
when combined. Ibid., 30. 
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for local navies, and re-assert British dominance (and thus Dominion security) in the 
Pacific, relieving the old Dominion anxieties about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The 
outcomes of the scheme were much less tidy than this. Clashing interests plagued the 
Defence Conference discussions, and though the fleet unit scheme eventually earned a 
loose consensus, it later unraveled. For, as in the discussion on Dominionhood at the 
1907 Conference, the fiscal, strategic, and democratic dimensions of the issue played 
important roles in the way colonial states imagined their sovereignties. These parameters 
will now be considered in turn. 
Discussions of Dominion defense spending at the Conference transcended 
ordinary cost-benefit analysis. Asquith, much like Joseph Chamberlain had done at the 
start of the 1902 Colonial Conference, set the tone with a jeremiad on the Empire’s per-
capita defense spending figures, brandishing a chart he had prepared for the task. After 
enumerating the huge imbalance of defense spending against the United Kingdom vis-à-
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vis its colonies, he concluded with wry politeness, “That, I think, is a striking table.”344
 
Figure 3 – Asquith’s Table on Defense Spending in the British Empire, 1907-08, bar chart 345 
Asquith was correct, of course – Britain did indeed significantly outspend the 
Dominions on defense, but the entire purpose of the Conference then convening was to 
discuss ways the Dominions could helpfully spend more, so Asquith was perhaps piling 
on. One truly striking facet of the table, though, was the racial distinction made in the 
data from South Africa – whereas the other Dominions and India were considered by 
whole population, the South African data disaggregated white and non-white inhabitants, 
which drastically inflated the “per-capita” amount paid by South Africans toward 
defense. In the ensuing discussion, Cape Colony Prime Minister J.X. Merriman proudly 
                                                        
344 Defence Conference Minutes, 1909 CAB 18/12A, TNA, 4. 
345 Data from Defence Conference Minutes, 1909 CAB 18/12A, TNA, Table I, III. Quantities were 
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held forth on South Africa’s incredibly robust per capita outlay when Louis-Philippe 
Brodeur, Canadian Minister for Marine and Fisheries, took issue: 
Mr. BRODEUR: Does that include all your population? 
Mr. MERRIMAN: It includes the whole—the whole of the European population. 
Mr. BRODEUR: Yes, but what about the others? 
Mr. MERRIMAN: As to the others, I am sorry to say that we have to keep a force 
to control them. 
Mr. BRODEUR: We have included everybody else as far as we are concerned. 
Mr. MERRIMAN: Yes, because you are all a homogeneous white population, 
Mr. BRODEUR: We have some Red Indians, 
Mr. MERRIMAN: How many? You bottle them up and keep them for show. 
CHAIRMAN: I think we are rather getting away from the Questions 1, 2, and 
3.346 
 
Here, the nexus between race and internal security is laid bare. The visiting South African 
delegation felt it had tougher liabilities to its internal security than the other Dominions, 
who in turn resented the South Africans’ cooking of the numbers to artificially inflate 
their defense spending data and, by extension, the weight they carried at the imperial 
negotiating table. This was also a quantitative argument about sovereignty – the state was 
a security-producing structure, and membership of it hinged on whether the individual in 
question served that end. The colonial governments in South Africa (they would not 
achieve Union until 1910) considered their white subjects contributors to collective 
                                                        
346 Ibid., 25. 
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security, and their black subjects threats. This way of sorting the imagined nation reveals 
the complicated ways that security constituted sovereignty, and also the way it fit easily 
with the racial and ultimately racist attitudes of colonial governments, especially in 
southern Africa.  
 Even less certain than absolute levels of defense spending was precisely what the 
governments in question received in exchange for their investments. To begin, “security” 
itself was a nebulous concept – the value one could attach to continued security hinged 
on the perceived likelihood that it might be violated, and those who saw little to fear thus 
valued it the least. The Dominion representatives knew naval spending in particular was a 
direct stimulus to Britain’s economy – jobs for British workers and orders for British 
shipyards.347 Their desire for navies of their own in part stemmed from displeasure at 
paying subsidies directly to the Admiralty (and hence the British economy) when these 
might be diverted to their own economic development. McKenna acknowledged as much 
in his memo detailing the fleet unit scheme ahead of the conference.348 He reiterated 
during debate, “I can imagine that the electors of the Commonwealth [of Australia] 
would be far more willing to contribute to the cost of the Navy, if the money was spent in 
the Commonwealth, and was not spent over here.”349 He was correct. When the 
                                                        
347 For more on this issue, see J.M. Hobson, “The Military Extraction Gap and the Wary Titan: The Fiscal 
Sociology of British Defence Policy, 1870-1913,” Journal of European Economic History 22 (1993): 485–
8 Possible Margins for Error in the Military Burden Estimates The Causes of the low British Military-
Extraction Ratio. 
348 “Pari passu with the creation of the fleet unit, it would be necessary to consider the development of 
local resources in everything which relates to the maintenance of a fleet.  A careful enquiry should be made 
into the shipbuilding and repairing establishments with a view to their general adaptation to the needs of the 
local squadron.  Training schools for officers and men would have to be established; arrangements would 
have to be made for the manufacture, supply, and replenishment of the various naval, ordnance, and 
victualling stores required by the squadron.” Confidential Papers Laid Before the Imperial Defence 
Conference, 1909 CO 886/2/9 TNA, 32. 
349 Defence Conference Minutes, 1909 CAB 18/12A, TNA, 35. 
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Dominions eventually placed shipbuilding orders for their fleet units, Australia and 
Canada paid exorbitant premiums to have some of them built locally, which involved 
obtaining plans and vetting contractors with the Admiralty, then shipping many of the 
manufactured components from British and Irish yards to their own yards for 
assembly.350 The Canadian naval command under Admiral Kingsmill launched an inquiry 
about how shipbuilding firms could be induced to open yards in Canada, and 
commissioned comparative estimates of building costs at a variety of yards.351 The fiscal 
dimension of the fleet unit story reaffirms the political-economic context of the naval 
crisis. It also demonstrates the link between defense spending and sovereignty – 
Asquith’s chart was a yardstick to which the Dominions hoped to measure up. Subsidies, 
to the Dominions, were its antithesis. In fact, the Imperial Government making good on 
the Dominions’ new status as sovereign nations, and the duties attendant to that status, 
was the very pretext of the Defence Conference. These were duties they were willing to 
meet in fiscally imprudent ways if it meant they could show their electorates the local 
payoffs of militarization, as McKenna suggested. Matters of spending also mapped on to 
the nagging issues of strategy that complicated the Dominions’ efforts to cement their 
sovereignties and arrive at a strategic consensus with Britain. 
                                                        
350 For the process of planning and contracting see “Construction of Ships - Liaison with High 
Commissioner and Admiralty Re Canadian Naval Programme,” 1909, RG24-2604, Library and Archives 
Canada (LAC). For the discrepancy in cost  (the Government of Australia paid £776,000 for HMAS 
Brisbane, built at Cockatoo Island in Sydney, versus £385,000 and £405,000 for HMAS Sydney and 
Melbourne, respectively) see: “Fleet Unit expenditure while based in London,” 1912-20, 16/20/407 
830456, National Archives of Australia (NAA). 
351 For the memoranda on planning and contracting, as well as the cost estimates, see: Construction of 
Ships - Liaison with High Commissioner and Admiralty Re Canadian Naval Programme, 1909, LAC, 
RG24-2604, 2-3, folio pagination 111-112. 
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As noted above, most scholarship that addresses the fleet unit scheme assumes 
that the Admiralty and the Dominions had completely divergent strategic interests. In 
reality, agreeing the scheme in the first place represented a major tilt by McKenna and 
Fisher to the Corbett-inspired, diffuse fleet posture – in other words, if Mahanian fleet 
concentration represented orthodoxy, the fleet unit scheme was shockingly heterodox. It 
proposed to build several state-of-the-art capital ships, and then to send them as far away 
from home waters as was geographically possible. Nevertheless, Mahan’s core assertions 
– of the danger of cataclysmic fleet battle and the of the inextricable link between naval 
power and the relative power of states (a proxy for sovereignty), remained on the minds 
of all the delegates at the Conference. This is particularly evident in the variety of opinion 
between the Dominions themselves on the Empire’s strategic priorities. 
The sharpest discrepancy existed between Canada and Australia. Though both 
were keen to build their own navies, Australia’s justifying logic had far more to do with 
strategic necessity. It felt isolated in the South Pacific with few friends within a week’s 
steam and expansionist rivals encroaching on its waters, while Canada shared the North 
Atlantic with a watchful Royal Navy and a land border with a friendly or at least benign 
United States.352 But perceptions of safety proved wildly variable across Canada’s vast 
expanses. Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper, President of the Vancouver Navy League told the 
Vancouver World that he wanted to “point out to Ottawa that we have the willing 
material at hand” to run a Canadian fleet unit in the Pacific, and Laurier received 
                                                        
352 Canada in fact contained significant factions in the Quebecois and agricultural lobbies who favored a 
Continentalist, Halford Mackinder-influenced perspective of Canada’s security rather than a maritime, 
British-oriented one; See Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914, 226. 
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similarly worded telegrams from Richard MacBride, Premier of British Columbia.353 
Balancing east and west was yet another electoral headache for Laurier. He was all too 
conscious of this when he dismissed a 1909 letter from E.H. Bronson, a hydroelectric 
power magnate and former Ontario provincial minister, urging that Canada should build 
its navy and thus its global profile, by replying “We are not a sovereign power, we have 
no diplomatic relations, and I think it is well that we should maintain as far as possible 
our isolation.”354 Laurier was exaggerating; Canada indeed had diplomatic relations and 
took a major step towards asserting them just three weeks later by establishing a new 
Department of External Affairs under Joseph Pope.355 It also had ample concern for its 
sovereignty. During the Conference, the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence 
Frederick Borden argued that discussions of Canadian defense should be kept secret so as 
to avoid needlessly provoking the United States.356 When the Admiralty attempted to 
determine the legal status of fleet unit ships on the high seas, it even figured that 
Canada’s “territorial waters” had a narrower radius than Australia’s.357 This quantitative 
spatial calculus shows the way the Admiralty, for its part, connected territorial 
sovereignty to the issue of security – and as above, the way perceptions of security risks 
                                                        
353 See MacBride to Laurier, Laurier Papers, 1909, LAC, MG26-G, Reel C-877. The BC Premier forwarded 
a resolution by the Vancouver Navy League to that effect; see Naval Militia in Pacific, 1909, LAC, RG24-
2498. 
354 Laurier Papers, Laurier to Bronson, 10 May 1909, MG26-G, Reel C-876, LAC. 
355 See Chapter 2 above and James Eayrs, “The Origins of Canada’s Department of External Affairs,” The 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne d’Economique et de Science 
Politique 25, no. 2 (May 1, 1959): 109–28. 
356 Defence Conference Minutes, 1909 CAB 18/12A, TNA, Frederick Borden, 20, “We are alongside very 
friendly neighbours… it would seem to me better if these war establishments could be kept secret and not 
published to the world. I throw that out as a suggestion.” 
357 “Status of Dominion Ships,” 1910, RG25-1102, LAC. 
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skewed the relative value observers attached to their security. Frederick Borden had gone 
some way to rebuffing Asquith’s salvo at the Conference, in fact, when he replied: 
In considering the statistics, the interesting statistics, which have been 
placed before us to-day by the Prime Minister, so far as they refer to 
Canada, and in which I admit Canada makes a very small showing, I think 
it is only fair to remember, and only a fair and proper thing to say – that, 
while that is true, Canada has nevertheless been doing its share in the way 
of developing the power and strength of this Empire by expending, not 
millions, not tens of millions, but hundreds of millions of dollars in 
developing the public works of that country.358 
 
The antipodean Dominions were indeed less sanguine about their security than 
Canada and Newfoundland. It is worth reiterating here that British possessions in the 
Pacific technically fell within the protective cordon of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 
1909, but the strategic discussions at the Conference either ignored this fact completely 
or referenced it in utter contempt. Joseph Ward lamented that Australasia could not share 
Canada’s confidence in repelling an invasion or receiving relief from Britain if one 
occurred; this would be “practically asking us to shut the door after the horses were 
out.”359 Colonel Justin Foxton, representing Australia’s defense forces, added, “We are in 
close proximity to the teeming millions of two great Asiatic powers. The awakening of 
the East has very great significance for Australia and New Zealand.”360 In 1908 Deakin’s 
                                                        
358 Frederick Borden, Defence Conference Minutes, 1909, NA, CAB 18/12A, p. 8 
359 Defence Conference Minutes, 1909, CAB 18/12A, TNA, Joseph Ward, p.23 
360 Ibid., Justin Foxton, p.46 
 199 
 
Government in Australia drove home its exasperation over progress on the naval issue 
when it telegraphed the United States to say it had heard Teddy Roosevelt’s “Great White 
Fleet” was touring the world – would it like to visit? The Americans were received by 
roaring crowds in Sydney and Auckland, underscoring Antipodean enthusiasm for a 
strong – and appropriately, glistening white – naval force that could shield them from 
regional threats.361 This is all exceedingly peculiar behavior from a state against its 
alliance partner. Suffice to say, the Australasian Dominions were not comfortable with 
the strategic assumption that their greatest national peril lay in the English Channel rather 
than the Tasman Sea or the Strait of Malacca.  
For their part, Canadian delegates at the Conference shared Australian skepticism 
of Japan. Clearly possessed of greater incentives to keep the Americans onside, the 
Canadians directly colluded against the Anglo-Japanese agreement by insisting they 
should keep warships positioned in Pacific waters that could support American vessels in 
any possible conflicts with the Japanese. Fisher admitted during a round of negotiations 
with Dominion representatives at the Admiralty, that “A further reason for stationing the 
vessel on the Pacific coast was, that the United States would regard Canadian vessels in 
these waters as potential support to them against Japan.”362 Here is Britain’s highest-
ranking naval officer discussing the logic of deploying British ships such that they might 
assist a foreign power in a war against one of Britain’s treaty partners. These arguments 
                                                        
361 See “Review in honour of the visit of the Fleet of the United States of America to New South Wales,” 
F355.1709944 R454, AWM.  
362 Fisher, “Proceedings of a Conference at the Admiralty, Tuesday 10 August 1909” CAB 18/12A 1909, 
TNA, 2. 
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underscore the way notions of strategic danger in the Pacific were articulated along racial 
lines.  
But the Dominions’ strategic interests encompassed more than simply their own 
internal security. They also hoped to build regional influence (and international 
credibility through the Empire) by projecting power abroad. Haldane’s two-level force 
posture became especially relevant here, for, as he tried to impress upon the delegates at 
the Conference, sovereign states had to prepare for contingencies abroad, and do their 
duty to their strategic partners.363 However, coming to a collective understanding of 
shared security goals proved a difficult task. The fleet unit scheme, with its provision for 
Dominion control in peacetime and Admiralty control in war, was the Empire’s first and 
last attempt to force those square interests into round strategic holes. Frederick Borden, 
his confidence in Canadian security notwithstanding, offered this in debate: “it [Canada’s 
fleet unit] should be not only a local service, but that it should be also a local force… 
which might, in case of war, if Parliament so decided, or the Government so decided, be 
joined to the British Navy for the general defence of the Empire.”364 This preoccupation 
with the extra-territorial projection of force highlights the extent to which concepts of the 
nation were contingent on external rather than simply internal factors. How the 
Dominions touched the outside world meant as much to their legitimacy as states as the 
way they ordered their internal affairs. 
One other aspect of the fleet unit negotiations helped smooth the Empire’s 
strategic wrinkles – a naval service would develop Dominion populations to their full, 
                                                        
363 Haldane, Ibid., 15. 
364 Borden, Ibid., 43. 
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martial maturity and help them seize their national destinies. McKenna assured the 
colonials in his opening speech that “Nobody recognises more fully than we do at the 
Admiralty that you have to take other things into account besides strategy,” and that the 
Dominions must have capital ships in their units because “if you are going to enlist men 
into the Navy you must offer them a future.”365 If the implied decision to include capital 
ships in fleet units hinged on the edification of colonial mariners, this entailed hundreds 
of thousands of pounds and years of production time over the alternative. The Dominions 
embraced the reasoning. Australian Secretary of Defence Samuel Pethebridge, Forrest’s 
successor, wrote to the Colonial Office ahead of the Conference, expressing his hope that 
the “Commonwealth will become a people efficient at sea.”366 Ward, stopping in 
Vancouver on his way back from the Conference, told the local Canadian Club, “When 
we look at the movement that is going on in the old countries, the increase of population 
and the advancement of science, it is our duty to realise that we cannot be stationary; we 
must move forward and accept our duty as partners in this great Empire.”367 Creswell, 
mindful of Australia’s naval prestige, reflected on the fleet unit scheme a month later, 
adding “The splendidly generous manner in which we are to be assisted to take our part 
and the great trust and responsibility which it imposes upon us, demand at the least on 
our part the determination that no effort shall be spared to make the vessels of the 
                                                        
365 Reginald McKenna, Ibid., 46. 
366 “Correspondence re Naval Defence” 16 April 1909, MP178/2 2152/1/9 444377, NAA, Melbourne The 
full text reads, “Whereas all the Dominions of the British Empire ought to share, in the most effective way, 
in the burden of maintaining the permanent Naval supremacy of the Empire: And whereas this Government 
is of opinion that, so far as Australia is concerned, this object will be best attained by encouraging Naval 
development in this country, so that the people of the Commonwealth will become a people efficient at sea, 
and thereby better able to assist the United Kingdom with men, as well as ships, to act in concert with the 
other sea forces of the Empire.” 
367 Naval Militia in Pacific, 1909, RG24-2498 LAC. Joseph Ward, speech to the Canadian Club, October 
1909. 
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Australian Unit such an efficient addition to the Royal Navy as to do us honour even in 
that distinguished company.”368 This language of racial edification constructed 
Australian, New Zealander, and Canadian men as the torchbearers of Anglo-Saxon 
heritage – of law and order, of liberty and commerce – in a way designed to comport with 
imperial security goals in the Pacific. 
Thus the strategic discussions at the Defence Conference were fraught with 
tensions the fleet unit plan tried to patch. British officials would relinquish new capital 
ships to the Dominions despite the current crisis with Germany, and Dominions hoping to 
press their own strategic interests would volunteer for expeditionary warfare far from 
their shores. The agreement demonstrates the intertwined natures of security and 
sovereignty. The final aspect of this security-sovereignty nexus to consider is the 
constitutional implications of the fleet unit scheme, and the role of Dominion 
democracies in the scheme’s precepts. Despite the extensive rhetoric on naval 
cooperation, both British and Dominion officials repeatedly stressed that Dominion 
Parliaments would have final say on any naval cooperation, even though the scheme 
called for instantaneous Admiralty control of ships in the event of war. This assertion 
contained a significant reinterpretation of Parliamentary sovereignty that struck at the 
heart of Britain’s authority over its Empire. As constitutional commentaries like Dicey’s 
and Keith’s pointed out, all sovereignty in the Empire emanated from the Crown-in-
Parliament. While all governments in the British Empire were agents of the King’ 
business in their respective states, the Westminster Parliament exercised supremacy over 
them all, especially on core constitutional principles like warfighting. When the King was 
                                                        
368 “Imperial Conference, 1909,” Creswell, 16 Nov. 1909, AWM124-1/22 489184, AWM, 3. 
 203 
 
at war (as His Majesty surely would be if Britain were ever threatened), all his subjects 
were therefore automatically at war, and that war status hinged on the official sanction of 
the Westminster Parliament. In this way, Britain had the constitutional prerogative to put 
the entire Empire at war at its whim. The fleet unit agreement, which allowed Dominions 
to sanction the release of their units for imperial use, thus ran counter to traditional 
Parliamentary supremacy in precisely the way A.V. Dicey worried over in his Law of the 
Constitution.369 Fully twenty-two years before the Statute of Westminster, colonial 
governments asserted their parity with the Mother of Parliaments by arguing that they, 
not Westminster, had the right to mediate the sovereignty of the Crown into rightful 
authority over decisions for war. In this way, the fleet unit plan shows us how security 
imperatives pushed conversations about sovereignty in the Empire well ahead of 1931 
and even the First World War. The same issue had been tacitly raised by the sending of 
the colonial contingents in the South African War nine years earlier. 
At the outset of the Defence Conference, Dominion representatives sought 
clarification on the wording of McKenna’s scheme memo, which stated that in the event 
of war, fleet units would “automatically” be placed under the command of the Admiralty. 
Col. Foxton suggested a revision “So that it would meet our national sentiment, so to 
speak, that the control should not pass automatically, but that it should be clearly by a 
voluntary act on the part of the Commonwealth [of Australia] Government and 
Parliament.”370 In a return to the theme of racial peril, Merriman of South Africa wanted 
the British diplomats who had negotiated the Anglo-Japanese alliance to know his 
                                                        
369 See Introduction: The Widening Gyre 
370 Colonel Foxton, Defence Conference Minutes, 1909, CAB 18/12A, TNA, 44. 
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thoughts on his country’s democratic prerogatives: “Supposing that by any misfortune, or 
mischance, your alliance with Japan was to bring you into collision or conflict with the 
United States, if any such calamity was possible, do you suppose that any colonist would 
for a single moment send an expeditionary force to help an Eastern Power? Never.”371  
Frederick Borden expressed the same reservations about including Canadian ships 
in imperial conflicts.372 Even Joseph Ward, enthusiastic though New Zealand was about 
collective imperial defense, pressed its democratic prerogative to abstain: “our local 
governments have an undoubted right to do whatever they consider proper within their 
own territory and without interference from the British Government.”373 But, as 
elsewhere, the saltiest words came from one J.X. Merriman, who was fond of cutting 
through his colleagues’ statesmanlike rhetoric with what he probably imagined were 
doses of reality: “You must recollect that you have got to deal with democracies. We 
come over here and we are sometimes carried away, but when we get up in Parliament 
there are always oppositions, and there is nothing so much opposed as anything like 
military combination in any shape or form.”374 Merriman’s admonishment targeted what 
he considered the flighty concerns of both the Dominions and Britain, for, as was made 
clear in the discussion of per capita defense spending, the South African colonies 
believed they had overwhelming local liabilities that all but precluded their participation 
in expeditionary conflagrations elsewhere in the Empire. This also confirmed, whether 
                                                        
371 J.X. Merriman, Defence Conference Minutes, 1909, CAB 18/12A, TNA, 24. 
372 Frederick Borden, Ibid., 20. “That is the whole point, that we shall be ready if we wish to take part; but 
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373 Joseph Ward, Ibid., 22. 
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Merriman realized it or not at the time, that the South African colonies did not yet qualify 
for Dominion status based on the norms and principles of 1907. 
Most of the Dominion delegations seemed confident, contra Merriman, that their 
Parliaments would of course vote their assent to assist in any imperial war, and the 
ensuing decade proved them right.375 This tone even suggested that democratically-
sanctioned naval service would be healthy for young nations. An Australian pamphlet, 
extoling the benefits of an Australian fleet unit, argued that Australia’s democratic spirit 
would keep its navy free of the stultifying class divisions of the Royal Navy (which, 
implicitly, mirrored those of British society).376 But the form Dominion navies might take 
in the future was still unclear in 1909. Deakin cabled Foxton on the issue of local 
consent, expressing his understanding that if the Admiralty did take command of 
Australia’s fleet unit, it would be in the context of a greater Far Eastern Fleet and not, 
say, orders to steam for the North Sea.377 As noted above, the Admiralty would nervously 
seek legal advice after the Conference over their liability for the doings of Dominion 
ships on the high seas. Even if they could not put the Dominions “automatically” at war, 
they feared the inverse would still be true. The experience of strategic aggression by 
colonial actors in recent memory, from Queenslanders’ attempts to seize Papua New 
Guinea, to Seddon’s designs on Fiji, to Curzon’s activities on the Northwest Frontier, 
                                                        
375 Indeed, the Australian fleet was placed under Admiralty control voluntarily and secretly not long after 
the outbreak of World War I, without any public consultation whatsoever. 
376 Keith Murdoch, The Homecoming of the Fleet Unit (Sydney: Sydney Day, The Printer, Ltd., 1913), 5. 
377 Telegram, Deakin to Foxton, quoted in Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, 185. 
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made them rightfully wary. Democracy did prove critical to the Dominion idea, and its 
true test came in the matter of who ordered military deployments.378   
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 Many of the ships planned for the fleet unit scheme were built, christened, and 
plied the seas; some were even built in Dominion shipyards. They bore names that 
evoked their symbolic roles as carriers of national honor: HMS New Zealand, HMAS 
Australia, HMCS Canada.379 William “Billy” Hughes, who would serve as Australia’s 
Prime Minister during the First World War, said as he watched the newly-built Australian 
Fleet Unit steam from Britain’s shipyards into Sydney harbor for the first time:  
The arrival of the Australian fleet unit is not only an historic event, it is 
one of supreme significance. It marks a new era in Australian 
development. By the establishment of the Commonwealth the old colonial 
regime came to an end. We had created the means by which we could 
become a nation. The Australian fleet unit is a formal notification to the 
outside world that we have recognised our responsibility, our danger, and 
our duty to ourselves, to the Empire, and to the cause of civilisation. 
Australia has assumed the toga of nationhood. It is no doubt a very 
                                                        
378 This reality presaged Carl Schmitt’s criterion of sovereignty - the state of emergency - two decades later. 
Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship (Wiley, 2015). 
379 Canada was actually laid down in 1904 and was meant to serve as a training ship for the Canadian unit’s 
centerpiece battle cruiser. Ultimately, none such was built. 
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scathing commentary on civilisation and on all those institutions upon 
which civilisation rests that in these days, as in the grey dawn of human 
history, force is the only safe foundation upon which a nation can rest.380 
 
Hughes recapitulates the Australian confusions discussed in Chapter 1 – when, 
precisely, did the Australian Commonwealth come into being? Was it the moment of its 
constitutional ratification in Sydney or London, or was it one of a series of military 
deployments by Australians from South Africa to the Fleet Unit to the First World War? 
Hughes’ invocation of the “grey dawn” of human affairs was an argument about the 
nature of sovereignty – the past, present, and future of the concept. It invoked the State of 
Nature, that famous playground of philosophers, and the essential foundations of human 
civilization that would support international relations in the new, globalized century. 
Self-defense was at the core of this idea. Hughes’ paradigm of sovereignty bore a certain 
resemblance to much older treatises on the subject, from Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
with its own grey dawn a “war of all against all,” to Vegetius’ classic phrase, Si vis 
pacem, para bellum.381 The Fleet Unit, then, was a “scathing commentary” on the need 
for self-defense in the modern world, but for Hughes it was also a bold statement of 
Australian sovereignty, of parity with foreign powers, and of intent to play a role in 
shaping the future of international affairs. The glinting, smoking sovereignty of the 
Australian fleet unit meant that some things about human affairs were perennial. 
Australia had arrived, and it would stand on a foundation of force. 
                                                        
380 “Mr. Hughes’ View,” Sydney Morning Herald, 6 Oct. 1913  
381 Loosely, ‘If you desire peace, prepare for war.’ Vegetius was a scholar in the late Roman Empire and 
recapitulated classical wisdom on warfare in his treatise De Re Militari. 
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Still, by the time Hughes uttered these words, the scheme itself had unraveled. 
The seeds of its defeat were present from the beginning – in the imbalanced perceptions 
of strategic danger across the Empire, and especially in the exigencies of democracy 
Merriman so forcefully evoked. Public life in the Dominions was unused to prolonged 
contact with soldiers and sailors; Ward told the Conference that a large standing army 
would be unimaginable in New Zealand, hearkening to the competing ideas about 
militarization that still swirled across the Empire.382 Australian press support for a 
locally-funded navy that might serve imperial needs struck Lord Dudley, the Governor-
General, as downright suspicious – surely, he wrote, they meant surreptitiously to divert 
these funds to social entitlements.383 McKenna even admitted, revealing that he was a 
more orthodox Mahanian than his First Sea Lord Fisher, that the Admiralty thought 
colonial subsidies were the most strategically effective option for the Royal Navy, as they 
did less to jeopardize the principle of central command.384  
 Furthermore, the fleet unit scheme raised more fiscal questions than it 
answered.385 Dominion-financed ships had strings attached in the form of crews, which 
would need to be pulled from other Royal Navy posts until sufficient Dominion sailors 
could be trained. The preliminary agreement also called for the British Government to 
pay a rebate of up to £250,000 per year in upkeep on Australian ships, though this was 
later waived by the Australian Government. As for the Dominions, if they had been 
                                                        
382 Joseph Ward, Defence Conference Minutes,1909, CAB 18/12A, TNA, 22. 
383 Dudley to Admiralty, quoted in Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914, 
224. 
384 McKenna, Defence Conference Minutes,1909, CAB 18/12A, TNA, 65. 
385 For more on this point see Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, chap. 6 – “Radical Finance and 
Dominion Aid.” 
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driven by fiscal imperatives, Asquith’s chart should have pleased them – they enjoyed 
relative safety (at least compared to Britain) at pence on the pound. Yet, Canadian 
protests, which nearly killed the scheme at the Defence Conference, stemmed from the 
fact that Canada apparently aspired to a full two-ocean navy, and the scheme only 
proposed to cover the Pacific.386 This protest, while partly disingenuous, implied even 
greater expenditures than the fleet unit scheme asked. 
Democracy proved an even more lethal obstacle. The Dominions might be willing 
to vote for participation in imperial wars, and did so in 1914, but in peacetime it proved 
too much to take on, as will be explored in the following chapter. Laurier’s Government 
crumbled after an unsuccessful Naval Bill, and when his Conservative successor Robert 
Borden tried to salvage the situation with a scaled-back subsidy bill, this too failed. 
Worse was the revolving door of officials in London – none did more to torpedo the fleet 
unit scheme than Winston Churchill. When he succeeded McKenna as First Lord of the 
Admiralty in one of Asquith’s Cabinet reshuffles, he swept aside all diplomatic progress 
of the preceding three years and planned to scrap two of the new ships in order to save £5 
million for Lloyd George’s People’s Budget.387 He casually informed the Government of 
New Zealand that HMS New Zealand would be stationed in Gibraltar and instructed the 
Colonial Office to start preparing Australia for similar news.388 Fisher was replaced by a 
                                                        
386 This was yet another politically tenuous play by Wilfrid Laurier – Pacific constituents lauded the idea of 
a Canadian fleet unit based in Vancouver. See Laurier Papers, McBride to Laurier, 1909, MG26-G, Reel C-
877, LAC. The BC Premier forwarded a resolution by the Vancouver Navy League to that effect. Sir 
Charles Hibbert Tupper, President of the League, told the Vancouver World that he hoped to “point out to 
Ottawa that we have the willing material at hand…” See Naval Militia in Pacific, 1909, RG24-2498, LAC. 
387 See Lambert, “Economy or Empire?,” 68. 
388 In addition to his budgetary priorities, Churchill also thoroughly subscribed to Mahan’s argument that 
core defense concerns trumped all; he resolved to bolster the Mediterranean squadron at the Pacific’s 
expense. 
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succession of more pliable First Sea Lords. The transience of democracy meant that the 
relative predictability of the old Empire was lost. 
But officials across the Empire had not initially endorsed the fleet unit scheme 
because it was fiscally tidy or strategically coherent or politically predictable. They 
embraced it at the outset, despite these things, because it was a messy compromise that 
satisfied their quest to access legitimacy for their young states through security 
cooperation. Toward the end of the Defence Conference, Colonial Secretary Lord Crewe 
said in prophetic weariness:  
It is quite true that though questions of strategy in a sense ought to take the 
first place in composing an organisation intended for war, yet there are 
occasions in which questions of strategy in composing that organisation 
have to take second place. We cannot impose any system upon the 
Dominions. We do not desire to, and we could not if we would. We do not 
speak of them now as Colonies; we speak of them as Dominions, and very 
largely as allied nations. Well, allied nations have to bear the disabilities 
which depend on their respective forces not being under identical 
control.389 
 
Crewe spoke of “centralized decentralization.” He spoke of the new realities observed by 
Dicey, and of the “Britannic Alliance” envisioned by Richard Jebb. These were inchoate 
ideas, but they grew more solid by the day. And they made clear that Britain was no 
longer fully sovereign over parts of the Empire. 
                                                        
389 Crewe, Defence Conference Minutes, 1909, CAB 18/12A, TNA, 75. 
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The fleet unit scheme looked ahead to the same future, despite Churchill’s efforts 
to ensure it never survived to see it. It presaged many of the emerging international norms 
of the twentieth century – self-determination, international security cooperation, and the 
rising expropriation of wealth by state institutions, military and civilian. In the same way, 
a 1908 Radio and Telegraphic Conference held in London saw the Dominions press for 
independent voting rights (which would have given the Empire six votes collectively).390 
This met strong resistance from Germany, who would grudgingly accept only Canada, 
Australia, and India – India, which despite its conspicuous absence from the subsequent 
Defence Conference and low per capita figure spent roughly £20 million in public money 
on defense that year. Sovereignty in the British Empire thus entailed more than simply 
self-government or military potency alone. It demanded a state sufficiently organized to 
look after its own security and capable of projecting that security abroad. It demanded a 
polity willing to voluntarily endorse the project, and disqualified those who individually 
or collectively failed the test.   
This in part explains the notable omissions of India and Ireland from the 
Dominions’ origin story. India certainly spent money on defense and maintained the 
largest professional army in the world, but British command of these had no democratic 
strings attached. Irish politics remained fixated on the issue of Home Rule during this 
period, but the acceleration of British shipbuilding and the stimulus it created for the 
shipyards of Belfast only reinforced the unionist-Protestant contingent in the north of the 
country. As John Darwin notes, the postwar Anglo-Irish Treaty gave Ireland a half-
                                                        
390 Action Taken on Colonial Conference Resolutions, 1907, CO 886/2/1, TNA, 21. 
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hearted version of Dominionhood with extra fiscal and military controls.391 In these two 
settings, strategic risks that either Ireland, which after all was part of the cuttlefish’s head, 
or India, which contained the Empire’s largest manpower reserve, would refuse to 
cooperate with imperial security goals were too high for British officials willingly to 
invite the constraints and uncertainties of democracy. 
Vice Admiral Wilmot Fawkes, the officer in charge at the Royal Navy’s Australia 
Station, wrote to Lord Northcote, the Governor-General of Australia in February 1907, 
“As yet no arrangements for giving political representation to the Colonies has been 
devised, and the payment of a subsidy [from Dominions to the Royal Navy] recalls days 
without Parliaments and is perhaps contrary to the instincts of an Anglo-Saxon race, who 
wish not only to contribute to the sea power of the Empire, but also to send their own 
sons to serve in the Fleet.”392 Fawkes’ view of the unsuitability of subsidies versus active 
participation hangs on a concept of mature nationhood that has collapsed its democratic 
and military dimensions. That he also employs the Anglo-Saxon racial paradigm to 
validate this argument shows, as has been demonstrated above, how colonial elites 
imagined nations under the Empire as racialized units that either added to or detracted 
from the security of all. 
 Keith Murdoch, the Australian pamphleteer who praised the fleet unit scheme and 
printed his works alongside recruitment flyers for the Australian Navy (and whose son 
Rupert would later become even more successful in the newspaper business), captured 
what the fleet unit moment in history meant as he lyricized:  
                                                        
391 Darwin, “A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics,” 75. 
392 Fawkes to Northcote, “Naval Agreement and Imperial Conference Discussions,” 1908, 2115/1/46 
334238, NAA.  
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The payment for our navy has been in greater things than coins. We have 
paid in fighting males. In droughty wayback villages, in golden wheat 
valleys, on sun-baked pastoral plains, and in our own pleasant city 
suburbs, homes are poorer because the boy has 'gone into the navy.' What 
matters the four million sovereigns compared with this? The boys are gone 
- that they are gone to polish the guns and stoke the fire and explore the 
Pacific seas does not minimise their departure to mothers. But as against 
the loss of able men from reproductive employment, and the loss of our 
own people from our homes, there is the gain of something new and big in 
our occupations and our thoughts. The nation has become productive of 
new things-   
...the sailor men 
  That sail upon the Seas, 
  To fight the Wars and keep the Laws. 
 
Murdoch’s concluding verse is lifted from a contemporary anthology of poetry and 
recollections on naval life called A Gun-Room Ditty Box by G.F.S. Bowles.393 It speaks 
directly to the national future chased by Dominion governments: armed with their navies, 
they would join, and shape, the world as sovereign states. Murdoch omitted the final line 
in the stanza: “…and live on yellow peas.” 
 The following chapter will explore the continued breakdown of consensus over 
imperial security matters in the years 1910-1914. As crisis after crisis again rippled 
                                                        
393 G.F.S. Bowles, A Gun-Room Ditty Box (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1898). 
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through the Empire, the tensions – racial, political, strategic – militating against working 
solutions grew stronger. In these years it became clear to British observers that 
constitutional upheaval and political instability were not simply the problems of the 
colonial sphere – an unquiet Ireland brought them ripping through heart of the Empire.
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4 Chapter 4 – Things Fall Apart: The Collapse of 
Consensus and Control, 1910-1914 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In May 1912, the SS Titanic sank to the bottom of the North Atlantic, taking with 
it over a thousand lives. Two months later, Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden 
boarded an ocean liner in Montreal to steam for London and confer with the British 
Government. His diary entries for the Atlantic crossing make ominous references to 
foggy weather and iceberg sightings. Borden soothed his nerves in the usual ways – 
shuffleboard, fine company, and light reading in the form of A.B. Keith’s 1909 
Responsible Government in the Dominions.394 Keith’s complimentary words on the 
durability and exemplary nature of Canadian institutions, and on the timeless wisdom of 
Lord Dunham’s 1838 tract on federation in Canada, must have comforted Borden. 
Troubled waters for troubled times – Borden left behind a Canadian parliament bitterly 
divided over naval questions, and sailed to a Europe boiling with military tensions. 
Borden was no Virgil or Dante; he was an irascible Nova Scotian – but his voyage seems, 
with hindsight, like a posh, Atlantic journey across the Styx. Borden’s Tories had 
successfully torpedoed Wilfrid Laurier’s long-serving Liberal Government just months 
                                                        
394 Entry 29 June 1912, Borden, Sir Robert Laird and Rose, Kathryn (1912) The Diaries of Sir Robert 
Borden, 1912-1918. Transcription by Dr. Kathryn Rose. Documentation. Library and Archives Canada 
(LAC), Ottawa, ON. (Unpublished) digitized by Memorial University Libraries. 
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before, catching him a pincer between Henri Bourassa’s hardline Quebecois Liberals and 
Anglo immigration hawks from western Canada eager to fence out Asian laborers and 
skeptical of Laurier’s imperialist credentials. In so doing, Borden had deprived future 
Imperial Conferences of their longest-serving statesman, and their longest-serving 
obstructionist. Just as well – Lord Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, had observed after 
the 1907 meeting that the conferences took a horrible toll on Laurier’s digestive 
constitution – 1907 had “nearly killed him,” Grey remembered.395 Over a decade of 
stymying imperial integration and creeping militarism apparently made one dyspeptic. By 
1912, the British constitution was faring little better. 
 The intervening years since the 1909 naval crisis with Germany and the attempted 
fleet unit compromise went poorly for imperial defense and federation proponents. The 
moment of hope for a future of technological, strategic, and political unity for the Empire 
had been heady, but fleeting. Admiralty officials had argued amongst themselves about 
Britain’s optimal strategic posture for decades, sometimes acrimoniously – Jacky Fisher 
told a journalist in late 1909 that his Admiralty colleague and professional rival, John 
Beresford, was like a monkey climbing a flagpole: “the higher he gets the more you see 
of his arse.”396 If outright consensus on strategic matters seemed elusive in London, it 
was even scarcer in the Dominions. Henry Stead, a prominent magazine editor, wrote to 
the Colonial Secretary in 1914 that for Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to 
claim “that Japan safeguards them in the Pacific is simply gall and wormwood to the 
                                                        
395 John E. Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911: A Study in Imperial Organization 
(London: Longmans, 1967), 228. 
396 Quoted in Matthew S. Seligmann, The Royal Navy and the German Threat, 1901-1914: Admiralty Plans 
to Protect British Trade during a War Against Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 34. 
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Australians on whom the Asiatic danger has been worked for all its worth for many 
years.”397 Though Dominion governments were busy building armies, navies, and the 
institutions necessary to run them, none were sure what they should, or even could, do 
with them. But in the years since the South African War, they had carved out space to 
carry on their own conversations about how to move forward. Suddenly, the British 
establishment found itself obliged to convince colonial governments to support its 
strategic visions. Matters of imperial defense that had been one-way conversations, even 
lectures, became cacophonous.  
 By 1910, a decade of distance separated the British Empire from the South 
African War. To show for it, there were three new alliances with great powers, two new 
colonial federations, a new Dominion category in the British constitutional ecosystem, 
and two new institutional bodies in the formal Conference system and the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. It had been a decade of militarization – socially, politically, and 
intellectually. Sovereignty, conceived in the collective minds of political actors and made 
tangible in institutional and constitutional forms, had relied on the logics of security to 
expand and grow. But this was a Faustian bargain – the more militarized ideas of 
sovereignty became, the less they synergized with the ostensibly liberal principles of the 
British constitution, especially the principle of civilian supremacy over the military 
prevailing since the days of Cromwell. As military institutions, capabilities, and assets 
spread across the British Empire, and were understood to be critical instruments of 
political power, they touched off competitions between those who would marshal and 
                                                        
397 Stead to Harcourt, 22 April 1914, Harcourt MSS, f. 80 dep. 457; quoted in Nicholas A. Lambert, 
“Economy or Empire? The Fleet Unit Concept and the Quest for Collective Security in the Pacific, 1909-
14,” in Far-Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (Portland, 
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control them. These competitions took place within and across the borders of colonial 
states – colonial governments fought to control the military beasts they had fed, as 
Curzon had done, and with each other for strategic primacy, as was the case with 
Australia Station and the roles of the Australian and New Zealand governments in its 
basing arrangements. These swirling forces made the years after 1909 characterized more 
by fracture than by the unity for which some hoped. Moreover, they came to exert 
themselves more than ever on the imperial center itself. British politics was already 
beginning to realign itself around the issue of “union,” both in abstract terms and 
concrete ones to do with Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom. The basic strategic 
axiom that underpinned the growth of the Conference system – that the colonies now had 
a role to play in defending Britain as well as the converse – now had a constitutional 
dimension also. The British constitution was coming apart; the Union of the Kingdoms 
that had been the British state’s first exercise in projecting imperial power overseas 
threatened to collapse. This problem, too, was substantively driven by the colonies 
inward. Irish migrant populations in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United 
States placed international diplomatic pressure on Britain that complicated metropolitan 
politics and, due to spatial dislocation and the growing autonomy of colonial states, 
proved difficult to suppress. But the paradoxes continued; even as colonial governments 
grew more independent of Britain and one another from 1910-1914, they also grew more 
alike. Their institutional forms – federal, centralized, increasingly democratic – and their 
overriding preoccupations – security and diplomacy – were converging rather than 
diverging. 
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 This chapter will discuss the ongoing progress of colonial military and naval 
buildup in the years following the fleet unit negotiations of 1909. It will also examine the 
1911 Imperial Conference, at which a robust and imaginative plan for imperial federation 
died, and the failure of naval legislation in Canada, which changed the political direction 
of that Dominion. These episodes will demonstrate how imperial central planning failed 
to hold together. The next section will discuss efforts to consolidate and centralize the 
Indian and South African states using infrastructure and security, and how this 
exemplified the ongoing centralization at state level in the Empire. Next it will return to 
the United Kingdom to examine the accelerating constitutional crisis caused by Irish 
Home Rule, and the way the British constitution finally came under threat from the same 
military exigencies that so often menaced colonial spheres, culminating in the outbreak of 
the First World War 
 
4.2 THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FAILURE OF 
CENTRALIZED IMPERIAL DEFENSE 
 The central internal question of imperial security after 1909 was whether the 
agreements between Britain and its increasingly autonomous colonies would hold. What 
Richard Jebb called the “Britannic Alliance,” had by 1909 assumed the form of 
networked settler societies, appointees to the colonial machine, and the social ties running 
between colonial states, and between them and the metropole. These were undergirded by 
the remaining constitutional architecture that bound the colonies to the Crown and 
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Colonial/Dominion Office, and guaranteed through emerging deals over security, which 
bridged the gulfs created by trade and immigration issues.398 Between the Imperial 
Conferences, the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the idea of the fleet unit scheme, 
an ad hoc institutional and political basis for maintaining this equilibrium arguably 
existed. Yet within a few years the tenuous balance unraveled. The erosion of 
constitutional hierarchy in the Empire made strategic axioms harder to impose on a 
diverse and far-flung Empire. The same is true of militarism – it unleashed a logic of 
state-building in colonial states and provoked strategizing and competition. Liberal ideas 
and liberal heads of government complicated the balance further – one of the period’s 
greatest ironies is of liberal icons like Wilfrid Laurier and the radical governments of 
Asquith and Lloyd George presiding over turbulent and foreboding militarization to 
which they were nominally opposed. 
The benefits of cooperation, for Britain and colonial governments, were fairly 
clear – they could defray the costs of defense in specific cases and mutualize costs 
generally, forge more robust collective security measures that would be more effective at 
deterring possible enemies, and of course create pathways to sovereignty and status in the 
Empire and the world more broadly. The drawbacks of cooperation, meanwhile, were 
that it required conceding strategic priorities – namely, in taking Britain’s word about 
whom to trust and whom to fear. In the parable of Damocles, the courtier is allowed to 
assume the throne of the king, Dionysus, but soon finds that he sits under the point of a 
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giant sword suspended by a single horsehair, symbolizing the danger and responsibility 
of great power. In March 1910, a Canadian MP wondered in a debate on Canadian naval 
spending whether it hung also over the Royal Navy, and over Canada.399 Few seem to 
have felt its menace more acutely than Wilfrid Laurier. The collapse of consensus on the 
issue of imperial defense, the failure of political reform at the 1911 Imperial Conference, 
and a series of setbacks at the domestic level like that of the Canadian naval bills, attested 
the weight and danger of the new realities of sovereignty in the British Empire. 
 Social scientists have extensively theorized the functioning of alliances and 
groups, which became increasingly institutionalized through the twentieth century. The 
waxing and waning fortunes of the “Britannic Alliance” in the years before World War I 
make for interesting analysis from this vantage point, as opportunities for testing some 
theories and as an early example of characteristically twentieth-century forms of 
international agreement, with formal precepts and imperatives for military intervention. 
Another benefit of deploying theoretical frameworks to understand the development of 
British colonies as states (and the role of security therein) is that it helps evade some of 
historical narrative’s teleological pitfalls, especially where the arc of colonial history is 
concerned. But the travails of Wilfrid Laurier, and other Dominion heads of government 
besides, are not easily understood through the idiom of Jebb’s “alliance,” however. 
Relations between Britain, India, and the various Dominions were at once too centrally-
controlled for some affairs, and too ad hoc for others, to easily fit description as alliances. 
The matter of imperial security in the early twentieth century, rather, appears more 
                                                        
399 Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, 2nd Session, 11th 
Parliament, 9-10 Edw. VII, Vol. XCV, 1 March 1910, 4477. 
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clearly through the paradigm of the political scientist Mancur Olson: the collective action 
problem. Olson described the way joint endeavors create perverse incentives for parties 
to default on working toward the common goal, betting that some other party will be 
sufficiently motivated to carry on the work (or that the effort will collapse and each will 
see to itself).400 This dilemma applied strongly to the British Empire – Britain possessed 
preponderant resources, and the colonies and Dominions could rightly bet that it would 
cover their real or imagined security liabilities for nightmare scenarios. As Olson puts it, 
“there is…a surprising tendency for the ‘exploitation’ of the great by the small.”401 To 
work around this problem, Olson argued, the joint endeavor must be made to produce 
“selective” goods, which either fence off access to non-participants or increase access 
based on engagement level on the one hand, or punish or coerce non-participants on the 
other.402 Security posed just such a collective action problem for the British Empire. 
Creating straightforwardly selective goods (simply leaving colonies that did not 
contribute to imperial security undefended) would have been unthinkable; as the Board of 
Admiralty wearily admitted in a 1911 briefing on naval defense, “Whatever may be the 
decision of Canada at the present juncture, Great Britain will not in any circumstances 
fail in her duty to the oversea Dominions…to watch over and preserve the vital interests 
                                                        
400 “If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to 
advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some 
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of the Empire.”403 Instead, the Empire tried to make security “selective” by leveraging 
the issue of sovereignty – vigorous contributors to imperial defense hoped for certain 
political payoffs that they believed enhanced their sovereignties and credentials as 
legitimate states. Tangibly, these payoffs appeared as seats on the Committee of Imperial 
Defence or at the Conferences, greater autonomy in diplomacy or military planning, and 
other boons discussed in previous chapters. 
Other theoretical work on alliances has explored the extent to which their 
foremost purpose is actually for stronger members to constrain their weaker alliance 
partners, rather than solely to constrain or deter the alliance’s enemies.404 This dynamic 
certainly obtained for the British Empire; as discussed in previous chapters, the Colonial 
Office had its hands full restraining colonial expansionism in the Pacific, and the British 
Government in restraining the Government of India from starting an Indo-Russian (and 
inevitably, Anglo-Russian) war on the Northwest Frontier. A clear agreement on imperial 
collective security (similar to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance), and defined procedures for 
military command-and-control (like the fleet unit plan), should have helped the imperial 
center by supplying predictability and sufficient assurance to discourage risky unilateral 
acts by colonists, like Queenslanders’ 1883 attempted seizure of New Guinea. 
Meanwhile, sovereignty added an abstract variable to the equation by providing an 
incentive to cooperate with collective security schemes that shoehorned participants into 
closer alignment with norms of statehood shaped by imperialism and war. Admiral Sir 
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George King Hall, remarked in 1912, “It is bad policy to throw cold water on the efforts 
of a young, and rising nation, to taking measures for their own defence, it might do harm: 
whereas if encouragement is given, and sympathy, they will place confidence in the old 
country, and be ready to place their defence forces certainly and always at our disposal, 
and if we act wisely, we become more and more amalgamated with the Home Forces.”405 
This encapsulated Britain’s bid to overcome the collective action problem by 
constructing a system that politically (and even competitively) rewarded colonial 
cooperative with imperial security goals. 
Some have argued that the militarization of the Dominions and India was not a 
matter of persuasion on Britain’s part, but rather one of necessity, due to British 
fecklessness and miscalculation.406 This claim seems tenuous; there was certainly no 
shortage of attempted persuasion, as previous chapters have documented, though there is 
something to the asymmetric perception of threat by colonial observers and Britain in 
explaining why colonies might have had incentives to arm. And while Britain’s response 
to its circumstances can and has been criticized, its appraisal of its strategic situation 
withstands near-term historical scrutiny at minimum for holding together war-winning 
coalitions.407 Authority and hierarchy were central to these dilemmas. Authority, distinct 
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from coercion in its voluntary nature, helps construct sovereignty by defining the source 
of legitimate power.408 It also shared sovereignty’s two-level nature – incipient Dominion 
and colonial states used military power to legitimize and assert authority over their own 
spaces, and to qualify for entry to the international community, a condition that has been 
called “Westphalian sovereignty.”409 A major complicating reality of this period was that 
the states of the Empire, including Britain, still faced serious challenges to authority in 
their domestic spaces, and those challenges commanded first priority.410 Authority begat 
hierarchy, since acknowledging and consenting to the power of another creates an 
inherently vertical relationship. Hierarchy thus existed both within incipient states, as 
they consolidated and centralized their control, and between them, as they negotiated 
their relationships with Britain and began mutually to acknowledge the rights of 
sovereign states to conduct their own internal affairs without interference. Some have 
persuasively argued that hierarchy simplifies alliances and coalitions because it can 
reliably enforce compliance.411 While the British Empire’s hierarchy did streamline 
collective security in some of the ways such work suggests – it ensured the congruence of 
combat technology, command and officer training, and access to revenue for relevant 
institutions – hierarchy was also unravelling in this period, and thus so were its payoffs. 
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 It remains to discuss why the British Empire’s security cooperation might have 
failed, from a theoretical perspective. To begin, serious debate about strategic first-
principles continued, complicating observers’ appraisals of their best options. Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s concentrated fleet posture, Julian Corbett’s dispersed fleet posture, 
Halford Mackinder’s emphasis on land-power and heartlands – these ideas competed for 
primacy in the minds of colonial politicians, officers, and officials, and shaped the way 
they approached the thorny dilemmas of imperial politics. One of these dilemmas was 
simply about which rival powers to cooperate with, and which to punish or deter. This 
binary did not necessarily cleave to Britain’s newfound formal treaty partners; Britain 
had pacts with France and Russia but continued attempting to constrain their behavior, 
especially the latter’s. Conversely, it lacked a formal operating agreement with the United 
States but largely ignored or acquiesced to its expansionism in the Pacific, and the 
Caribbean.412 The wisdom of these choices was not equally understood as such across the 
British Empire. The Government of India, especially during Curzon’s Viceroyalty, 
considered rapprochement with Russia folly, and assurances from Japan unconvincing. 
Deal-making with France and Germany in the Pacific provoked New Zealand’s direct 
action in the attempted annexation of Fiji, and a similar scenario played out in the 
Caribbean with Canadian designs on the Bahamas in 1911.413 These rogue moments 
pointed to the strategic dissonance among the several governments of the Empire, an 
important reason that a clear consensus on imperial security policy and constitutional 
                                                        
412 This paradox is explored further in Steven E. Lobell, “Britain’s Paradox: Cooperation or Punishment 
Prior to World War I,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 2 (April 2001): 169–86. 
413 For more on New Zealand’s designs on Fiji, see Chapter 1 – A Tide in the Affairs of Men: Fear, 
Federation, and the South African War in Australasia. 
 227 
 
arrangements remained elusive. Additionally, some of the Empire’s attempts at formal 
strategic cooperation, especially the deployment mechanics of the fleet unit plan (which 
transferred command to the Admiralty immediately upon the outbreak of war), created 
deep absurdities. They meant that the Dominions were encouraged to build navies, for 
example, but could only control them during peacetime. “Canadian warship” thus 
became, after 1909, an oxymoronic concept. 
Moreover, the institutional consensus on these questions was not uniform within 
Britain itself – the Colonial Office and the Admiralty, for all their clutching at the pearls 
of central command in this period, actually showed remarkable flexibility on innovative 
schemes for the Empire, as in Chamberlain’s endorsement of imperial federation, or 
Fisher’s reconciliation to the fleet unit scheme despite its command implications. The 
Foreign Office, meanwhile, conducted its dealings largely without concern for the 
ramifications in colonial capitals.414 Finally, the outbreak of the First World War 
constituted an obvious failure of deterrence for Britain, considering Germany’s eventual 
appraisal of the costs and benefits of choosing war. This question has proved especially 
vexing for historians, some of whom have argued that, despite the extensive 
militarization and naval buildup in Britain and across the Empire, this was still 
insufficient to make war unattractive to Germany and to force it to abandon its quest for 
military prominence.415 On this analysis, the British Empire’s insufficient aggressiveness 
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constituted a massive policy failure, and the price of this languor totaled in the hundreds 
of thousands of lives and the billions of pounds. Any appraisal of this question must 
account for the fact that Britain was making serious efforts to mutualize its security costs 
with colonial partners in this period, at some detriment to central command and control. 
Thus, even if it can be said to have failed to deter Germany, it must be acknowledged that 
it was working to thwart another disastrous eventuality: the breakup of the Empire. 
Britain managed to keep that particular coalition together, and to utilize its aggregate 
resources, through two world wars. This can hardly be construed as failure, even if the 
objective of deterrence failed.416 
 
4.3 WILFRID LAURIER, THE CANADIAN NAVAL BILLS, AND THE 
‘VORTEX OF MILITARISM’  
 The dream of a uniform scheme for imperial defense did not deteriorate in a rapid 
or even linear fashion, but its first obvious setback occurred in Canada. The Dominion 
contained some of the most diverse political realities in the Empire – a dilemma between 
continentalist and navalist strategic modes, the necessity of accounting for two oceans in 
the latter case, and the Empire’s most politically-empowered minorities (non- Anglo-
Saxon or Protestant) in the Quebecois and Irish. The most remarkable thing about 
Laurier’s downfall over the 1910 Naval Service Bill is that it did not occur sooner. The 
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tenets of the fleet unit scheme – especially the provision placing ships under Admiralty 
control during war (when they were ostensibly most useful) – deeply perplexed many 
Canadians of all political stripes. W.B. Nantel, the Conservative Member for Terrebonne, 
said in a debate on the Naval Bill in March 1910, “Mr. Speaker, we will try to reassure 
these good people [farmer constituents] by saying to them ‘in time of peace…you will 
sell your eggs just as you did before. Only you will please to lay aside a little percentage 
out of each dozen…to pay the cost of these floating fortresses…In time of war, your fleet 
will have to be protected by the British Navy or else it will be blown out of 
existence.’”417 Nantel’s example hit home – Canadian taxpayers would be funding a navy 
that would only be commanded by Canadians so long as no actual hostilities occurred. 
Such a force was, theoretically, not valueless to Canadian security, since it could still 
function as a deterrent during peacetime, but it was clearly not a fully-realized instrument 
of Canadian interests. Ironically, the only way to ensure the ships continued to defend 
Canada in wartime would have been to use them to start a war in Canadian waters. A July 
1910 policy document circulated by Lt. Col. John Chancellor, Secretary of the Colonial 
Defence Committee (the pre-CID subcommittee of the Colonial Office tasked with 
formulating security policy for the colonies), noted that to “dispatch reinforcements to 
distant seas” in wartime would be a “false strategy,” and that such things would have to 
wait until the “clearing of the situation in home waters.”418 The brief went on to 
emphasize to Dominion governments the importance of keeping a stiff upper lip during 
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naval bombardment – with no fleet protection, enemy ships might threaten to bombard 
Dominion ports if the besieged British subjects refused to pay indemnities. “Surrender 
would entail more moral, if not material, loss to the place than the result of a few shells,” 
Chancellor lectured rather aloofly.419 This was scarcely reassuring stuff for a skeptical 
Canadian Parliament. 
The evolving nature of Canadian military and diplomatic institutions created 
space for questioning and contesting strategic mentalities of sacrifice for the good of 
England. On Laurier’s watch, Canadian institutions had evolved into more fully-realized 
forms, from Marine and Fisheries under Louis-Philippe Brodeur, to External Affairs 
under Joseph Pope, to Militia under Frederick Borden. To this group was added Capt. 
Charles Kingsmill, a retired Royal Navy officer from Ontario who was appointed to 
Marine and Fisheries in 1909 and created Rear Admiral commanding the Canadian Naval 
Service in 1910.420 It would be this last issue – the navy – that finally sank Laurier. To 
fully comply with the fleet unit framework, the Canadian Government would have 
needed to fund a battlecruiser attack group, and to base it at Esquimalt, at the tip of 
Vancouver Island in British Columbia (adjacent such evocative landmarks as a town 
called Ladysmith and a mountain called Majuba), leaving the Atlantic to the Royal Navy. 
But it was scarcely ever clear that Laurier was willing or able to fund a force of that size. 
Instead, his Government set about acquiring two secondhand Royal Navy cruisers, Niobe 
and Rainbow, and Kingsmill began inquiries into the possibility of developing local 
                                                        
419 Ibid., Section 46, 11. 
420 George V would officially grant it the title “Royal Canadian Navy” in 1911. 
 231 
 
shipbuilding capacity robust enough to produce future warships.421 As Reginald 
McKenna admitted in 1909, the Admiralty understood the Dominion governments would 
likely rather build warships in their own yards rather than contracting with British ones, 
despite the technical and fiscal efficiencies entailed in doing so.422 In March 1910, 
Kingsmill wrote to the Admiralty asking about obtaining the plans for building Britain’s 
then-current Bristol- and River-class destroyers. He coyly attached a newspaper clipping 
about the British shipbuilding firm Vickers, Sons & Maxim fitting out Argentine 
shipyards at preferential rates.423 The replies disappointed him. He informed Laurier in 
August that plans would be “grudgingly given,” and in September Lord Strathcona, 
Canada’s High Commissioner (its diplomatic representative in London), informed 
Kingsmill that he anticipated “considerable difficulty” in securing contracts to build 
British-designed warships in Canadian yards, “though there would, of course, be no such 
difficulty [building them] in Great Britain.”424 
 This episode only highlighted the lacunae in Canada’s sovereignty – Canada 
lacked the facilities and the expertise to build its own warships, and could not secure 
these from Britain even under seemingly reasonable circumstances. Now that the 
Canadian navy was an official entity, however, issues of legality in international waters 
resurfaced. The British Admiralty’s worst fear was of a disaster on the high seas – of a 
                                                        
421 Construction of Ships - Liaison with High Commissioner and Admiralty Re Canadian Naval 
Programme, 1909, LAC, RG24-2604, 2-3, folio 111-112. 
422 “I can imagine that the electors of the Commonwealth [of Australia] would be far more willing to 
contribute to the cost of the Navy, if the money was spent in the Commonwealth, and was not spent over 
here.” Defence Conference Minutes, 1909 CAB 18/12A, National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), 
35.  
423 Construction of, 1909, LAC, RG24-2604, 3-5. 
424 Ibid., 28, 57. 
 232 
 
Canadian vessel firing on a German one, say, and consequently starting an Anglo-
German war. Conversely, Henri Bourassa’s Quebecois Liberals feared that the transfer-
of-command provisions of the fleet unit scheme meant that Canada’s assets would be 
automatically implicated in any British war, no matter how remote to Canadian interests, 
ensuring Dominion susceptibility to the “vortex of militarism.” A September 1910 memo 
from the Foreign Office and Admiralty laid out some policies: RCN ships could fly 
Canadian ensigns in Canadian territorial waters, but they would remain fully British in all 
extra-territorial contexts and must fly the (Royal Navy) White Ensign from their main 
masts.425 By late 1910, the Canadian Government had succeeded only in purchasing two 
obsolescent cruisers and in getting tentative agreements from the British firm, Vickers, to 
fit out Canadian shipyards. Laurier’s Naval Service Bill had satisfied no one. Imperialists 
to his right decried it as a plan for a “tin pot navy” capable of little beyond blundering 
around the Canadian littoral; certainly not of deterring a foreign aggressor, or of 
decreasing British reliance on the Japanese alliance in the northern Pacific, an agreement 
Laurier was inclined to trust. To make matters worse, Laurier also advocated preferential 
tariff agreements with the United States, not Britain, which enraged conservative voters 
in Ontario and British Columbia.  
Having spent the last ten years trying to fortify Canada against the vortex of 
militarism, Laurier found himself sucked up by it anyway. Laurier's eventual downfall 
was not in his failure to understand the security-sovereignty nexus – his protestations that 
Canada was “not a sovereign power” and his foot-dragging on building a Canadian navy 
suggest he understood the link better than most. It was in his apparent belief that he could 
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triangulate away from them; to build Canadian institutional capacity in infrastructure, 
diplomacy, and politics, toward a sovereignty that dare not speak its name. He retained 
his liberal bona fides to the last, searching for cost-efficient ways to secure Canada and 
participate in imperial politics without becoming entangled in them, trying to serve the 
state primarily through trade concessions. It is perhaps appropriate that Nantel, a 
Quebecois Tory, saw him with such piercing gaze in 1910. In his hours-long speech on 
the Naval Service Bill, he insisted, as Laurier once had, that Canada was “not a nation,” 
and that to claim otherwise invoked the kind of nonsense mumbled “after a banquet, 
among the fumes of wine that lead to boasting, to overestimation, and to the burning of 
frankincense.” He compared the idea of creating a Canadian navy that would be used to 
defend other parts of the Empire equivalent to Canada “establish[ing] a postal service for 
New Zealand.”426 On the Colonial Defence Committee’s controversial advice about 
bombardment, he warned of the way it constrained Canada’s choices, calling it 
“imperialism in action” and pronouncing gravely “I see there written in letters of fire: 
‘You must bend or be broken.’”427 In his final assault on Laurier, Nantel dubbed him an 
“imperialist against his will,” and quoted the damning critique launched against Laurier 
by David Lloyd George as the latter opposed the Boer War in 1901 – “Sir Wilfrid 
Laurier…stated that Canada was an independent nation, and yet, that colony pretending 
to be independent has sent troops in South Africa to crush down the independence of men 
who have an equal right to the independence Canada claims for herself.”428 
                                                        
426 Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, 2nd Session, 11th 
Parliament, 9-10 Edw. VII, Vol. XCV, 1 March 1910, 4539. 
427 Ibid., 4545. 
428 Ibid., 4548. 
 234 
 
These fusillades went on for days. The Naval Service Bill actually passed in May, going 
through on support from Anglo Liberals and some Tories who were content to see a 
formal Department of Naval Services and associated funding, hoping they could build on 
it later. It alienated the Quebecois, however, and Laurier lost the subsequent election 
having galvanized his opposition and hollowed out his own support base. A Canadian 
Navy was born, fitfully, with its own Department, two obsolescent ships, and a new staff 
college to be built in Halifax. But the sword hanging over him ultimately forced Laurier 
to vacate the throne. He deserves credit for understanding the changing nature of 
sovereignty the sword symbolized, and the gathering storm of militarism he described 
from out of his own visions, even if, in the end, he failed to arrest or harness it. 
 Robert Borden, whose Tory government succeeded Laurier’s in late 1911, entered 
office with a mandate to do something about the navy. Thus far he had advocated for 
building a Canadian Navy along reasonable lines, rather as Laurier had, but with the 
crucial difference that Borden hoped to operate jointly with the Royal Navy to the 
greatest extent possible, and thus to secure for Canada a formal influence in the British 
Government’s decisions on war and peace.429 Knowing he needed to manage both the 
Quebecois and the imperialist wing of his own party, Borden tried to do this by 
campaigning for the repeal of Laurier’s Naval Service Act, but the Liberal-controlled 
Senate stymied his strategy.430 Unfortunately for him, his path to an aggressive naval 
spending program was obstructed by the upper house, who wanted no such thing. This 
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forced Borden to fall back on the mechanism of subsidy – a mechanism with a rich recent 
streak of political failure. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, had done 
his share to maneuver Borden back into the subsidy trap during his visit to London in 
1912, by throwing more cold water on the prospect of contracting warships in Canadian 
yards and entreating Borden for funding to relieve the Admiralty’s fiscal burden.431 In the 
prior debate on the Naval Service Bill alone, the concept of “taxation without 
representation” (and all its historical baggage in North America) had been referenced on 
seventeen different occasions.432 Per his consultation with Churchill, Borden’s Naval Aid 
Bill would have earmarked $35 million for three new dreadnoughts – for the Royal Navy. 
His bill tried to sidestep the command-and-control problem by simply conceding it 
altogether. Borden attempted to assure the chamber during the debate that Canada’s naval 
efforts and position on the CID meant “no important step in foreign policy would be 
undertaken without consulting such a representative of Canada.”433 This was an 
optimistic statement, and Borden’s audience knew it. In a spectacle of futility worthy of 
its predecessor, the Naval Aid Bill endured six months of Liberal filibuster, after which 
Borden’s Government invoked the first formal cloture in Canadian parliamentary history 
to end the debate. The bill died anyway, as expected, in the Liberal-controlled Senate. 
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4.4 THE 1911 IMPERIAL CONFERENCE: FEDERALISM’S FAILURE 
 As the long struggle for a Canadian naval settlement played out, the United 
Kingdom returned H.H. Asquith’s Liberal Government for another term in the January 
1910 General Election by a hair’s breadth – two seats, and behind, in the popular vote, to 
Arthur Balfour’s Tories. To continue in power, Asquith had to cut a deal with John 
Redmond’s Irish Parliamentary Party to support him. The election itself followed a 
constitutional crisis in which the House of Lords had refused to pass David Lloyd 
George’s “People’s Budget” the previous year. Asquith’s win gave him the technical 
means to pursue constitutional reform and break the Lords’ veto, but a mandate and a 
margin that was not particularly reassuring for a task so momentous. It also obliged him 
to push harder on the issue of Home Rule for Ireland, now that Redmond backed up his 
Commons majority.434 The British constitution was coming apart at the seams. As it 
reached its ripping point in summer 1911 with the new Parliament Acts, the next iteration 
of the Imperial Conference convened in London, adding to the circus of politics taking 
place in the imperial capital. A beleaguered Laurier, on the last legs of his premiership, 
did his utmost to skip the Conference, his continued association with which did him no 
favors and diverted him from his myriad political problems at home. But Borden forced 
him to go, loudly offering to adjourn Parliament from the opposition benches, thus 
priming Laurier for more uncomfortable imperial imbroglios and freeing Borden for 
further machinations in Ottawa. The Canadian delegation naturally declined to submit 
any proposals ahead of the Conference, and had submitted little besides to the permanent 
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Conference Secretariat in the intervening years since the last meeting.435 The Australians, 
considering their journey, had to plan a seven-month recess for the Commonwealth 
Parliament; the South Africans were deeply distracted by the business of their recently-
accomplished Union. But New Zealand, as ever, came prepared. 
 Joseph Ward had big shoes to fill in Wellington and at the Conferences in London 
– literally, Richard Seddon had been a large man. Ward hit the ground running shortly 
after assuming office at the 1907 Conference and intended to keep up his form in 1911. 
He arrived in London with a fresh portfolio of exciting new proposals, but these were not 
entirely his making – they were the fruit of a trans-national network of officials, thinkers, 
and writers known as the Round Table. The Round Table was a self-styled Arthurian club 
of blue-sky thinkers who set about planning the future of world order from well-suited 
positions atop the British Empire’s pinnacles of power.436 Imperial federation was one of 
the Round Table’s central objectives, which is how it came to link up with Joseph Ward. 
At the time of the 1911 Conference, the Round Table’s master document on the imperial 
federation issue was a schematic paper called the “Green Memorandum.” The Green 
Memo contained Lionel Curtis’s sketch of how an empire-wide parliament would work, 
and included a bicameral legislature with a population-based lower house and a twelve-
member Senate containing two representatives from each Dominion that would serve as 
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an “Imperial Council of Defence.”437 This was an ambitious plan, and would certainly 
have laid to rest any lingering ambiguity about central planning on defense and foreign 
policy in the Empire. It was also far too radical to be useful for public consumption at the 
time, and most of the members of the Round Table understood this. Ward did not. After 
receiving an advance copy of the Green Memo at a caucus with a Round Table group in 
Wellington, Ward thought it would be a perfect item of business to submit at the Imperial 
Conference for which he was shortly to depart.438 
 In Canada, the Round Table enjoyed a reputation among some Liberal and 
Quebecois observers as a sort of dangerous jingo cult trying to marionette the 
Dominions.439 Curtis, for his part, tried to steer his members away from direct 
intervention in politics, but Ward took no such steering. The Round Table offered direct 
and systematic thinking about the Empire’s policy problems, and drawing on its literature 
seemed an intuitive move. The third issue of the group’s quarterly in 1911 directly 
addressed the “New Problem of Imperial Defence” in its opening article. The quarterly 
offered a familiar diagnosis of the “problem” – dreadnought technology had upended the 
calculus of British naval superiority, and the Empire’s naval strategy and foreign policy, 
formerly under central command, now rested among the several Dominions 
collectively.440 It called the Dominions “no longer colonies, but nations,” and went on to 
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link their new autonomy to a certain responsibility for imperial defense: “In undertaking 
the management of their own affairs the Dominions have ipso-facto made themselves 
responsible for the safety of the Empire of which they are part.”441 The Green Memo, 
meanwhile, began by listing a series of resolutions on the importance of preserving the 
British Empire, the first two of which were that Britain would cease to be a first-rate 
power without it, and perhaps Canada (but probably none) of the Dominions could 
possibly maintain their independence without its security umbrella.442 The Round Table, 
then, also grasped the paradox that developing and acquiring military resources brought 
the Dominions both freedom and constraint; it decentralized the Empire’s decision-
making, but brought the individual parts into closer alignment by forcing them to 
consider the same basket of international security issues and to behave according to the 
same norms of sovereign state conduct, invariably shaped, a priori, by Britain. To Ward, 
these were obvious points to put before the Imperial Conference, preoccupied as it was in 
trying to reconcile the interests of the Dominions on the matter of security. 
 Unlike the previous conferences, 1911 did not begin with the sitting UK Prime 
Minister berating the visiting colonial heads of government about their poor contributions 
to imperial defense spending. Asquith even said, “I am not going to trouble you with 
statistics,” in his introductory remarks.443 This departure from established tradition had 
many causes, not the least of which was that colonial military spending actually did climb 
over the interim. Moreover, many of the attendees had years of experience with imperial 
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conferencing under their belts by 1911, and there was less need to belabor the urgency of 
imperial defense, or the danger of Germany, or the necessity of aggressive shipbuilding. 
Asquith also directly recapitulated the writings of A.V. Dicey and A.B. Keith on the arc 
of imperial history – the false choice between “centralization” and “disintegration.”444 
The assembled Conference, he implied, had solved that dilemma, if it had also introduced 
a new one about whether the CID or the Conferences should serve as the primary 
instrument for making common imperial policy.445 Laurier, the Conference’s longest-
serving member, spoke next, and briefly stated that Canada had nothing to report but 
prosperity and general contentment, a statement as sincere as it was disingenuous.446 
Beginning the first day, Ward laid out in alarming detail his plan for a federated imperial 
government, along the lines of the Green Memo, to his somewhat bemused colleagues. It 
was a poorly-timed speech, both for the reasons outlined above and because it directly 
recalled the early days of the 1902 Conference, at which Joseph Chamberlain had 
expected colonial support to greet his plans for federation and instead had his hopes 
dashed.  
Ward actually laid even more emphasis on security than the Green Memo did, 
extemporaneously redubbing the proposed governing bodies an “Empire Parliament of 
Defence” and an “Imperial Council of Defence.”447 Clearly he believed this subtle 
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446 Minutes of the Imperial Conference, 1911, CO 886/5A, 23 May 1911, TNA, 24. 
447 Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887 - 1911, 173. 
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rebranding would enhance their appeal. He told Asquith that he considered the concepts 
“state” and “defence” interchangeable when challenged about his inconsistent usage: 
“Yes. Perhaps I ought to use the term Imperial Council of State. Defence is above all 
other questions the one in which every part and subject of the Empire is vitally 
concerned. It is the great vital topic which can be treated only by a proper Council of 
State. I am going to assume that this is obvious, and I will not occupy the time of the 
Conference by arguing the matter.”448 Ward made himself perhaps too clear to his 
colleagues – his proposal, proceeding from the axiom that security begat sovereignty, 
meant taking much of the hard-won sovereignty the Dominions had accrued in recent 
years, and re-investing it in a centralized imperial authority. His colleagues saw forfeiture 
rather than progress in this plan. He tried to head off criticisms, from Laurier especially, 
by pointing out that (if no scheme were agreed) Canada’s planned navy would still be 
subject to the war-making power of the British Government. But his alternative seemed 
little better, and Laurier knew full well his own troubles without being reminded. Andrew 
Fisher, the Australian Prime Minister, politely called the scheme a “benevolent 
revolution.”449 A memo prepared ahead of the Conference by the Australian government 
listed some key priorities for the delegation: figuring out how to transfer sailors currently 
posted to the Royal Navy’s Australia Station to the Australian Fleet Unit itself, how to 
build warships in Australian yards as Canada hoped to do, and how to transfer control of 
Sydney’s naval base from the Royal Navy to the Commonwealth government, among 
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others.450 The other Dominion governments were clearly busy clawing power and 
resources back from the imperial center, not ceding them. 
For the case of South Africa, the newest unitary delegation at the Conference, the 
response to Ward’s proposal once again illuminated the way imperial concepts of security 
interlocked with those of race. In an ironic reversal of the ripostes made at the 1909 
Conference – at which South Africa had tried to inflate its per capita defense spending 
figures by omitting its black population from the denominator, and incurred the wrath of 
their fellow delegates for this sleight of hand – the Minister for Education for the new 
Union of South Africa, F.S. Malan, probingly asked Ward whether his figures for 
representation in an imperial federal parliament had figured in the coloured population of 
his Dominion.451 For once in the debate, Ward went on the offensive and found his 
rhetorical footing:  
I understood that when you were framing the South African Constitution 
you refused to give the coloured population there the right to vote. 
Speaking generally, you could hardly expect in connection with an 
important proposal such as this, that a departure should be made so 
different to what has been carried out in South Africa…452 
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Here, Malan inverted the logic of his predecessor J.X. Merriman, who statistically 
omitted black South Africans, while still managing to remain fully true to the spirit of 
South Africa’s growing tradition of opportunistically instrumentalizing its black 
population in conversations about security. As with Merriman, Malan (and Ward) 
ensured that the intersections of race, security, and sovereignty that surfaced in 1909 
would have obtained for a theoretical imperial parliament as well – black South Africans 
ostensibly played no role in (and perhaps even compromised, in the Union government’s 
view) South African security, and thus they would not be counted among its full citizens. 
Neither could they count, then, as full citizens of the Empire’s “parliament of defence.” 
 Those speaking after Joseph Ward expressed polite dissent with his proposals, if 
in private they equivocated less. Louis Botha, Prime Minister of the Union of South 
Africa, wrote home to his colleague Jan Smuts in the Union government that the 
Conference had “easily defeated” Ward’s “idiotic proposal.”453 The Conference attendees 
in 1911 enjoyed access to a forum in which they could lobby the British Government 
with equally-weighted voices, and whose resolutions they enjoyed the luxury of standing 
aloof from if they chose. An imperial parliament, however fairly designed, would have 
lent a measure of democratic legitimacy to the use of their military assets for imperial 
ends, but it would also have re-imposed a numerical representative hierarchy on the 
Dominions vis-à-vis Britain. Furthermore, what had already been true for Chamberlain in 
1902 was the more so in 1911 – the erosion of hierarchy meant that the Dominion 
governments could no longer be compelled to adopt one scheme or another, yet as 
contributors to imperial security Britain was forced to try to bargain with them for 
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strategic cooperation. To underscore the extent to which strategic cooperation was 
fraying by 1911, a quiet campaign was gathering pace in Canada for the Dominion to 
annex the Bahamas. In an eerie echo of the New Zealand’s federal dreams of a decade 
prior, a coalition of Canadian lawyers, grocers, and newspapermen began visiting Nassau 
in 1910 with the object of investigating the payoffs to Canadian trade of having a tropical 
foothold in the Bahamas, but crucially also of shoring up the growing void of British 
power in the Caribbean.454 As with the case of the Australasians, the Colonial Office 
(with its reconstituted Dominion Office) vigorously opposed this idea, and did its best to 
constrain Canadian aspirations, fearing they would interfere with the principle of free 
trade and generate tensions with local powers, especially the United States.455 At its root, 
the bid for the Bahamas drew on Canadian suspicions that Britain no longer acted in its 
interests regionally, and that these would be better served by taking a greater share in 
defending the Empire’s interests. 
 Some proactive measures did emerge from the 1911 Conference on the matters of 
diplomacy and defense. In a new departure, the Foreign Secretary Lord Grey held a 
special session of the Conference in Whitehall at which he painstakingly explained the 
logic of British diplomatic strategy, confidentially, to the Dominion heads of government. 
Among other things, he told Dominion delegates they would be consulted in advance of 
future Hague international conferences, and even represented “in whatever way they 
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found most convenient.”456 This briefing constituted somewhat of a climb-down for 
Grey, who had remarked in 1909 that even the likes of Canada possessed only three men 
who knew anything about foreign affairs, and, worryingly, one was a drunk, the second 
woefully inarticulate, and the third was Joseph Pope, who was a really first-rate official. 
He also deemed Australia’s foreign affairs department “incapable of translating an 
ordinary French letter correctly.”457 While the briefing offered the Dominion 
governments little space to steer imperial policy, the dialog was another crack in the 
edifice of central command. This was offset somewhat by the progress made in the years 
since the 1907 Conference on developing an Imperial General Staff – a uniform training 
and modular command system for the Empire’s senior military officers. The initiative, 
like so many others, grew out of dismay at the general disorder of troop training among 
the contingents in the South African War.458 By 1911, the Dominions had made some 
progress towards filling out the positions in their respective military staffs, and had 
agreements with Britain over harmonizing officer examinations and training.459 
Dominion officers could travel to one of two locations to attend staff college – 
Camberley, in Surrey, or Quetta, in India. The General Staff agreement reinforced one of 
the interesting facets of emerging sovereignty in the Empire – the ability of (and need 
for) colonial states to deploy military forces in an expeditionary capacity, wherever they 
                                                        
456 Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887 - 1911, 203. 
457 Minute, CO 532/19/39643; and Grey to Elgin, 23 March 1908, Box 1793, Elgin Papers. Ibid., 226. 
458 “It will be remembered that, when Lord Roberts landed in South Africa at the beginning of 1900, owing 
to the heterogeneous nature of the force placed under his command, he had to spend more than a month of 
valuable time in evolving a new transport organization for the Army, before any further strategical 
measures could be undertaken.” Correspondence on Defence for the 1911 Conference, A5954-11853 
693751, NAA, “Possibility of Assimilating War Organization Throughout the Empire,” 19-20. 
459 Commonwealth of Australia, Imperial Conference London, 1911: Naval and Military Defence, Papers 
Laid before the Conference, AWM124-1.25 489185, 1911, Australian War Memorial (AWM).  
 246 
 
were needed. As the agreement itself stated: “the first point to note is that it is a cardinal 
military maxim that no organization for defence can be regarded as adequate or complete 
which does not contemplate offensive action. Passive defence seldom, if ever, wins 
decisive results.”460 Such were the expectations for the highest political echelon of the 
British Empire. The college at Quetta, and the tendency of Dominion officers to seek 
military experience in the Indian Army, represented one of the Army’s tangible payoffs 
to the Government of India relative to the other states of the Empire. It meant prestige 
and influence, but less abstractly, it helped inculcate in the Empire’s future military 
leadership the exigencies and strategic primacy of Indian defense. It also made India yet 
more indispensable to the Empire’s collective security as a primary node of producing 
quality officers. 
India, meanwhile, had come no further in 1911 toward representation at the 
Imperial Conference. From the British House of Commons, the matter actually saw 
daylight through the person of Col. Charles Yate – an Indian Army officer who asked on 
6 April 1911 whether the Imperial Conference could adequately discuss the defense of 
the Empire without India present.461 The answer, from Colonial Secretary Lewis “Lou-
Lou” Harcourt, was as ever that India’s interests were represented by the Indian 
Secretary, who would be present at Conference sittings if he were needed. Yate, of 
course, represented India only insofar as he represented the Indian Army; namely, its 
British officer corps. Security here remained India’s primary point of entry to imperial 
politics. The matter arose during the Conference as well – as Joseph Ward delivered his 
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ham-fisted call for an imperial federation, he faced questions as to its proper composition, 
and the place of India. He proposed to amend his proposed resolution affirming an 
imperial federation to include the words “representatives from all the self-governing parts 
of the Empire.” The sitting President, (Harcourt), advised him – “the effect of it is to 
omit…the Crown Colonies and India.” “That’s so,” Ward replied.462 The Times of India, 
an organ of the British establishment, had little to say on the matter. It did report fairly 
extensively on the Conference proceedings, though, and more importantly, on the issue of 
labor migration within the Empire. On Ward’s dismissal of the problem of Indian 
migrants – “every colour going back to its own zone” – the Times asked sardonically: 
“What answer would [Ward] make if it were pressed on him by a delegation of 
Maoris?”463  
The British Government’s position on India followed from constitutional 
principle – the Indian Secretary stood for Indian interests; popular representation of the 
British Indian state was no more welcome at the Conference than it was in the Raj itself. 
Yet the officers who alone spoke for Indian interests were correct – India’s vast 
importance to imperial matters of all stripes made its absence at the Empire’s highest 
forum a problem, especially so for matters of defense. The enforced absence of an Indian 
delegation, even so much as one of British Indian officers, spoke to the way incipient 
Dominionhood hinged on creating strong distinctions with other colonies. It also spoke to 
the incredibly high stakes of Indian security – whereas British officialdom seriously 
doubted the risk of a Dominion being invaded by a foreign power (as evidenced by the 
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Colonial Defence Committee brief), they seriously feared a Russo-Indian conflagration. 
Furthermore, while the Admiralty Board and others took an exasperated parent’s tone on 
security cooperation with the Dominions (as seen in the Board’s memo about having to 
do its duty, even if Canada chose not to help), they could afford no such pronouncement 
about India. In contrast to the Royal Navy’s power at sea, it was far from clear that the 
British Empire’s land-based security liabilities could be covered without the might of the 
Indian Army; conversely, the small British Army could scarcely contemplate fighting a 
war in India or Central Asia without the Indian Army’s cooperation. Allowing “Indian 
interests,” however construed or constituted, to contest the principles of imperial strategy 
with the power of the Indian Army hanging in the balance would have been truly 
momentous, and have placed the idea of central command in far greater jeopardy than 
any of the Dominions’ “tin-pot” navies could have done. As above, this sort of strategic 
discord proved to be a major obstacle, and the British Government would not imperil the 
hierarchy that allowed it to ensure the Indian Army remained its instrument. The 
direction of government in India and Africa, meanwhile, took this problem to heart by 
trying to do to the Empire’s vast continental spaces what the sea did for the Royal Navy – 
allow ubiquitous access, through infrastructural penetration on a grand scale. 
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4.5 INFRASTRUCTURAL POWER: THE DELHI DURBAR AND THE UNION 
OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 If imperial strategists felt like they could rely on the Royal Navy to do what it 
must in any corner of the Empire, they dreamed of land forces with a similar reach. As 
Halford Mackinder had argued in his famous 1904 lecture “The Geographical Pivot of 
History,” Central Asia was the “heartland” of the world itself; India meant the British 
Empire was perched on its margin. The Royal Navy’s security backstop, to a significant 
extent, prefigured the expansion of British imperialism itself – outward in a series of 
“bridgeheads” that could be reinforced or relieved from the sea if necessary.464 As such, 
colonial capitals and seats of power tended to be coastal – Calcutta, Sydney, Melbourne, 
Wellington, Cape Town, Vancouver, etc. – rather than interior. But that dynamic began to 
change in the late nineteenth century, as imperial state-building trended toward the 
federalizing projects discussed in previous chapters. The new seats of power – Canberra, 
Ottawa, Pretoria, Delhi, tended to be interior, continental cities. This posed a serious 
challenge to imperial security over how to defend them, deepened by memories of the 
Empire’s worst military failures in South Africa and India half a century earlier.465 The 
best available solution, in a word, was railways. Railway grids gave land forces a 
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modicum of the deployment flexibility enjoyed by naval forces, and thus the great project 
of federalizing and securing incipient colonial states meant building extensive railway 
grids that could make interior spaces legible to, and securable by, military force. In this 
sense railways underpinned the domestic dimension of sovereignty as Weber described it: 
monopolizing the use of force within a given territory. In a remarkably concentrated 
stretch of time: from 1910 to the outbreak of World War I, seats of government in major 
colonial states moved inland: Calcutta to Delhi, Sydney to Canberra, Cape Town (and 
others) to Pretoria and Johannesburg. As the British government fought to keep 
Dominion and colonial governments on the same strategic page in naval matters, debates 
on the military intensified also. Interior seats of government shifted the security burden 
(and its attendant political leverage) away from Britain and the Royal Navy, and towards 
colonial governments and their fledgling security forces. This shift imbued state-building 
projects with military logic and touched off major programs of railway construction. The 
problems of collective imperial security had sprouted legs and begun to crawl inland. 
 India and South Africa experienced the most intense processes of infrastructural 
and constitutional development over the period 1909-1914. As their seats of government 
moved to Delhi and Pretoria, their constitutional systems evolved also: the 1909 Indian 
Councils Act (known as the “Morley-Minto Reforms” for its two sponsors, Viceroy the 
Earl of Minto and Indian Secretary John Morley) introduced legislative advisory councils 
for Raj governors, while South Africa’s individual colonies combined in 1910 to form the 
Union of South Africa. Both of these developments took place in conjunction with 
coordinated railway development plans. The bureaucrats and officials who conceived 
these schemes described railway planning as a way to construct political order itself, 
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offering a glimpse into the logic of imperial rule as a spatially and technologically 
contingent exercise. Scholarly explanations of the role of technology in imperialism have 
generally fallen into two camps, with some positioning technology as the primary 
variable explaining imperial conquest, and others suggesting a more double-edged 
phenomenon whereby technology-transfer happens swiftly and complicates colonial 
encounters.466 The role of railway technology in India and South Africa seems to support 
the latter argument; it produced unintended, and sometimes detrimental, consequences to 
the stability of the colonial states. Early waves of scholarship on colonial railways 
focused on their effects on economic development and their relationship to British 
capital.467 More recently, scholars have turned to the issue of railways as agents of 
cultural change and as points of contact between colonized and colonizer.468 Because of 
their unique role as manifestations of geopolitical power, colonial security, and public 
service, railways offer a useful point of entry to both the logic and experience of 
colonialism. They have been described as sites of “collaboration,” because of the range of 
actors required to build, service, and use them, and yet they also serve as examples of 
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how collaboration broke down – both in colonial societies, and among colonial states.469 
Railways were another arena in which the British Empire’s strategic tensions pulled in 
various and sundry directions, chipping away at the primacy of naval strategy in the 
minds of government officials and complicating intra-imperial security cooperation. 
Upon George V’s accession as King in 1910, the Empire gained a Sovereign in 
sufficient health to travel. No British monarch had ever visited India, the dominion of the 
Crown responsible for their styling, since Victoria, as “Empress/Emperor.” None had 
visited the Dominions either since that term had gained its new constitutional significance 
after 1907. George resolved to remedy this, and to physically manifest sovereignty in his 
various realms where its meaning had changed so much in recent years. The Government 
of India had been moving toward Mughal-style royal Durbar celebrations for some years 
already, dating back to Curzon’s 1903 celebration for Edward in absentia.470 With George 
fit to travel, they now had a chance to mount a fully-fledged Durbar in India. Such an 
event was an anti-modern statement of symbolism and aesthetic, but it was also wedded 
to a thoroughly modern program of policy reform concerning Indian politics and 
infrastructure. Ahead of the planned visit, the Government of India planned to announce 
several measures that would help secure the subcontinent and mollify hardline 
nationalists gaining influence in Bengal and the Indian National Congress. The plan 
involved emphasizing the Morley-Minto reforms, investing heavily in the railways, 
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moving the Government of India’s official capital from Calcutta to Delhi, and reversing 
Curzon’s incendiary partition of Bengal.471 Each of these measures was designed to 
enhance the colonial state’s ability to manage space, and to consolidate its sovereignty 
over the subcontinent. 
Since the advent of formal British rule in India, the seat of government had been a 
matter of some schizophrenia. Calcutta, the old stronghold of the East India Company in 
Bengal, possessed a warm and humid climate that gifted its British migrants persistent 
irritation and exceedingly high mortality rates. Since the 1860s, the Government’s 
practice had been to relocate its entire apparatus to the temperate Himalayan hill-station 
at Simla during the summer, a journey that took personnel and materiel 42 hours by rail 
according to a government estimate.472 The ubiquitous Rudyard Kipling, after observing 
this circus-like affair on his visits to India, composed for it a wry ode called “A Tale of 
Two Cities,” which told the story of how British presence in India grew from a merchant 
operation based in Calcutta to sovereignty over the whole subcontinent:  
Once, two hundred years ago, the trader came 
Meek and tame.  
Where his timid foot first halted, there he stayed, 
Till mere trade 
Grew to Empire, and he sent his armies forth  
South and North,  
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Till the country from Peshawar to Ceylon 
Was his own. 
 
The course of history, though, had caused much turmoil. Kipling compared residence in 
Calcutta to being fried over a fire, as in the martyrdom of St. Lawrence, who was roasted 
to death by Roman officials. The city, personified, demands: 
“Cast the Viceroy and his Council, to perspire  
In our fire!” 
 
But the situation had become intolerable, and, in Kipling’s view, had to change. For,  
 
Nor can Rulers rule a house that men grow rich in, 
From its kitchen. … 
Let the City Charnock pitched on [Calcutta] —evil day!—  
Go Her way. 
Though the argosies of Asia at Her doors 
Heap their stores, 
Though her enterprise and energy secure 
Income sure,  
Though “out-station orders punctually obeyed” 
Swell Her trade— 
Still, for rule, administration, and the rest, 
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Simla’s best!473 
 
But the Sisyphean ritual of annual relocation to Simla, presumed an ethno-medical 
necessity by Raj officials, provoked a storm of criticism from Indian nationalists over its 
expense and waste of resources.474 The Simla exodus relied heavily on India’s railway 
network, which had already been expanded specifically to service the hill-station by the 
turn of the century at great expense (and eventually, financial loss to the state and 
investors).475 India’s railway network, densest in the north, was already one of the most 
extensive in the world by the turn of the century. In 1907 a committee on India Railway 
finance and administration cited its extent at over 29,000 miles at a total capital outlay 
exceeding £286,500,000.476  Notwithstanding the massive financial commitment, much 
of the Indian railway network was not market-oriented but strategic. India’s Northwest 
Frontier was the British Empire’s most perilous land border, and if the Indian Army 
could not rapidly deploy there to counter a Russian incursion, it was feared, the entire 
subcontinent would fall to Russian designs on central Asia, the world’s “heartland” – and 
Britain would lose the “Great Game.” Thus the Army encapsulated the tension Kipling 
outlined – Calcutta represented the commercial and the maritime, but for rule – for 
consolidating and securing the colonial state, its interior spaces had to be plied with ties 
and rails. 
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The functioning of India’s railways under this often conflicting set of priorities 
required aggressive intervention by the colonial state. The extent of this intervention 
varied: some railway companies were both owned and operated by the Government, 
while others were only partially state-owned and run by private firms, and a handful were 
completely private, if subject to close Government oversight.477 New construction of 
lines and the scheduling of construction and repairs were done in consultation with the 
Raj’s Railway Board. Crucially, the Government of India also guaranteed a five percent 
return on private investment in Indian railway companies to ensure they remained 
robustly capitalized and solvent. This fantastic return attracted massive investments from 
across the Empire, yet constituted a heavy financial obligation on the Government itself, 
and by extension, on Indian taxpayers. After 1905 the Government of India consolidated 
its railway oversight under an India Railway Board which would bring strategic 
coherence to financial and technological policy and whose planning was meant to smooth 
budgetary cycles.478 Subsequent Government profits on existing railway assets 
skyrocketed.479 Government of India policy at the time was for budget surpluses to be 
consumed by purchasing specie that would bolster the value of the rupee and thus 
preserve its Sterling convertibility, but the 1907 Committee on Railway Finance and 
Administration recommended pumping the excess directly back into the railway system, 
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arguing that as much as £20 million in annual railway investment would not be too 
high.480 Scholars often describe trade balance as the foremost concern of British colonial 
rule in India, so budgetary realignment of this magnitude speaks to the urgency of the 
infrastructure question within the Government of India in this period.481   
George’s Durbar was to help mark that realignment with due pomp and 
circumstance. The 1909 Indian Councils Act provided the first prong. It expanded the 
Legislative Councils kept by the governors of each province in India, allowing for 
publicly-elected members (between thirty and sixty depending on the population of the 
province in question).482 Though the Councils could not overrule their Governors, they 
were meant to hold Governors accountable in matters of finance and the public interest, a 
measure designed to bring an incremental form of responsible government to India.483 
But incremental reform could not solve deep problems like Curzon’s partition of Bengal. 
Worse still, the provisions of the 1909 reforms called for the creation of a separate 
Muslim electorate – a specific allotment of Legislative Council seats for Muslims, for 
which only Muslims could vote. This linkage of political representation with religion 
                                                        
480 Gross annual revenue over the same period increased 27.65%, from £21 million in 1902 to £26 million 
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only entrenched the social tensions ripping through Bengal. Charles Hardinge succeeded 
the Earl of Minto as Viceroy the following year. He resolved to compliment the work of 
his predecessor by burnishing the security capabilities of the British Indian state, and also 
in using railways to solve the dilemmas of British sovereignty in India.  
 Hardinge oversaw final preparations for the King’s arrival. When the Durbar 
celebration took place in late 1911, George V announced that the Government would not 
only undo the partition of Bengal, but would relocate India’s capital from Calcutta to 
Delhi, where a shining new administrative district would be built. The Durbar 
pronouncement, from the mouth of the Sovereign himself, allowed the colonial state to 
reinvigorate its sovereignty by looking both to a future of technological and 
infrastructural progress, and to a past of imperial rule from Delhi, the Mughal capital in 
the subcontinent’s interior. Its added payoff was in following Kipling’s rhyming advice, 
and leaving Calcutta to the “Babu, dropping inflammatory hints, in his prints.” Hardinge 
underscored the crucial role of railways in this departure. He wrote in a secret 1911 letter 
to Indian Secretary the Marquess of Crewe, “The considerations which explain 
[Calcutta’s] selection as the principal seat of Government have long since passed away 
with the consolidation of British rule throughout the Peninsula and the development of a 
great inland system of railway communication.”484  
After the Durbar, Hardinge continued to expound on the strategic realities of 
governing a vast, continental space. “It is generally recognized,” he wrote, “that the 
capital of a great central Government should be separate and independent, and effect has 
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Majesty the King-Emperor at the Coronation Durbar, 1911, Cd. 5979, 6. 
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been given to this principle in the United States, Canada, and Australia.”485 While Delhi 
(like Calcutta) remained too hot for British officials to tolerate in the summer, the rail 
journey to Simla on recently-laid track would be reduced by three quarters, to around 12 
hours.486 Railway planning also played a central role in the design of New Delhi, as the 
Planning Committee worked with the India Railway Board to create a holistic new plan 
for railway infrastructure in the capital. Its objectives were twofold: to harmonize the 
incompatible rail gauges that passed through Delhi and to serve the massive new Indian 
Army cantonment under construction in the new capital. The infrastructural basis of 
British power in India is perhaps most obvious in these plans for New Delhi’s military 
installations. Spending levels bore this out: the Government of India spent around 20 
million on defense in FY 1911, roughly a quarter of its entire budget (and, since it ran a 
small surplus, its revenue also).487 Hardinge’s logic followed Kipling’s. The sea, and the 
Royal Navy that ruled it, had been for centuries the great ligament and muscle of British 
imperialism. But the proliferation of new skeletal structure across India meant the 
colonial state could control continental territory in a way hitherto impossible, and could 
actualize Halford Mackinder’s dictum to control the world’s (and the Empire’s) strategic 
heartlands. “New” Delhi would forge the link between the distant imperial past and this 
grandiose vision of the future. 
Westward across the Indian Ocean, a comparable process was unfolding in the 
British Empire’s newest Dominion, the Union of South Africa. Lord Selborne, who had 
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moved from his position as First Lord of the Admiralty some years prior to become High 
Commissioner to South Africa, had been one of the most vociferous proponents of 
Union, the ultimate goal of British strategy in southern Africa for decades. Like his 
counterpart Hardinge in India, Selborne felt he had no handier tool for carrying out this 
vision than railways and railway planning. Writing in 1907, at the same time as India’s 
Committee on Railway Finance and Administration, Selborne summed up the challenges 
of imperial government in South Africa with a characteristic flair for the dramatic: “Of all 
the questions so fruitful in divergence of opinion or of interest to the Colonies of South 
Africa, there is none so pregnant with danger as the railway question…As long as the 
Governments of the five British Colonies in South Africa are wholly separated from, and 
independent of, each other, their railway interests are not only distinct but absolutely 
incompatible.”488 Selborne gestured here to the monumental task of interlinking five 
individual states across unforgiving terrain, and of creating an infrastructural grid that 
could unlock the true economic potential of South Africa’s mineral wealth. The several 
colonies’ mutually-incompatible rail grids meant that it was often cheaper to ship goods 
and raw materials directly east, to the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, and its major 
port, Delagoa. He worked with the Prime Ministers of the various colonies, notably with 
Leander Starr Jameson, who had recovered from his disastrous raid to become premier of 
the Cape Colony, to advance the cause of Union, which would allow a unitary South 
African government to integrate the rail networks and keep shipping running through 
British ports. As Selborne floridly stated it, “This divergence, this conflict of railway 
interests, this cloud of future strife, would vanish like a foul mist before the sun of South 
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African Federation, but no other force can dissipate it.”489 Selborne and Jameson got their 
wish when a National Convention convened in 1908 to oversee South Africa’s federal 
project. The Convention reached a settlement by 1909, and the Union of South Africa 
came into being in May of 1910. According to Lord Crewe, who spoke in the House of 
Lords debate on the Union of South Africa bill, the Union had a threefold purpose: to 
allow South Africa to take its place beside the Dominions of the Empire (crossing the 
hurdle of federalism discussed in previous chapters), to facilitate trade, and to allow for a 
unitary and comprehensive railway network.490 The geostrategic logic of colonial state-
building is visible here in a concise summary – moving from coastal enclaves to 
territorial sovereignty required infrastructure and security. Half a world away, work was 
beginning on the new city of Canberra that would serve as the capital of the 
Commonwealth of Australia. Future occupants would call it the “bush capital” for its 
natural green-spaces, and its distance from Australia’s major coastal cities. 
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4.6 CONCLUSION: HOME RULE, THE CURRAGH INCIDENT, AND (PARA)-
MILITARIZATION 
Back Home, as many across the Empire still called London’s imperial metropolis, 
all was not well. The British Government remained paralyzed by a constitutional crisis 
that complicated its efforts to control, or cajole, colonial governments on matters of 
security or sovereignty. If the definition of sovereignty in the British Empire had 
coalesced around a few core features: constitutionally-managed federalism, effectively-
ruled interior space, and above all, the ability to underwrite security at home and abroad, 
the United Kingdom itself was about to fail the very tests its ruling elite had helped 
construct. Within the capital itself, the constitutional question of women’s suffrage 
produced organized public disorder as suffragettes resolved to forcibly demonstrate their 
lack of consent to the legitimacy of Parliamentary rule. A more dangerous problem 
emanated from Britain’s first overseas possession: Ireland. Ireland occupied a peculiar 
place in the United Kingdom and the British Empire more broadly, aligning in some 
ways more closely with India than with Scotland or another country within the UK. 
While it sent over 100 MPs and peers to Parliament in Westminster, it was also ruled by a 
Viceroy (officially called “Lord Lieutenant”) and Council, who occupied the feudal seat 
of Dublin Castle and served as agents of the sovereignty of the British monarchy. 
Ireland’s judiciary and local administration were overseen by the Viceroy and his Privy 
Council. Growing nationalist sentiments there, and the island’s Protestant minority, 
would soon demonstrate the true price of failing to monopolize the use of force within a 
sovereign territory. Rather ironically, the challenge to British power in Ireland came as 
much from Ulster’s Protestants, steadfastly loyal to the Crown, as it did from the island’s 
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nationalists and republicans, drawn mainly from the Catholic majority. The rumbling 
constitutional pressures of Home Rule and the Lords crisis eventually erupted – not, as 
they are usually marked, in the Easter Rising of 1916 or the Anglo-Irish War a few years 
after – but in the 1912 Solemn League and Covenant through which Ulstermen pledged 
to oppose Home Rule by force of arms, and in the Curragh Incident, in which British 
officers refused orders to stop them arming themselves. How could Britain bend the 
Dominion governments to a common security strategy when it could not even guarantee 
the security of the metropole? Ireland, and the significant contingents of Irish migrants 
inhabiting the other states of the Empire, posed difficult questions on the eve of the First 
World War. 
After his narrow and unconvincing win in the General Election of 1910, Asquith 
tried calling yet another election in December of the same year, but it produced virtually 
identical results. He resorted to tapping-up the newly-crowned monarch, George V, to 
guarantee assent to a new Parliament Bill that would remove the Lords’ veto. When 
Balfour tried to rally Conservative opposition to Asquith’s plans in the upper chamber, he 
found himself undermined by press leaks about the King, and the Ulster issue. The House 
of Lords feared that Asquith (and George V) would simply pack the house with new, 
Liberal peers if they continued to stonewall the Parliament Bill. Lord Lansdowne, the 
Tory leader in the Lords, urged his fellows to abstain from the vote and allow the bill to 
pass, so they could avoid the peer-packing nightmare and hopefully retain control of the 
Lords, which they could at least use to continue delaying and opposing Home Rule. But 
the Ulstermen balked, and so did a rump of sympathizers, including Lord Selborne. 
Fearing disaster, twenty-nine Tory peers and Bishops actually voted for the Bill, a crew 
 264 
 
later dubbed the “Judas Group.” The Bill passed, and the way was cleared for Asquith’s 
agenda of reform (or catastrophe, for unionists).491 The Government, backed by Redmond 
and the Irish nationalists, put its Third Home Rule Bill on the floor the following spring, 
1912. 
Ireland’s Protestants braced for a future of minority status under a Dublin-based 
government. At the point of crisis, Belfast was Ireland’s largest and most prosperous city. 
It boasted the world’s largest shipyard, which had just christened the world’s most 
glamorous ocean-liner, Titanic.492 Irish Unionism had no intention of acquiescing to 
Home Rule, and worse for the British Government, much of right-wing Britain felt strong 
sympathy for their position. Some of the leading lights of British conservatism: Andrew 
Bonar Law, Edward Carson, James Craig – were Ulster unionists. Craig, and many others 
besides, had fought in South Africa, and had deeply internalized the linkage between 
military power and emerging sovereignty across the Empire. Their hand seemingly forced 
by the machinations in Westminster, Ulster unionists prepared to make their own bid for 
sovereignty. Their first move was rhetorical and constitutional. Gathering in Belfast City 
Hall in late 1912, prominent unionists signed, on a table spread with a Union flag, 
“Ulster’s Solemn League and Covenant” – a deliberate echo of the compact signed by 
Scottish Covenanters in 1643 that pledged their support to the Parliamentary faction in 
the English Civil War. Carson signed first, followed closely by Craig and Lord 
Londonderry, a former Viceroy. An officer named Frederick Crawford, according to 
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legend, signed the document in his own blood. 470,000 others followed. Nearly half of 
the signatories were women. They made their own pledge to affirm the Covenant, support 
the men who signed it, and appeal to God to bless it. The language invoked constitutional 
principle and sovereignty, stating that Home Rule would imperil their “civil and religious 
freedom,” their “citizenship,” and “the unity of the Empire.” They pledged to resist by 
“all means which may be found necessary.”493 Kipling, unsurprisingly, emptied his 
inkwells to memorialize the occasion, and captured some measure of the betrayal the 
Ulster faction felt toward London:  
The blood our fathers spilt, 
Our love, our toils, our pains 
Are counted us for guilt 
And only bind our chains - 
Before an Empire's eyes 
The traitor claims his price. 
What need of further lies? 
We are the sacrifice.494 
 
Kipling quoted in the poem’s header the prophet Isaiah – “Their webs shall not become 
garments…their works are works of iniquity, and the act of violence is in their hands.”495 
Isaiah’s evocative prose itself alludes to Job, the Bible’s most famous beleaguered soul, 
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who spoke to God of “hope cut off” and how “trust shall be a spider’s web.”496 Whereas 
the Australian Billy Hughes would presently watch HMAS Australia steam into Sydney 
and declare his country had donned the “Toga of Nationhood,” Ulster unionists felt 
themselves arrayed in nothing more substantial than the filaments of spiders’ webs.497 
 Their next move, then, was to seize sovereignty by force of arms. James Craig, 
Frederick Crawford, and other military-minded unionists culled 100,000 military-aged 
men from the roll of the Covenant, who agreed to serve in a new militia to uphold its 
precepts – the Ulster Volunteer Force. The UVF quickly boasted impressive manpower. 
But it lacked equipment. There were no happier people in the world to arm a formidable 
paramilitary group operating inside the United Kingdom than weapons manufacturers in 
Germany and Austria. In a daring operation, Crawford arranged a shipment of over 200 
tons of weaponry out of Hamburg and into ports along the Ulster coast, eventually 
placing in UVF hands over 20,000 firearms and 5,000,000 rounds of ammunition. The 
British Government, by spring 1914, faced the prospect of a Boer War-style military 
conflict taking place within its own sovereign borders. Over a decade’s worth of work to 
solve the Empire’s constitutional and military conundrums – reforms, planning, 
conferencing, federation, committees – seemed poised to explode in the flames of civil 
war. Britain’s military establishment, recognizing the constitutional and military severity 
of the situation, had already moved into action to stamp it out. Jack Seely, the Secretary 
of State for War, and Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, ordered troop 
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garrisons in Ireland to reinforce weapons depots, and ships moved into position in the 
waters off Belfast. One such garrison, stationed at a position outside Dublin called the 
Curragh, destroyed any hope of re-imposing central authority. Sixty officers of the 3rd 
Cavalry Brigade, led by Brig. Gen. Hubert Gough, refused orders to move against the 
UVF and resigned their army commissions on the spot.498 The effective sovereignty of 
the British Government over much of Ulster no longer existed. 
 News of the Ulster imbroglio met with bizarre and befuddled receptions across 
the Empire. The Empire’s collective security, and the responsibilities of Dominion and 
colonial governments to uphold it, had been a running feature of Conferences and 
Committee of Imperial Defence meetings (and interminable Round Table and other 
societies’ discussions). But while the need to station the Empire’s fleets in Home waters, 
or of colonial troops to deploy in foreign theaters was certainly contentious, the 
imperative to assist the Empire’s wars was never supposed to be aimed at Britain’s own 
citizens. An exasperated New Zealander wrote to the New Zealand Times of the 
deteriorating Ulster situation in summer 1913, “…taking Ulster at its own estimation – 
grim and menacing – armed to the teeth – determined never to submit! No! Never! – I 
ask, will the [NZ Prime Minister William] Massey Government dispatch an expeditionary 
force ‘at a moment’s notice’ to help quell the rebellion in Ulster…if requested to do so by 
the Imperial Government?”499 The Earl Grey, who had just retired as Governor of 
Canada, took a visit in New Zealand in early 1914 and found that the exceedingly 
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precarious circumstances in Ulster had followed him halfway around the world. Grey, an 
ally of the Liberal Party, found himself peppered with questions about Home Rule and 
Ulster at his public appearances. The Dunedin Evening Star quoted his replies at length. 
While he advocated some sort of federal solution for the United Kingdom (what was 
often called “Home Rule all-round”), he thought the present Home Rule Bill – and the 
Parliament Bill that made it possible – were utter disasters. “I cannot understand how any 
men of Liberal traditions could ever have thought the present Bill would be accepted by 
Ulster” he told the crowd. When asked if Ulster would “really fight,” he replied “I do not 
only believe it, but I am certain of it, and I should think they have the spirit of slaves if 
they do not.”500 In the Ulster problem, the dilemmas of sovereignty in the British Empire 
had found their way home. Militarization as a path to sovereignty posed difficult 
questions for civilian-controlled, liberal government, and by 1914 they were no longer 
being asked only in the colonies. Ulster offered perhaps the clearest picture of the erosion 
of hierarchy in the Empire – the UVF armed itself to resist the very entity to which it 
claimed undying allegiance: the British Crown. It was equally clear, meanwhile, that the 
British Government could no longer constrain Ulster unionists, their supposed allies in 
the joint endeavor of strengthening the British Union and its global position. 
And yet, the forces of militarization, and the breakdown and remaking of 
sovereignty across the Empire, had also made its various states more alike; it reoriented 
their goals and operations around the exigencies of security even as it eroded hierarchy 
and fractured cooperation. This process would soon become more visible, and 
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accelerated, with the outbreak of World War I. The commanding officer of the New 
Zealand Forces, Maj. Gen. A.J. Godley, had only recently returned to the Dominion from 
a visit to Britain, during which he met with Kitchener and Roberts, and spent some time 
observing British Army maneuvers – in Ireland.501 Godley’s visit was part of the Imperial 
General Staff’s regular observations and rotations, by 1914 one of the only well-
functioning bits of the Empire’s joint security apparatus. Instead of a clear-cut, modular 
imperial fleet as envisioned in 1909, Dominion navies continued to grow in fits and 
starts, all the while acting as tools building the incipient sovereignty and national self-
image of colonial states. New Zealand, like Australia, was by then seeing the first fruits 
of its investment in naval power. HMS New Zealand, a glinting new battlecruiser, made 
its first visit to its home country in the summer of 1913. A newspaper account described 
the journey of Maoris to see the ship in Wellington. It told a concise history of the Maori 
people, and described their arrival in New Zealand as itself an act of naval conquest that 
proved “No other people have so good a claim to be called sea-born as the Maoris.” It 
marked their migration from Hawaii and Samoa as a pretext for New Zealand’s 
hegemony over the southern seas, and finished with a flourish:  
Why should not the next one be called H.M.S. Maori, and why should not 
she be manned, in part at least, by descendants of the Argonauts from 
Hawaiiki? Surely there need be no colour line here. When Maoris 
volunteered in great numbers for the war in South Africa it was no 
pleasant task for the Governor to explain to them why they could not go 
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with their Pakeha comrades. The reasons in that case were overwhelming. 
There are no such reasons against Maoris being accepted into the Imperial 
Navy. Two things are very certain. Thousands of splendid men would be 
found eager to join the flag. Not one would ever disgrace it.502 
 
The aspirations of the Dominions, and their growing military and naval capabilities, 
threatened to disintegrate the British Empire’s centralized strategic command by the 
summer of 1914. This was true both for matters of internal security, and for the Empire’s 
external security, for the Pacific Dominions continued extensively to scheme against the 
alliance with Japan. One Colonial Defence Committee planning document noted, “The 
whole strategic situation in the Far East, in the event of the possible termination of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, whenever that event takes place, will depend largely upon the 
extent to which Australia and New Zealand find it possible to develop their respective 
contributions to the naval forces of the Empire.”503 Another noted ominously, “Japan 
could easily place over a million men in the field.”504 But Britain would shortly receive a 
grim blessing in its efforts to reassert hierarchy and central command over imperial 
security, and by extension, sovereignty. In the dying days of summer 1914, the long-
awaited war indeed ripped through the British Empire. But the opponent was not Japan. 
A flurry of telegrams from the Admiralty came through the Pacific undersea cables to 
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New Zealand in the last days of July. It ordered the Dominion’s local naval ships to 
steam north, to the very outlying islands that had been objects of New Zealand’s desire 
for decades – the New Hebrides, Fiji, Tonga. The Dominion government, and its naval 
officers, acted immediately. New Zealand, its parliament, and its public were at war, and 
none save the Dominion’s naval officers would learn of it for days.
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5 Chapter 5 – The Blood-dimmed Tide is Loosed: World War 
I, Conscription, and the Crisis of Sovereignty 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Thirty-five days before he was executed by firing squad in Kilmainham Gaol, 
Patrick Pearse sat in his office at St. Enda’s school in south Dublin and put the finishing 
touches on the pamphlet The Sovereign People. Pearse, a teacher by trade, founded St. 
Enda’s in 1908 as a Gaelic riposte to centuries of Anglicized education in Ireland. His 
headmasterly duties had suffered in recent years as he became progressively more 
involved with radical, militant Irish nationalism. The Sovereign People was to be one of 
Pearse’s final expositions of the nationalist position before Ireland’s Easter Rising, during 
which he would lay waste to much of central Dublin, read the Proclamation of the 
Republic from the steps of its General Post Office, and ultimately endure capture and 
summary execution at the hands of British forces. The pamphlet propounded his theory 
on the nature of sovereignty and related it to the body of wisdom generated by notable 
Irish nationalists stretching back to the eighteenth century. It argued that “National 
independence involves national sovereignty. National sovereignty is twofold in its nature. 
It is both internal and external. It implies the sovereignty of the nation over all its parts, 
over all men and things within the nation; and it implies the sovereignty of the nation as 
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against all other nations.”505 Ireland’s internal case for sovereignty enjoyed the luxurious 
advantage, shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Britain, of island status – its 
territoriality had discrete and obvious limits. It would be the task of Pearse’s Irish 
Volunteers, and their republican allies, to secure that territory “and all things within” to 
fulfill the first criterion of Irish sovereignty. Their task began with Dublin in Easter 1916, 
while the First World War raged in Europe. “Nationality is a spiritual fact,” Pearse 
asserted, but he conceded the need to realize it in the temporal realm, for “nationhood 
includes physical freedom, and physical power in order to the maintenance of physical 
freedom, as well as the spiritual fact of nationality. This physical freedom is necessary to 
the healthy life, and may even be necessary to the continued existence of the nation.” It 
was a testament to Irish vitality, Pearse argued, that its nationhood had survived for so 
long absent physical freedom, but even Ireland could not hold out forever.506 
Pearse (Pádraic, to his friends) never reached the point of achieving the second 
criterion, of vindicating Irish sovereignty abroad and securing its place and recognition 
among the community of nations. He understood its importance, however, and argued 
that sovereignty’s two dimensions formed a natural unity. He chose the idiom of family 
to explain this organic unity; “family” reflected the Catholic theological symmetry that 
bound together much of Pearse’s political ethos. The Sovereign People continues, “I 
assert the sovereignty and the sanctity of the nations, which are the people embodied and 
organised. The nation is a natural division, as natural as the family, and as inevitable.”507 
Instead of synthetic constructs, Pearse posited nations as families within themselves – a 
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natural law governing the organization of humankind. As for Britain and the British 
Empire, they were artificial and even profane: “A nation is knit together by natural ties, 
ties mystic and spiritual, and ties human and kindly; an empire is at best held together by 
ties of mutual interest, and at worst by brute force. The nation is the family in large; an 
empire is a commercial corporation in large. The nation is of God; the empire is of 
man—if it be not of the devil.”508 The contrast with other imagined metaphors of imperial 
relations – Kipling’s idealized, classical mother-and-daughters, Jebb’s “Britannic 
Alliance” – may not be as great as it seems. Certainly “mutual interest” and “brute force” 
had been key determinants of collective imperial politics in recent decades. The point of 
contention, perhaps, was over the precise role of the Devil. Pearse drew heavily on the 
dichotomy between state and nation, material and spiritual. His nationalist ideology tried 
to locate sovereignty within the nation, and thus to sanctify it – to purify it from the 
iniquities of greed and fear that held venal institutions like the British Empire together. 
But Pearse was no more able to escape the snares of the Devil than his imperialist 
contemporaries. His theory of sovereignty still hinged on seizing control of territory: no 
less a material than the very soil of Ireland. And his revolutionary colleagues were about 
to launch a campaign of physical destruction on their enemies.509 
                                                        
508 Ibid., 336. 
509 Isaiah 14:9-15 is instructive: “Hell from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming: it stirreth 
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unto us? Thy pomp is brought down to the grave, and the noise of thy viols: the worm is spread under thee, 
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heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God: I will sit also upon the mount of the congregation, in 
the sides of the north: I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the Most High. Yet thou 
shalt be brought down to hell, to the sides of the pit.” (KJV). 
 275 
 
The Easter Rising of 1916 marked one of the most contentious moments in the 
British Empire’s experience of World War I. It imperiled the United Kingdom’s internal, 
domestic sovereignty when it was most vulnerable, having focused nearly all the efforts 
of state and society on keeping a great conflagration sequestered to the external, 
international sphere. This partially explains the severity (and ultimately, clumsiness) of 
Britain’s response in squelching it – namely, of executing its leaders. The executions 
seemed to signal, much like executions for cowardice or insubordination on the Western 
Front, that if individual subjects tested the absolute sovereignty of the state over their 
physical selves, the state would be compelled make an ultimate demonstration of itself by 
annihilating their bodies altogether. The above chapters have explored the ways colonial 
states increasingly used security as a way to define and construct sovereignty as they 
became more institutionally complex and powerful in the years after 1898. This chapter 
will explore how the experience of the First World War, and especially the issue of 
military conscription, brought deepening links between security and sovereignty home to 
unprecedented numbers of British subjects, especially soldiers and military-aged men. 
The war did not create these links, but it did give occasion for strengthening them, and 
more importantly, it implicated much wider sets of people in the growing power of states 
and the preoccupying logic of security. The clearest example of this phenomenon in 
action was conscription – the decision taken by the governments of Britain, Canada, and 
New Zealand, and debated hotly in Australia and Ireland, to compel military-aged males 
to serve in the war effort. Conscription forced publics to reckon with the true and full 
meaning of sovereignty – that the state could take possession of their bodies for its own 
service – and to question what this meant in the complex, variegated political context of 
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the British Empire. In this way, conscription (and colonial participation in a war led by 
European belligerents) became the purest version yet of the constitutional crisis 
enveloping the British Empire. Dicey wrote clairvoyantly about the problems raised by 
conscription just before the war began: “The Parliament which destroys one of the main 
guarantees for individual freedom must hold, whether wisely or not, that a crisis has 
arisen when the rights of individuals must be postponed to considerations of state.”510 It 
also accelerated processes of institutional change meant to rectify the Empire’s 
constitutional complexities; the same complexities Dicey and A.B. Keith explored in The 
Law of the Constitution and Responsible Government in the Dominions.511 Days before 
the outbreak of war, New Zealand’s newly-arrived naval adviser, Captain Percival Hall-
Thompson, said as much in his introductory speech to the Dominion: “All thinking men 
must realise that we have reached a crisis in the history of the Empire, when we must 
pursue a course different form that of the past.”512 
Conscription and war as crises of sovereignty produced public responses, and a 
corresponding array of sources, that reveal how people understood and negotiated their 
relationship to nation, state, and empire from 1914-19. This chapter draws on sources 
produced by incipient (in some cases, just a few years from inception) colonial military 
and diplomatic institutions as they scrambled to cope with the demands of a cataclysmic 
global war. Beginning with Australia, New Zealand and Canada, it will investigate how 
                                                        
510 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (1915) 8 ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Classics, 1982), 166. 
511 See Introduction; Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution; Arthur Berriedale 
Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions (London: Stephen and Sons, 1909). 
512 “Naval Defence – Pressing Problems – Speech by the New Naval Adviser,” New Zealand Times, 23 July 
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World War I and the conscription question exposed the potential of state power once 
unleashed by security logic, yet also exposed its limits, as colonial states’ sovereignty 
claims collided with unresolved problems like the construction of national identities 
delineating populations, and their place within greater regional and global frameworks – 
much like the dichotomy posited by Pearse in The Sovereign People. Of particular 
interest will be Australia’s strategic preoccupation with Japan and its wartime ironies, 
New Zealand’s handling of conscription amid the formation of Māori battalions, and the 
difficulty non-British diasporic communities, especially the Irish and French, posed for 
wartime Canada as well as for the Australasians. The next section will consider how the 
war continued to strain the connections between the Empire’s two great poles of Britain 
and India by investigating the continued efforts of Indians (and Britons purporting to 
speak on their behalf) to gain representation within the Empire’s nascent institutional 
machinery, especially that governing war. The final section will return to Ireland, and 
will focus on two specific moments: the “conscription crisis” of 1918 when Lloyd 
George considered imposing Britain’s conscription regime in Ireland, and the breakdown 
of civil government in Ireland near the conclusion of World War I, which ultimately led 
to the Irish War of Independence and the creation of the Irish Free State. These issues 
demonstrate how people and governments apprehended the British Empire’s war as a 
crisis of sovereignty as well as a crisis of security. 
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5.2 THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN WORLD WAR I 
The British Army, as has been widely noted, lacked the operational capacity and 
sheer size to greatly affect the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and France in late 
Summer 1914. In any case, it was not nearly formidable enough for British entry to the 
war to successfully deter Germany’s initial march on Paris.513 While the literature on 
colonial participation in the First World War often makes note of their comparative 
remoteness from the Western Front, this distance can be deceptive. The first British 
hostilities of the war came when Gold Coast troops assaulted German Togoland and 
seized its major ports and telegraph stations in the first weeks of August 1914. By 
September, the German cruiser Emden arrived in southern India and shelled the major 
port of Madras, killing dozens and touching off oil fires in the city’s port district. The 
Colonial Defense Committee’s hollow admonishment on the threat of coastal shelling 
from four years’ prior, that “Surrender would entail more moral, if not material, loss to 
the place than the result of a few shells,” failed to prevent many from fleeing the city, and 
served as a highly public reminder that the Royal Navy’s policy of central command left 
colonies exposed and vulnerable, regardless of the fact that they helped fund it.514 
                                                        
513 This problem is explored by Hobson, who considers Britain’s pre-war liberalism, which kept military 
spending relatively low, to be a costly deterrence failure. J.M. Hobson, “The Military Extraction Gap and 
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important to prioritize deterring Russian designs in Asia than Germany’s in Europe. 
514 See Chapter 4. “General Principles of Imperial Defence Affecting Overseas Dominions and Colonies” 
Collection 308/41 [1910] IOR/L/MIL/7/13589, British Library (BL), Section 46, 11. 
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As the Empire found its war footing, the problem in the colonies shifted away 
from pure security threats, as German colonies in Africa and the Pacific were lightly-
guarded (and none extensively populated by settlers), usually consisting of telegraph 
stations and related staff. They fell quickly and without great resistance, apart from 
General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck’s raiders in East Africa. Likewise, the German fleet, 
with some notable rogue exceptions like Emden, was mopped up or kept pinned in 
Hamburg after the first years of the war. Instead, the Empire’s challenges became matters 
of logistics (and thus of U-boats) – whether and how to produce large quantities of 
manpower and material, and to deploy them where needed in the global sweep of the 
British war effort. By 1915 and 1916 it became abundantly clear, after horror-shows like 
Verdun and the Somme, that the greater conflict would weigh the mobilization of 
manpower reserves and industrial capacity. The rationalizing military reforms after South 
Africa, the growth of the imperial conference system, the diplomatic squabbles between 
various colonial actors – all constituted, at some level, a bet on the future utility of 
imperial resources in an unknown war. The bet called, Britain now commanded (in 
theory) a greater resource pool than any other single belligerent, even if its level of 
engagement did not yet reflect the fact. Its overall strategy, as such, involved using the 
Royal Navy to starve Germany of resources while hopefully containing (amidst more 
plentiful French armies) its land maneuvers.515 Colonial and Dominion governments 
responded to the outbreak of war much as they had to the naval crisis in 1909: by 
                                                        
515 Avner Offer has argued that Allied resource superiority effectively prefigured the outcome of the war 
when German forces failed to achieve a breakthrough to Paris in late 1914. German strategists ought to 
have realized, in Offer’s assessment, that they were not capable of winning an attritional war against the 
manpower and material resources of the British Empire and its Continental allies, to say nothing of the 
United States. Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (New York: Oxford 
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telegraphing messages of support and promises of assistance. Canada managed to 
mobilize an expeditionary force as early as October 1914, and sent a million bags of flour 
along with it. Australia and New Zealand telegraphed on August 2 and 3 that their naval 
resources were at Britain’s disposal and that they would immediately prepare deployable 
contingents. Even Ireland turned the fruits of its paramilitary arms race to the use of the 
war effort, when John Redmond’s Irish Parliamentary Party chose to send the Irish 
Volunteer Force (raised to safeguard future Home Rule) to fight with the British Army 
alongside the Ulster Volunteer Force (raised to prevent Home Rule). Even India sent 
enthusiastic support from amongst the Government, its official and unofficial Legislative 
Council, and the princes, while the Indian National Congress remained momentarily 
silent. Only in South Africa were there murmurings of dissent among the Boer 
population.516 
Still, the War Office attempted to tread cautiously, preferring at the outset to use 
colonial forces in support and supplementary roles and to use the British Expeditionary 
Force for its appointed role of supporting France against German advances. Remarkably, 
these initial offers of support featured very little discussion of parliamentary sanction in 
the self-governing Dominions, let alone actual postponement for debating and votes. 
Colonial preoccupation with “automatic deployment,” voiced in the aftermath of South 
Africa and vociferously during the Fleet Unit scheme discussions, seemed strangely 
                                                        
516 For helpful overviews of initial colonial response to the war, see C.E. Carrington, “Chapter XVI - ‘The 
Empire at War, 1914-1918,’” in The Cambridge History of the British Empire, ed. E.A. Benians et al., vol. 
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Roger Louis and Judith M. Brown, vol. VI (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 114–116. 
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absent in August 1914.517 Joseph Cook, the Australian premier in Summer 1914, 
announced that “whatever happens, Australia is part of the Empire, and the Empire is at 
war.”518 Each of the Dominion governments announced similar pledges ahead of 
legislative approval; their entries to the war were no more democratic than India’s, and 
forfeited impassioned claims to input on the Empire’s decisions to go to war that had 
been staked in recent years. There were myriad reasons for this strange reversal – the 
affective and familial bonds between colonial populations and Britain, for example – but 
the willing cooperation of the colonies in Britain’s war effort masked political self-
interest as well.519 Militarization had already proved one of the most effective ways for 
colonial states to expand their institutional capacities and their tax bases. War – 
especially a world war – offered ever greater opportunities for colonial governments to 
continue that work at home and to pursue their strategic interests abroad. The Dominions’ 
wartime designs on the greater Pacific, and the Government of India’s campaigns in the 
Middle East, demonstrated the stakes of this game. 
H.H. Asquith’s government knew this, and acted initially to constrain and control 
colonial participation. He also faced his own domestic debates over how vigorously to 
deploy to France (stirred by the ubiquitous Kitchener) and had no wish to juggle possible 
input from Dominion governments or to effect an “improvised deployment” like that of 
the South African War which could provoke another backlash like Arnold-Forster’s The 
                                                        
517 See Chapter 3, “Imperial Defense and the Birth of Dominionhood” for further discussion of the Crown’s 
right to place all colonies and Dominions “automatically” at war. 
518 Carrington, “Chapter XVI - ‘The Empire at War, 1914-1918,’” 605. 
519 The idea that rational choice governs the behavior of people in a position to volunteer for (or be coerced 
into) military action has been explored by Margaret Levi, who argues that cooperation with conscription 
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War Office, the Army, and the Empire.520 Dominion troops found themselves having to 
resist being subsumed into British units, while Indian Viceroy Charles Hardinge had to 
insist upon the British government deploying Indian Army units to France in order to 
avoid the slight of mere garrison and support roles.521 The course of the war eventually 
cured the British government of this sort of hesitancy. Colonial troops came to be seen as 
especially fierce and were disproportionately thrown at key tactical objectives in 
battlefield situations, as well as at strategic objectives like Gallipoli for the Australia-
New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac) and Mesopotamia for the Indian Army. The British 
Army Council’s operational planning for colonial deployments lagged far behind its 
enthusiasm over colonial fierceness, however, and both campaigns were wracked by 
ignominious failures like the destruction and capture of an Indian regiment at Kut despite 
the extraordinary endurance of the soldiers. Despite high rates of volunteering in Britain, 
the Dominions, and India, Asquith’s government found itself unable to maintain Britain’s 
liberal stance against compulsory military service. Setbacks on the Western Front forced 
Britain to impose conscription in early 1916 to supplement the monumental manpower 
demands of trench warfare. Conspicuously, the measures exempted Ireland. The 
following summer, New Zealand introduced its own scheme, and Canada joined in late 
1917. Australia held two contentious referenda on imposing conscription, both of which 
failed in late 1916 and late 1917 respectively. Volunteering still produced hundreds of 
thousands of recruits, regardless of conscription regimes, though in the colonies it 
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selected heavily on first-generation British transplants, who (fortunately for military 
officials) were plentiful.522 By the Armistice in November 1918, the imperial contribution 
to the war had reached incredible proportions. Britain itself raised about £2 billion via 
war bonds and other internal debt instruments; Canada, Australia, and India combined to 
add a further billion.523 Canada produced about a third of Britain’s artillery shells from 
1917, when its war industry came online.524 
 
 
 
  Est. Pop., 1914 Deployed % Deployed Killed % Killed 
Britain 46m 5,000,000 10.8% 705,000 14.1% 
Ireland  4.3m 200,000 4.7% 35,000 17.5% 
Canada 8m 458,000 5.7% 57,000 12.4% 
Australia 5m 332,000 6.6% 59,000 17.7% 
New Zealand 1.1m 112,000 10.1% 17,000 15% 
South Africa (whites) 1.4m 136,000 9.7% 7,000 5.1% 
India 320m 1,200,000 
(826,000 
combatants) 
0.37% 65,000 7.8% 
                                                        
522 For figures and literature on the composition of military recruits from the Empire, see Stephen Garton, 
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Table 1 - Deployment and mortality rates, British Empire, World War I525 
The magnitude of these combined resources augmented Britain’s war-fighting 
capabilities and undoubtedly helped Allied forces outlast Germany’s preponderant 
domestic resources and often superior battlefield effectiveness. But they also strained the 
British Empire’s constitutional infrastructure as never before, and forced millions of 
imperial subjects to question the limits of legitimate state authority in wartime. 
 
5.3 AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND CANADA: PACIFIC DOMINIONS IN 
AN ATLANTIC WAR 
 Since its inception in 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had variously confused, 
outraged, and worried many Australians and New Zealanders. It complicated their plans 
to curb non-white immigration into the two Dominions, and it provided Britain with a 
convenient excuse to strategically ignore them. World War I invoked the Alliance’s 
precepts, however, and British Australasians suddenly found themselves operating joint 
military operations with Japanese naval forces. The Commonwealth of Australia had 
begun assembling its fleet unit in 1912 with the arrival of its flagship, HMAS Australia. 
Though the Australian Parliament had earmarked £300,000 for further ship construction, 
                                                        
525 Figures drawn from ibid. and ; Garton, “Chapter 8 - The Dominions, Ireland, and India,” 155; F.W. 
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by summer 1914 the Treasury had only released £130,000 of that sum.526 Australia 
Station lacked the strength to adequately patrol, never mind police, the southern Pacific. 
On 29 August 1914, five days before Britain formally declared war on Germany, a New 
Zealander force landed at Apia, German Samoa, and overran the colony with virtually no 
resistance. On 11 September, an Australian force amphibiously assaulted and captured 
the German telegraph station at Kabakaul in Kaiser-Wilhelmsland, German New 
Guinea.527 Australia helped convoy that task force, authorized by a sub-committee of the 
British Cabinet known as the “Offensive Sub-Committee.” and heartily agreed by the 
Australian government.528 In order to transport Australian and New Zealander forces west 
across the Indian Ocean, however, they would require Japanese escort to check the threat 
of Graf Von Spee’s marauding German Pacific fleet. They also used this Japanese-
supported convoy to hunt Emden after its raid on Madras.529 It was destroyed by HMAS 
Sydney in November, while Australia helped hunt down and destroy Spee’s squadron 
near the Falkland Islands in December. Over the same period, Japanese forces laid siege 
to Germany’s Chinese concession port at Tsing-tau, which they finally seized with the 
joint aid of British Indian forces on 7 November. Though Britain had formally requested 
Japanese action along the Chinese coast, its diplomatic messaging tried to keep Japan’s 
                                                        
526 Commonwealth Naval Board, Request for Funds, National Archives of Australia (NAA), 3/14/3782 
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deployments within acceptable lines, fearing portentously that the Japanese had too much 
to gain from German and Chinese collapse across the northern Pacific.530 
 Thus, British subjects in the Pacific entered an uneasy wartime posture in which 
they depended on Japanese cooperation for protection from German raids (at least 
initially), and more importantly for protecting their long maritime supply lines connecting 
Anzac forces with theaters of war in Europe and the Middle East. Though Japan 
performed its duties faithfully, this did little to assuage British Australasians’ paranoia 
about its intentions, or its potential postwar gains. Ronald Munro-Ferguson, Australia’s 
wartime Governor-General, was one such paranoiac. In late August 1916, he wrote to 
Andrew Bonar Law, a prominent Tory and future UK Prime Minister originally from 
New Brunswick, who was then serving as Colonial Secretary in Asquith’s coalition 
government: “A sign of the times, which may be likened to ‘the writing on the wall’ is 
the marked alteration in the demeanour of Japanese who are now met throughout the 
Pacific... there is an air of assurance and self-reliance which has been noticeable only 
since the outbreak of the war.”531 Quite why the confidence of a wartime ally should be 
compared to Belshazzar’s Feast, at which God warned of the destruction of Babylon, 
only seems logical in light of pervasive fears of Japan’s rise. This was a question of both 
security and migration policy, for, as Munro-Ferguson had written to George V earlier in 
1916, the “emptiness” of the Australian continent was a “temptation to all over-peopled 
nations…the future of the Pacific and our attitude towards Japan and India concern 
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Canada and New Zealand as much as Australia.”532 A more immediate concern for the 
Australian government was the Dominion’s present demographic outlook in light of its 
manpower needs in war theaters half a world away. 
 Preliminary war-planning by Australia’s protean defense establishment in 1910 
included a scheme whereby the proper Australian Army would deploy abroad in the 
event of an imperial war, while additional soldiers would be conscripted for homeland 
defense, the latter of which a perennial concern about expeditionary deployments given 
Australian remoteness from presumed imperial wars.533 The opening moves of the war – 
seizure of German possessions in Polynesia to create a sort of island buffer-zone – reflect 
this concern. With this accomplished, it soon became clear that Australian deployment 
(with Japanese assistance) to Europe and the Middle East would demand far greater 
numbers than the Army could then supply. The disastrous Gallipoli Campaign, for which 
some 35,000 Anzac forces deployed in late 1915 in a failed attempt to capture the 
Dardanelles Straits approaching Constantinople, only underscored this reality. Billy 
Hughes, who had serenaded the 1912 arrival of the Fleet Unit in Sydney, succeeded the 
Labor leader Andrew Fisher as Australian premier in October 1915, and early the next 
year moved to hold a national referendum on imposing military conscription. Two 
bitterly divisive referenda followed, the first in October 1916 and the second in 
December 1917. Both failed, and between them Hughes’ enthusiasm for conscription 
caused a schism within his own Labor party, from which he split and formed National 
Labor. He reemerged as Prime Minster leading a Nationalist Party after the next election. 
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Even his resignation after the second referendum failure could not remove him from 
office; Munro-Ferguson reinstated him. Australian forces ultimately succeeded in 
consolidating their units and avoiding assimilation into British outfits or subordination 
under British officers. Under generals Birdwood and Monash, the latter a native-born 
Australian, the British Fifth Army in France became a largely Australian-commanded 
enterprise from the officer corps down to the enlisted men.534 
Nevertheless, the conscription referenda exposed deep rifts within Australia’s 
relatively young civil society. The country’s labor movement (it was the first state in the 
British world to produce a Labor Prime Minister) harbored deep skepticism about the war 
generally and conscription specifically, hence its internal divisions.535 Ethno-religious 
splits proved even more acrimonious. Australia’s mainline Protestant churches supported 
conscription and the imperial war effort, but its Catholic hierarchy, a powerful institution 
given the high numbers of Irish immigrants in Australia, did not. Irish Australians tended 
to sympathize with nationalist and republican sentiments in their mother country, and 
many also heard denunciations of conscription from the pulpits of their Church. As such, 
Irish Australians tended to resent compulsory participation in Britain’s wars and became 
bitter partisans for the “No” side of the conscription referenda, though Catholics 
ultimately served in the war effort in roughly equal proportion to their population in 
Australia.536 Indeed, the figurehead of the anti-conscription cause was none other than 
Daniel Mannix, the Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne. Mannix, born in Ireland, 
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characterized World War I as a “trade war” in which Catholics were not obliged to 
participate if they did not choose to do so. He was also scandalized by the British 
government’s brutal response to the Easter Rising in 1916, an event still fresh at the time 
of Australia’s first conscription referendum later that year.537 Though research has shown 
that Australia’s Catholic vote was not unanimously against conscription (nor its 
Protestant vote unanimously for), Archbishop Mannix’s role in working against 
conscription led Billy Hughes to label him a German sympathizer and an enemy of 
Australia.538  
Munro-Ferguson wrote despondently after the first failed vote that the backlash 
against Hughes was down to people who would “lose the war rather than abandon their 
rights” and that Labor’s seeming determination to shut out the outside world reflected a 
“spirit of selfishness, irresponsibility, and a total inability to realise Australia’s great 
stake in the struggle.” This spirt, Munro-Ferguson believed, gravely jeopardized 
Australian security and thus its future: “Not one of those sections of the community who 
are fighting the Government have any conception of the danger incurred in endeavouring 
to hold Australia with five millions of people or of the madness of doing so without the 
concurrence of the rest of the Empire and the protection of the British Fleet.”539 It was no 
good protecting Australian workers from competition and conscription, in this view, if 
one could not protect them from foreign invasion. “The Japanese press is most 
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outspoken,” Munro-Ferguson continued ominously in a letter to the King, “on the 
character of the British occupation of Australia, and assumes that this continent could 
carry a population of 400,000,000.” He reported that the Japanese consul in Sydney had 
begun suggestively passing on German questions as to why Japan could lose “so glorious 
a chance of severe reprisals against British Dominions for their Legislative policy of 
Japanese exclusion” while the war raged. “This should give food for reflection,” Munro-
Ferguson finished angrily, “to a Community which can put five Divisions in the Field 
when its existence is at stake and cannot, even for these, find adequate 
reinforcements.”540 
Continued alarmism about Japan helped create a legitimizing logic for Australia’s 
regional ambitions during the war, a logic that also had the benefit of being easily 
digestible by the public. The Governor-General’s apprehensions about Australia’s future 
security were shared by the Commonwealth’s Navy Office. As the war drew to a close, 
the War Staff in Melbourne began preparing a dossier on the future of the Pacific in the 
form of a Secret Naval Intelligence Report entitled “NOTE ON THE JAPANESE 
SITUATION.” Published in August 1919, it began with the sentence: “The Japanese 
nation is as a whole, arrogant with respect to its position in Asia.”541 It went on to 
describe several systemic issues that might cause Japan to start a greater Pacific war for 
dominance analogous to Germany’s attempt to seize Europe. The issues included Japan’s 
abiding sensitivity to slights (of the exact type inflicted by Billy Hughes at the Paris 
Peace Conference when he led opposition to Japan’s proposed Racial Equality Clause), 
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resource scarcity (especially of oil) that threatened Japan’s demographic future, and the 
possible need to start diversionary wars in light of burgeoning Japanese labor unrest. The 
nascent League of Nations had granted Japan a Class C Mandate over the German 
possessions it had captured during the war, allowing Japan to create a partially encircling 
cordon to Australia’s northeast – the Marianas, Marshall, and Caroline islands, and Palau. 
It also clearly hoped to extend its hegemony over China, which the Australian Navy 
Office found nearly as ominous. The report concluded portentously, “It is only by 
securing for her own use the illimitable resources of China that Japan can make herself 
strong enough to risk, some day, a war in the Pacific comparable to that which has just 
ended in Europe.”542 A robust appendix followed, consisting of charts comparing British, 
Australian, and Japanese naval assets in the region and their respective building plans. 
Figures for Japanese dreadnoughts sat adjacent to glaring British figures of “NIL.”543  
The First World War had done nothing to cure Australian apprehensions that 
Britain’s strategic focus sold its Pacific Dominions short, as its continuing preoccupation 
with Japan demonstrates. However, its play to use the war for strategic gains paid off, in 
the form of Class C Mandates recognizing Australian control over New Guinea and 
Nauru. The Commonwealth found itself in a bind: it could no longer depend on Britain to 
provide it with military and diplomatic safeguards against presumed regional menaces, 
but alone it lacked the resources and the population to provide those goods. The 
Australian state’s internal divisions also confounded its incipient sovereignty claims. To 
begin, the Australian state’s obsession with territorial sovereignty directly fed their 
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obsession with controlling inward migration, which contemporaries like Munro-Ferguson 
realized was self-defeating because sparsely-populated territory was impossible to 
defend. Making matters worse, discord about sovereignty and rights prevented the 
government from conscripting citizens for military service, which strategists feared 
would fatally undermine both efforts to resist foreign invasion and efforts to build 
confidence among allies by robustly supporting joint ventures like the Great War.  
New Zealand’s experience of the war featured many of the same issues, if not 
always with identical outcomes. New Zealanders shared in much of Australia’s wartime 
highlights (and lowlights). To begin, they felt similarly shortchanged by the fleet unit 
scheme agreed in 1909, for at the outbreak of war the splendid new battlecruiser HMS 
New Zealand was tooling about the North Sea, not the Tasman. William Ferguson 
Massey, the acting Prime Minister in the summer of 1914, wrote angrily that “the 
agreement of 1909 has been ignored, and explanations given that do not meet the 
situation.” Lord Liverpool, New Zealand’s Governor-General, agreed in a letter to the 
Colonial Secretary.544 Responses to their concerns remained the same as ever. New 
Zealand’s High Commissioner in London (and erstwhile Prime Minister in Wellington) 
Thomas Mackenzie said in a speech to the London Navy League in December 1913, what 
was the use of “peopling the waste spaces of the Empire,” if this did not produce 
“inhabitants who are willing to train and defend and stand shoulder to shoulder with the 
Old Country in any emergency?”545 The Dominion’s wartime government consisted of 
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Massey, head of a centrist Reform Party, in coalition with Joseph Ward and his Liberals, 
who had fought a late 1914 election to a virtual stalemate. With Britain suddenly buying 
massive quantities of New Zealand’s produce for the war effort, Ward and Massey would 
spend the duration of the conflict dealing with the price-control problems and a 
worsening urban/rural divide propelled by the Dominion’s raging export market. The 
coalition imposed conscription in 1916, shortly after Britain, and while New Zealand’s 
labor movement was not robust enough to successfully resist it as in Australia, the 
experience did consolidate the Labour Party into a serious political force in the Dominion 
for the first time, having gifted it a polarizing issue by which to distinguish itself.546 
Conscription also, along with the scheme of commandeering produce for the British war 
effort, produced new state institutions that drastically expanded the power of New 
Zealand’s governing architecture, like the National Register and the Health Department, 
created to fight the flu pandemic of late 1918.547 
As recently as the 1913 Naval Estimates produced by the New Zealand 
parliament, Massey’s official statement noted that if Britain did not re-base ships in the 
Pacific, his government would be obliged to begin planning to set aside significant funds, 
up to £400,000, for building ships it could expect to retain.548 The report went on to state 
clairvoyantly, “It appears quite certain that we are on the eve of great changes in the 
Pacific, and it is well that we should commence to shoulder our responsibilities and look 
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to the future both of the Empire and our growing Dominion.”549 New Zealand’s 
ostensible responsibilities were among the first questions invoked upon the outbreak of 
war, given the relative absence of friendly warships and the lurking possibility of German 
squadrons in the area. Amid the hundreds of telegrams that whizzed frenetically through 
Pacific sea cables in the final days of July and early August 1914, a few representative 
messages passed between the Governors of Fiji and New Zealand. The island group 
Seddon had tried and failed to annex a decade earlier had, nonetheless, developed a 
significant trading relationship with New Zealand and a troubling dependency on its 
produce. The Governor in Suva wrote to his counterpart in Wellington for assurances that 
the shipping lines between them would not be cut by enemy ships. If this could not be 
ensured, he expected “famine in Fiji within a few weeks.”550 With Australia preoccupied 
and the next available cruiser moored in Honolulu, shipping freight had to be suspended 
for the time being. 
New Zealand wasted little time in readying contingents for oversea deployment; 
the government felt confident that its universal training scheme for boys, instituted a few 
years prior, had prepared the Dominion for just such an eventuality. The decision to 
impose conscription, following Britain’s and the major deployment of New Zealanders at 
Gallipoli, appears to have enjoyed broad consensus among members of parliament and in 
the community. The scheme called for mandatory registration of men aged 20 to 45 
across the Dominion’s local jurisdictions; in the event that certain departments did not 
meet their allotted recruitment quotas, these registrations would be used to draw ballots 
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for conscripts. As of late 1916, this had not been necessary, but by the end of the war the 
Military Service Act would be invoked for around 32,000 conscripts, about a quarter of 
New Zealand’s total force under arms.551 Imposing conscription via legislation, in the 
opinion of New Zealand’s Defence Minister James Allen, allowed the Dominion to avoid 
the sorts of ugly popular confrontations endured by the Australians in their referenda. He 
wrote about the conscription controversies to Gen. Birdwood, the officer then 
commanding the Anzac Corps in France, in late 1917. “I am very hopeful that the 
Commonwealth [of Australia] will carry conscription,” he said of their looming second 
referendum. “I am bound to say that in my opinion they have gone the wrong way about 
it. The only safe course is to act and to show to the people that your actions are well-
founded. An appeal as to whether conscription should be brought in or not is not a fair 
thing to put to a public vote. There are too many who would be influenced by sentiment 
and personal feelings in the ballot box to get the real solid opinion of the country.”552  
By Allen’s description, the personalization of an issue like conscription made it 
an untenable candidate for direct democracy; individual citizens would need to abstract 
away from themselves to fully grasp the political imperatives inherent in military service. 
In the end, he felt, parliament must remain sovereign in matters of security. 
Conscientious objection in New Zealand proved a rare and unpopular phenomenon. Its 
parameters stiffened significantly from their prewar form; the 1912 Defence Bill allowed 
individuals to positively object to combatant service on religious grounds. The Military 
                                                        
551 Military Service Act 1916. 7 Geo V 1916, No. 8, 18e. also see “New Zealand’s Firm Resolve – We 
Fight to the Finish says Her Prime Minister,” Evening Standard and St. James’ Gazette, 11 October 1916.  
552 Allen to Birdwood, 29 November 1917, 1914-1920 Correspondence between Allen and Birdwood, 
ADBQ 16145 ALLEN1/9 R22319674, NANZ, 3. 
 296 
 
Service Act, by contrast, only permitted objector status if a person belonged, since before 
August 1914, to an officially-recognized church with pacifism as a core doctrinal feature, 
and personally affirmed that doctrine. Only Seventh Day Adventists, Quakers, and 
Christadelphians fit this description, and of these only a few dozen men received 
conscientious objector status.553 Allen had written to Birdwood in 1916, when the latter 
was still stationed in Egypt, that “we have had a great fight over the religious question,” 
and that he was “astonished to see how many people there are who have no consideration 
for the conscience or religious principles of others.” He went on to describe debates over 
how strong to set the thresholds for objection, adding that its unpopularity was a 
testament to “the people of New Zealand and their determination to make everyone take 
his share in the enormous struggle that is before us.” The public, he added, was even 
more rash in its bellicosity. “The Government have had a good deal of difficulty in 
keeping in check some people, especially women, who are out to victimize anybody who 
even has a German name.”554 The contrast with Australia is sharp here, and had much to 
do with the contrast in government and public perceptions of their domestic security 
situations. As many New Zealanders noted during their own federation debate, the 
Dominion was more defensible and well-stocked; an “Island Nation” like Britain, that 
could naturally turn its energies to the wider world without fear of infiltration.555 
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As the war dragged on into its final years, New Zealanders looked increasingly to 
the next fight: the renegotiation of relationships within the British Empire, and the 
realization of the Dominion’s sovereignty in the international community. War service 
became, to a significant extent, instrumental to future political goals rather than 
immediate military ones. This dynamic began to emerge in the aftermath of Gallipoli, and 
the recognition it brought to Anzac forces. When that disastrous offensive was finally 
called off and the Anzacs prepared to redeploy to Europe, it was proposed to divide up 
the Corps and reassemble it into different Dominion units, which would then embed in 
the British Fifth Army.556 Furious outcry ensued in New Zealand at the prospect of its 
soldiers being dissociated from the Anzac name. A C.B. Morison wrote to the Dominion 
Post,  
If the present state of things be permitted to continue, New Zealanders 
will, in the eyes of the Empire, gradually cease to be identified with the 
great and honourable tradition which should not only be handed down to 
our children, but acknowledged throughout the Empire. The traditions of a 
regiment are its life and spirit, and every New Zealand regiment which 
took its part at Gallipoli is entitled to claim ‘Anzac’ as the foundation of 
its traditions.557 
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Allen wrote an irritated annotation on the clipping advising that the newspaper avoid 
publishing speculation on official military decisions of this type in the future. By the end 
of 1916, both Massey and Ward had traveled to London to confer with the British 
government on the course of the war and attend the Imperial War Cabinet. They were 
determined, as New Zealander soldiers prepared to redeploy to the Western Front, that 
their efforts would be rewarded. “The Dominions have been united to the Empire by ties 
of blood, kinship, and tradition,” Massey told a London crowd, but “after the war, 
something more will be assuredly required; something which will distribute the 
responsibilities of Empire more satisfactorily and equitably than at present.”558 His 
coalition partner Ward echoed the opinion. “The Oversea Dominions, by their 
participation in the war without question,” he trumpeted, “have a right to look forward in 
the future to a place at the council table of the Empire.” The key privilege conferred by 
this status, according to Ward, would be input on decisions for war. “With adult age, the 
outlying countries of the Empire should at least have a say in the future before the Empire 
is involved in war…when peace is declared at the conclusion of this titanic struggle the 
Overseas Dominions should be taken into consultation by the Imperial Government.”559 
 As they had tried to do before the war, New Zealand’s advocates on the imperial 
stage also wanted to refocus the Empire’s strategic attention on the greater Pacific, not 
least to remedy their own profound isolation. This meant rehearsing old warnings about 
Japan, then guarding New Zealander troop and supply convoys. The tentative but 
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successful joint operations undertaken in the war’s opening days gave way to rising 
tension after the controversial tour of Australia and New Zealand undertaken by the 
British General Ian Hamilton, whose visit coincided with the deterioration of the situation 
in Europe. Hamilton, a decorated soldier who had served in the South African War and 
embedded with Japanese forces as an observer during the Russo-Japanese War, gave a 
series of incendiary speeches that caused a press furor once they reached the Japanese 
press. New Zealand’s geographic isolation might seem to confer some measure of safety, 
warned Hamilton, but it also masked a grave danger. In comments published by the 
Dominion Post under the headline “REMOTE BUT TERRIBLE – New Zealand’s 
Danger,” Hamilton used a series of grisly analogies to warn the locals of future 
destruction. With its bucolic mountain vistas and compulsory military training, New 
Zealand bore many resemblances to Switzerland, Hamilton explained. The trouble was, if 
Switzerland’s neutrality and citizen-soldiery failed, it would endure conquest by a 
neighboring power that at least shared the linguistic, cultural, and religious assumptions 
of some proportion of the Swiss population. Not so New Zealand. 
If you look upon the domain of nature, you find that in the struggles in the 
animal world they are much more alarming and terrible when the types are 
different. You may view a spider destroying an insect without much 
feeling, but if you see it catch a humming-bird and kill it, strangle it, you 
feel that something rather terrible is happening. Or if you think of an 
octopus and a man, you are filled with horror… I would say, then, that 
 300 
 
there are dangers here in the Pacific which make up in terror for their 
remoteness.560 
 
The General apparently gave little thought to the implications of this imagery to New 
Zealanders who were themselves attempting to forge social harmony from a preceding 
century of racial strife between the original Māori population and white Pākehā settlers. 
His dire racial pronouncements proved so extreme, in fact, that they provoked a backlash 
by letter-writers across Australasia. One respondent began his letter to the Christchurch 
Star, “The Japanese have a proverb that ‘the mouth is the front gate of all misfortune…’” 
while another averred that Japan would have every right to both outrage over the 
General’s comments and its deserved place among international powers.561 That 
Hamilton provoked moderating pleas of this type is all the more remarkable given the 
official hostility towards Japan evident in Wellington and Canberra. 
But the government of New Zealand still intended to make good on its regional 
interests, and to leverage security concerns to this end. By early 1915, strained 
communications had already passed between the Governor in Wellington and the 
Colonial Office on the fate of occupied German islands in the Pacific. The government of 
New Zealand wanted assurances that there was no secret agreement between Britain and 
Japan to carve them up in ways that could jeopardize the Dominion’s security; the 
Colonial Secretary dismissed the suggestion and reminded the Australasians they should 
be suppressing anti-Japanese sentiment among their population in view of the war 
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effort.562 Much like their suspicion of the Tripartite Pact decades earlier, New Zealand’s 
apprehensions proved well-founded.563 As the war progressed, Japanese diplomats 
increasingly pressured their British counterparts to support Japan’s claims against 
Chinese territory. Ward fumed at the 1917 Imperial War Conference that the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance was complicating the main question of the future of the Pacific: 
“whether the White Races or the Yellow Races were to predominate.”564 Ward and 
Massey told a luncheon crowd of the British Empire Club that they would not 
countenance the continued presence of Germans in the Pacific, either. “As long as 
Germany had a foothold in the Pacific she would ever stand a menace to our security and 
our peaceful development, and consequently the security of the Empire,” they warned. 
The only reason Germans had ever gained a regional foothold was down to the “masterly 
negligence of British statesmen.”565 In another London report on the New Zealanders the 
following month, a story about the valor and loyalty of the Māori people noted 
triumphantly that they fought “side by side with British troops in a colossal struggle 
against Teutonic despotism and all that barbarous system of exploiting native races of 
which Germany’s treatment of the Herreros affords a signal example.”566 Constructing 
Germans as domestic threats to New Zealand, regional threats to the southern Pacific, and 
finally, as despotic (or ineffective) colonizers allowed New Zealanders to legitimize their 
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own wartime regional ambitions. A postwar League Mandate over German Samoa 
eventually validated their efforts. 
The First World War politicized New Zealand’s Māori-Pākehā relationship just as 
it had many others. The Māori reputation as fierce warriors meant that their participation 
in the war effort required sensitive handling by government officials. The Māori Pioneer 
Battalion, recruited from among the Dominion’s tribes, eventually mobilized over 2,000 
soldiers and was deployed with Anzac forces at Gallipoli and in France.567 As with the 
controversial King Movement of the previous decade, Māori leadership hoped that war 
service would burnish their community’s reputation and improve its political position.568 
Apirana Ngata, the figurehead of the Māori community in New Zealand’s parliament, 
commissioned an official history of the Pioneer Battalion as soon as it deployed, and 
even composed a recruitment song in the Māori language to boost the unit’s prestige.569 
Early in 1915, Allen wrote to Birdwood with the Anzacs in Egypt asking him to keep a 
special eye on the Pioneer Battalion. “I do hope everything possible will be done to 
protect them from wine and women,” he wrote. “New Zealand will be proud indeed to 
receive them back having honourably upheld the name of New Zealand, with clean 
records and having earned the respect of Britishers and Egyptians and others they may 
have come in contact with.”570 Allen was also concerned to prevent the Māori from being 
slighted. After an episode in which some Māori unit commanders were relieved of their 
positions for incompetence and slated for return home, he wrote urgently to Birdwood to 
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intervene in the case and keep them with the Anzacs. “The Native Members of 
Parliament and many others…are deeply touched at the suggestion that any Māori officer 
should be guilty of cowardice,” he wrote, and if the situation were not resolved it would 
“seriously damage recruiting and create a very unpleasant feeling in the Māori Race.”571 
The episode demonstrates the myriad ways in which military service was important for 
political purposes among colonial polities – Māori service alongside Pākehā New 
Zealanders stood as an important symbol of the Dominion’s racial harmony in the eyes of 
its government. Recruitment figures, too, acted as a cipher for the unity of New Zealand’s 
society. That symbol of unity masked internal division, including among the Māori 
themselves. Ngata’s recruitment song named tribal iwi in sequence; he omitted disloyal 
tribes who did not produce recruits from his roll of glory.572 Allen noted in 1916 that 
Māori enlistment continued apace among most of the tribes, but that “one large tribe 
could not be induced to join,” which he surmised was because “they still feel some 
grievance over the confiscation of the lands at the time of the Māori War.” He resolved to 
go among them and “bring them to a more reasonable way of thinking on the matter.”573 
Conscription, after 1916, applied to Pākehā New Zealanders only. Much like the 
Dominions imagined their future in the Empire, the future in New Zealand would be 
forged from the mutual participation of Māori and Pākehā in the war effort, and the iwi 
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had to choose whether they would share in that future.574 The ones that did not, as in 
Ngata’s song, would be left out.  
Canada’s entry to the British war effort, like many of its actions on the imperial 
stage, was calculated to demonstrate the Dominion’s senior status among the states of the 
Empire. Nevertheless, despite the initial enthusiastic offer of troop contingents (and 
flour), there were immediate questions raised about whether it would even be legal, under 
Canadian law, for its soldiers to deploy without a threat to the Canadian homeland. The 
Governor-General wrote on 2 August 1914 that “a suggestion has been made that 
regiments might enlist for a stated period as Imperial troops,” to find a way out of the 
problem.575 But as with the other pre-war platitudes about the domestic sovereignties of 
the Dominions, this was swept away as a mere technicality just days after Britain’s 
declaration of war. An initial contingent of 31,000 soldiers, informally dubbed “Canada’s 
Answer,” arrived in Britain no later than the second week of October 1914. After the 
course of the war and its ghastly attrition became clear, Robert Borden’s government 
tried to assure its British counterparts that Canada could be counted on for 500,000 
recruits by the end of 1916, but this ambitious number did not materialize and Borden 
was forced to consider imposing conscription at the beginning of the following year, 
when he traveled to Britain for the Imperial War Conference. His public remarks during 
the visit echoed Massey’s and Ward’s calls for the future of imperial relationships to 
reflect the changed realities of the war. He hailed the Imperial War Cabinet as the “key of 
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future constitutional development,” a development that would lead, he argued, “to 
equality of nationhood.”576 Upon his return from the conference, Ward and Massey 
themselves accompanied him on a tour through Canada, and visited meetings of the 
Canadian Cabinet in Ottawa.577 The visit nearly ended in fiery disaster when the train car 
Massey and his wife had taken from Halifax to Montreal derailed and burst into flames, 
but they managed to escape unscathed. Railway mishaps notwithstanding, for the first 
time in decades there seemed to be a spirit of harmony between the Canadian and New 
Zealander outlooks on the constitutional future of the Empire. 
While the war may have raised Canada’s diplomatic profile and enhanced its 
international bargaining position, it did not, as some hoped, galvanize the Dominion’s 
multi-ethnic society. Pre-war rifts between Anglo and Quebecois boiled over after the 
imposition of conscription in August 1917. Borden’s Unionist government faced 
expected opposition from Quebecois Liberals, and Henri Bourassa proved to be a 
formidable opponent who mobilized much of Quebec against the government. 
Recruitment among Francophones over the course of the war was already incredibly low 
– about 1.4% of military-aged Quebecois enlisted, compared to over 37% among the 
British-born population and about 6% in other demographics.578 Whereas young men 
across the British Empire faced wartime social pressures to enlist, like “white feather” 
activism, in which women presented them with white feathers in public to disgrace them 
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as cowards, comparable social pressures in Quebec were pressures not to enlist.579 In all, 
over 24,000 conscripted Canadian soldiers saw combat in the year or so that Borden’s 
Military Service Act was in force, a significant number but not a great proportion of the 
total numbers the Dominion fielded. The total number of conscripts reached just under 
100,000, Borden’s original target.580 Only about 1,500 Francophones reported for their 
call-ups, and in Easter 1918, a crowd of thousands ransacked and burned a recruiting 
office in Quebec City.581 The local government was left to impose martial law, the fear of 
internal uprising haunted the Canadian government, especially in light of events in 
Ireland.582 This, combined with the fact that nearly one in ten residents of western Canada 
had recently migrated from one of the Central Powers, meant that the Dominion 
government kept a significant garrison to ensure Canada’s domestic security, a force that 
with troops in training exceeded 50,000.583  
Borden managed to win the election that followed the conscription crisis by a 
comfortable margin, mainly by leveraging the information that the overwhelming 
majority of active soldiers supported both conscription and his Unionist government. 
Nevertheless, the experience of war had done more to divide the disparate parts of 
Canadian society than it had to unite them. Quebec’s tepid response to service had many 
causes – Quebecois were not heavily recruited in the first place, and demographically 
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tended to be much more likely to have families than their Anglo countrymen, but these 
explanations counted for little in the moment, and Bourassa had to be vigilant against his 
own lynching.584 Furthermore, the evidence suggests that Canada’s heralded battlefield 
role in World War I, its innovative and gritty capture of Vimy Ridge and the 
distinguished leadership of Canadian-born Gen. Arthur Currie, could not have been 
sustained without the guaranteed replenishment conscription provided.585 Canada’s 
“senior” Dominion status hinged on its ability to compel its population to serve the 
imperial war effort. 
Colonial contributions to the imperial war effort represented a highly important 
military advantage for the Entente; whether this advantage was decisive is obviously 
difficult to evaluate. That the conscription question forced its way into each of the 
Dominions in the war’s final years attests the dire manpower situation at the Front, 
especially by Germany’s Spring Offensive in early 1918. Though the Dominions that did 
conscript soldiers did so effectively, none was able to either recruit or conscript 
significant numbers outside the British-identifying demographic. This quantitative reality 
points to a more abstract one – that whatever national consciousness the war helped forge 
did so mainly for the Empire’s Anglo-Saxon subjects, even if it also encouraged them to 
begin distinguishing themselves from British identity. The experience of war also 
exacerbated many of the Empire’s open questions about sovereignty and constitutional 
integrity. The Pacific colonies could not guarantee that the ships they paid for would be 
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on-hand to protect them, or that the territory they seized would not be handed over to 
Japan in some bargain or another, and moreover, faced serious difficulties even getting 
information on these questions since they were being adjudicated by imperial officials 
thousands of miles away. Each colonial state had to balance the need to deploy troops 
abroad, supposedly vindicating its sovereign status as a peer actor among great powers, 
against the need to secure its own territory for domestic insurgency or foreign attack 
brought on by the selfsame war. The position that British Dominions should have formal 
sovereignty over their own defense, and a formal role in international politics, was not 
original to World War I, but did attract an unprecedented level of consensus because of 
the war. Wartime conditions, especially conscription, forced unprecedented numbers to 
consider the question. The British MP Percy Alden, a Liberal, radical and socialist, 
remarked on this shift in mentalities in late 1916 comments carried in the Christchurch 
Star. Noting that Liberals had always harbored misgivings about imperialism, this was no 
longer the case. He said: “henceforward our Dominions and Dependencies must occupy 
an entirely different position in the minds of Liberals who have passed through the fire of 
this war.” The constitutional ramifications were obvious to Alden. “In the future, all our 
self-governing Dominions must have a voice in the issues of peace and war, on the 
understanding, of course, that they take their fair share of the responsibility for finance in 
respect of the army and navy.”586 Alden directly illustrated how he believed sovereignty 
was constructed in these statements, and moreover how it was perfectly consistent with 
Liberal principles. Much like the problems raised by peacetime colonial military 
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subsidies, a failure to politically reciprocate war-fighting colonies would produce a fatal 
crisis of sovereignty of the type that severed the American colonies in 1783. New 
Zealand’s High Commissioner Thomas Mackenzie reflected on in summer 1914 – “We 
lost the American colonies by reason of taxation being imposed without 
representation...the same question is now arising, but in another form. The overseas 
people are willing to contribute towards imperial defense, but, as in the case of Canada, 
they desire representation with their contributions.” Mackenzie boiled the problem down 
to a single dilemma. “Just now, the question is being asked by thinking people: ‘Can a 
democracy rule an empire?’ The reply has yet to be found.”587 
 
5.4 CONFERENCES, CABINETS, AND CONSTITUTIONS: BRITAIN AND 
INDIA IN WORLD WAR I 
 In the summer of 1914, India fielded the largest standing army and spent the most 
on its military in the British Empire, and over the ensuing four years it mobilized more 
people and materiel than any other colony or Dominion. It was also the first to endure 
domestic attack after Emden shelled Madras. Lacking governing legislature, India 
avoided the question, asked in a perfunctory fashion by the Dominions, of whether it 
would automatically join Britain’s war. Charles Hardinge, the Viceroy, placed the Indian 
Empire at war as soon as its King found himself at war. The princely states expressed 
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enthusiasm for the war effort, while the Indian National Congress momentarily avoided 
any strong pronouncement. Knowing at the outset that the demand on Indian resources 
for the war effort would become great, the British government then under Asquith took a 
two-pronged approach of promising future concessions to Indian political aspirations (a 
tactic well-rehearsed over the preceding fifteen years), and introducing measures to 
tighten India’s domestic security. Given Russia’s position as an Entente power, territorial 
invasion of India by enemy forces was not seriously anticipated by British strategists; 
instead, they feared domestic nationalists and dissidents who might now be inflamed or 
supported by Germany. The 1915 Defence of India Act, much like Britain’s Defence of 
the Realm Act (DORA), granted government officials the power to make emergency 
rules, forbade the transmission of information from the enemy, and legalized effectively 
indefinite detention. The act provoked strong dissent from the nationalists in the 
Legislative Council, who, as ever, were unable to prevent its passage.588  
The initial shape of the Indian Army included about 120,000 active duty troops, 
30,000 reservists, and 22,000 Imperial Service Troops supplied by the Princely States.589 
Despite the Army’s size and strategic importance, it operated with relatively obsolete 
weapons compared to British, let alone German, forces; substandard equipment was a 
continuing reflection of British fears of mutiny since 1857. Bringing the Army up to full 
capacity also involved staggering increases in its recruiting – over 877,000 additional 
combatants by the end of the war. Augmentation on this scale required altering the 
                                                        
588 N. Gerald Barrier, “Ruling India: Coercion and Propaganda in British India during the First World 
War,” in India and World War I, ed. DeWitt C. Ellinwood and S.D. Pradhan (New Delhi: Manohar, 1978), 
85. 
589 S.D. Pradhan, “Indian Army and the First World War,” in India and World War I, ed. DeWitt C. 
Ellinwood and S.D. Pradhan (New Delhi: Manohar, 1978), 51–53. 
 311 
 
“martial race” underpinnings of recruitment policy since 1857, a shift the Government of 
India justified on climate grounds since it now expected its soldiers to fight in 
Mesopotamia, Turkey, and France rather than against Russians in Afghanistan.590 This 
expectation proved true, as the Indian Army deployed in every major theater of the war. 
Like the Dominion contingents it earned moments of great distinction, such as when it 
arrived in France just in time to reinforce the beleaguered British Expeditionary Force 
during the initial German push on Paris, and similarly arrived to reinforce imperial troops 
at Gallipoli, but like the Anzacs its war record was marked by a great moment of 
ignominy. A large Indian force was captured at Kut in the Mesopotamian campaign and 
taken prisoner by Ottoman forces. The failure claimed the jobs of the commanding 
generals and of Austen Chamberlain, the Indian Secretary. 
 Fallout after Kut centered on the question of oversight – the Government of India 
was alleged to have fatally mismanaged its Army’s actions in the Mesopotamia 
Campaign. The dispute pointed at a larger question about constitutional autonomy and 
control between London and Delhi, and about India’s place in the Empire. With India 
providing more troops than any part of the Empire, it seemed more incongruous than ever 
that it was not represented at the Imperial Conferences that were held during wartime. 
Protests over the matter intensified. British Members of Parliament and military officers 
raised the matter in the House of Commons several times in December 1916, ahead of the 
proposed Imperial War Conference meeting to be held the following year. Sir Herbert 
Roberts proposed that India should be present “in view of place of India in the British 
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Empire and the part which it has played in the war,” and Commander Wedgwood asked 
that when the prime ministers of the Dominions were called together to discuss peace 
terms, “a representative of India is also invited to the discussion.”591 When the War 
Cabinet convened, it included Sir James Meston, the Lieutenant Governor of the United 
Provinces, and Maj. Gen. Sir Ganga Singh, Maharaja of Bikaner, the first non-white 
member of a British Cabinet and first full participant in the Imperial Conferences. Indian 
princes were formally granted diplomatic status as representatives of the Princely States 
at international functions.592 Singh, Meston, and Sir Satyendra Prassanna Sinha, Law 
Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council and Member of the Bengal Executive 
Council, toured Britain to some acclaim ahead of the 1917 meeting.593 When the War 
Conference met, it passed a unanimous motion to include India in all future meetings. 
Borden proposed the motion and Massey seconded it. This was a strange turn for New 
Zealand’s delegation at the Imperial Conferences – Joseph Ward had helped exclude 
India from the first officially designated parameters for membership at the 1907 meeting, 
and from membership in his ill-judged plan for imperial federation in 1911.594 
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 Despite these official moves at the top levels of imperial politics, the war (and the 
hardships it created in India from failing infrastructure and high prices), tended to 
galvanize Indian nationalists, separatists, and revolutionaries. Local revolutionaries, 
holdovers from the 1905 Bengali partition unrest, also had significant international 
support networks – they conferenced with Irish republicans and received aid from the 
Indian diaspora elsewhere in Asia, from the Ghader Party of radical revolutionaries that 
operated mainly out of North America, and from an organization of Indian nationalists 
that had more recently coalesced in Berlin.595 Over 4,000 Ghader-backed militants 
managed to make their way back into India by the end of the war.596 Moreover, the Indian 
National Congress reacquainted itself with radicalism during the war years. The Congress 
had experienced schism in late 1907, when moderates attempted to block the election of 
the radical Bal Ganghadar Tilak as President, who was subsequently arrested for sedition 
in Bombay. That session dissolved in an actual brawl.597 But even Tilak would not 
cooperate with revolutionary elements like Ghader, and their inability to cement serious 
political support meant there would be no wartime uprising of the type achieved by Sinn 
Féin in Ireland.598 Instead, the war helped bridge religious and class divides that had 
hitherto fragmented opposition to British rule. At the war’s outset, a Congress contingent 
led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah was in London unsuccessfully petitioning the Indian 
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Secretary (Crewe) to appoint more Indians to the Viceroy’s council. Jinnah, an influential 
member of both the Congress and the Muslim League, steered both organizations to agree 
on a list of core principles known as the Lucknow Pact in 1916. The Pact, acclaimed at a 
joint session of Congress and League, called for self-government in India and the 
Indianization of Raj appointments.599 But while Jinnah had managed to bring together 
disparate coalitions (including the Tilak and Gokhale factions of Congress), he still 
favored cooperating with British rule and advocated constitutional means of reform; the 
course of the war in India harmed him politically for this reason. Mohandas Gandhi 
gradually supplanted him as the focal point of Indian national politics during the war 
years. Gandhi proved more effective at leveraging religious populism, and despite tepid 
responses to his initial support for the war effort, was able to mobilize the population to 
resist the repressive Defence of India and Rowlatt Acts, especially when these persisted 
after the Armistice. Gandhi also forged relationships with the Khilafat Movement, a pan-
Islamic movement that arose in South Asia to fill the void left by the crumbling Ottoman 
Caliphate, and leveraged British rule for concessions to Muslims. This allowed Gandhi to 
maintain a foothold in the Muslim community that did not depend on Jinnah’s Muslim 
League. The Amritsar Massacre in April 1919, in which British soldiers attempting to 
enforce the Rowlatt Acts had murdered over a thousand civilians in a public square, 
further eroded the legitimacy of British rule. Jinnah resigned from his seat on the 
Viceroy’s council, and Gandhi’s calls for satyagraha gained more adherents. 
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 One irony of India’s wartime experience is that while the self-governing 
Dominions tended successfully to use the opinions (and voting preferences) of their 
active military personnel as a tool to influence their civilian electorates, the Government 
of India lacked access to this tactic despite having put well over a million Indians in 
military service. The Raj could not hector the population about how Indian soldiers were 
voting, because no such voting took place. Instead, they relied on their security apparatus, 
and the army itself, to coercively manage the population. Compared to a case like 
Ireland’s, this was a success, and as noted above, Indian interests also made significant 
progress at the imperial level in the Conference system and the War Cabinet. The 
Secretary/Viceroy team of Edwin Montagu and Lord Chelmsford also introduced 
eponymous reforms in 1917, which promised a future of self-government in India and the 
addition of Indians to Legislative and Executive Councils; a loose approximation of the 
demands made by the Lucknow Pact. But the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms clove to the 
watchword of incrementalism (Lord Curzon himself ensured this about their language), 
and the experience of war led more Indian subjects to reconceptualize political 
sovereignty as a matter of spiritual import rather than simply the military technocracy 
typified by the Raj, and herein lay Gandhi’s genius – the religious populism unleashed by 
satyagraha and Khilafat could not be placated with procedural reconfigurations of 
legislative councils. 
 Wartime pronouncements on the future of the self-governing Dominions were not 
dissimilar to the prevailing tone of discussions about the future of India. The concept of 
the Imperial War Cabinet was itself a recognition of the need for constitutional 
innovation in the midst of a dual crisis of security and sovereignty. Much like the 
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principle of a wartime coalition government, which prevailed in both the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand, the War Cabinet was meant to legitimize the collective effort 
of the British Empire and provide an institutional symbol of its unity of purpose. After 
Asquith’s governments experimented with a variety of committees for delegating war 
tasks (such as the notorious Dardanelles Committee), Lloyd George’s coalition that took 
over in late 1916 took a different approach. In the spring of 1917, he invited the 
Dominion prime ministers to participate in a series of Cabinet meetings. Robert Borden 
and his newly-appointed “Resident Minister in London” George Perley attended from 
Canada, Massey and Ward from New Zealand, E.P. Morris from Newfoundland, and 
General Smuts from South Africa attended this Imperial War Cabinet for six weeks 
before convening an ordinary meeting of the Imperial Conference. Billy Hughes was 
unable to leave Australia on account of the need to fight the election between his 
acrimonious conscription referenda.600 The 1917 Imperial War Cabinet did not 
fundamentally alter the direction of British policy in the war. It rather acknowledged 
what was already the case: that Britain’s war-fighting capacity depended on the 
cooperation of colonial participants.  
 The 1917 Conference, joined by Ganga Singh and Satyendra Prassanna Sinha, 
passed the resolution formally recognizing India and also paved the way for the 
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms.601 India thus formally entered the Conference system, and 
with it, the Empire’s muddling attempt to solve its ongoing crisis of sovereignty. 
Resolution IX acknowledged the unresolved crisis directly: 
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The Imperial War Conference are of opinion that the readjustment of the 
constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire…should 
form the 
subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as 
possible after 
the cessation of hostilities…Such readjustment, while thoroughly 
preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of 
domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions 
as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an 
important portion of the same; should recognise the right of the 
Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign 
relations; and should provide effective arrangements for continuous 
consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for 
such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several 
Governments may determine.602 
 
Inasmuch as conscription proved to be the purest expression of state sovereignty evident 
arising from the war, Britain’s Military Service Act (1916) also carried a highly 
conspicuous exception: the British government disavowed the right to conscript 
Dominion subjects who were present in Britain. The Canadian and New Zealander 
representatives at the War Conference queried this fact in 1917, and Walter Long, 
Colonial Secretary and Chairman for the day, confirmed that for Dominion subjects “we 
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have no power over such a man.”603 This admission seemed appropriate and even 
intuitive to those assembled, but contained a crucial concession to Dominion sovereignty. 
Dicey’s Law of the Constitution asserted, three years prior, that the Imperial Parliament 
did not concede the right of any Dominion to stand neutral in the event of war between 
the King and a foreign power, but allowed that it would concede their “moral right” to 
legislate for “matters occurring within the territory of such Dominion.”604 The matter of 
conscription directly concerned the King’s ongoing war, and his (e.g.) Canadian subjects 
resident in Britain could in no way be said to be within Canadian territory, yet the 
Colonial Secretary conceded that Dominion sovereignty applied to Dominion subjects 
anywhere, even within Britain itself. He also conceded it in principle, notwithstanding 
the clear practical impediments to the British government rounding up Dominion subjects 
within its borders. The concession formed the essence of General Smuts’ reminiscence in 
Pretoria after returning from the Peace Conference in 1920: “Beyond [the Dominions’] 
borders, they had no power or authority…in other words, they had no international status. 
And in the future the Dominions have in principle authority and power, not only in 
respect of their domestic questions, but also over their international or foreign relations, 
and in the questions of peace or war which may affect them.”605 
 In summer 1918, the Admiralty prepared an anticipatory memo intended to 
defend the concept of the central command of the Royal Navy in the face of Dominion 
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opposition after the war, and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Wemyss, presented it to the 
Imperial War Cabinet. In his opening remarks he tried to assure them, “We tried to take 
the wider view of the Empire, as a partnership of nations under the Crown, and with the 
constitution of the Imperial War Cabinet somewhat as our guide.”606 Returning to form, 
the Canadian representatives at the July 1918 Imperial War Conference (Borden had 
returned to Canada), managed to have all formal discussion of the memorandum removed 
from the agenda, stating that their government preferred to have any such discussion of 
the naval future with the Admiralty, directly.607 This disappointed Massey and Ward, but 
they had time enough to reiterate that they considered the status quo of naval security in 
the Pacific unacceptable, and that they would put this concern to the Admiralty directly if 
they must. General Singh told the press that India also felt a renewed need to act as a 
stabilizing force in Asia given the deterioration of the Tsarist regime in Russia, and the 
renewed possibility of Russo-Indian conflict on the Northwest Frontier.608 If a consensus 
arose regarding the Empire’s constitutional crises during the First World War, it was that 
the status quo had become untenable. The exertions of states to meet the demands of war 
had an astringent effect on constitutional conversations – the Imperial War Cabinets, like 
the Conference system originally, had arisen on an ad hoc basis but quickly came to 
embody a minimum expectation for future business.  
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5.5 THE CONSCRIPTION CRISIS IN IRELAND: A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? 
The rigors of war and the fraught politics of conscription proved the most 
incendiary and destructive to public order within the United Kingdom’s sovereign 
territory itself. Pearse and his cadre managed, after their initially unpopular Easter Rising 
and rather fanciful and short-lived Proclamation of the Republic, to rally public support 
for radical separatism in southern Ireland.609 The Christ-like posthumous flourishing of 
Pearse’s mission certainly would have pleased him. Still, the domestic drama created by 
Irish radicals tends to distract from the reality that over 200,000 Irish served the British 
war effort during World War I, and at about 5% of the military-aged male population, 
this number compared closely with the soldiering proportions of Canadians and 
Australians. Irish deployment did take a politically bimodal form, after the Ulster 
Volunteer Force and Irish Volunteer Force, constituted in the prewar years for a civil war 
over Home Rule, deployed respectively as the 36th Ulster Division and the 10th and 16th 
Irish Divisions.610 Irish soldiers were some of the first British units to arrive in France, as 
they were conveniently already organized for war. The names of these units 
foreshadowed trouble ahead – volunteer recruitment produced significant returns during 
the war, but Ireland was formally exempt from Britain’s Military Service Act, placing the 
Irish on par with Australia’s Aboriginal subjects, New Zealand’s Māori, and (informally) 
Canada’s Quebecois. The severity of the constitutional crisis in Ireland also eclipsed that 
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of anywhere else in the British Empire – a bill authorizing Irish Home Rule sat passed but 
suspended on the floor of Parliament and its sectarian communities were equipped and 
prepared to shoot one another over it. The only thing certain was the impossibility of 
status quo. 
Lloyd George’s government began seriously to consider conscription in Ireland 
over the winter of 1917-18. The Allied manpower situation on the Western Front began 
deteriorating in the face of Erich Ludendorff’s Spring Offensive, and Gough’s Fifth 
Army seemed on the brink of losing its operational capacity, so depleted were its units. 
The severity of the situation was sufficient to convince Lloyd George to ignore most of 
the advice he was getting about Ireland: Henry Duke, the Irish Chief Secretary (the 
ranking Cabinet member for Irish affairs), told his Prime Minister that he “might as well 
try and recruit Germans,” and Edward Carson, leading Ulster unionist and First Lord of 
the Admiralty, also advised that conscripting Irish would be lunacy.611 The “Welsh 
Wizard” forged ahead anyway: he put a bill to enforce the Military Service Act in Ireland 
through the Commons, and it received Royal Assent on 18 April 1918. Lord French, the 
sacked commander of the original BEF and newly-created Lord Lieutenant (Viceroy) of 
Ireland, immediately took the rather perplexing step of informing the British government 
that he would need more troops, because the Irish conscription effort would assuredly 
require martial law. French, whose own biographer described him as “politically naïve,” 
proved to be much more politically prescient here than his famously savvy Prime 
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Minister.612 Within days, mass resistance to conscription erupted across Ireland, uniting 
hitherto divided elements of society in unprecedented opposition to British rule. The 
government ultimately abandoned its plans altogether, helped by changing battlefield 
fortunes as American troops helped turn the last German offensive into a rout that 
culminated in Armistice some months later. But not before it had irretrievably radicalized 
the Irish population. This section will show that Irish Conscription Crisis of 1918 drove 
thousands of military-aged males into the Irish Volunteers (the precursor of the IRA), 
forged an anti-conscription consensus from disparate political factions, and forced many, 
often for the first time, to consider the nature and meaning of sovereignty in a crisis-
wracked Empire. It will do so by using detailed witness statements from the Irish Bureau 
of Military History, which invited nearly two thousand participants in and observers of 
Ireland’s revolutionary conflict period to reflect on their experiences.613 These statements 
provide a useful way of understanding how people outside the circles of government 
understood complicated questions of security and sovereignty. 
Ireland’s political strife affected the course of politics in the other Dominions and 
India. Its ethno-religious fissures replicated themselves in Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, pitting Catholic Irish migrants against Ulster Protestants, replete with local 
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branches of Sinn Féin and the Orange Order, respectively. As in the case of Archbishop 
Mannix, the Irish Question can even be said to have dominated the conscription question 
in Australia nearly as much as it did in Ireland. Earl Grey, who arrived in New Zealand 
for a tour just before the war began in 1914, was forced upon arrival to give newspaper 
interviews on the Home Rule question and its future. He hoped the original bill would be 
scrapped in favor of a federal solution that might incorporate the other Dominions in a 
newly-constituted upper chamber, and opined that Ulster ought to fight a civil war rather 
than accept its current terms.614 When William Massey took the opposite journey to the 
United Kingdom to participate in the Imperial War Cabinet, he was pressed, on account 
of his Irish extraction, to comment on the conscription question in Ireland. “There are still 
many natives of Ireland who have not yet risen to a sense of their duties and 
responsibilities,” he told the Irish Times, who should “remember that Irish men have 
always been on the side of liberty and freedom…Let them remember that Germany, by 
her record in this war, stands for the crushing of small nations. He who refuses to assist 
the Allies, by doing so assists Germany.”615 At home in New Zealand, the local pro-
conscription consensus and the incendiary nature of the debate in Australia provoked a 
strong anti-Catholic backlash among Protestant New Zealanders, and helped drive the 
Dominion’s marginalized Irish community and labor movement together in mutual 
opposition to the measures.616 The sense of crisis produced by Ireland’s Home Rule 
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situation intensified the feeling of crisis across the whole Empire, and its polarizing 
effects forced people to speculate about, and comment on, constitutional matters. Albert 
Dryer, the Secretary of the Australian League for an Undivided Ireland, told his members 
that recruitment pitches like Massey’s, based on the dignity of small nations, rang hollow 
with the memory of the Boer War.617 Ireland served as the spiritual focal point for 
opposition to conscription across the Empire; as one Irish republican recalled, it drove his 
comrades to “[join] with our fellow countrymen at home and in foreign lands in 
proclaiming once more that Ireland is a distinct nation with a just right to Sovereign 
Independence.”618 Irish disquiet also further implicated Germany in the Empire’s 
domestic security fears. Berlin-based Indian nationalists and persecuted German New 
Zealanders are two examples already noted, but the links would prove even stronger in 
the Irish case. Days before the 1916 Rising, the ignominious arrest of disgraced former 
journalist and British Foreign Office official Roger Casement revealed that he had been 
negotiating directly with the Germans about importing arms into Ireland ahead of the 
Rising, and had in fact been returned to his home country by a German U-boat lurking off 
the Kerry coast. Casement was executed not long after the leaders of the Rising.619 
Within Ireland, conscription came as a major boost to the somewhat dilapidated 
units of Irish Volunteers who had refused to join the First World War and remained at 
home to focus on their original mission of securing Irish independence – for this crowd, 
independence of the more hardline sort: republicanism, not Home Rule. While the large 
contingents of Irish on the Western Front represented the majority opinion, at least at the 
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war’s outset, the deployments also had the critical effect of shipping every moderate 
nationalist with military inclinations out of the country, leaving behind only committed 
radicals. The threat of conscription allowed these Volunteers, the protean group that 
would become the Irish Republican Army, to begin harnessing the public discontent 
generated by the 1916 Rising and to legitimize armed resistance among ordinary and 
hitherto politically aloof swathes of the public.620 Nearly every existing Volunteer unit in 
southern Ireland that had maintained an organizational presence after the Rising 
immediately experienced a surge of new recruits who were eager to resist conscription by 
any means necessary. The Conscription Crisis also coincided with the end of the policy 
of British internment for captured participants in the Rising, most of whom had been in 
Frongoch prison camp in Wales since spring 1916, but who now returned to a country 
aroused by the aftermath of their deeds and the possibility of conscription.621 Richard 
Walsh, Volunteer Adjutant of Co. Mayo and the Connaught provincial representative on 
the Volunteer Executive, explained in his statement that a squad of Volunteers under 
Cathal Brugha were sent to London to await the imposition of conscription, whereupon 
they would attempt to assassinate members of the British Cabinet. Walsh added that the 
Executive took this decision because of their “belief that the enforcement of conscription 
                                                        
620 Michael O’Kelly, Sinn Féin President in Co. Kildare and organizer for the Irish Volunteers, said that the 
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by the British government was nothing short of a direct attempt by them to destroy the 
Irish race.”622  
Young men seeking employment in the public sector already found themselves 
shut out by Ireland’s official establishment, who resented their lack of service in the war 
effort. Michael McGovern recalled applying for a job vacated by his father in the 
county’s municipal water service, only to be told that his “place was in France.” The 
“upsetting” rejection led him to an alternative job: Quartermaster of the Kells Battalion, 
Irish Volunteers.623 Seamus Finn, Brigade Adjutant for Co. Meath, noted a conspicuous 
feature of some of the new recruits to his paramilitary force: they were Royal Irish 
Constabulary officers who had abandoned their posts. As Lord French observed, 
conscription would likely require martial law conditions to enforce, and the local police 
force itself was suffering defections to the Irish Volunteers. Finn recalled that his Brigade 
received a welcome boost in operational training from an ex-RIC sergeant named T.J. 
McKliggot.624 In that county alone, 94 men joined as a direct result of the conscription 
scare, roughly doubling the original size of the whole Brigade.625 Significant cash influx 
from public anti-conscription donations also gave Volunteer units the resources to fund 
drill instructors, propaganda, and bomb-making materials, which they used to prepare for 
the expected war.626 All this activity served a less-obvious but more important purpose – 
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through public visibility, it put the lie to British-dominated law and order in Ireland, and 
demonstrated to the general public that their security was contingent on the protection of 
the Volunteers, rather than the state.627 Liam Brady, the Co. Derry organizer for the 
republican Boy Scout analog Fianna Éireann in 1918, remembered that organizing 
resistance to conscription felt like the “people, by their unity, had scored another 
smashing blow against the British Government's plot to Anglicise the Irish.”628 
Conscription also forged a unity of organizational purpose between groups that 
had thus far refused to cooperate over doctrinal differences. The Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, a secret society dedicated to revolutionary republican vanguardism that 
operated by infiltrating Irish society and institutions, drew closer to Sinn Féin, the more 
extreme Irish nationalist party; this cooperation was not a foregone conclusion since 
Arthur Griffith, Sinn Féin’s founder, was a monarchist who thought republicanism 
inimical to Irish traditions and culture.629 The question of republicanism proved thorny, 
as Irish nationalism gained momentum – it pointed directly to the larger questions of how 
to conceptualize Ireland’s national sovereignty, and how to constitute a future Irish 
state.630 Monsignor Michael Curran, then Secretary to the Archbishop of Dublin and 
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future Rector of Irish College in the Vatican, recalled how Griffith and the Church 
initially opposed republicanism, but that events like conscription eventually polarized the 
debate such that moderate positions seemed untenable. Redmond’s Irish Parliamentary 
Party, Msgr. Curran said, imagined independence as a “glorified county council sitting in 
College Green, and this forced Sinn Féin to adopt republic as an unmistakable definition 
of a sovereign state.”631 Kevin O’Shiel, a jurist who acted as a Land Commissioner for 
Dáil Éireann when Sinn Féin created it as Ireland’s separatist legislature, wrote that 
moderate solutions like Home Rule or an Irish monarchy would only give Britain “a hand 
with which to confuse the world on our sovereignty issue.”632 A number of disparate 
organizations eventually coalesced to back Sinn Féin’s full separatist solution to Ireland’s 
constitutional crisis. The Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) helped propagandize large 
numbers of ordinary Irish. Somewhat more surprisingly, the separatist fold also 
welcomed the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), a cultural but fairly conservative 
society frequented by establishment figures. One Volunteer remembered that the local 
AOH branded Sinn Féin and its membership “paid German agents” and “Bolshies,” but 
after the Conscription Crisis, the Order requested protection from the Volunteers and 
leant them their Assembly Hall to hold fundraising dances.633 The rhetorical shift here 
from the Order’s reactionary slanders to its active collusion in resisting British law and 
order demonstrates the transformative power of the conscription issue.  
                                                        
631 College Green was the Dublin location of Ireland’s former Parliament, dissolved with the Act of Union 
in 1800. Right Reverend Monsignor Michael J. Curran, BMH.WS 687, NAI, 278. 
632 O’Shiel narrates how Griffith resisted republicanism at successive Ardfheiseanna and eventually had the 
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The Catholic hierarchy, meanwhile, had a fraught relationship with Irish 
republicanism; the latter’s egalitarian ethos posed troubling questions for the Church, 
while official doctrine forbade the swearing of secret oaths of the kind demanded by the 
IRB and other revolutionary groups. Richard Walsh, the Archbishop of Dublin, signaled 
a shift in position in a speech of 9 May 1918, shortly after the Conscription Bill passed. 
The Archbishop said that some had misguided ideas about republicanism, “associating it 
with the excesses of the French Revolution and forgetting all about the United States.”634 
The temporary alliance between these groups forged by conscription, which the Catholic 
Church consistently and effectively opposed across the British world, created a powerful 
social consensus in Ireland that carried significant political, and shortly, electoral 
consequences. Anti-conscription committees were set up “in every parish” and were 
“usually presided over by a priest or curate,” one Volunteer recalled, while another 
remembered his own parish priest collecting hundreds of pounds in post-Mass 
meetings.635 A Tyrone IRB operative recalled his joy at the anti-conscription meetings 
that occurred “after every mass.”636 Seán Farrelly remembered how clergy often spoke at 
anti-conscription rallies, at which he and members of his Company served as security 
guards and conducted anti-surveillance operations.637 Much as it had in New Zealand, 
Msgr. Curran recalled how the Irish labor movement also received a boost from the anti-
conscription consensus, proclaiming in September 1918 that “We mean thereby that 
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Ireland, no less than Belgium or Serbia, Poland or Finland, Bohemia or Esthonia, shall 
have the right to decide its own form of government, to choose its sovereignty,” and 
professed their “opposition to conscription, even to conscription in an Irish republic.”638 
The left-right coalition conscription brought together created unprecedented political 
unity and marginalized pro-British voices in southern Ireland. Peter Hart has called the 
cooperation of the Catholic Church with Irish radical elements on the conscription issue 
“the loss of a counter-revolutionary bulwark.”639 
The threat of conscription in Ireland also played a significant role in Sinn Féin’s 
resounding victory in the general election of 1918, in which they seized 73 of Ireland’s 
105 seats in the House of Commons, nearly annihilating the moderate, constitutionalist 
Irish Parliamentary Party in the process. Campaigners were able to sustain the pace of the 
large public rallies provoked by conscription into the election, and many of the election 
rallies were organized (and “guarded”) by the Irish Volunteers. During July 1918 by-
elections, Volunteer units helped secure early electoral victories, such as when most of 
the Meath Brigade traveled to neighboring Co. Cavan to police rallies for Arthur Griffith, 
the party’s founder and candidate.640 In the general election the following December, 
David Hall recalled that there was little or no existing Sinn Féin organization in his 
county, so his local Irish Volunteers simply carried out the election campaign themselves, 
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canvassing, fund-raising, transporting voters to polling stations, and “guarding” the 
latter.641 Both constituencies in the county returned Sinn Féin MPs and ousted moderate 
nationalists. Meath’s Fifth Battalion OC Seán Keogh remembered how his unit marked 
this occasion by directly challenging the authority of the local RIC: they marched to the 
station and hoisted a Sinn Féin flag up its flagpole in defiant celebration.642 1918 marked 
a shift towards full separatism in Irish politics, and it occurred because conscription 
discredited moderates and empowered the paramilitary Irish Volunteers to influence (and 
intimidate) voters.643 Sinn Féin’s messaging worked hard to link Redmond’s Irish 
Parliamentary Party with conscription during the election campaign, an effective move 
given his support for the war effort.644 Redmond died in March of that year, having failed 
a final time at securing support for a Home Rule solution and suffering heart failure 
during an operation. 
Though the course of the First World War gave the British government some 
respite from imposing conscription in Ireland, they found themselves trying to negotiate 
peace among great powers at Versailles while fully at war at home, with Ireland, until 
1921. When the Volunteers (now constituted as the Irish Republican Army) began 
attacking RIC and Army barracks across Ireland, the British government first tried to 
scramble de-mobilized and veteran auxiliary soldiers to shore up the security forces, but 
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this solution produced messy results: failed operations, bloody reprisals, and a deepening 
rift between state and society. Knowing that the mechanized warfare of the Western Front 
could not solve a problem like domestic insurrection, Lloyd George was forced to 
negotiate with the leadership of Dáil Éireann on Irish independence, a matter complicated 
by irreconcilably unionist Ulster, which by 1919 was calling for partition of Ireland and 
its own state that could remain within the United Kingdom. “Sovereignty,” as ever, 
proved a point of contention in these negotiations. Cathal Brugha, the Dáil’s first 
President (excepting Pearse), said angrily while presiding over a constitutional debate, 
“These are the people who, we are told, are out for the freedom of small nationalities. 
And, though having made that statement, he [Lloyd George] now comes forward and 
says that the sovereign independence of Ireland cannot be tolerated. Are you going to 
allow a gentleman who has been referred to as a Welsh adventurer to suggest that we are 
to remain a slave nation for all time?”645 Several members of the Irish delegation that 
went to London to negotiate with Lloyd George recalled how the Prime Minister seemed 
willing to work with them at first, until he read an official letter from Eamon de Valera, 
the new Dáil President (Brugha stepped aside to run military affairs). A single phrase, 
apparently, sent Lloyd George into hysterics.  
I could have given de Valera all the realities he wanted, an Ireland with its 
own Gaelic system of education, its own army and police force, its own 
flag, its own anthem, the wherewithal to work out its own destiny as a free 
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and independent Gaelic nation, and this man spurns it all for a phrase. I 
asked him not to use that phrase – ‘a sovereign nation’.646 
 
He told the visitors he would pretend he had not read the letter if they could persuade De 
Valera to revise it. The Dáil had already met by the time they were able to converse with 
Dublin on the phone. 
 The Dáil’s case was also helped by the tone of discussions at Versailles, 
especially Woodrow Wilson’s emphasis on self-determination as the singular principle of 
the new international system. The American Cardinal James Gibbons quoted Wilson in a 
speech on Ireland’s future: “President Wilson cannot leave Ireland out of his reckoning. 
He had asked for self-determination and gained his point in practically every demand for 
nations outside the British Empire. He surely will not refuse to lift his voice on behalf of 
Ireland.”647 Patrick McCartan, member of the IRB’s Supreme Council, OC of forces in 
Co. Tyrone since the Rising, and Dáil envoy to the United States and Russia, was 
implicated in a plot for the Soviet government to recognize the Irish Republic in 1921. 
Commenting on the possible exposure of his mission, he wrote “Instead of doing Ireland 
harm the publication will do us good…If there is no denial, explanation or apology the 
majority of the people of Ireland and our friends everywhere will be convinced that we 
have a secret agreement with Russia. The documents themselves show that we are 
thinking and acting as a sovereign nation and hence will be useful in helping to refute or 
kill the charges of anxiety to compromise on the basis of Dominion Home Rule.”648  
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The outcome of the Irish War of Independence ultimately satisfied no party fully. 
The island was partitioned; six of its counties became an independent Northern Ireland, 
with its own Assembly, and remained within the United Kingdom. The rest of the island 
became the Irish Free State, an independent Dominion under the British Sovereign and a 
member of the Commonwealth. These terms, the substance of the Treaty signed to cease 
hostilities with Britain, plunged Ireland anew into civil war between those who accepted 
the terms and those who refused to accept full republican sovereignty – among them 
Eamon de Valera. Dan Breen, an anti-Treaty IRA commander who was also elected to 
represent Co. Tipperary in the Dáil, reflected that “to the Army Officers who opposed the 
Treaty the all-important issue was the issue of Republic versus Free State, or, to put it 
another way, of Dominion status versus Sovereign Independence.”649 Breen was incensed 
when the Catholic hierarchy in Ireland recognized the Free State government, and wrote a 
letter to the Vatican, accusing it of abetting “the partition of the ancient territory of our 
nation, the loss of its sovereignty and independence.”650 His witness statement concludes 
with bitterness, since he was famous for his uncompromising role in the Civil War but 
was not encouraged to discuss it. He said he hoped “some competent historian [would] 
undertake the task which still remains to be done…For the struggle of centuries is not 
over. An alien army of occupation still remains on Irish soil, and Irish freedom and 
sovereignty have still to be achieved.”651 
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5.6 CONCLUSION  
 The First World War did not disrupt and reshape the constitutional structure of the 
British Empire because colonial subjects paid a price in blood (in the Empire’s name, as 
the Anzacs, or against it, as Pearse and the IRA) that earned them new prizes. The war 
changed the Empire because it drastically increased the powers of the state in every 
Dominion and colony, confronting British subjects with the bare meaning of sovereignty 
and forcing them to reckon with it. The Crown needed, and in some cases would take if 
not offered, their money, their crops, their manufactures, and their bodies. It did all this in 
the name of security – of saving the Mother Country from invasion, of securing the future 
for decency and for “small countries.” The war did not touch all parts of the Empire 
equally, but it made it much more difficult for most people to ignore questions of 
sovereignty. It made the abstract real. It also sharpened sovereignty’s international 
dimension – as Pearse put it, “of the nation as against all other nations” by embroiling 
colonies and Dominions as actors within a global drama, a drama only heightened by 
Woodrow Wilson’s sweeping rhetoric of self-determination. The British government and 
the international community by now acknowledged the Dominions and India as discrete 
international actors in their own rights, but the matter of sovereignty still proved to be a 
delicate balance between the ability to seize and control territory, and the recognition and 
acceptance of peers. During the Paris Peace Conference, Bal Ganghadar Tilak wrote a 
letter to Wilson and to French President Clemenceau, urging them to recognize India’s 
right to self-determination, and enclosed a pamphlet outlying a fifteen-year plan for 
transitioning British India into a democratic United States of India within the British 
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Commonwealth. Clemenceau ignored it; Wilson replied that India was a matter for 
another time.652 
 If the war focused questions of sovereignty, the issue of conscription distilled its 
essence. It created a direct link between individual and state, and subordinated the 
individual will to the collective security of the Empire. In one way, by bringing the 
British Empire’s constitutional confusions to a point of crisis, or at minimum testing the 
true limits of constitutional status quo, conscription clarified new realities. That the 
British government acknowledged the rights of Dominion governments to implement it 
or not, that it avoided imposing it on Ireland despite the legal right to do so, and even on 
Dominion subjects living in Britain, as Dicey suggested was also its legal right, attests 
that the realities of sovereignty within the Empire had already changed when World War 
I began. Instead, a real entity called “The Dominion of Canada” and an imagined one 
called “the Canadian nation,” could compel people to die. The Dominion of New Zealand 
could compel people to die. Yet, despite clarifying some dimensions of new Dominion 
sovereignty, conscription also raised new, highly vexing ones. The real or perceived 
inability of imperial governments to conscript Māori, Quebecois, or Irish attests the 
disconnect between nation and state; the incomplete process of fully “securing” territorial 
space and dominating, as Pearse explained it, “over all its parts, over all men and things 
within the nation.”653 Nations may have been spiritual, nebulous creatures, but they could 
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still influence the material realities of conscription and security for colonies and 
Dominions. 
This problem was as true for Dáil Éireann and the Irish Republican Army as it 
was for the British or colonial governments. Kevin O’Shiel, the Dáil’s Land 
Commissioner, (in the context of revolutionary Ireland, its most crucial judicial position), 
described in his witness recollection the case that would make or break his court’s 
legitimacy: Prendergast and Others vs. Hyland and Murphy. He ruled against a group of 
farmers in a land dispute, and they flouted the court’s decision by continuing to work the 
land. The IRA arrested and imprisoned them, but their wives took up their places and 
carried on. Unsure of what to do and unwilling to harm women, O’Shiel resolved to wait 
them out. After a few days, the women relented and requested the release of their 
husbands, who agreed the IRA’s demands to hand over the fields to the rightful claimant. 
“This case,” he remembered, “was the test case of Dáil sovereignty, and, in the numerous 
cases that followed, there was never so much as a suggestion to flaunt the decisions of 
our courts.”654 Just as with conscription – in protest of which thousands of Irishmen had 
joined the Irish Volunteers just months before – the incipient Irish state could not call 
itself sovereign until the IRA could take control over the bodies of its citizens.
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6 EPILOGUE: SLOUCHING TOWARDS BETHLEHEM 
 
 George V usually misses out on the historical attention lavished upon his long-
reigning grandmother, his blustering, jovial father, and his scandalous, Nazi-
sympathizing son. Yet, his reign was perhaps the most dynamic in the past two centuries 
of British history. George presided over incredible constitutional upheaval unseen since 
his namesake George III, and had the strange honor of personally opening myriad new 
parliaments throughout the British Empire. By the end of his reign he was obliged to hold 
all of these governments in equal esteem to the one that governed his United Kingdom. 
Already well-traveled by the time of his accession, George was the first reigning monarch 
to visit his overseas Dominions since William IV landed in the Canadian Maritimes in 
1786.655 As the Duke of York, he undertook an extensive tour of the Empire in 1901, and 
opened the first meeting of the Australian Commonwealth Parliament on behalf of his 
father in May of that year. After becoming King, he embarked almost immediately for 
India, where he became the first British monarch to visit in person and held a resplendent 
royal Durbar enshrining his status as Emperor in 1911. His Majesty announced at the 
Durbar that the Indian Empire’s capital would be relocated from Calcutta to Delhi, the 
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old Mughal capital, reinforcing imperial sovereignty with historical gravitas and new 
monumental architecture.656 In wartime, George went on campaign with British forces in 
France, and watched his cousins on the thrones of Russia and Germany meet ignominious 
ends. Under pressure from nationalists in his own realm, he renamed his own Royal 
House “Windsor” from the German-sounding “Saxe Coburg and Gotha,” renounced his 
ancestral holdings in Germany, and instructed much of the British nobility to do the 
same. In 1921, he formally opened the newly-formed Parliament of Northern Ireland 
outside Belfast. He called Ramsay Macdonald, the first Labour politician in British 
history, to be his Prime Minister in 1924. Before a life of non-stop smoking destroyed his 
health in the mid-1930s, he presided over high-profile meetings of the Imperial 
Conference. He lived long enough to see the Balfour Declaration and Statute of 
Westminster make all his self-governing realms equal, and legal responsibility for his 
Succession pass from the United Kingdom to his several realms together, requiring all 
their assent. It was not just sovereignty but the Sovereign himself that changed in the 
British Empire. 
 This dissertation has charted the rise of militarization across the British Empire, 
and the extent to which matters of security shaped politics, constitutional issues, and the 
way political actors understood sovereignty. It argues that these trends are the key to 
understanding the speed and the magnitude of the changes witnessed by George V and 
experienced by his millions of subjects across the world. It has also shown that these 
trends substantively predated World War I, though the war of course intensified them. 
The end of the war created an atmosphere permitting radical change which, 
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paradoxically, was mostly intended to foreclose on the possibility of further such change. 
Most of the treaties that ended formal hostilities after 1919, and Woodrow Wilson’s new 
vision for the international system, had as their objective the prevention of further 
conflict – of ensuring it had been a “war to end wars.” The remainder of this epilogue 
will discuss some of these attempted postwar settlements and how they exemplified the 
changed nature of sovereignty over the ensuing decade. It will also suggest that the 
violent component of sovereignty as it would come to be understood in post-colonial 
states throughout the twentieth century is observable in the case of Ireland at war from 
1918-1923. Finally, it will end with a discussion of the Statute of Westminster and the 
new legal and constitutional realities created by three decades of militarization.    
 The Imperial War Cabinets convened with the participation of representatives 
from the Dominions and India ensured that any grand conference on peace would include 
imperial representation. The form their representation would take was a less-settled 
question. Foreign powers, as they had before the war, tended to oppose the separate 
representation of the British Dominions at international meetings, arguing that this 
effectively gave Britain an unfairly large voting bloc in deliberative matters. The French 
contingent planning the 1919 Peace Conference likened the notion to the United States 
bringing voting delegations from each of its states individually.657 Ultimately, the 
Dominions and India secured a highly favorable deal: they retained separate 
representation on par with that of smaller nations with interests in the Conference (two 
delegates each for Canada, Australia, and India, and one delegate for New Zealand – 
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China and Greece received two delegates, by comparison), as well as inclusion (as one of 
five members) in the British Empire delegation that would confer among the five 
victorious powers on the most important matters. This gave the imperial contingents the 
opportunity to sit on and influence the Peace Conference’s 52 committee panels and to 
influence top-level deliberations on the fate of Germany and the shape of postwar order. 
Robert Borden of Canada even sat as representative of the whole Empire for a few 
meetings of the Council of Five at which Lloyd George and Balfour were required to be 
away in London. That the Dominions and India were able to secure this sort of deal 
stemmed from their incontrovertible role in British and Allied victory. Canada, Borden 
noted wryly, had kept more men in the field over the course of the war than Belgium had, 
while Billy Hughes famously parried Woodrow Wilson’s complaint that he only 
represented a population of five million by pointing out that he represented “60,000 war 
dead” – a greater toll than that suffered by the American Expeditionary Force.658 In 
addition to the balance of manpower, the Empire had also stopped the British economy, 
and its credit, from collapsing. Canada had supplied over a billion dollars in provisions. 
South Africa’s vast gold reserves sufficiently backed the value of Sterling to prevent its 
value deteriorating against the US dollar after billions more in loans. The Government of 
India gave perhaps the costliest gift – it assumed responsibility for funding Indian troops 
outside India’s borders (all of which was legally billable to Britain), gifted its entire tax 
revenue from fiscal year 1917 (£100 million), and increased per capita tax burdens on 
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Indians by 65% during the war. The combined effect of these efforts on Indian public 
finances and crucial infrastructure and spending projects was ruinous.659 
The greatest individual influence from the Empire at the Paris Conference came 
probably from Jan Christian Smuts, the South African general who had spent half the war 
pursuing a highly-romanticized campaign against his German adversary Paul von Lettow-
Vorbeck up and down the African continent, and the other half sitting in the Imperial War 
Cabinet in London. Smuts, who demonstrated an uncanny ability to politically insinuate 
himself, published a pamphlet called The League of Nations – A Practical Suggestion in 
late 1918. In it, he outlined how to reconcile Wilson’s imperative for self-determination 
with the problem that certain peoples were “untrained politically.” He proposed that 
“suitable Powers may be appointed to act as mandatories of the League in the more 
backward people and areas.”660 Smuts’ ideas for preserving international hierarchy 
eventually came to fruition in the League’s Mandate system, from which the Dominions 
also benefited. South Africa was granted German South West Africa (later Namibia), 
Australia Nauru and parts of German New Guinea, and New Zealand German Samoa 
(renamed Western Samoa) as Class C Mandates under League authority. The formal 
recognition of these rights by the international community marked a momentous 
departure from the Dominions’ colonial past, and pointed, for them, to a colonial future.  
                                                        
659 See John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970, 1st 
ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 324–5. 
660 Smuts, The League of Nations - A Practical Suggestion, in K.C. Wheare, “XVII - The Empire and the 
Peace Treaties, 1918-1921,” in The Cambridge History of the British Empire, ed. E.A. Benians et al., vol. 
3, 4 vols. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1959); For more on the implications of Smuts’ thinking 
for international order, see Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological 
Origins of the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Chapter 1 – Jan Smuts and 
Imperial Internationalism. 
 343 
 
The acquisition of formerly German territories also validated, in a strategic sense, 
Dominion participation in a European war despite having few national interests there – as 
Borden protested before the Peace Conference began, if the Dominions were relegated to 
committees that only called them when their “interests” were at stake, they would simply 
never be called. Ultimately, each of the five Dominions and India signed the Treaty on 
their own lines, an act that recognized that they were individually assenting to its 
precepts. This created a new constitutional precedent, and there was some speculation as 
to whether the addition of the United Kingdom’s signature had “double signed” for them 
all.661 Each Dominion parliament also individually ratified the Treaty and passed Orders-
in-Council affirming it, a process that was not complete until the following year. The 
Dominion delegations also played a critical role, along with the Americans, in torpedoing 
the Japanese delegation’s proposed “Racial Equality Clause,” which was meant to affirm 
the status of Japan by declaring that the League and the Treaty would make no distinction 
between any members, nations, or peoples based on race. The totalizing language of the 
proposal raised troubling implications for both British settlers and committed colonialists, 
and for Woodrow Wilson’s segregationist Democrats. Billy Hughes stated unequivocally 
that the Australian public would not accept the principle, and that its meaning for White 
Australia and other Dominion migrant policies would be untenable. The United States 
and British Empire delegations abstained from voting on the proposal, which passed only 
to see Wilson, the chair, overturn it claiming the vote illegitimate.  
Whatever new constitutional reality had been created in the British Empire, it 
came under strain almost immediately. The end of hostilities on the Western Front 
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obscured their continuation in a number of other theaters that concerned the Empire, from 
Ireland to Asia. The clearest demonstration of new realities would emerge from the 
unlikely locale of western Anatolia. The war had raged on within the decaying Ottoman 
Empire, and the army under Mustafa Kemal which had successfully defended Gallipoli 
against Anzac assault in 1915 now turned its guns on Greek forces contesting for control 
of Constantinople and the western shores of Anatolia. The Allied powers supported 
Greek forces against the Ottomans, and felt committed to backing their cause, not least 
because of the Anglo-French occupying force left holding the Dardanelles at the end of 
the war in Europe. After a meeting between Lloyd George and his Foreign Secretary 
Lord Curzon, the British government gave Kemal’s forces an ultimatum: if they 
advanced any farther towards the European side of the Bosporus, they would find 
themselves at war with Britain. The War Office and the Admiralty were instructed to 
begin planning for a second Dardanelles invasion. The problem with this ultimatum was 
that Lloyd George and Curzon had not yet consulted the Dominions. Incredibly, New 
Zealand and Australia, who had lost so many soldiers trying to take the same land seven 
years prior, suggested they would consider helping if conflict actually broke out, but 
South Africa and Canada refused to play a role in any such war. Meanwhile, Turkish 
troops ignored the warnings and continued their build-up across from the British position 
at Chanak, raising fears of another massacre like the one that had occurred at Smyrna just 
months prior, when Turkish troops had massacred the city’s Greek and Christian 
population. Fortunately for the beleaguered British force, Kemal simply ignored them 
and carried on occupying western Thrace and the surrounding area, eventually rendering 
the ultimatum a farce. In the resulting fallout, Lloyd George’s coalition with the 
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Conservatives collapsed (as did, in microcosm, his relationship with Curzon).662 The 
Chanak Crisis, as it came to be called, clarified many of the Empire’s new realities. First, 
it showed that the British government no longer controlled warfighting decisions for the 
whole Empire, for two of the Dominions had categorically refused to participate. 
Secondly, it strongly hinted (though due to the abatement of the crisis did not 
conclusively prove), that Britain actually lacked the military capacity to act in a unilateral 
capacity without imperial assistance in certain theaters. The contrast between this 
moment and that of 1914 or South Africa 1899, when London accepted colonial 
participation in foreign wars with an almost grudging attitude, was stark. 
Further strategic dissonance abounded. When it came time to renew the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance in 1921, incredibly, the Australians and New Zealanders argued 
aggressively in favor. Their wartime experience operating jointly with the Japanese navy 
had convinced them of its benefits (and the futility of opposing it). The Canadians 
though, ever conscious of their proximity to the United States, objected. At the 1921 
Imperial Conference, dissent about the direction of the Alliance between the imperial 
delegations led to its dissolution. This in turn soured the environment between Britain 
and Japan when they met to negotiate the Washington Naval Treaty with the United 
States the following year. That treaty intended to foreclose on the possibility of costly 
naval races between great powers of the kind between Britain and Germany before the 
Great War, and locked Britain, the United States, and Japan into a 5:5:3 ratio of 
combined fleet tonnage. Borden and several other Dominion representatives attended the 
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conference, and the limitation ratios were understood to include the forces of Dominion 
navies within Britain’s share. Compliance with the agreement required Britain to scrap a 
significant proportion of its fleet – twenty-three capital ships in total. HMS New Zealand 
and HMAS Australia, once the pride of their Dominions and masterpieces of engineering, 
the subject of so many vexed deliberations across colonial conferences and huge 
expropriations of taxation, were scuttled and sold off as scrap.663  
Their legacy remained, however, in the form of debt service, and most peculiarly 
in the case of the “Dreadnought Boys.” A public fundraising campaign in Australia 
during the 1909 naval crisis had raised some £90,000 for which there was no obvious use 
after the Dominion government decided to build its own ships rather than subsidize 
British ones. Instead, the fund was converted into a trust for sponsoring the migration of 
young British boys to Australia, where they would either train as naval cadets or (usually) 
apprentice as ranch-hands. 5,595 young men ultimately emigrated under the scheme, 
many of whom were veterans of the Great War looking for a new beginning. 
Unfortunately, most of the Dreadnought boys had difficulty finding steady work and 
assimilating to Australian life. Many returned to Britain during the Depression and a few 
even committed suicide. The Dreadnought Boys are but one small chapter in Australia’s 
deeply tragic history of migration, and another strange intersection of the problems of 
security and problems of population on the island-continent.664 
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6.1 THE IRISH FREE STATE: A NEW FORM OF SOVEREIGNTY? 
Bloody, internecine conflict continued in Ireland for another five years after the 
official end of hostilities in Europe. The Irish Free State that emerged from that period 
had to face a counterpart government in six Ulster counties: Northern Ireland, a majority 
Protestant, loyalist province that resolved to remain an integral part of the United 
Kingdom despite the Free State’s Dominion status. Somewhat ironically, Northern 
Ireland’s parliament gave it the first set of parallel democratic institutions to 
Westminster’s in the United Kingdom since 1800, when the Act of Union dissolved 
Ireland’s Dublin-based parliament. The state born in mortal opposition to Home Rule had 
thus recreated it. Partition of the island concluded over a decade of uncertainty on the 
Home Rule question, and over a decade of conflict that began with the gun-runnings of 
the Ulster Volunteer Force and Irish Volunteer Force in 1912. But it did not foreclose on 
the continuation of violence, which has continued for much of the intervening century.665 
Ireland’s experience of the early 1920s reveals how new ideas for a popular sovereignty, 
manifest in both the Free State Dáil and the new Northern Irish parliament, used violence 
to legitimize and secure their respective territories. Patrick Pearse and Edward Carson 
may have imagined that they were inaugurating new eras of democratic politics (even if 
they disagreed about core principles of monarchy), but they both relied heavily on 
security as a means of establishing that sovereignty, just as had been the case elsewhere 
in the British Empire. In the immediate aftermath of the Boundary Commission and 
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partition, this popular, violent sovereignty took the form of population transfer and even 
ethnic cleansing, as Protestant Irish moved north of the border and Catholics south, 
whether voluntarily or because they were threatened or burned out of their homes.666 
After the civil war, in which hardliners led by Eamon De Valera rejected the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty in favor of pursuing full, republican sovereignty at all costs, the new 
Irish Free State had to reconcile its citizens to their new constitutional reality. Ordinary 
institutions of state power, from the police force to the court system, had been 
systematically drained of their legitimacy by decades of nationalist activism against 
British rule. The Free State now faced the challenge of reversing this trend in order to 
consolidate its own territorial sovereignty; no small task given the recent history of 
paramilitarism in Ireland. This challenge did not end with the conclusion of the civil war. 
The Free State Army, which had spent the first years of its existence growing rapidly in 
size to subdue the anti-Treaty IRA, mutinied against its own government in March 1924, 
demanding that prime minister (President of the Executive Council of the Dáil) W.T. 
Cosgrave dismiss the Army Council and meet with them to discuss their “interpretation 
of the Treaty,” which they had accepted only “as a means of achieving…a republican 
form of government in this country.”667 In response to this threat, Cosgrave actually did 
sack his Defence Minister and the leadership of the Free State Army, demonstrating his 
inability to fully resist the powers of militarism in the new Irish state. Cosgrave’s Vice 
President Kevin O’Higgins, who played an active role while Cosgrave recovered from 
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illness, resolved to establish law and order under the Free State aegis against 
irreconcilable IRA forces and against “anarchy” in the countryside. He urged “executions 
in every county” rather than just in Dublin, as “local executions would tend considerably 
to shorten the struggle.”668 Richard Mulcahy, the erstwhile Defence Minister, added that 
“the problem is psychological rather than physical, we have to vindicate the idea of law 
and order to government, as against anarchy.”669 In fact, Mulcahy’s fraught task of 
demobilizing the Irish Army had led directly to the mutiny – he had culled a 60,000-
strong force down to about 13,000 in a year. Mulcahy favored former British Army 
soldiers for retention, only increasing his unpopularity. 
The problem was just as bad between the new state and the civilian population. 
Mulcahy observed that “as a first sign of crumbling civilization, it may be pointed out 
that the bailiff…has failed. There are large numbers of [court] decrees unexecuted in 
every county.” The problem here was not just that Free State citizens lacked confidence 
in civil society. The courts now regulating their lives suffered from a deeper problem – in 
order to embrace the new institutions of the Irish Free State, the population would have to 
change the way it understood sovereignty itself. Kevin O’Shiel, a friend of Michael 
Collins and Arthur Griffith, judge in Sinn Féin’s land courts, legal adviser to the new 
Free State government, and overseer of the Free State’s effort to join the League of 
Nations, described the problem best. In his witness statement, O’Shiel had already 
described the difficulty of having his rulings on land ownership respected by involved 
parties during the war with Britain, and the necessity of IRA enforcement of those 
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rulings.670 His remarks on the proper functioning of courts in a system of popular 
sovereignty is worth quoting in full:  
I should, perhaps, mention that when opening a session in any county I 
judged it advisable, so as to inculcate respect for our proceedings and 
loyal support for our judgments, to give a little prefatory dissertation in the 
nature of a directive. Addressing those before me, I would point out that I 
was there, sitting on that bench, because of their sovereign will. Therefore, 
they must ignore me as an individual. When I gave a decision, I told them, 
that decision was theirs, not mine - the decision of the people through the 
organizations and courts that they had called into being and set up by their 
will. In the British judicial system, solicitors were the officers of the 
courts. Under our republican system, they, the people, were the officers of 
the court. It was, accordingly, their duty and their responsibility to see to it 
that every decree or order of those courts was honoured and obeyed in 
every respect and particular. A defiance, or a contempt of such an order or 
decree, was not a defiance or contempt of me, who was but a citizen like 
the rest of them, but it was a defiance and contempt of the sovereign will 
of the people whose agent for court matters I was…Mind, I would 
conclude, it mattered little to me as an individual whether my decisions 
were obeyed or not; but it mattered tremendously to them. Those 
dissertations were, I know, somewhat hyperbolistic and not wholly 
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accurate. They were designed to meet the then prevailing conditions by 
endeavouring to give a people long divorced from a love of law and courts 
of justice, a good conceit of themselves where their own courts were 
concerned.671 
 
And so the courts continued the didactic task taken up by Pearse in The Sovereign People 
– of defining a new locus of sovereignty upon which to build the Irish state. The order 
side of “law and order” vexed the Northern Irish state as well – despite the most creative 
efforts of the Boundary Commission, the new statelet still contained a large Catholic 
minority, most of whom did not accept its legitimacy. Sir Edward Carson, who had done 
so much to promote Ulster unionism, left the scene when it became clear that partition 
would divide the country. His successor and first premier of Northern Ireland, James 
Craig, tried to solve his new state’s security problems by welcoming ex-soldiers and 
paramilitaries into the new Ulster Special Constabulary and its part-time wing, the “B-
Specials.” When the county councils in Fermanagh and Tyrone declared their loyalty to 
the Dáil and not the Northern Irish parliament, he forcibly dissolved them. In 1922, there 
was one policeman for every two Catholic families in Northern Ireland. He also 
suspended habeas corpus and granted his Home Secretary emergency powers.672 
 Despite the great institutional changes in Ireland during the early 1920s, its 
congruence with the course of events elsewhere in the Empire is equally remarkable. The 
island’s two new governments engaged in aggressive population control measures in the 
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name of security. Just as the Union of South Africa had refused to count its black 
population among its per capita spending on defense for the Imperial Conference, as the 
Commonwealth of Australia had denied voting rights to Aborigines, as the government of 
New Zealand had chosen not to conscript Maori during the Great War, the Irish states 
made judgments about which of their people served the state’s security interests, and 
which did not. The Free State and its northern counterpart systematically armed and 
disarmed segments of their populations to consolidate their power, and worked to 
marginalize and deny rights to those who threatened their security. Whether they 
operated on democratic principles, such as in the self-governing colonies and the 
inchoately republican Free State, or authoritarian ones, as in India, imperial states tried to 
create order within their territories and gain acceptance to the society of other sovereign 
states abroad by adopting their norms. To this point, access to the international 
community had meant working more closely with Britain, but the League of Nations now 
made it possible for them to access the new international system directly.  
Observing the violent, securitizing projects of these colonial states, whether 
through militarization, conscription, war, or policing, highlights the growing importance 
of racial and ethnic differences in their politics. It also speaks to the persistence of 
hierarchy, both within states and between them. These states located their sovereignty in 
authority rather than in raw coercion, and authority required willing acceptance. The 
Northern Irish state exercised comfortable authority over loyalist Protestants; it subjected 
Catholics to coercive power. The Raj made it abundantly clear that it still required 
coercive power to govern India when it declined to suspend the repressive Rowlatt Acts 
put in place during wartime to quash sedition and dissent, and most spectacularly when 
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British troops opened fire on an “unlawful assembly” of unarmed civilians in a public 
square in Amritsar, killing up to a thousand. These security problems revealed more of 
the peculiar gaps in sovereignty that had emerged during World War I, when the British 
government had declined to conscript the Irish, the Canadian government failed to 
conscript Quebecois, and the New Zealand government had refused to conscript Maori. 
Colonial states doubted their authority over these groups, and their commitment to the 
greater security project that was the state. This mirrored the relationships between the 
colonial states and Britain – those willing to cooperate with imperial security goals were 
fully welcome among the community of sovereign states, while those whose 
commitments were less clear would continue to endure coercive power. 
 
6.2 THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE SYSTEM AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
EMPIRE 
 Continuing the trend of pre-war conferences and the wartime Imperial War 
Cabinets, the Imperial Conference met in 1921, 1923, 1926, 1930, 1932, and 1937. After 
World War II they gave way to Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conferences and finally 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGM). The 1921 meeting, as noted 
above, resulted in the decision to dissolve the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and paved the 
way for the Washington Naval Treaty. At the 1923 Conference, the Irish Free State 
joined India as a new member of the proceedings. Cosgrave’s government sent a 
delegation, though they were not entirely cooperative with the proceedings and wrote 
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copious complaining letters home. A memo from the delegation to its government on the 
matter of securing insurance for the Free State’s shipping industry during times of war 
noted that it could probably rely on procuring insurance on the London markets, though 
this could be complicated if the Free State chose to remain neutral in a given imperial 
war.673 This note, which foreshadows the very conditions prevailing under Eamon De 
Valera during World War II, demonstrates how much the British Empire had changed in 
little more than a decade. What had once been an integral part of the United Kingdom, let 
alone a Dominion or colony, now openly discussed the likelihood of holding itself aloof 
from a British war. At the British Empire Exhibition that occurred the following year, the 
Free State government declined to participate, citing costs. They were the only part of the 
British Empire not present besides Gambia and North Borneo. By contrast, Australia 
spent £150,000 on its exhibition.674 While efforts were made to brand the 1923 meeting 
as an “Imperial Economic Conference,” its proceedings were thoroughly overshadowed 
by defense and security, as it occurred in the wake of the Chanak Crisis. The Australasian 
Dominions, having lost the debate on the alliance with Japan, hoped to forge a common 
imperial foreign policy, but renewed opposition from Canada and South Africa quashed 
this idea. In what came to be called the King-Hertzog principle, after Canadian prime 
minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and South African prime minister J.B.M. 
Hertzog, the Dominions would henceforward be free to conduct their foreign affairs 
autonomously. 
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 The pivotal shift in intra-imperial relations, though, occurred at the 1926 Imperial 
Conference meeting. A special committee chaired by former British prime minister 
Arthur Balfour drafted a resolution, approved by the delegations at the Conference, that 
the Dominions were to be recognized as “autonomous Communities within the British 
Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their 
domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and 
freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.” The 
liberalization of imperial control on matters of defense and foreign policy was now 
complete. The Declaration acknowledged equality between all imperial  governments and 
their individual rights to legislate for both their internal and external affairs. The only 
things binding them together were George V and tradition. Like the 1907 meeting, it also 
introduced a new concept to the constitutional ecosystem – the Commonwealth. The 
rhetorical shift inherent in this name was vast – the Colonial Office’s distaste for 
Australia adopting it in 1901 spoke to its prior stigma. Rebranding the whole Empire as a 
Commonwealth invoked Cromwell, radicals, regicides, and republicans. The following 
1932 Conference took place in Ottawa, hearkening back to the 1894 meeting of the 
Colonial Conference in Canada’s magnificent, neo-gothic Centre Block parliament 
building. The conference system had come full circle. It was the first to meet since the 
British government had passed the Statute of Westminster, in which it legally forfeited 
the right to legislate for the Dominions: “No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom 
passed after the commencement of this Act shall extend or be deemed to extend, to a 
Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act 
that that Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof.” It was also 
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the first since the war in which India had been represented by a non-British envoy of the 
Viceroy – Sir Atul Chandra Chatterjee. It was the last to include the Irish Free State, 
which wrote itself a new constitution four years later before formally declaring itself a 
republic in 1948. 
 As with the other institutional and constitutional changes documented here, the 
Statute and Balfour’s declaration did not so much create new conditions in the British 
Empire as they acknowledged what had already changed. Sovereignty, embodied by the 
King but truly present only when his authority was willingly accepted, had been shifting 
to the colonies for decades. These shifts became visible not when colonial actors resisted 
British coercive force, but when they replaced it with rival claims over the authority to 
coerce. Glimpses of this authority were present in the South African War, when colonies 
with no formal procedures for participating in wars voted to send contingents abroad 
anyway on an ad hoc basis. They were present in the Imperial Service Corps sent by 
Indian princes to join the Indian Army instead of paying subsidies to the British Raj, and 
in the assertions by the Pacific-facing Dominions that they would shoulder the 
responsibility for projecting force and upholding British interests in the region. They 
were present in Dominions’ insistence that the battleships they built or funded would 
require a parliamentary vote before they could pass to the command of the British 
Admiralty. During the Great War, they were present in the British government’s 
admission that it could not conscript Irish men into the British Army, and that it had no 
right to conscript British subjects resident in the United Kingdom if they had come there 
from one of the Dominions. The war accelerated these transfers of sovereignty, but it did 
not initiate them. In this sense, the distinction usually made about these colonies – that 
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they all, save Ireland, experienced decolonization “peacefully” – elides the inherently 
violent processes through which they clawed sovereignty back from the imperial center. 
They directed this violence against groups within their own borders who did not comport 
with their own local security projects, often using race and ethnicity as a heuristic. They 
directed it abroad against foreign enemies in international wars. That they mostly did not 
direct it against British forces themselves is the only thing distinguishing these cases 
from the “violent” decolonizations that would follow in places like Kenya.  
 George V saw his fair share of violence during the twenty-six years of his reign. 
He is rumored to have shot over a thousand pheasants in a single day of orgiastic hunting 
at Sandringham, and on his famous Durbar tour as Emperor of India, he offed several 
tigers. He is said to have been a savage philatelist. He remained hale enough to 
personally attend meetings of the 1926 Imperial Conference, and was thus on hand to 
witness the radical leveling of imperial hierarchy that occurred at that meeting. A picture 
taken on the occasion shows him sitting, stoically, surrounded by the seven heads of 
government to which the Balfour Declaration applied, suddenly made equals under his 
sovereign rule. Over the subsequent decade, the King’s health declined; poetically, he 
had never fully recovered from an injury he received when his horse threw him in France 
during the Great War. Still, he managed to play an unexpectedly close role, for a 
twentieth century monarch, in the great political and military upheavals the British 
Empire experienced during his reign. He remained engaged with current affairs up to the 
moment of his death in 1936. Stanley Baldwin, the British prime minister at the time, 
recalled that he continued to ask for news from aides in his final days, and that his last 
utterance was to ask his secretary, “How is the Empire?” “All is well, sir, with the 
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Empire,” the King was told, and shortly after, His Majesty slipped into eternal sleep. This 
scene, containing both the sentiment of bygone days and the veiled perturbations of the 
present, was a fitting way for a Sovereign like George V to have ended his reign. The 
scene is somewhat marred, however, by the diary of his doctor, who remembered instead 
that the King’s last words, after being given an anesthetic injection by his nurse, were a 
terse “God damn you.”
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